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Abstract
Indigenous ways of living are typically described as being harmonious with—if not 
instrumental for—the protection of the environment. This dissertation moves from the 
quite different evidence that the protection of biodiversity may encroach on indigenous 
rights. More specifically, the legal regime of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
establishes obligations for its Parties whose interpretation and/or implementation may lead 
to the violation of indigenous rights.
In this context, this research identifies potential conflicts between the obligations 
incumbent on CBD Parties pursuant to the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol on access and 
benefit-sharing (ABS) and those stemming from human rights treaties and protecting 
indigenous rights. This thesis also develops an interpretative approach aiming to prevent or 
solve conflicts failing the applicability of hierarchy, lex specialis, or lex posterior rules to the 
relationship between indigenous rights and the protection of biodiversity. This dissertation 
argues that systemic interpretation offers a valuable interpretative tool to incorporate the 
rights of indigenous peoples into the CBD regime. Beyond substantive and procedural 
indigenous rights, another applicable rule between CBD Parties is the principle of self-
determination, which this thesis derives from a teleological interpretation of indigenous 
rights.
The dissertation concludes that conflicts between indigenous rights and obligations 
established in the CBD regime cannot be solved in the abstract but rather need a case-
by-case approach. Evidence from two thematic case studies—one on ABS and the other 
on conservation—shows that indigenous rights and self-determination allow interpreters 
both to choose between competing interpretations of the CBD regime and to privilege 
those interpretations that do not threaten the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous 
peoples. Successful examples of applying this interpretative approach in the thesis concern 
issues such as the ownership of genetic resources, the notion of traditional knowledge, 
and the articulation of concrete forms of participation in the application of CBD-related 
obligations. These findings have a broader significance for the debate on human rights and 
the environment, the interplay between self-determination and permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, as well as for the harmonization of specialized regimes with the rights of 
indigenous peoples.
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1INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity: Problem, 
Research Questions, and Methodology
1. Indigenous peoples and biodiversity: classic approaches and novelty of present 
research
This dissertation examines the legal problems stemming from the interaction between two 
international regimes, namely the protection of indigenous rights and the conservation of 
biodiversity. The original interest in combining these particular subfields of international law 
mainly derives from the knowledge of concrete cases where the promotion of biodiversity or 
related issues has led to the violation of indigenous rights.
A paradigmatic example in this sense is the forced removal of indigenous peoples 
following on from the establishment of protected areas.1 The Kaliña and Lokono peoples 
have for instance seen their access to natural resources curtailed after Suriname had decided 
to create the Wia Wia, Galibi, and Wane Creek reserves.2 In the African regional context, 
the Endorois people have been evicted from their traditional land around Lake Bogoria 
pursuant to the decision by Kenyan government to create a natural reserve on the same 
territory.3
Another recurring example of the violation of indigenous peoples’ rights in connection 
with the sustainable use of natural resources concerns the misappropriation or misuse 
of either indigenous traditional knowledge or natural resources belonging to indigenous 
peoples. International case law related to this issue does not exist to date. However, the 
fight of the San people of South Africa over Hoodia-related patents perfectly illustrates 
the tensions surrounding this problem. Products derived from Hoodia, a succulent plant 
traditionally used by San people in Southern Africa, were patented in the form of appetite 
suppressant drugs without initially involving the communities concerned, notwithstanding 
the fact that the properties of the plant were discovered through indigenous traditional 
practices.4 The Hoodia case is an illustration of a more generalised tendency to promote 
1  See Chapter 4, section 1 for a brief historical account of the global trends in the establishment of 
protected areas.
2  These facts are documented in Case of Kaliña and Lokono v. Suriname, Judgment, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Case No. 12,639 (25 November 2015) (hereinafter Kaliña and Lokono case).
3  See Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Communication No. 276/2003 (25 November 2009) (hereinafter 
Endorois case). The decisions of human rights treaty bodies are thoroughly analysed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
A good website documenting inter alia news on land issues of indigenous peoples, also in connection with 
conservation projects, is https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news (last accessed October 2016).
4  For background information on the Hoodia case, see Rachel Wynberg, ‘Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit-
Sharing: Use of Traditional Knowledge of Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant’ 
(2004) 6 Journal of World Intellectual Property 851. It is interesting to note that San people eventually 
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research activities on genetic resources—also known as bioprospecting—with the purpose 
of product commercialisation, but also with the aim to conduct non-commercial research 
on the ecological properties of natural resources with a view to understanding ecosystems.5
Both the issue of in-situ conservation and that of access to genetic resources and related 
traditional knowledge are regulated under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),6 
which is one of the three international regimes emerging from the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development held in Rio in 1992.7 While climate change has acquired public 
currency since then, the depletion of biodiversity is a less discussed problem, though not 
less urgent.8 The CBD elevates conservation, sustainable use, and benefit-sharing stemming 
from access to genetic resources to global environmental problems, labelling the first of the 
three objectives as common concern of humankind.9 However, the perspective adopted 
in this dissertation is that, as legitimate and urgent as they may be, measures to combat 
biodiversity loss have human rights implications that need to be fully understood.
The relationship between human rights and the environment has drawn the attention 
of international legal scholars for more than forty years.10 Scholarly debate has focused on 
obtained a benefit-sharing agreement. On this, see also Harry Jonas, Kabir Bavikatte and Holly Shrumm, 
‘Community Protocols and Access and Benefit Sharing’ (2010) 12 Asian Biotechnology and Development 
Review 49, at 54-57.
5  See Chapter 3, section 1.
6  Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993) 
(hereinafter CBD).
7  The other treaties adopted following the Rio summit are the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994) and the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in 
Africa (Paris, 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996). The latter treaty encourages its Parties to promote 
the use of traditional knowledge. A discussion of these obligations can be found in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘Doing 
the Right Thing with Traditional Knowledge in International Law: Lessons for the Cllimate Change Regime’ 
[2016] BENELEX Working Paper N 8; Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No 2016/16 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrncom/abstract=2780332.
8  Discussions on species depletion at the international level precede the ratification of the CBD. An 
important step for the mobilisation of international action is represented by the so-called Brundtland report 
titled Our Common Future, adopted by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. 
The report owes its nickname to the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Ms. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who 
chaired an ad-hoc expert group made of politicians, scientists, and civil servants, convened under the aegis 
of the UN. The report pictured a troubled framework for the conservation of the world biodiversity and 
called for global action to inter alia revert this trend. Most recent reports, however, indicate that biodiversity 
depletion has not been abated. See IUCN Red List on Threatened Species and IUCN Red List on Threatened 
Ecosystems at www.iucnredlist.org and http://iucnrle.org (last accessed October 2016). See also, CBD, Global 
Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Secretariat of the Convention of Biological Diversity 2014). To understand concepts 
such as biodiversity transformation and biodiversity loss and their implication for human development, see 
Charles Perring, Our Uncommon Heritage: Biodiversity Change, Ecosystem Services, and Human Wellbeing 
(Cambridge University Press 2014), especially Ch. 4.
9  See Preambular para. 3 CBD. See Virginie Barral, ‘National Sovereignty over Natural Resources: 
Environmental Challenges and Sustainble Development’ in Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (Edward Elgar 2016 forthcoming), at 13, where the 
author shows the implications of considering the conservation of biodiversity rather than biodiversity itself 
as common concern.
10  Catalysers of this debate have been the adoption of both the Declaration of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 16 June 1972), UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (hereinafter 
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four main aspects, namely the common moral underpinnings of environmental and human 
rights problems,11 the correlation between environmental degradation and the enjoyment 
of human rights,12 the incorporation of environmental concerns into the protection of 
existing rights by human rights treaty bodies—also known as human rights approach to 
Stockholm Declaration) and the abovementioned report Our Common Future. See, in particular, Principle 
1 and preambular paras. 1 and 2 of the Stockholm Declaration. The latter recognises the importance of 
the environment for human well-being as well as the consequences that environmental management could 
potentially have on the right to life. It is interesting to note that the relationship of man and nature is also 
framed in terms of the duty of men to maintain an adequate level of the environment. On this point, see 
preambular para. 7 and Principle 4. See also, Ch. 1, para. 8 of Our Common Future. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the legal debates concerning the interaction between human rights and the environment, see Alan 
E. Boyle and Michael Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford University 
Press; Clarendon Press 1996). See also, Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present 
and Future Linkages and the Value of a Declaration’ [2009] UNEP-OHCHR, High-Level Expert Meeting 
on the New Future of Human Rights and the Environment: Moving the Global Agenda Forward, Nairobi 
(30 November – 1 December 2009) and Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ 
(2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 613.
11  See Alexander Kiss and Antonio A. Cançado Trindade, ‘Two Major Challenges of Our Time: Human 
Rights and the Environment’ (1995) 21 Revista IIDH - Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
25, at 28. See also, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been 
Concerned: Human Rights and the Environment, Final report prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zhora Ksentini, 
Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (6 July 1994) (hereinafter Ksentini report 1994), 
para. 4. On the legal value of the Ksentini report, see Neil A.F. Popovic, ‘Human Rights, Environment 
& Community: A Workshop: Presentation by Neil A.F. Popovic’ (1999-2000) 7 Buffalo Environmental 
Law Journal 239, at 245. The report contains a Draft declaration on human rights and the environment. 
According to Popovic, the legal significance of this document would mainly derive from three factors: the fact 
that it is cited by judges and scholars; the fact that it constitutes an empowerment mechanism for activists; 
its role in creating a legal culture where the relationship between human rights and the environment is 
acknowledged.
12  See Ksentini report 1994. See also, Analytical Study on the Relationship between Human Rights and 
the Environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/34 (16 December 2011), at 3; Separate Opinion of Vice-President 
Weeramantry, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (hereinafter Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case), at 91: “The protection of the environment is…a vital part of contemporary human rights 
doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life 
itself ”. There is also a specific sub-literature on the extent to which environmental degradation negatively 
affects vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples. See e.g., Gregory F. Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital 
Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity’ (1997-1998) 16 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 179, at 191 ff.; Ellen Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined 
with Nature Conservation (Intersentia 2011), at 59; Sabine Lavorel, ‘Le renouvellement du droit des peuples 
à l’autodétermination face aux changements environnementaux’ in Christel Cournil and Catherine Colard-
Fabregoule (eds), Changements environnementaux globaux et Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 2012), at 554. 
These issues are analysed in depth in Chapter 1.
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environmental protection13—and the existence of an autonomous right to environment.14 
Notwithstanding the importance of these debates, this section does not aim to explore them 
in detail. Suffice it here to mention that they share an important common feature, i.e., 
environmental protection and human rights are mainly conceived as mutually supportive 
under all of these strands, thus overlooking the possibility for conflict.
Another important point is that, although these debates describe some key characteristics 
of the relationship between human rights and the environment, they have not covered all 
possible aspects.15 In particular, some authors have acknowledged that the human rights 
13  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has inaugurated this approach. The technique used by 
the Court is that of enlarging the scope of existing rights. In this sense, negative environmental impacts have 
been used as a criterion to ascertain the violation of human rights. The ECtHR has discussed environmental 
issues under the rubric of the following rights protected under the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Strasbourg, 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953) 
(hereinafter ECHR): the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR), the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8 
ECHR), the right to property (Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention), the right to information 
(Art. 10 ECHR), the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR), and the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13 
ECHR). See López Ostra v. Spain, Application No. 16798/90 (9 December 1994); Guerra and Others v. 
Italy, Application No. 14967/89 (19 February 1998); Kyrtakos v. Greece, Application no. 41666/98 (22 May 
2003); Hamer v. Belgium, Application No. 21861/03 (27 November 2007); Tatar v. Romania, Application 
No. 67021/01 (27 January 2009). For an overview on this expansionary technique, see Richard Desgagné, 
‘Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1995) 89 American 
Journal of International Law 263. See also, Lucy Kiousopoulou, ‘La dimension écologique de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme et les limites du contrôle juridctionnel’ in Dean Spielmann, Mariaelena 
Tsirli and Panayotis Voyatzis (eds), La Convention européenne des droit de l’homme, un instrument vivant: 
Mélanges en l’honneur de Christos L Rozakis (Bruylant 2011), at 263-264; CoE, Manual on Human Rights 
and the Environment (Council of Europe 2012), at 8, 60, and 64. In a more recent trend, the public interest 
to protect the environment has been found to limit the realisation of some rights. On this point, see Ulrich 
Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2011), at 402. For an in 
depth analysis of the application of this approach to the case of indigenous peoples, see Chapter 1.
14  See Ksentini report 1994, paras. 21-46. Although the Special Rapporteur strongly argues in favour 
of the existence of this right, because of the incremental support by States and of the integration of the 
environmental dimension into existing human rights, the right to environment is still controversial mainly 
due to the difficulty to determine its content and to ensure its implementation. To date only two international 
human rights instruments contain a right to the environment, namely Article 24 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul, 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986) and Article 11 of the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (San Salvador, 17 November 1988, in force 16 November 1999). The right to environment 
is also protected, although in different terms, under the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources (revised version, Maputo, 11 July 2003, not yet in force), which in its Art. II includes 
among the Convention’s principles “the right of all peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development”. For an account of the academic debate on this issue, see e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, ‘The Right to 
a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment 
under International Law’ (2002) 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 65; Alexander Kiss, ‘The Right to 
the Conservation of the Environment’ in Romina Picolotti and Jorge Daniel Taillant (eds), Linking Human 
Rights and the Environment (The University of Arizona Press 2003); Amedeo Postiglione, ‘Human Rights and 
the Environment’ (2010) 14 International Journal of Human Rights 524; Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights, 
Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment’ (1991-1992) 28 Stanford Journal of International 
Law 103; Janusz  Symonides, ‘Human Right to a Clean, Balanced and Protected Environment’ (1992) 20 
International Journal of Legal Information 24; Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present 
and Future Linkages and the Value of a Declaration’ 2009; Alexander Kiss, ‘Définition et nature juridique 
d’un droit de l’homme à l’environnement’ in Pascale Kromarek (ed), Environnement et droits de l’homme 
(UNESCO 1987).
15  According to Boyle, international lawyers that deal with human rights mostly neglect this debate. See 
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approach to environmental protection, that is the incorporation of environmental concerns 
into existing rights,16 is not a sufficient theoretical tool to grasp the multiple interactions 
deriving from the relationship between human rights and the environment, inter alia 
because the latter is not necessarily an interest to be protected through individual rights.17
Against this background, this dissertation aims to bring scholarly discussion a step 
further, as well as covering new ground in the analysis of possible interactions. This is done 
in two steps. First, this thesis claims that the interplay between international environmental 
law and international human rights law may generate conflicts between the two bodies of 
law.18 The literature so far has limited itself to argue that a conflict may arise in the interplay 
of two possibly opposing interests,19 with some notable exceptions.20 In any event, there 
has never been a systematic attempt to identify conflicts between CBD provisions and the 
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. This need of systematisation runs throughout 
the dissertation.
Second, the core of this thesis aims to understand how to solve or mitigate conflicts 
before they arise by ways of interpretation. The technique used is not that of the human 
rights approach to environmental protection developed by human rights treaty bodies. 
The innovative perspective adopted in this thesis, instead, is that of incorporating human 
rights into multilateral environmental treaties (METs), and more specifically the rights of 
indigenous peoples into the CBD.21
Boyle 2012, at 614.
16  The human rights approach to environmental protection is explained in more detail in Chapter 1.
17  Sands argues that one of the limitations of the human rights approach to environmental protection is 
that environmental degradation cannot be considered a human rights violation ex se but is only relevant 
in connection with the violation of a protected right. See Philippe Sands, ‘Human Rights, Environment 
and the Lopez-Ostra Case: Context and Consequences’ (1996) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 
597, at 597. One of the most interesting remarks in this regard is that made by Francesco Francioni, 
‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International 
Law 41, according to whom the human rights approach bears an individualistic perspective that is not 
apt to address intrinsically collective problems, such as the conservation of the environment (at 44). See 
contra Kiousopoulou 2011, at 271. The author considers, in fact, that the Court’s fragmented approach 
to the protection of the environment is inherent in the lack of a specific positive obligation to protect the 
environment in the Convention.
18  The notion of conflict adopted in this thesis is canvassed in section 5 in this chapter.
19  See Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present and Future Linkages and the Value of a 
Declaration’ 2009, at 29-30; Boyle 2012, at 605. See also, Leena Heinämäki, ‘The Right to Be a Part of 
Nature: Greening Human Rights via Strengthnening Indigenous Peoples’ (2012) 4 The Yearbook of Polar 
Law 415.
20  Seminal reflections upon conflict are contained in Leena Heinämäki, ‘Protecting the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples – Promoting the Sustainability of the Global Environment?’ (2009) 11 International 
Community Law Review 3. The author discusses in critical terms “whether and under which conditions the 
legal recognition of the special rights of indigenous peoples in relation to the environment can be seen as 
promoting the protection of the planet Earth” (at 1) and highlights that some indigenous practices may be 
in conflict with agreed objectives of environmental protection.
21  These ideas have been developed in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law Implications 
of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013) and Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya 
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One of the main problems with this approach is that international environmental law 
and human rights law are formally two separated regimes. The remainder of this chapter 
starts with a brief analysis of the latter point. Section 3 explains why the interplay between 
indigenous peoples and biodiversity represents a meaningful case study with respect to the 
general problem of coordinating human rights with environmental protection. Section 4 
enucleates research questions, delimits the scope of research, and clarifies the methodology 
used in the thesis. Section 5 gives a definition of conflicts as intended in this dissertation, 
while section 6 explains the presumption against conflicts in international law as well as the 
harmonisation tool represented by systemic interpretation. Finally, section 7 illustrates the 
outline of the dissertation.
2. International environmental law and human rights: interrogating their 
separateness
The protection of human rights and the conservation of the environment are in principle in 
the purview of two separated bodies of law in international law, which obey to distinctive 
logics and have established special institutional systems.22 These differences might be 
explained through the increasing specialisation of international law, which is intended to 
respond to different global societal challenges.
International human rights law traces back its origins to the end of the 1940s with 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,23 as a way to respond to 
the atrocities of WWII.24 International environmental law has developed in its modern 
form of multilateral regulation during the course of the 1970s-1980s to address increasing 
challenges following from accelerating industrial development, while the role of the UN 
has been more prominent starting in the 1990s.25 Although international human rights law 
and international environmental law address different issues, both have contributed to the 
evolution of international law towards a post-Westphalian system, challenging the idea that 
Protocol: A Commentary on the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff 2014).
22  Desmet 2011, at 157.
23  UNGA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/RES/3/217 A (10 December 1948).
24  See e.g., Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014), Ch. 2; Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2012), Ch. 2; Dinah Shelton, ‘An Introduction to the History of  International Human Rights Law’ [2007] 
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No 346 Available at SSRN: http://ssrncom/abstract=1010489; 
Thomas Bürgenthal, ‘Human Rights’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Part B.
25  Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘International Protection of the Environment’ (2001) 293 Recueil des cours 
9; Philippe Sands, Principles of International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003), Ch. 2; 
Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010), 
Ch. 2; Alessandro Fodella and Laura Pineschi (eds), La protezione dell’ambiente nel diritto internazionale 
(Giappichelli 2009), at 9-35.
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international law is only centred upon States.26
Allegedly, the environmental norms and human rights rules also have different 
underlying rationales and objectives. According to some authors, while environmental 
treaties aim primarily to protect nature, human rights law embraces an anthropocentric 
vision of the world.27 Indeed, most modern environmental treaties are increasingly 
concerned with the protection of nature as a function of human life.28 Furthermore, the 
anthropocentric approach is part and parcel of the principle of sustainable development 
as originally elaborated in the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and 
subsequently developed inter alia by UN intergovernmental conferences.29
When it comes to the mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement, the two bodies of 
law are extremely different. The application of human rights conventions is demanded to 
monitoring treaty bodies that exercise both non-judicial (State reports, conclusion on State 
submissions, and reports/adoption of views on individual petitions) and judicial functions 
(adjudication of cases).30 The alleged victims of human rights violations—individuals 
and, in regional systems, groups—have legal standing before human rights treaty bodies. 
Therefore, rightholders indirectly enforce the respect for the international human rights 
instruments subscribed by States. On the contrary, international environmental regimes do 
not usually foresee dedicated compliance mechanisms.31 States can in principle resort to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), if the Court’s jurisdictional requirements are satisfied,32 
26  Antonio A. Cançado Trindade, ‘International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium (I) and 
(II)’ (2005) 316 and 317 Recueil des cours 31, especially Part V. See also, e.g., Thilo Marauhn, ‘Changing Role 
of the State’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007); Maurice Kamto, ‘Singularité du droit international 
de l’environnement’ in Michel Prieur and Claude Lambrechts (eds), Les hommes et l’environnement: Quels 
droits pour le vingt-et-unième siècle? (Frison-Roche 1998); Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Individual as a 
Catalyst for Change in International Law: Interactions between General International Law and Human 
Rights’ in Dean Spielmann, Mariaelena Tsirli and Panayotis Voyatzis (eds), La Convention européenne des 
droit de l’homme, un instrument vivant: Mélanges en l’honneur de Christos L Rozakis (Bruylant 2011).
27  Donald K. Anton and Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University 
Press 2011), p. 131: “Despite a common core of interest, the two topics remain distinct. Environmental 
protection cannot be wholly incorporated into the human rights agenda without deforming the concept 
of human rights and distorting its programme. Ecologists are concerned with the preservation of biological 
diversity, including species not useful or even harmful to humans…The central concern is the protection of 
nature”.
28  This emerges from Chapters 3 and 4.
29  See also, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Earth 
Summit, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (12 August 1992) (hereinafter Rio Declaration); Declaration 
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (4 September 2002); 
Outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 2012, The future we want, UN 
Doc. A/RES/66/228 (11 September 2012). On the idea of balance under international environmental law, 
see Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales, International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015), at 71-87. On the anthropocentric approach and the change of mind produced by sustainable 
development, see Barral 2016 forthcoming, at 4-7.
30  Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights. The Successor to International Human 
Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals (Oxford University Press 2013), Ch. 9.
31  Sands, Principles of International Law 2003, Ch. 5.
32  Art. 36(1) and (2) Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 
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but they have not done so concerning the violation of the CBD.33 Furthermore, individuals 
or those who are directly affected by the violation of the international rules established 
under METs34 are not able to take action to challenge States’ non-compliance. Indeed, 
both human rights and environmental conventions have treaty bodies contributing to the 
interpretation and development of treaty obligations, a telling example of the latter being 
the work undertaken by the Conferences of the Parties (COP) of METs.35
Furthermore, differences completely fade away when it comes to the sources of 
these two subfields of international law.36 Both legal regimes are dominated by treaty law, 
which of course is true of contemporary international law as a whole. Most importantly, 
however, soft law plays a fundamental role in the development of both international 
human rights law, especially in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights, and in international 
environmental law. A patent example of the former that is of relevance to this dissertation 
is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,37 while in the case 
of international biodiversity law one may refer to COP decisions.38 In this respect, the value 
of these documents, as well as the interplay between obligations contained in treaties and 
new standards emerging from treaty practice are complex legal problems that are examined 
24 October 1945) (hereinafter ICJ Statute).
33  See the case law of the ICJ at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (last accessed October 
2016).
34  Just to provide some examples of potential individuals or groups affected by the violation of METs: 
citizens who suffer from CO2 increasing emissions, farmers affected by the degradation of land, indigenous 
peoples affected by decreasing natural resources, or those who are hit by pollution or natural disasters.
35  Concerning human rights treaty bodies, see Geir Ulfstein, ‘Law-making by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ in Rain Liivoja and Jarna Petman (eds), International Law-making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers 
(Routledge 2014); Andre Nollkaemper and Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘The Legal Status of Decisions by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law ’ [2011] Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011, at 42-44. 
Regarding METs, the role of the CBD COP is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. On the legal value of 
COP decisions, see Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1. See also, Thomas Gehring, ‘Treaty-Making 
and Treaty Evolution’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007), in particular at 480-482 and 485-495. 
This author in particular argues that the legal value of COP decisions is not expressly dealt with by State 
Parties to environmental treaties. This characteristic is a means to ensure the flexibility of the system. The 
author also explains the different functions of bodies similar to the CBD COP within METs, including 
constituting subsequent State practice relevant for interpretation and representing internal decision-making 
systems valid internally as happens in international organisations. 
36  On the sources of human rights law, see Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights 
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1988-1989) 12 Australian Year Book of International 
Law 82. Concerning international environmental law, see Sands, Principles of International Law 2003, Ch. 
4; Fodella and Pineschi, at 61-93.
37  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res. 61/295, UN Doc. 
A/61/L.67 and Add.1 (13 September 2007) (hereinafter UN Declaration on indigenous rights in text or 
UNDRIP in footnote).
38  These can be assimilated to soft law declarations of States, notwithstanding the institutionalised context 
in which they are taken, since COPs are made of States and they formally adopt non-binding decisions. As 
an example of what is usually referred of as soft law in the field of international environmental law see the 
documents elaborated by UN intergovernmental conferences in note 29 supra.
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throughout the dissertation.39
The arguments on the separateness of the two bodies of law examined above can also 
be tested by specifically looking at the two regimes that are examined in this dissertation, 
namely the CBD and the rights of indigenous peoples. This analysis produces three 
interesting remarks. First, indigenous rights are not contained in a single instrument and 
are the results of evolutionary interpretations of human rights treaty bodies. In this sense, 
one of the preliminary challenges, before exploring the interplay with the CBD, is to 
identify the content and legal value of indigenous rights.40 Second, the argument about 
different underlying values can be substantiated by looking at the different objects and 
objectives of the CBD and the corpus of indigenous rights. Again, since the latter derives 
from a combination of multiple instruments, this comparison is not unproblematic. A third 
element that is not sufficiently emphasised when discussing in general terms the relationship 
between international environmental treaties and human rights law is the difference in the 
scope of application of the two regimes, both concerning their Parties and the temporal 
validity of their obligations.41
In this light, the issue of the alleged separateness of the international regimes regulating 
biodiversity protection and the rights of indigenous peoples reveals itself more complex 
than commonly discussed. This question thus is explored throughout the dissertation.
3. Why indigenous peoples and biodiversity?
The study of the relationship between the rights of indigenous peoples and the conservation 
of biodiversity can be seen as a case study of the more general question about the interplay 
between international human rights law and international environmental law. The difficulty 
then lies in understanding why the former relationship deserves a special case, and to what 
extent the conclusions reached through this study can be applied to the more general 
relationship between human rights and the environment in international law.42
Part of the reasons why this case is particularly interesting are to be found in the 
interrelatedness of the phenomena concerned. As explained, the loss of biodiversity is 
an extremely worrisome trend that threatens the survival of ecosystems and their value 
for human life. In parallel, loss of cultural diversity is a problem for indigenous peoples, 
since they both usually live in natural environments that suffer from degradation and are 
furthermore intentionally deprived of their land and natural resources.43 In this light, the 
39  See also infra section 4 in this chapter. Generally on soft law, see Dinah Shelton (ed) Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press 2003).
40  This problem is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.
41  These issues are discussed infra in section 5 of this chapter.
42  The latter point is explored in the Conclusion.
43  Anja Meyer, ‘International Environmental Law and Human Rights: Towards the Explicit Recognition 
of Traditional Knowledge’ (2001) 10 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 
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salience of this connection lies in the factual relevance of survival as a common dimension 
of biodiversity conservation and the protection of indigenous rights.
Indeed, what primarily justifies their joint analysis are a number of legal reasons. 
Before proceeding with illustrating them, it is important to delimit the scope of this research 
by discussing the notion of indigenous peoples under international law.44
3.1. The definition of indigenous peoples
The issue of the definition of indigenous peoples has emerged at the same time as the 
problem of the protection of indigenous rights under international law. One of the first 
attempts to find a universal definition is contained in a 1986 UN report denouncing the 
discrimination of indigenous peoples, issued by the Special Rapporteur Martínez Cobo.45 
The report has identified three main characteristics, namely the continuity with pre-colonial 
societies, a sense of distinctiveness from national prevailing societies, and the will to maintain 
and transmit their distinct culture to future generations. Continuity with the past can be 
expressed inter alia through a persistent attachment to traditional lands.46
Similar elements are echoed in the specialised ILO treaties dedicated to the protection 
of indigenous groups.47 The ILO Convention on indigenous and tribal populations of 1957, 
37, at 38-39.
44  See Mattias Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System (Oxford University 
Press 2016), at 143-145; Alexandra Tomaselli, Indigenous Peoples and Their Right to Political Participation. 
International Law Standards and Their Application in Latin America (Nomos 2016), at 32-37; Cathal M. 
Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior and Informed 
Consent (Routledge 2015), at 112 ff.; Federica Cittadino, ‘The Balance Between Indigenous Rights and 
the Protection of Nature: Some Remnants of the Colonial Past’ (2013-2014) 20 African Yearbook of 
International Law 223, at 225-231; Siegfried Wiessner and Federico Lenzerini, Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(International Law Association, The Hague Conference 2010), section 2; Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous 
Peoples and Human Rights (Juris Publishing 2002), at 33 ff.
45  José Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add.1-4 (1986), para. 379.
46  The Cobo’s definition reads as follows: “Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts 
of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal 
system. This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the 
present of one or more of the following factors: Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; Culture in general, or in specific manifestations 
(such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of 
livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual 
means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal 
language); Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; Other relevant 
factors”.
47  On the reasons why these instruments emerged in the context of the ILO, see Luis Rodriguez-Piñero, 
Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919-1989) (Oxford University 
Press 2005), at 8-11.
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which is not open to ratifications anymore due to its assimilationist approach, emphasises 
descent and cultural distinctiveness.48 The ILO Convention No. 169 on indigenous and 
tribal peoples has revolutionised the approach to indigenous issues since it both abandons the 
assimilationist approach and explicitly adopts the term peoples with its implications in terms 
of the attribution of collective rights.49 Concerning definition issues, the ILO Convention 
169 distinguishes between tribal peoples, who are distinct from the rest of society and enjoy 
a certain form of autonomy in the regulation of their culture, and indigenous peoples, 
who have pre-colonial descent and maintain “some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions”.50 Most importantly, Article 1(2) establishes that self-
identification is the fundamental criterion for determining the scope of application of the 
rights protected under the Convention.
Self-identification is now the prevalent approach to the issue of the definition, which 
has been implicitly embraced throughout the process that has led to the adoption of the 
United Nations Declaration on indigenous rights in 2007. The listing of specific features 
seemed inadequate in a context where indigenous groups can be very different from one 
another. Furthermore, the creation of an externally imposed definition was seen as a further 
attempt by States to patronise the discussion on indigenous rights. For these reasons, the 
UN Declaration on indigenous rights has avoided adopting a definition with the intent 
both not to unduly restrict the application of rights and to increase the acceptability for 
States of the instrument.
Self-identification has also accommodated regional concerns against a concept of 
indigenous peoples that is restricted to ancestral links with land predating colonial history. 
In Africa, for instance, the survival of pre-colonial society, as opposed to the destruction of 
pre-settler societies in Latin-America, has ignited a debate about the extent to which it is 
possible to identify indigenous groups in this regional context.51 The African Commission 
has solved this apparent contradiction by downplaying the importance of ancestry in favour 
of “constitutive elements”, such as marginalisation and exclusion, cultural distinctiveness, 
attachment to land, and self-identification.52 In the same period, the Inter-American Court 
48  Art. 1(b) Indigenous and Tribal Population Convention C107 (Geneva, 26 June 1957, in force 2 June 
1959) (hereinafter ILO Convention 107).
49  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention C169 (Geneva, 27 June 1989, in force 5 September 
1991) (hereinafter ILO Convention 169). On the difference between populations and peoples in the ILO 
Conventions, see Rodriguez-Piñero 2005, Ch. 5. Collective rights are attributed to indigenous peoples by 
the ILO Convention 169. Art. 1(3), however, specifies that “[t]he use of the term peoples in this Convention 
shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law”.
50  Art. 1 ILO Convention 169.
51  See Cittadino 2013-2014, at 229-230.
52  Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41st Ordinary session (May 2007), paras. 12-13. Similar 
criteria have been adopted in the context of the World Bank’s Operational policy 4.10 (July 2005, revised 
2013). The Bank acknowledges the lack of a universally accepted definition, then identifies four criteria: 
self-identification and recognition of identity by others; collective attachment to land and natural resources; 
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has assimilated the Saramaka people, descendants of slaves of African origins transplanted 
into the American continent by Spanish settlers, to tribal communities holding communal 
rights to land under the same conditions of other indigenous groups.53
A similar debate is ongoing in Asia but no regional position has been adopted yet inter 
alia because of the lack of a regional human rights system.54 Some Asian States have raised the 
issue of the lack of a definition in the UN Declaration on indigenous rights as a problematic 
point.55 Some others, such as Japan, have recognised the existence of indigenous groups 
within their national societies.56 Asian multifaceted positions are a sign that the debate over 
the definition of indigenous peoples is tainted with a fundamental dilemma.57 On the one 
hand, the failure to provide with a definition renders the scope of application of indigenous 
rights more uncertain, thus generating the opposition of some States. On the other hand, 
sticking to a universal definition, or rather to a nationally determined definition, certainly 
risks to unduly limit the enjoyment of indigenous rights.
In this context, self-identification appears as a solution that privileges the largest 
scope of application possible for indigenous rights. In this sense, self-identification is both 
a criterion for indigenous peoples themselves to identify their members internally58 and a 
standard for the identification of rightholders externally. The latter point is confirmed by 
the systematic lack of discussions about the identification of groups as indigenous in the 
decisions of human rights treaty bodies.59
Indeed, human rights treaty bodies do not even distinguish between minority rights 
separate and culturally distinctive institutions; an indigenous language. On the Operational policy, see Fergus 
MacKay, ‘Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights and the World 
Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples’ (2002) 17 American University International 
Law Review 527.
53  Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Case No. 12,338 (28 November 2007) (hereinafter Saramaka case), paras. 79-80.
54  See Christian Erni (ed) The Concept of Indigenous Peoples in Asia: A Resource Book (IWGIA - AIPP 
2008), at 13-25. See also Benedict Kingsbury, ‘“Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist 
Approach to the Asian Controversy’ (1998) 92 The American Journal of International Law 414.
55  See declarations of vote on UNDRIP, UN Doc. A/61/PV.108 (13 September 2007), at 4. Indonesia 
argued that without definition, it is not possible to identify rightholders. A similar argument lies behind 
the decision of the African Commission to identify constitutive elements supra. However, this argument is 
double-edged; Indonesia and India used it to provide a rigid definition of indigenous peoples according to 
which the whole population of their countries is indigenous.
56  UN Doc. A/61/PV.108, at 15. The Philippines, Taiwan, and India also have a regulatory system in place 
on indigenous rights, although they define indigenous groups in different ways. On the Philippines, see 
Country Profile: Philippines in Erni, at 427-434. On India, see Country Profile: India in ibid., at 367-374. 
On Taiwan, see Country Profile: Taiwan in ibid., at 437-441.
57  This is well illustrated in ibid., at 17-18. See also Karin Lehmann, ‘To Define or Not to Define - The 
Definitional Debate Revisited’ (2006-2007) 31 American Indian Law Review 509, at 523.  
58  On the issue of membership, see Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977 (31 July 
1980), UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (hereinafter Lovelace case).
59  See the cases cited in Chapter 1. On minority rights, see Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the 
Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press 1991); Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka (eds), International Approaches 
to Governing Ethnic Diversity (Oxford University Press 2015).
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and indigenous rights when it comes to ensuring protection to groups that self-identify 
as indigenous peoples.60 On the contrary, they have adopted an expansive interpretation 
of general human rights treaties to extend individual and minority rights to indigenous 
peoples, including Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.61
The difference between minorities and indigenous peoples mainly emerges from 
indigenous claims and the UN practice. The former have insisted on the use of the term 
‘peoples’ for the implications it has in terms of the right to self-determination.62 The UN, 
starting with the Cobo report, has recognised the particular conditions of marginalisation, 
poverty, and abuse of rights, from which indigenous peoples suffer. In 1982, the UN 
established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP),63 which elaborated 
the first Draft to the UN Declaration on indigenous rights.64 In the same period, the 
UN proclaimed the first International Decade of World’s Indigenous Peoples.65 In 2000, 
ECOSOC instituted as one of its advisory bodies the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (UNPFII), which is a mixed organ made of members nominated both by States 
and in consultation with indigenous organisations.66 All of these political steps testify to a 
particular focus of the UN’s action on indigenous peoples.
As fully argued in Chapter 2, one of the central elements of indigenous peoples’ identity 
is their special attachment to traditional territories, as well as the causal link between the 
protection of indigenous land and the respect for indigenous cultural rights.67 The centrality 
of land and natural resources is what makes indigenous rights overlap with the international 
regime on the conservation of biological diversity. In this sense, the definition that is 
meaningful to the present investigation is one that emphasises the relationship between 
indigenous groups and land.
60  See the Views adopted by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR) in Chapters 1 and 2.
61  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 
1976) (hereinafter ICCPR). On this point, see Chapter 1, section 2.1.1, and Chapter 2, especially sections 
3.1 and 3.3.
62  On indigenous peoples and self-determination, see Chapter 2.
63  Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1982/19 (10 March 1982); ESC res. 1982/35 (7 May 1982), 
Supp. No. 1 26, UN Doc. E/1982/82 (1982).
64  See Åhrén 2016, at 86.
65  UNGA Res. 48/133, UN Doc. A/RES/48/133 (18 February 1994). The second decade run from 2004 
to 2015, UNGA Res. 59/174, UN Doc. A/RES/59/174 (24 February 2005).
66  ECOSOC, Res. 2000/22 (28 July 2000). The mandate of UNPFII is to: “(a) Provide expert advice and 
recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council, as well as to programmes, funds and agencies of the 
United Nations, through the Council; (b) Raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination 
of activities relating to indigenous issues within the United Nations system; (c) Prepare and disseminate 
information on indigenous issues” (para. 2).
67  See Åhrén 2016, at 84, where the author in drawing the line between indigenous peoples and minorities, 
emphasises the centrality of land in the protection of indigenous rights. See Chapter 2, section 3.1.
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3.2. The special case of indigenous peoples and biodiversity
As said, indigenous rights and the protection of biodiversity in international law may 
overlap since they both concern the management of natural resources and raise the issue 
of which subjects can exercise powers over them.68 The latter is an underlying question of 
this dissertation. There are two additional factors that render this relationship particularly 
meaningful as a special case of the more general interplay between human rights and the 
environment.
First, the focus on this case study addresses the preoccupation voiced in the literature 
that the human rights approach to environmental protection reduces environmental 
protection to a problem of the individual, although in contrast this would be a collective 
issue by its nature.69 When exploring the interplay between the conservation of biodiversity 
and the protection of indigenous rights two collective interests are at stake, i.e., those of the 
State, usually associated with a notion of public interest, to protect biodiversity, and those of 
indigenous peoples representing a group—rather than a collection of individuals—that holds 
collective rights.70 The public interest to the conservation of nature is protected under the 
CBD and through the sovereignty of States over natural resources, while indigenous rights 
are protected under human rights treaties and through the principle of self-determination.71 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the collective rights of indigenous peoples may also create limits 
to the permanent sovereignty of States over natural resources.
This point is linked to the second element in favour of a special case. It is true that 
indigenous rights and the conservation of biodiversity can be mutually supportive since both 
indigenous traditional knowledge may contain important information on the functioning 
of ecosystems and the conservation of biological resources may benefit indigenous 
traditional ways of living.72 However, this is not the only possible dimension in that the 
implementation of States’ obligations in the field of biodiversity conservation may also 
68  This is more thoroughly explained in Chapter 2, section 1.1.
69  Francioni 2010. See also, supra note 17.
70  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 103, where the State recognises that indigenous peoples are entitled to 
collective rights under international law. On the collective nature of indigenous rights, see to Chapter 2, 
section 3. On the applicability of collective rights to minorities, see Katerina Tsotroudi, ‘Ethnic Minorities 
and Collective Rights in the New Europe: Some Observations’ (1993) 46 Revue Héllenique de Droit 
International 225, at 226; Claudia Tavani, ‘The Protection of Cultural Identity of Minorities in International 
Law: Individual versus Collective Rights’ (2010) 9 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 55, at 78.
71  See Chapters 1 and 2.
72  See Our Common Future, at 114-115; Principle 22 Rio Declaration; Agenda 21, UN Doc. A/
CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (12 August 1992), Annex II, Chapter 26, para. 26(1); Johannesburg Declaration on 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (4 September 2002), para. 25; Preambular paragraph 
10 UNDRIP; Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Case No. 11,577 (31 August 2001) (hereinafter Awas Tingni case), para. 149. In support 
of the role of indigenous peoples in promoting sustainability, see Maggio 1997-1998. See also, Mauro 
Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law: The Significance and Implications of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Taylor and Francis 2016), at 133-138.
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lead to the violation of indigenous peoples’ rights.73 The establishment of natural reserves 
on indigenous territories74 or the utilisation of traditional knowledge without indigenous 
peoples’ consultation or consent represent concrete examples of these potential conflicts. 
In this sense, the human rights approach to environmental protection is not sufficient to 
illustrate the complexity of this relationship and its potential for conflict.75 
4. Research questions, scope of research, and methodology
This dissertation aims to address two main research questions:
(1) Can legal conflicts arise between States’ obligations stemming from the CBD regimes 
on conservation and access and benefit-sharing (ABS) and the human rights of indigenous 
peoples as protected under human rights treaties, and what are they?
(2) How can conflicts be avoided or resolved?
Conflicts between international conservation law and the rights of indigenous peoples 
are usually not discussed in the literature. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this gap, first 
demonstrating that conflicts are a relevant dimension when it comes to the interaction 
between the CBD and the rights of indigenous peoples. This argument is substantiated in 
Chapter 1, which looks in particular at the tensions that have emerged before human rights 
treaty bodies between the protection of indigenous rights and the adoption of conservation 
measures by States. Chapter 1 also explores the conflicts potentially arising from the 
implementation of Articles 8(a), 8(j), 10 (c), and 15 of the CBD, regulating some aspects 
of in-situ conservation, sustainable use, and ABS related to genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. Conflicts represent a problem because States might be induced to implement 
their obligations pursuant to the CBD regime to the detriment of the obligations regarding 
the respect for indigenous rights.
This thesis, however, is not limited to the superficial analysis of the abovementioned 
CBD provisions but proposes a contextual reading of the CBD and relevant COP decisions. 
73  Sebastiaan Johannes Rombouts, Having a Say: Indigenous Peoples, International Law and Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent (Wolf Legal Publishers 2014), at 418: “more research is needed on how to combine 
environmental protection and respect for indigenous rights. While it is stressed in all examined documents, 
cases, and implementation schemes that environmental protection and indigenous peoples’ rights should go 
hand in hand, it is not inconceivable that in some cases environmental and indigenous interests may collide”.
74  The incidence of this phenomenon is confirmed by the fact that the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights), Ms. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, has 
invited indigenous organisations and representatives to contribute to the Dialogue on the issue of indigenous 
peoples’ rights and conservation activities: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/
Pages/ConservationActivities.aspx (last accessed October 2016). See infra.
75  On the possible conflicts arising between indigenous rights and conservation, see Chapter 1. The notion 
of conflict adopted in this thesis is explained in section 5 of this chapter.
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The latter provide useful indications on the interpretation of treaty obligations and their 
development in line with the practice of States. Although not adopting binding standards, 
COP decisions are the result of deliberations between CBD Parties. Furthermore, the COP’s 
mandate is to promote and guide the implementation of CBD obligations.76 In this sense, 
COP decisions offer relevant indications about the consensus over the interpretation of 
concerned CBD provisions. One of the main difficulties in utilising them to purposefully 
make the content of CBD obligations more precise is the fact that they are numerous and 
often do not represent a coherent set of decisions. Therefore, this dissertation also highlights 
ambiguities and contradictions deriving from an overall reading of COP decisions.
Concerning the ABS regime, this dissertation also interprets relevant CBD obligations 
in light of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilisation to the CBD, adopted in 2010 and entered 
into force in 2014.77 The main caveat is that not all CBD Parties have ratified the Nagoya 
Protocol. This means that, according to Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of the Treaties,78 the Protocol only applies in the relations between its Parties, while the CBD 
will continue to apply between Parties and non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol. Indeed, due 
to its demanding obligations concerning consent and benefit-sharing, the Protocol might be 
able in the future to influence also the relations between Parties and non-Parties.79
For reasons explained in Chapters 3 and 4, this dissertation also examines the multilateral 
benefit-sharing regime of the International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture80 and the conservation-related provisions of the Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.81 Both are global multilateral 
treaties that partially overlap with the CBD, concerning their object and their Parties. At the 
same time, this thesis does not consider regional conservation treaties and more resource- or 
ecosystem-specific conservation conventions, due both to their limited geographical and 
thematic scope and to feasibility reasons. This dissertation offers an interpretative approach 
to look at the interaction of indigenous rights with other conservation treaties but, given the 
specificities and technicalities of other regimes, this approach requires an in-depth analysis 
to understand potential conflicts and related remedies.82
76  On the mandate of the CBD COP, see Chapter 4, sections 2.1 and 3.
77  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, 29 October 2010, in force 12 
October 2014) (hereinafter Nagoya Protocol).
78  Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980) 
(hereinafter VCLT).
79  This point is more explicitly discussed in the Conclusion.
80  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 November 2001, in 
force 29 June 2004) (hereinafter ITPGRFA).
81  Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Paris, 16 November 
1972, in force 17 December 1975) (most commonly known as World Heritage Convention, hereinafter 
WHC).
82  These considerations are included in the Conclusion, section 4.
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Furthermore, concerning the thematic scope of States’ obligations, this dissertation 
only investigates the issue of the management of natural resources for the purposes of 
the objectives embraced by the CBD, namely conservation, sustainable use, and benefit-
sharing.83 Other types of uses of natural resources are not analysed in this dissertation, 
which therefore excludes interactions of indigenous rights with international investment 
treaties, international trade, and the international regime on intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). Conflicts in these fields have received more scholarly attention84 than the interplay 
of indigenous rights with the international conservation regime, which is the exclusive 
object of this thesis because it offers more room for original analysis and, as explained, 
constitutes an interesting case study of the general relationship between human rights and 
the environment.
Different selection criteria have been used to identify the scope of relevant human 
rights treaties. As said, one of the difficulties of this research lies in identifying the corpus 
of relevant indigenous rights. Like conservation regimes, this dissertation focuses on the 
83  Art. 1 CBD. Conservation and sustainable use are jointly examined in Chapter 4.
84  For an overview of debates in the field of international investment law and trade law, see Attila Tanzi, 
‘Reducing the Gap between International Investment Law and Human Rights Law in International 
Investment Arbitration?’ (2013) 1 Latin American Journal of International Trade Law 299; Valentina 
Vadi, ‘When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in 
International Investment Law’ (2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 797; Judith Levine, ‘The 
Interaction of International Investment Arbitration and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Freya Baetens 
(ed), Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2013); 
Tarcisio Gazzini and Radi Yannick, ‘Foreign Investment with a Human Face - with Special Reference to 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams (eds), International Investment 
Law and its Others (Nomos 2012); Kevin C. Kennedy, ‘Trade and Foreign Investment in the Americas. The 
Impact on Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Introduction’ (2006) 14 Journal of International Law 
and Practice 139; Julinda Beqiraj, ‘The Delicate Equilibrium of EU Trade Measures: The Seals Case’ (2013) 
14 German Law Journal 279. The literature is well developed in the field of intellectual property rights (IPRs): 
Gerald Carr, ‘Protecting Cultural Intangible Resources: Alternatives to Intellectual Property Law’ (2013) 
18 Michigan Journal of Race and Law 363; David Vivas-Eugui, Bridging the Gap on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources in WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) (ICTSD 2012); Jonathan Curci, The 
Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge in International Law of Intellectual Property (Cambridge 
University Press 2010); Antony Taubman and Matthias Leistner, ‘Traditional Knowledge’ in Silke von 
Lewinski (ed), Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowlegde and 
Folklore (Kluwer Law International 2008); Barbara Tedlock, ‘Indigenous Heritage and Biopiracy in the Age 
of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2006) 2 The Journal of Science and Healing 256; Mpazi Sinjela and Robin 
Ramcharan, ‘Protecting Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Medicines of Indigenous Peoples through 
Intellectual Property Rights: Issues, Challenges and Strategies’ (2005) 12 International Journal on Minority 
& Group Rights 1; Carolina Lasén Díaz, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Biological Resources’ (2005) 
151 Wuppertal papers; R. V. Anuradha, ‘IPRs: Implications for Biodiversity and Local and Indigenous 
Communities’ (2001) 10 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 27; Anil K. 
Gupta, WIPO-UNEP Study on the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Sharing of Benefits Arising from the 
Use of Biological Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge (IUCN - WIPO 2000); David R. Downes, 
‘How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal 
of Environmental Law 253; Michael Halewood, ‘Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International Law: A 
Preface to Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection’ (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 953; Michael Davis, 
‘Indigenous Rights in Traditional Knowledge and Biological Diversity: Approaches to Protection’ (1999) 
4 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 1; Rosemary J. Coombe, ‘Intellectual Property, Human Rights and 
Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and 
the Conservation of Biodiversity’ (1998-1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59.
Introduction
18
obligations incumbent on States pursuant only to treaty provisions. The main reason for 
that is that limiting the analysis to treaty obligations gives more legal certainty. Debates 
over the customary nature of indigenous rights are too unresolved and would require an 
in-depth analysis of States’ practice and opinio juris, which would deserve a PhD thesis on 
its own because of the complexity and uncertainty of this undertaking.85 Issues related to 
the customary nature of indigenous rights are nevertheless discussed in Chapter 2 to show 
emerging trends and possible evolution of the debate.
Treaty provisions include not only the letter of general human rights conventions but 
also their interpretations as developed by human rights treaty bodies both in their views 
following individual or group petitions and in concluding observations on individual States. 
Although these documents are generally not binding, they reflect the interpretation of 
binding human rights provisions developed by human rights treaty bodies. Their extensive 
reconstruction of indigenous rights is presumed to be in line with the obligations contained 
in human rights treaties. In any event, as far as this dissertation has been able to verify, 
the conclusions reached by human rights treaty bodies have not received the opposition 
of States.86 Furthermore, it must be reminded that the judgments adopted by the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights are binding on the State Parties of the American 
Convention on Human Rights that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.
What this dissertation examines in particular is the content of indigenous collective 
rights. The purpose is not to understand the interplay between rights of indigenous 
individuals and rights of indigenous groups. Instead, the focus is on collective rights as 
opposed to the public interest of States to protect biodiversity.
Differently from conservation regimes, this dissertation also investigates the regional 
treaties protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.87 The reason behind this choice is that 
85  See also Chapter 2, section 3.6. See also, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’ Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 11, who argues that even the methodologies to assess 
whether opinio juris and practice are in place are difficult to tell apart from one another.
86  Tomuschat 2014, at 267: “Generally, there exists a presumption in favour of substantive correctness of 
such views [those adopted by human rights treaty bodies]. No better expertise as to the scope and meaning 
of any of the human rights treaties can be found than in the expert bodies set up to monitor their observance 
by states. If a state disagrees with the views expressed on a given case, it must present detailed observations 
specifying its counter-arguments”. This thesis has limited itself to verify to what extent States’ declarations, 
adopted in connection with the adoption of human rights treaty bodies’ views and formalised in States’ 
submissions, have contested the position adopted by human rights treaty bodies. Any other analysis would 
have been outside the scope of this research, which does not aim to demonstrate that custom has emerged in 
the field of indigenous rights. For a more detailed study on this point, it is possible to refer to the positions 
of States submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter CERD), the 
Human Rights Committee, and the CESCR. In these reports since 2005 this research could not find any 
opposition from State Parties, with the exception of the position of the US. See CERD, Reports Submitted 
by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, United States of America, UN Doc. CERD/C/USA/6 
(24 October 2007), para. 345; Human Rights Committee, Concluding observation on the United States of 
America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (28 November 2005), para. 15. These restrictive positions, however, 
are not reflected in the last report submitted to the Human Rights Committee. See UN Doc. CCPR/C/
USA/4 (22 May 2012). This point is also illustrated with reference to specific cases also in Chapter 2.
87  However, given their limited scope, it does not examine human rights practice related to treaties that 
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regional treaty bodies have tremendously contributed to the development of indigenous 
rights at the international level. The international body of indigenous rights mainly derives 
from the expansive interpretation of existing rights by human rights treaty bodies. This 
technique has received an enormous boost from regional human rights treaty bodies. 
Furthermore, contamination between different human rights jurisdictions is a common 
phenomenon in this field of international law, and this is particularly true in the subfield of 
indigenous rights.88
Indigenous-tailored instruments are also examined with a view to reconstructing the 
content of indigenous collective rights, including the abovementioned ILO Convention 
169. This treaty has only been ratified by twenty-two States but its importance goes beyond 
the direct application of its provisions since it has influenced the interpretation of indigenous 
rights under general human rights instruments.89 Concerning instruments dedicated to 
the protection of indigenous rights, the UN Declaration on indigenous rights represents 
a fundamental stepping stone in the international protection of indigenous peoples. 
Notwithstanding its non-binding value, the Declaration has a fundamental interpretative 
role to play as explained in Chapter 2.
In light of the above, one of the underlying legal problems of this dissertation is 
the relationship of treaties with a different object that anyhow overlap in their application 
because their norms apply to the same factual situation. Again, this issue is linked to the 
understanding of conflicts embraced in this dissertation.90 It is important to highlight 
at this stage that similar issues are raised in scholarly debates about the fragmentation of 
international law,91 the harmonisation of obligations stemming from different treaties, and 
are aimed to protect only a specific category of the population, such as the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (New York, 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990) and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 18 December 1979, in force 3 September 1981). 
On the extent to which these conventions have been used to protect indigenous rights, see e.g., Alessandro 
Fodella, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment, and International Jurisprudence’ in Nerina Boschiero and 
others (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves 
(T.M.C. Asser Press 2013).
88  Maria Papaioannou, ‘Harmonization of International Human Rights Law through Judicial Dialogue’ 
(2014) 3 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 1037, especially at 1047. See: Gaetano 
Pentassuglia, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal 
of International Law 165. Amplius: Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International 
Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?’ (1999) 31 International Law and Politics 679.
89  See Rodriguez-Piñero 2005 and see also Chapter 2, section 3.
90  See section 5 in this chapter.
91  For an overview of the problem of the unity of international law, see International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Groups of the International Law Commission finalised by Martti 
Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L. 682 (13 April 2006) (hereinafter ILC fragmentation report). The 
literature on the fragmentation of international law is extensive and cannot be fully recounted here. See e.g., 
Ian Brownlie, ‘Problems Concerning the Unity of International Law’ in Le droit international à l’heure de 
sa codification: études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, vol 1 (Giuffré 1987); Joseph H. H. Weiler and Andreas 
Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in International Law or: Is there a Hierarchy of Norms in International 
Law’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 545; Philippe Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the 
Cross-Fertilization of International Law’ (1998) 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 85; 
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the role of systemic interpretation and general principles, which are outlined in the following 
sections and then explored in the whole thesis. This framework of reference permits to clarify 
another important feature of the research conducted in this thesis. The dissertation is only 
concerned with States’ obligations and does not explore issues regarding the responsibilities 
of private actors towards indigenous peoples in the context of biodiversity conservation.
The second research question, i.e., how conflicts can be prevented or solved, lies at the 
basis of the most innovative part of this dissertation. In particular, this thesis engages with 
the question of which standards can be used when the main rules concerning the resolution 
of conflicts between treaties—hierarchy, lex posterior, and lex specialis92—cannot be applied. 
The need for harmonisation between potentially conflicting obligations is justified in terms 
of the binding nature of both the CBD and indigenous rights. In the absence of other criteria 
for the resolution of conflicts, systemic interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
provides a fundamental tool to integrate the rights of indigenous peoples in the application 
of the obligations stemming from the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.93 In this respect, this 
thesis is methodologically indebted to the developing literature on global environmental 
law, which argues that not only vertical but also horizontal interactions of different legal 
systems are fundamental for understanding the functioning of any legal regime.94
Additionally to formal criteria to solve conflicts, this thesis also turns to substantive 
criteria, identifying the principle of self-determination as the main normative standard to 
assess the legitimacy of restrictions to indigenous rights deriving from the application of 
provisions contained in the CBD regime.95
As reminded, looking at the relationship between indigenous peoples and biodiversity 
allows for exploring an emerging trend, namely the integration of human rights standards 
in the implementation of international environmental treaties. This research strand is 
Martti Koskenniemi and P Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 553; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalization Era: On 
the “Fragmentation” of International Law’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 25; Anne Peters, 
‘Constitutional Fragments – On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and Fragmentation in International 
Law’ [2015] Centre for Global Constitutionalism, University of St Andrews, Working Paper No 2 Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrncom/abstract=2591370; Adamantia Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law 
Revisited: Insights, Good Practices, and Lessons to Be Learned from the Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 863; Enne-Charlotte Martineau, Le débat 
sur la fragmentation du droit international. Une analyse critique (Bruylant 2015).
92  See Art. 30, 41, 53, 59, and 64 VCLT. See section 5 in this chapter.
93  Harmonisation and systemic integration are further discussed in section 6 in this chapter. See also, 
Chapter 2, section 5.
94  See Elisa Morgera, ‘Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-judicial Enforcement 
of Global Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 743; Ellen Hey, ‘Common Interests and the (Re)constitution of the Public Space’ (2009) 
39 Environmental Policy and Law 152; Tseming Yang and Robert V. Percival, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Environmental Law’ (2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly 615; Jonathan B. Wiener, ‘Something Borrowed for 
Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 Ecology 
Law Quarterly 1295.
95  This is fully explained in Chapter 2, see especially section 5.
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completely underdeveloped and deserves scholarly attention. In this connection, this thesis 
illustrates possible ways in which this incorporation can be realised. A fundamental problem 
is that the Parties to the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol do not perfectly coincide with the 
Parties of the human rights treaties protecting indigenous rights. This problem is further 
complicated by the fact, already highlighted, that the body of indigenous rights does not 
derive from a unitary treaty but from a collection of regional and global treaties having 
different Parties, as well as from the interpretation of human rights treaty bodies.96 The 
problem of different parties also relates to the issue of under which circumstances conflicts 
may arise between treaties having a different object and is, therefore, explored in the next 
section.
From a methodological perspective,97 the questions asked and the tools used in this 
dissertation are perfectly in line with a classic approach to international law, as a law made 
by States for States,98 because the thesis is mainly concerned with the classic sources of 
international law and the conflicting obligations incumbent on States. At the same time, law 
is not regarded at in a static way but it is rather conceived as a pool of binding norms that 
may evolve over time in response to pressures from different fields of the law (i.e., the rights 
of indigenous peoples), from different non-State actors (i.e., indigenous peoples, NGOs, 
and international organisations), and from non-binding norms (i.e., the UN Declaration on 
indigenous rights). In this sense, this thesis sees international law as a process.99 Furthermore, 
it is concerned not only with prescriptions pursuant to binding rules, but also with the legal 
effects produced by non-binding norms on binding norms.
This conception of the law aims to respond to one of the challenges daunting 
international law as a legal system. Although international law remains as for its sources 
a law made by States, it is no longer true that international norms only address inter-
State relations. Increasingly, and this is particularly true when it comes to human rights 
and international environmental law, international norms regulate intra-State situations 
and affect subnational actors. Notwithstanding its broad potential reach, non-State actors 
cannot create international rules, except in some cases for international organisations.100 
96  See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/71/229 (29 July 2016), at 9: “The rights of indigenous peoples stem from various branches of 
international law and have developed through international human rights law, international labour law and 
international environmental law”.
97  For an explicit discussion on methodological choices in international law, see Jean D’Aspremont, 
Epistemic Forces in International Law: Essays on the Foundational Doctrines and Techniques of International 
Legal Argumentation (Edward Elgar 2015). See also, Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Cours général de droit public’ 
(1987) 207 Recueil des cours 15, at 33-43.
98  Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ in Christian 
Tomuschat (ed), Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 1993), at 48-49.
99  See Abi-Saab 1987, at 209. See also, Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How 
We Use It (Clarendon 1994), at 1 and 8.
100  See International Law Commission (ILC), Identification of Customary International Law, Text of the 
draft conclusions provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.872 (30 May 
2016), Draft conclusion 4(2), at 2.
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This imbalance leads to the paradox, for instance, that rules on indigenous peoples are 
formally created only by States. In this respect, Århén observes that “international law is to 
be deduced from the actions and intent of the same polities the law is supposed to govern”.101
Indeed, this thesis is also aware of the fact that, although the theory of sources of 
international law has little changed over the last years, there are ways in which international 
law itself allows for the contamination of formal law-making and broader societal needs. 
This happens through soft law norms, such as the UN Declaration of indigenous peoples, 
as well as innovative institutional mechanisms, such as the fact that the UN Declaration 
has been drafted in collaboration with indigenous representatives. The same is true for 
the CBD, which allows for the participation of indigenous peoples in the CBD COPs. 
These innovations are discussed throughout the whole dissertation. In this light, this thesis 
also purposefully looks at the role of non-State actors such as indigenous peoples.102 The 
instruments adopted by indigenous groups are of course not binding on States, but one 
of the purposes of this thesis is to verify whether indigenous claims are reflected in the 
developments of binding norms.
5. Conflicts in the absence of hierarchy
It is very important to clarify from the outset which kind of conflicts this dissertation 
is concerned with since a clear definition of the phenomenon studied may help to fully 
understand the aims of the present research, as well as the methodology used. International 
lawyers have canvassed both the complexity and the ambiguity of the very notion of conflicts 
in international law.103 In very general terms, conflicts arise when “[t]he same Act is subject 
to different types of norms” requiring opposing behaviours.104 This research, indeed, narrows 
down the notion of conflicts from tensions between any kinds of norms to clashes between 
obligations contained in treaties.
The question remains under which circumstances obligations incumbent on States 
pursuant to different treaties can be in conflict with one another. This thesis distinguishes 
between “necessary conflicts”105 and potential conflicts. The first category applies to the case 
when the very existence of a treaty obligation produces the impossibility for a State to comply 
101  Åhrén 2016, at 67.
102  More generally, on the emergence of non-State actors in international law, see Math Noortmann, August 
Reinisch and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actors in International Law (Hart Publishing 2015).
103  See the seminal work of Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003). See also, Christopher J. 
Borgen, ‘Resolving Treaty Conflicts’ (2005) 37 George Washington International Law Review 573, at 575: 
“An initial problem is that there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a conflict between 
treaties”.
104  Seyed-Ali Sadat Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2003), at 7-8.
105  This definition is borrowed from Pauwelyn 2003, at 170. The author uses it to describe Jenks’ notion of 
conflicts, which he then rejects.
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with an obligation stemming from another treaty by which the same State is bound.106 This 
would have been the case in the absurd hypothesis that the CBD prescribed that Parties 
would have had the right to dispossess indigenous peoples when accessing genetic resources 
in other States. Of course, this is an extreme example but it is useful to illustrate that 
this research has encountered nearly no necessary conflicts in the study of the interaction 
between the biodiversity regime and the rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, merely 
focusing on necessary conflicts would be “too restrictive”107 since it would leave aside a 
significant portion of reality.108
This thesis instead analyses several examples of the second type of conflicts, i.e., 
potential conflicts. Borrowing from Pauwelyn, conflicts do not only arise when obligations 
are mutually incompatible as such, that is “if one constitutes…a breach of the other”, but 
also when an obligation contained in one treaty “may lead” to the breach of one or more 
obligations contained in another treaty.109 In this sense, conflicts imply either a certain 
ambiguity of the provisions concerned or some discretion in their implementation.110 
Therefore, breaches may occur when States exercise a faculty or decide to implement a given 
norm in a certain way.111 As explained in Chapters 1, 3, and 4, this is the case for instance 
with the implementation of Article 8(j) of the CBD. This provision can be interpreted and 
implemented in a way that either encroaches on indigenous rights or protects and reinforces 
them.112
Two additional elements must be present for conflicts to arise. First, potentially 
conflicting norms must regulate the same factual situation. In this sense, conflicting treaties 
must not necessarily have the same object, which is not the case for the treaties analysed in 
this dissertation.113 Instead, this thesis focuses on what the ILC fragmentation report defines 
as “parallelism of treaties”, that is when the same problem arises under different treaties.114 
For instance, the problem of the creation of protected areas on indigenous territories is 
relevant under both the CBD and human rights treaties.115
Second, potentially conflicting obligations must be incumbent on the same State.116 
106  Sadat Akhavi 2003, at 5: “A conflict arises when it is impossible to comply with all requirements of two 
norms”.
107  Borgen 2005, at 575.
108  Pauwelyn 2003, at 170.
109  Ibid., at 175-176.
110  Ibid. talks of discretion at 176. See also, D’Aspremont 2015, at 207: interpretation “produces the law as 
well as the facts, and the relation (and potential conflicts) between them”.
111  See Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer 2003) at 
24 and 96. They talk of “implementation conflicts”.
112  The legitimacy of restrictive interpretations is assessed in the Conclusion.
113  See section 2 in this chapter.
114  ILC fragmentation report, at 210, para. 417.
115  Parallelism of treaties is very frequent at the intersections of nearly any other subfields of international 
law.
116  Pauwelyn 2003, at 165: “This state (or body) must necessarily be bound by both rules”.
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This condition does not mean that all Parties of one treaty must coincide with all Parties of 
the other treaty. Indeed, it is essential that a given State is bound by obligations pursuant to 
different treaties. In this respect, almost all CBD Parties are party to universal human rights 
treaties, such as the UN Covenants.117 
Theoretical difficulties may arise because the application of the CBD regime on 
ABS usually implies bilateral relationships between provider and user States that might be 
bound by different human rights obligations. The question therefore arises of what happens 
when one State is bound by both conflicting norms, and another State that must interact 
with the former is not.118 Although interesting, for the purposes of this dissertation this 
option is mainly theoretical, given that the ICCPR and the ICESCR are virtually globally 
ratified. Moreover, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) also protects indigenous rights and has been ratified by most of 
the States that are not bound by the UN Covenants.119 In the residual hypothesis that one of 
the States is not bound by these universal human rights treaties,120 the more limited CBD/
Nagoya Protocol framework applies.121 However, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the CBD 
regime at least ensures some form of protection for indigenous rights.
Clearly, if national and/or international courts were faced with cases of parallel 
application of human rights and CBD norms, they would need to carefully discuss the 
issue of the applicability of both regimes. The concrete adjudication of these obligations, 
however, is only a residual option at the international level. Concrete conflicts in this field 
have not arisen yet because of both the deficient compliance mechanisms of the CBD122 
and the limited scope of human rights law.123 Notwithstanding the absence of concrete 
conflicts, this dissertation wants to draw attention to some pressing problems when it comes 
to the overall coherence of States’ obligations in the fields of conservation and indigenous 
rights. In particular, the thesis analyses possible techniques to ensure that obligations arising 
under the CBD are in line with those arising under human rights treaties concerning 
indigenous peoples, also with a view to giving indications in case of future developments of 
the international biodiversity regime .
117  See infra section 6 in this chapter and Chapter 2, section 3.6. This thesis refers to the UN Covenants 
when speaking of the ICCPR supra and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (New York, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976) (hereinafter ICESCR).
118  This problem is raised by Pauwelyn 2003, at 423.
119  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (New York, 21 
December 1965, in force 4 January 1969) (hereinafter ICERD). To compare membership, see http://
indicators.ohchr.org/ (last accessed October 2016).
120  For instance, China is not party to the ICCPR and the US is not party to the ICESCR.
121  On this point, see Conclusion.
122  Note that a dedicated compliance mechanism has been instituted under the Nagoya Protocol. This 
mechanism is analysed in Chapter 3, section 2.4.1.
123  The Inter-American Court, however, has recently decided a case where the CBD was explicitly cited to 
illustrate to what extent the establishment of protected areas is compatible with indigenous rights. See Kaliña 
and Lokono case, discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and 4.
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In this respect, this thesis is faced with the difficulty that normal techniques of solving 
conflicts between international norms—hierarchy, lex posterior, and lex specialis—are 
not applicable to the special case of the interplay between conservation obligations and 
indigenous rights. 
First, hierarchy does not apply to this relationship.124 As said, this thesis does not 
fully engage with the question whether the norms analysed have reached the status of 
customary norms. Nor it explores in detail the highly sensible question whether there exists 
jus cogens in the concerned fields of international law. Peremptory norms are the only type of 
obligations from which treaties cannot derogate. Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT establish 
that if treaties conflict with—even supervening—jus cogens, they are void. The analysis 
conducted throughout the dissertation, and especially in Chapter 2,125 permits to conclude 
that hierarchy is far from being established in the relationship between indigenous rights 
and the conservation of biodiversity.126 Furthermore, hierarchy is a very exceptional rule in 
international law.
Second, the rules established under Article 30 of the VCLT are not applicable either. 
This provision regulates the case in which successive treaties amend or repel previous ones. 
However, it only applies to treaties having the same subject matter, which is not the case for 
the CBD and human rights treaties.127
Third, the fact that the objects of the two bodies of law do not coincide but may 
overlap is not incompatible with the general rule of lex specialis, according to which the 
more specific regime derogates from the more general one.128 However, it is very difficult 
124  Hierarchy is indicated as a possible way to solve conflicts in international law in the ILC fragmentation 
report, at 168 ff.
125  See especially section 3.6 of Chapter 2.
126  It is interesting to note that in the Kaliña and Lokono case, Suriname has claimed that nature conservation 
is a “higher interest” that must prevail over the protection of indigenous rights (para. 120). On the absence 
of hierarchy between the Nagoya Protocol and other international treaties, see Riccardo Pavoni, ‘The Nagoya 
Protocol and WTO Law’ in Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck (eds), The 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation 
Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 2013), at 206. Concerning indigenous rights, some limited authors have 
claimed that the cultural genocide applies to indigenous peoples. See Damien Short, ‘Cultural Genocide and 
Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach’ (2010) 14 International Journal of Human Rights 833. See 
also, Benny Peiser, ‘From Genocide to Ecocide: The Rape of Rapa Nui’ (2005) 16 Energy and Environment 
513. Cultural genocide, however, is not included in the scope of application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Paris, 9 December 1948, in force 12 January 1951).
127  See Borgen 2005, at 603: “the VCLT is not applicable to the thornier issues of what happens when 
treaties have different foci but overlapping issue areas”.
128  On lex specialis as a criterion to solve conflicts, see Pauwelyn 2003, at 385 ff. The author argues that 
the criterion of lex specialis recognizes the contractual liberty of States to change rules previously agreed 
upon if these apply to a specific context (at 388). See also, at 389: “A norm may be lex specialis on one of 
two grounds: (i) subject matter; or (ii) membership”. Concerning subject matter, the content must be more 
precise or referred to specific circumstances. Concerning membership, subject matter must be the same, but 
parties are different (usually more restricted), such as in regional human rights treaties (at 390). See also, 
Anja Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ 
(2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 27, at 27, 41-42, and 66. The latter author argues that lex 
specialis is not a suitable criterion for solving normative conflicts between “seemingly independent normative 
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to determine which of the two bodies of law analysed in this thesis is the most specific 
regime in relation to the other.129 It is true that rules affecting indigenous rights under the 
CBD might be seen as derogating from the general regime of human rights in the context 
of conservation and ABS. At the same time, the opposite argument can also logically hold, 
namely that human rights law on indigenous rights could also in principle be considered lex 
specialis since they attribute rights to groups of the society that deserve special protection due 
to past injustices and current marginalisation.130 In this sense, the CBD would only apply as 
it is to situations that involve other sectors of the society.131 Therefore, it is very difficult to 
demonstrate in the abstract that one of the two regimes derogates from the other.132
When specifically addressing the hypothesis that the CBD constitutes lex specialis 
of the human rights regime on indigenous peoples, other difficulties emerge. The CBD is 
not meant to directly regulate indigenous rights, although it refers to indigenous and local 
communities. Therefore, in principle, the fact that the two bodies of law have different 
subject matters excludes the applicability of lex specialis. This argument, however, can be 
countered by the fact that both the CBD and human rights law regulate the same factual 
situations with regards to indigenous peoples, as explained above.
In this light, for lex specialis to be applicable, it would be necessary to demonstrate that 
the CBD regime aims to derogate from the more general protection of indigenous rights 
granted under human rights law.133 However, the CBD regime does not explicitly derogate 
from the more general regime on human rights. Quite on the contrary, the Nagoya Protocol 
takes account of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights in its Preamble. Moreover, some 
CBD COP decisions acknowledge the need to respect the international framework on 
indigenous rights.134 In addition, both the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol have conflict 
rules that acknowledge the existence of other treaties connected to conservation without 
derogating from them.135
orders”. On the affirmation of lex specialis as a legal maxim, see ILC fragmentation report, at 34-47.
129  In general terms on the difficulty of identifying special regimes, see ILC fragmentation report, at 35.
130  This is the reason why a specific body on indigenous rights emerged in the first place. See difference with 
minorities in section 3.1 in this Introduction. 
131  For instance, when protected areas affect private individuals or access to genetic resources impinges on 
private property.
132  Indeed, the argument goes that treaties in human rights law and environmental law are lex specialis of 
general international law. See Lindroos 2005, at 31.
133  Pauwelyn 2003, at 240: following from the presumption against conflict, when a new norm seeks to 
derogate from another one, it must do so explicitly; at 242-243: the State arguing that the presumption is 
not valid because the new rule seeks to change previous norms, needs to prove this.
134  See more in detail Chapters 3 and 4 on these points.
135  See Art. 22 CBD and Art. 4 Nagoya Protocol. These provisions are discussed in more details in Chapter 
3, section 2.4.1 and Chapter 4, section 2.1, which both highlight the limitations of these rules in terms 
of providing useful criteria to solve conflicts with obligations arising from other instruments. The ILC 
fragmentation report explains that Parties to a treaty may be reluctant to state once and for all how a given 
treaty relates to other applicable regimes. One reason for that might be that concrete situations are too 
heterogeneous to be addressed in a comprehensive general formula (at 141, para. 277).
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Indeed, it is very doubtful that the criterion of lex specialis can be used to justify 
that the CBD regime as a whole can derogate from the whole body of the rights of 
indigenous peoples as established under human rights law. Such a reasoning would deprive 
the international regime on indigenous rights of any significance and, therefore, would be 
against the object and purpose of human rights treaties.136 A different point would be to 
affirm that some provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol can be interpreted as lex 
specialis.137 Concerning this point, the Conclusion of this thesis assesses to what extent the 
CBD practice points in the direction of derogating from existing indigenous rights.
It emerges from the analysis above that general criteria to solve conflicts are not 
applicable to the case explored in this dissertation. The question, therefore, arises of what 
happens when potential conflicts result from the application of the CBD regime. This thesis 
argues that conflicts in the relationship between biodiversity law and indigenous rights mostly 
derive from erroneous or too restrictive interpretations of the obligations contained in the 
CBD regime. In this sense, harmonious interpretation is the proposed methodology to solve 
conflicts under these two regimes. According to Pauwelyn, if conflicts can be “‘interpreted 
away’”, they are only apparent—not genuine—conflicts.138 Pauwelyn’s conception, however, 
derives from the different aims of his research. In particular, this author wants to understand 
“what to do in case such harmonious interpretation is not possible”.139 Rather, this research 
aims to expose potential conflicts and to see to what extent and in what ways harmonious 
interpretation can help to avoid or solve them. As explained, this objective derives from 
the acknowledgment that conflicts may also derive from the discretion that some treaties 
leave in the implementation of their provisions. This discretion, however, finds important 
limitations in the obligations established under other regimes applicable to the same factual 
situation.
6. Harmonisation, systemic interpretation (and mutual supportiveness)
The existence of multiple international treaties regulating seemingly separated problems 
does not imply that each treaty is a legal system completely aloof from other international 
rules. In contrast, there is a general expectation in favour of harmonisation, meaning that 
Parties to a given treaty should avoid conflicts when concluding new treaties or interpreting 
existing ones.140 The inclusion of provisions on the relationship with existing legal regimes, 
136  On this point, see also Chapter 3, section 2.3.
137  Lindroos 2005, at 43, highlights the “difficulty of designating one area of law as being special with regard 
to another area of law”.
138  Pauwelyn 2003, at 178.
139  Ibid., at 6.
140  Ibid., at 240, explains this presumption against conflict by referring to the fact that States are aware or 
should be aware of the rules already binding on them. See also, ICJ, Case concerning Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, Judgment (26 November 1957), at 142: “It 
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as explained earlier, serves to reinforce the presumption against conflicts in the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol. In particular, Article 4(3) of the Nagoya Protocol explicitly enunciates 
the principle of mutual supportiveness with other international instruments relevant to the 
Protocol.141
A duty to seek the harmonisation of international conventional regimes also derives 
from the application of the more general and well established principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
according to which Parties must honour their obligations, including when applying other 
treaties, unless it can be demonstrated that these treaties explicitly derogate from other 
existing obligations.142 Furthermore, if more than one treaty is applicable to a given factual 
situation, such as in the case discussed in this thesis, the need for harmonisation becomes 
inescapable.143
This thesis aims to respond to this general need, exploring in which ways harmonisation 
can be realised in the interplay between the CBD regime and indigenous rights. Given 
the inapplicability of other conflict-resolution techniques, this dissertation turns to 
interpretation as a general means to avoid and/or mitigate conflicts.144 As already claimed, 
the insurgence of conflicts as intended in this thesis is premised on the openness of the 
concerned provisions. Similarly, interpretation may identify ways in which certain provisions 
can be implemented in a manner that avoids conflicts.145 In this sense, this dissertation 
proceeds from the understanding both that interpretation is “constitutive” and that it is the 
function of the interpreter to propose convincing explanations of why a given interpretation 
is sound.146
is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be interpreted as 
producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of it”.
141  On this point, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 80 and 82-83. See also, Pavoni 2013, at 207.
142  This rule is also codified in Art. 26 VCLT. See Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau and Alain Pellet, Droit 
international public (8th edn, LGDJ 2008), at 238-241; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2003), at 811-812; Tullio Treves, Diritto internazionale. Problemi fondamentali 
(Giuffré 2005), at 378. These authors highlight the link between pacta sunt servanda and good faith. See also, 
Nele Matz-Lück, ‘Harmonization, Systemic Integration, and ‘Mutual Supportiveness’ as Conflict-Solution 
Techniques: Different Modes of Interpretation as a Challenge to Negative Effects of Fragmentation?’ (2006) 
17 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 39, at 46: “Although the pacta sunt servanda rule must be 
considered part of customary international law, it is questionable whether it follows from this rule that states 
must adopt a harmonizing approach”.
143  See ILC fragmentation report, at 210, para. 418: “it cannot be dependent on how a State chooses 
to characterize a problem that decides which treaty is applicable”. The report concludes that it is up to 
international tribunals to characterise facts in order to evaluate what regimes are applicable. Given the 
abovementioned difficulty for international courts to intervene concerning the application of the CBD, 
interpreters should try to fulfil this duty.
144  See Christina Voigt, ‘The Role of General Principles in International Law and their Relationship to 
Treaty Law’ (2008) 2/121 Retfærd Årgang 3, at 21: “the problem of fragmentation may be held to require 
the introduction of new ideas and approaches to the interpretation of treaties where there is overlapping and 
conflicting consensus on fundamental value-questions in different social and political sectors”.
145  ILC fragmentation report, at 207, para. 412: “conflict-resolution and interpretation cannot be 
distinguished from each other…Rules appear compatible or in conflict as a result of interpretation”.
146  On the constitutive character of interpretation, see Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994), at 144-150; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of 
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According to the general rules of interpretation codified under the VCLT, treaties 
must be interpreted literally, “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms”, teleologically, in the light of “object and purpose”, and contextually.147 Context 
is to be determined in relation to agreements and instruments explicitly concluded in 
connection with the treaty to be implemented.148 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 31(3)
(c) of the VCLT, interpreters must take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties”.149 This provision, therefore, identifies 
systemic interpretation as a required step in the process of treaty interpretation.150 This does 
not mean that it must be performed every time interpretation is conducted but when the 
conditions for its applicability are met.151
A process of interpretation must of course be in place. Contrary to the views of some 
authors,152 interpretation does not only take place when rules are particularly ambiguous 
or obscure153 but it is instead the logical step preceding and facilitating the implementation 
of any treaty rules. In this sense, when States fulfil the obligations contained in the treaties 
to which they are party, they need to interpret them first. This is not to underestimate 
California Press 1967), at 348-356. See also, D’Aspremont 2015, at 202; Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein 
(eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of the Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011), at 
806; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press 2006), in particular Ch. 1.
147  Art. 31(1) and (2) VCLT. On the methods of interpretation, see e.g., Daillier, Forteau and Pellet 2008, at 
282-291. These authors interestingly point out that the choice of interpretative methods is intimately linked 
to the conception of international law embraced by the interpreter (see in particular at 289-290). See also, 
Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press 2005), at 178-180; Benedetto Conforti, Diritto 
internazionale (9th edn, Editoriale scientifica 2013), at 112-118; Shaw 2003, at 838-844; Treves 2005, at 
378-398; Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015), especially Ch. 
5 and 6; Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31 Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of the Treaties: A Commentary, vol I (Oxford University 
Press 2011); ILC, Draft Articles on the Vienna Convention with commentaries (1966), available at http://
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf (last accessed October 2016), at 221: 
the commentary emphasises very much the will of the parties to accept subsequent agreements.
148  Art. 31(2)(a) and (b) VCLT.
149  See Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279, at 281, on the indeterminacy 
of this clause. At 290-293, this author briefly illustrates the genesis of Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. The rest of 
the article discusses how the clause has been used by international tribunals.
150  See ILC fragmentation report, at 214, para. 425, according to which systemic interpretation is “a 
mandatory part of the interpretation process” and is not like Article 32 that only applies if the meaning of 
treaty clauses is ambiguous or unreasonable. This is confirmed in the manuals cited supra in note 147.
151  See Pauwelyn 2003, at 254: “not in every situation of alleged conflict must one norm be interpreted with 
reference to the other, pursuant to Art. 31(3)(c)”. See also, Duncan French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the 
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 281, at 
301.
152  See Pauwelyn 2003, at 245: the treaty to be interpreted “must, first of all, include terms that are broad 
and ambiguous enough to allow for input by other rules”.
153  As reminded, these are the conditions for applying subsidiary means of implementation. See Matz-Lück 
2006, at 50: “Whether the understanding of a norm is clear depends upon the particular circumstances and 
cannot be addressed in an abstract manner”. This argument is clearly stated in Robert Jennings and Arthur 
Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992), at 1267.
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the fact that some interpretative processes can be much more complex than others. 
However, notwithstanding specific difficulties, the same interpretative toolbox is available 
independently from the complexity of the interpretative process. This conclusion is also 
in line with the above-mentioned principle of mutual supportiveness contained in the 
Nagoya Protocol, which similarly to systemic interpretation requires a reading of one 
treaty’s obligations that is in harmony with the obligations stemming from other applicable 
treaties.154
Another condition, which instead must be verified, is that rules external to the treaty 
to be interpreted must be “applicable in the relations between the parties”. This clause 
requires a two-step test aimed to understand (a) which rules are applicable and (b) when 
they are applicable between the parties.
Concerning the first part of the test, indigenous rights are not relevant when 
implementing any CBD obligations. Instead, the latter must present some sort of link 
with indigenous rights.155 This may happen when provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol explicitly include a reference to indigenous and local communities, such as in 
Articles 8(j) and 10(c) of the Convention and, inter alia, Article 5-7 of the Protocol.156 
Moreover, the link with indigenous rights may be established by way of teleological 
and contextual interpretation, including when CBD provisions are read in light of the 
Convention’s objectives, other CBD rules, and successive CBD COP decisions.
While the language of the CBD maintains a certain degree of ambiguity,157 important 
developments testify to a growing tendency for CBD Parties to accept contamination of 
the conservation regime with indigenous rights. The last CBD COP has adopted a decision 
where it specifically addresses the issue of the interpretation of the locution “indigenous and 
local communities”.158 The failure to refer to indigenous groups as peoples, unlike human 
rights instruments, has generated doubts concerning the permeability of the CBD to human 
rights standards and the perfect coincidence between the two categories. COP Decision 
154  See Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A 
Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International 
Law 649, at 650 and 661-666.
155  Pauwelyn 2003, at 245, makes a similar point with reference to international trade law rules and relevant 
external rules. In more general terms, Lee explains that relevant rules are those “that address the same facts or 
grapple with the same type of problem”. Lee Jing, Preservation of Ecosystems of International Watercourses and 
the Integration of Relevant Rules: An Interpretative Mechanism to Adddress the Fragmentation of International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2014), at 45. Emphasis on the interpretation of the clauses “relevant” and “applicable” 
is also put by Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’ 1998, at 102 (though 
in the context of the relationship between treaty law and custom in international law). See also, French 2006, 
at 304-305, who distinguishes between relevance and applicability.
156  These are fully analysed in Chapters 1, 3, and 4.
157  The CBD does not refer to indigenous peoples, but to “indigenous and local communities”. Furthermore, 
free, prior and informed consent is in some cases watered down to indigenous approval and involvement. See 
Chapter 1, section 3, and Chapters 3 and 4.
158  The CBD adopts consistently this locution in its Preamble and Art. 8(j). The Nagoya Protocol has not 
changed the language of the CBD regarding the locution “indigenous and local communities”.
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XII/12 has partially clarified those doubts since, pursuant to it, the new terminology 
“indigenous peoples and local communities” will be adopted in “future decisions and 
secondary documents”.159 The decision also states that the change in terminology cannot be 
considered as a relevant interpretation or practice for the purpose of the application of Article 
31(2), (3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.160 It seems, however, 
that it is not up to the Parties to limit future interpretation of the locution ‘indigenous and 
local communities’, unless they explicitly agree on the fact that the CBD derogates from the 
international framework on human rights concerning indigenous peoples. Furthermore, 
the decision recognises as relevant to the CBD the role of systemic interpretation, thus de 
facto acknowledging the importance of existing international law for the interpretation of 
the CBD, including human rights.161 It seems, therefore, that decision XII/12 explicitly 
supports a systemic interpretation of CBD relevant provisions in light of indigenous rights 
under international human rights law.
Regarding the intertemporal relationship between CBD provisions and indigenous 
rights, it could be argued that since the latter were not well established when the CBD was 
concluded, systemic interpretation would run counter the initial intentions of the Parties. 
Quite on the contrary, however, the formulation that limited systemic interpretation to the 
rules in force at the conclusion of the treaty was not retained in the final formulation of 
Article 31(3)(c).162 Therefore, the final understanding of this interpretative tool is one that 
allows for evolutionary interpretation, thus ensuring flexibility to the international legal 
system.163
The second part of the test concerns the issue of membership to the obligations that 
are applicable in the relations between Parties. The ILC fragmentation report has concluded 
that systemic interpretation can be performed even in the context of multilateral treaties 
whose Parties do not perfectly coincide with the Parties of the treaty from which relevant 
rules are extracted.164 The only condition is that, when a rule is concretely applied in a 
159  COP dec. XII/12, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/11 (13 October 2014), Part F, para. 1.
160  COP dec. XII/12, Part F, para. 2(c): the COP decides “[t]hat the use of the terminology “indigenous 
peoples and local communities” in future decisions and secondary documents shall not constitute a context 
for the purpose of interpretation of the Convention on Biological Diversity as provided for in article 31, 
paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or a subsequent agreement or subsequent 
practice among Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity as provided for in article 31, paragraph 3 
(a) and (b) or special meaning as provided for in article 31, paragraph 4, of the Vienna Convention the Law 
of Treaties”.
161  COP dec. XII/12, Part F, para. 2(c): “[t]his is without prejudice to the interpretation or application of 
the Convention in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”.
162  ILC fragmentation report, at 216-217.
163  ILC fragmentation report, at 242. See also, McLachlan 2005, at 282. This is also the way systemic 
interpretation has been used in the ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. See e.g., Philippe Sands, ‘Watercourses, 
Environment and the International Court of Justice: the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case’ in Salman M.A. 
Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (eds), International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict (World Bank Technical Paper No. 414 1998).
164  ILC fragmentation report, at 237. See also, McLachlan 2005, at 314: “If complete identity of parties 
Introduction
32
bilateral relation, both involved Parties must be bound by the provision that is invoked in 
the context of systemic interpretation.165 As rightly pointed out in the ILC fragmentation 
report, “Article 31(3)(c) refers to ‘the parties’, not ‘all parties’”.166 According to some 
authors, moreover, membership is not crucial if the treaty to be interpreted enshrines the 
principle of mutual supportiveness as the Nagoya Protocol does.167 Furthermore, while the 
issue of membership might be relevant when international judicatories are to decide over 
disputes brought before them, it might be considered less relevant when it comes to the 
interpretative process which precedes the application and concrete implementation of a 
treaty by its parties.168
This means, in the context of the present research, that indigenous rights as interpreted 
by the Human Rights Committee must serve as an interpretation tool even though CBD 
Parties do not perfectly coincide with the Parties of the ICCPR. However, if ABS provisions 
were applied in the context of a bilateral relationship between, for instance, South Africa, 
which is party to the ICCPR, and China, which is not, systemic interpretation could not 
be performed with reference to the rights of indigenous peoples protected under that 
particular human rights instrument. However, as illustrated in Chapter 2, a similar result 
could be reached if interpreting CBD provisions in light of relevant ICESCR provisions 
protecting indigenous rights, to which China is indeed bound.169 Furthermore, South 
African indigenous peoples could bring their case before the African Commission that, again 
as explained in Chapters 1 and 2, has recognised that the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples had been violated in connection with the creation of protected areas and other 
activities performed with the authorisation of the State.170 Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge that, if conflicts cannot be resolved by ways of systemic interpretation, they 
might in principle be addressed outside the CBD context in a way that exposes the State’s 
international responsibility for the violation of indigenous rights.
were required before the other treaty could be regarded as being ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’, it would have the ironic effect that the more membership of a particular multilateral treaty such 
as the WTO Covered Agreements expanded, the more those treaties would be cut off from the rest of 
international law”.
165  ILC fragmentation report, at 238. Pauwelyn 2003, at 257-260, has formulated an additional condition 
for systemic interpretation to apply in case treaty membership is not perfectly coinciding, namely that 
other relevant rules of international law must reflect the intentions of all Parties to the treaty that has to be 
interpreted. As highlighted in the ILC fragmentation report, at 239, this argument has concretely been used 
by the WTO (World Trade Organisation) Appellate Body. Common intentions, however, do not add much 
in terms of both legal certainty, because they are difficult to verify, and strict legality, because they do not 
represent a relevant source in international law.
166  ILC fragmentation report, at 261.
167  See Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for 
the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, at 668.
168  A hint of this argument is given by French 2006 at 305-307.
169  Chapter 2 inquires to what extent the interpretation of indigenous rights is convergent under human 
rights treaties.
170  See the analysis of the Endorois case in Chapters 1 and 2.
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Furthermore, systemic interpretation is relevant for interpreters and scholars even 
outside litigation implying a bilateral relationship. For instance, this thesis assesses through 
the lenses of systemic interpretation whether a particular reading of CBD-related provisions 
is in line with the international human rights regime on indigenous rights. This choice can 
be justified in light of the particular nature of human rights and environmental rules, which 
inter alia regulate purely internal situations in pursuance of a common objective defined 
in treaties (promotion of certain rights or common concern of humankind). In this sense, 
systemic interpretation can be used outside litigation to assess whether the implementation 
of the CBD regime at the national level runs counter the obligations that States have 
concerning the respect of indigenous rights under international human rights law.
This does not mean that systemic interpretation is without limits. Interpretation, in 
fact, cannot go so far as to impose new obligations on States but must be aimed to illustrate 
the meaning of the concerned provisions in light of relevant international law.171 However, 
it must be reminded here that applicable international rules do not stop at treaty obligations 
mandatory on the parties of the dispute, but include also general international law, such as 
custom and general principles.172 Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of the principle of self-
determination from the body of indigenous rights. General principles can be used in the 
process of systemic interpretation and technically are not subject to the limitations concerning 
membership in multilateral treaties. In this sense, the principle of self-determination allows 
for the penetration of substantive and procedural criteria to assess States’ behaviour with 
regard to the respect of indigenous rights irrespective of issues concerning the existence of 
specific obligations binding CBD Parties under human rights treaty law.173
Finally, as suggested by some authors, when conflicts cannot interpreted away, by 
virtue of the principle of mutual supportiveness, State Parties might be obliged to cooperate 
in good faith to amend incompatible rules with a view to ensuring the compatibility between 
the CBD regime and the human rights of indigenous peoples.174
7. Research outline
This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part (Introduction and Chapter 1) 
sets the scene, making the case for why conflicts between the CBD regime and indigenous 
rights are relevant. The second part (Chapter 2) illustrates my personal understanding of 
171  See Pauwelyn 2003, at 245 and 254; Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and 
Law-Making: A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, at 668; French 2006, at 
299. The latter author warns against the incorporation of extraneous legal rules into a given treaty in a way 
that is not acceptable to States in that it might compromise the trust States put in international judicatories.
172  ILC fragmentation report, at 233-237.
173  This argument is fully developed in Chapter 2, section 5.
174  See Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for 
the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, at 668.
Introduction
34
the legal problems illustrated in this thesis and proposes an interpretative approach that is 
applied in the third part. The last part (Chapters 3 and 4) is constituted of two case studies 
to verify the approach explained in Chapter 2. They are not geographical case studies, but 
rather thematic ones, exploring two essential sub-regimes of the CBD, i.e., access to genetic 
resources and related benefit-sharing and conservation and the creation of protected areas, 
which both also include issues about sustainable use.
Chapter 1 aims to show how the relationship between indigenous rights and biodiversity 
conservation has traditionally been framed in international law. First, it illustrates the case 
law of human rights treaty bodies incorporating environmental protection into the rights 
of indigenous peoples. This interpretative approach emphasises the mutually beneficial 
relationship between indigenous rights and environmental protection but overall fails 
both to recognise possible conflicts between the two and to propose criteria to solve those 
conflicts. Second, Chapter 1 looks at how the relationship between indigenous rights and 
the protection of biodiversity has been framed under the CBD. Similarly to what happens 
with human rights treaty bodies, potential conflicts are visible in the interpretation of the 
main CBD provisions concerning indigenous and local communities but fail to be addressed 
in the literature. Chapter 1, therefore, concludes that the interplay between indigenous 
rights and biodiversity conservation in international law is an understudied case illustrating 
the possibilities for conflicts between human rights and the environment. This chapter also 
identifies the interplay of indigenous and States’ powers over land and natural resources as 
one of the main contentious issues in this field.
Chapter 2 claims that this problematic interplay can be explained through a more 
fundamental conflict between the underlying principles of the international regime laying 
down the human rights of indigenous peoples and the international regime on biodiversity 
protection. The latter is founded on the sovereignty of States over natural resources, 
which regulates the problem of the allocation of natural resources through the criterion 
of national territory. In other words, States can exercise extensive sovereign powers on the 
resources located in their territories in a way that must be undisturbed from the actions of 
other States. The second part of the chapter argues both that several limits derive to this 
principle from the exercise of indigenous rights, the content of which is carefully detected 
in light of relevant international treaties, the interpretation of human rights treaty bodies, 
and relevant soft law instruments. What emerges is an extensive body of rights with both 
substantive and procedural prerogatives that limit the capacity of States to autonomously 
regulate the management of national natural resources. In this respect, and drawing from 
the decisions of human rights treaty bodies, Chapter 2 argues that the self-determination 
of indigenous peoples, more as an economic than a political right, is the crucial underlying 
issue to be addressed to unravel the puzzle of the potential conflict between States’ powers 
and indigenous rights over natural resources. The chapter, therefore, discusses the right 
to self-determination of indigenous peoples in light of the more general debate on self-
Introduction
35
determination under current international law. Under common Article 1 of UN Covenants, 
self-determination is conceived as a right for all peoples. In the decisions of human 
rights treaty bodies concerning indigenous peoples, self-determination is framed as an 
underlying principle that must inform the interpretation of indigenous rights. In this sense, 
self-determination is presented as a general principle of international human rights law 
concerning indigenous peoples, which allows for a teleological interpretation of indigenous 
rights according to which the restrictions imposed by States on indigenous rights cannot 
go so far as to compromise the distinctiveness of indigenous groups as separated peoples. 
This finding is used in Chapter 2 to elaborate an interpretative approach for the analysis of 
the interaction between the CBD regime and indigenous rights in the following chapters. 
According to this approach, the general principle of self-determination can be used to 
incorporate the rights of indigenous peoples into the CBD regime.
Chapter 3 analyses the case of the interplay between the international ABS regime 
under the CBD and the rights of indigenous peoples. It explores developments in the ABS 
obligations of CBD Parties following the creation of the Working Group on Article 8(j) and, 
most importantly, the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. It does so analysing separately 
three main issues, i.e., access to genetic resources, access to traditional knowledge, and the 
benefits arising from the utilisation of both. The study of the ABS regime logically precedes 
that on conservation since the former illustrates issues that are discussed in the latter, such 
as the scope of Article 8(j) of the CBD, the meaning of “approval and involvement”, as well 
as the benefit-sharing implications of conservation. Chapter 3 identifies tools, contained in 
the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, or in CBD COP decisions, that allow for the harmonisation 
of the conflicts between CBD-related provisions and indigenous rights. Furthermore, it 
identifies potential conflicts that are not addressed within the CBD regime and must be 
resolved by integrating indigenous rights into the CBD regime, inter alia through the 
principle of self-determination.
Chapter 4 is the second and last case analysed in this thesis. It examines the interplay 
between the conservation regime of the CBD and the rights of indigenous peoples. It also 
addresses problems related to the third objective of the CBD, that is sustainable use. To 
this end, it explores conservation from the perspective of indigenous participatory rights, 
including the emerging phenomenon of indigenous and community protected areas. It also 
compares the CBD framework to the establishment of World Heritage sites protecting nature 
and traditional culture. Similarly to Chapter 3, it then identifies the main harmonisation 
measures enacted in the CBD and the WHC and the main gaps therein. It finally uses the 
principle of self-determination to incorporate indigenous rights into the CBD regime on 
conservation, also highlighting the conflicts that cannot be resolved under the WHC.
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CHAPTER 1 
Indigenous Rights and the Protection of Biodiversity: State of the Art
1. Introductory remarks
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the relationship between indigenous rights and 
the protection of biodiversity has traditionally been framed in international law. The main 
point of departure is that, although the areas of intersections between the two elements are 
numerous, the two underlying regimes are considered as separate since they pertain to two 
different areas of international law, namely human rights and international environmental 
law.1 This is why approaching the relationship between the two means as a first step analysing 
whether and in what terms this has been framed under each of the concerned regimes.
Under international human rights law, the specific issue of the interplay between 
indigenous rights and biodiversity conservation as regulated in METs has not been specifically 
addressed. Instead, there is a copious case law concerning the relationship between the rights 
of indigenous peoples and the protection of the environment. The approach to this issue is 
also know as the human rights approach to environmental protection, which has been largely 
studied by international scholars. Section 2 illustrates this approach, presents the main 
decisions of human rights treaty bodies dealing with the relationship between indigenous 
rights and the environment, and argues that this approach suffers from some limitations. The 
main limitation lies in the recognition of the separateness of claims deriving from human 
rights and environmental protection, which reverberates on the partial inadequateness of 
the solutions provided by human rights treaty bodies to balance indigenous rights with 
the public interest. Furthermore, section 2 shows to what extent the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples are framed as being in line with the protection of nature.
Under international environmental law, the CBD and its related instruments provide 
the main terms of reference. Although the CBD directly includes indigenous peoples’ issues 
in its provisions, the relationship of its regime with indigenous rights has been less studied.2 
Section 3, therefore, illustrates the state of the art in international biodiversity law, while at 
the same time highlighting the unresolved issues that are examined in the following chapters 
of this thesis. The main problem lies in the integration of the rights of indigenous peoples 
as protected under international human rights law into the CBD.
With the analysis of the state of the art in mind, this chapter argues that the main 
1  See Introduction, section 2.
2  Notable exceptions are Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking 
Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 150; Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking 
Afresh at the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
1.
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limitation encountered in both sectoral approaches is the failure to acknowledge the 
possibility of conflict between these two bodies of law, i.e., the dimension of conflict.
2. The human rights approach to environmental protection: the case of indigenous 
peoples
This section examines the human rights approach to environmental protection as applied 
by the decisions of human rights treaty bodies concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The focus on indigenous peoples’ rights within this relationship constitutes a special case 
for two main reasons. First, human rights bodies have recognised a number of collective 
rights, not originally included in human rights instruments, that are inherent in the very 
existence of indigenous peoples. Second, indigenous rights are often protected through 
the implementation of procedural standards, recognised in the decisions of human rights 
bodies, which de facto ensure control over resources.
The extensive interpretation of existing rights has been possible through the application 
of general rules of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the VCLT, and in particular 
the technique, established in paragraph 3(c), of systemic interpretation.3 According to this 
technique, treaty provisions should be interpreted taking into account “[a]ny relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.4 The Inter-American 
Court and Commission have often relied on this provision, although they have rarely 
specified which are the general rules specifically applicable in the relations between the 
parties.5 Other human rights bodies have not justified their expansive techniques in light of 
systemic interpretation, arguing instead for the comprehensive nature and the open-ended 
formulation of the rights protected.6
The organisation of this section reflects the global-regional divide in the protection 
of human rights at the international level. The first part deals with the decisions, views, 
reports, and recommendations adopted by the monitoring systems of the global human 
rights instruments that are relevant for the analysis of the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and the environment, i.e., the UN Covenants, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the ILO Convention 169. At 
3  See Introduction, section 6.
4  According to Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, interpreters can also rely on “[a]ny subsequent agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”, while pursuant to 
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT interpretation is also done in light of “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty”. While the latter element has not been explicitly invoked in the decisions on indigenous 
peoples and the environment examined below, it can perhaps provide a normative backing to the fact the 
human rights treaty bodies have sometimes relied on national legislation to support the soundness of a given 
interpretation.
5  For the application of this technique in the Inter-American system, see infra section 2.2.1 in this chapter.
6  See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23 (Art. 27): Rights of minorities, UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (26 April 1994) (hereinafter General Comment 23).
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the regional level, this section focuses on the latu sensu jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court and Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights. In order to give a picture of the 
regional approaches to the relationship between indigenous peoples and the environment 
as extensive as possible, this section includes also the most representative decisions taken 
by the national tribunals of some countries in Asia and Oceania. The lack of a specific 
international monitoring system on human rights for these countries can in this sense be 
supplemented by a limited survey on the national judicial practice in the regions indicated.
2.1. The global mechanisms of human rights protection
2.1.1. The Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee can receive individual communications from the subjects 
that qualify as victims within the scope of the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR7. If 
admissibility conditions are met, the Committee adopts views on the merits. It is in this 
framework that the Committee has used Article 27 to assess the interference of States’ 
actions with the rights of individual members belonging to indigenous communities.
Article 27 protects the right of individual members of minorities to enjoy their own 
culture without undue interference. In this sense, although only individuals can invoke the 
violation of Article 27 before the Committee, this provision guarantees that individuals 
belonging to minorities “shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language.”8 When it comes to indigenous peoples, culture may take the form 
of a particular land or resource use.9 Therefore, respect for environmental soundness may 
be recognised as a precondition for the enjoyment of the indigenous right to culture, in 
that the degradation of land and natural resources may have an impact on the capability of 
indigenous peoples to exercise their culture.
This does not imply, however, that any interference with the enjoyment of the right to 
culture amounts to a violation of Article 27 on the part of the State.10 Indeed, considerations 
related to the factual context have consolidated in three main trends that are discernible in the 
views expressed by the Committee. Under the first trend, the Committee operates a balance 
7  See Art. 2 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 
December 1966, in force 23 March 1976).
8  General Comment 23, para. 1.
9  General Comment 23, para. 7: “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include 
such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law”.
10  See Lovelace case, para. 15: “not every interference can be regarded as a denial of rights within the 
meaning of article 27”. It is necessary to read the provision “interfered with” in light of other provisions of 
the Covenant, as well as the circumstances of the case.
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between the rights of the community as a whole with the rights of individual members.11 
The first trend, however, can be considered as marginal and does not reveal a lot of the 
relationship between indigenous rights and the environment. 12 The second trend creates 
a test for assessing States’ interference, thus defining the admissibility of restrictions to the 
right to culture of indigenous peoples. Under the third trend, environmental degradation is 
considered to affect the very survival of indigenous communities as distinct peoples.
In decisions corresponding to the second trend, arguments of public interest, including 
the need to carry out development activities and to protect the environment, have prevailed 
on the cultural rights of individual applicants. Examples of this line of reasoning are the 
Länsman cases. In Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland,13 the authors of the communication had 
argued that the quarrying of stone on the flank of a mountain where reindeer herding by 
Sami was taking place violated their rights under Article 27, especially in light of the on-
going negotiations about long-term leases of the land implying inter alia the construction 
of a road. While the authors insisted on the effects that development would have on the 
traditional activity of reindeer herding due to the impact on forest ecosystems, the State 
pointed to the limited effects on the environment linked to the modalities of quarrying 
that had been agreed upon.14 The Committee concluded that a violation of Article 27 had 
not occurred based on the relevant context of the case.15 Although States’ development 
initiatives are in principle legitimate, these must find a limit in the application of Article 27. 
In this sense, measures that imply a denial of this right constitute a breach, whereas a limited 
impact is acceptable.16 According to the Committee, the impact of the quarrying activity on 
the enjoyment of Article 27 was very limited. As for the compatibility of future measures, 
limits to States’ actions derive from the community’s capability to continue to benefit from 
their traditional activity.17
The same reasoning is applied by the Committee, in Jouni Länsman v. Finland,18 
which is related to the effect of logging activities on reindeer herding. The Committee 
11  In the Lovelace case, for instance, the Human Rights Committee discusses the issue of membership and 
how to balance the community’s right to allow for that and the inherent right of individual community 
members to maintain this membership. For a commentary on the case, see Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-
Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002), at 361-372.
12  Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985 (27 July 1988), UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 
(hereinafter Kitok v. Sweden), para. 9.8. In Kitok v. Sweden, limitations to the carrying out of reindeer herding 
by Mr. Kitok have been considered reasonable within the meaning of Art. 27 ICCPR since they were meant 
to preserve reindeer herding for the rest of the Sami community.
13  Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992 (26 October 1994), UN Doc. CCPR/
C/52/D/511/1992 (hereinafter Länsman I).
14  Länsman I, para. 7.
15  Länsman I, paras. 9.3 and 9.6.
16  Länsman I, para. 9.4.
17  Länsman I, para. 9.8.
18  Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995 (30 October 1996), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (hereinafter Länsman II).
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reiterated that measures with only a limited impact on the enjoyment of a particular way of 
life are compatible with Article 27.19 The fact that a consultation process had taken place, 
coupled with the impossibility to reach a conclusion on the long-term impact of the forestry 
activities, made the Committee conclude that a violation had not taken place since the 
measures approved by the State did not pose a threat to the survival of reindeer herding.20
In the third Länsman case,21 the authors built their argument on an alleged effect 
of intensified logging activities on the effective enjoyment of their right to culture. The 
authors made concrete arguments to substantiate their allegations, such as the fact that the 
reduction in the allowed population of reindeer had been caused by the logging operations 
that diminished the number of available pastures. It is interesting to note that the State 
opposed arguments related to the general interest of preserving nature.22 Although the 
authors presented several reports to support their arguments, the Committee eventually 
found no violation of Article 27 since the causes of the low profitability of reindeer herding 
were not directly attributable to logging and the reindeer population was still very high.
The same kind of reasoning is upheld by the Committee in Anni Äärelä and Jouni 
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland,23 where a violation of Article 27 was not found due to the impossibility 
to reach definitive conclusions, based on the findings of national courts, about the impacts 
of logging on traditional activities. In the same vein, in George Howard v. Canada,24 the 
Committee was unable to find a violation of Article 27 due to the disagreement on the 
facts between the parties and the lack of an evaluation of those facts by national courts. 
Importantly, the Committee reiterated that States can regulate the exercise of the right to 
culture as long as the regulation does not amount to a denial of this right.25
In Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand,26 the Committee developed the arguments 
put forward in the Länsman cases by identifying further criteria to assess the interference of 
States’ actions with the indigenous right to culture under Article 27. The case is particularly 
relevant since it concerned the restriction of Maori fishing rights on the basis of a general 
19  Länsman II, para. 10.3.
20  Länsman II, para. 10.6. It is interesting to note that the Committee retained the possibility to reverse this 
pronouncement in case the logging activities would intensify or it would be shown that they have an adverse 
impact on reindeer herding.
21  Jouni Länsman, Eino Länsman and the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee v. Finland, Communication 
No. 1023/2001 (17 March 2005), UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001 (hereinafter Länsman III).
22  Länsman III, para. 7.4. The State argued that logging activities had been carried out “for the purposes of 
thinning forests to ensure proper growth”.
23  Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, Communication No. 779/1997 (24 October 2001), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997.
24  George Howard v. Canada, Communication No. 879/1999 (26 July 2005), UN Doc. CCPR/
C/84/D/879/1999 (hereinafter Howard v. Canada).
25  Howard v. Canada, para. 12.7.
26  Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993 (15 November 2000), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (hereinafter Apirana Mahuika case).
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measure adopted by New Zealand.27 To this end, a settlement with Maori had been concluded 
in order to preserve the country’s fish stock.28 While a national court, the Waitangi Tribunal, 
concluded for the incompatibility of the settlement with the indigenous fishing rights 
protected under the Waitangi Treaty, the Committee found that the interference of the 
quota system with Maori’s right to culture was not unreasonable and, therefore, it did not 
violate Article 27. In this assessment, it was crucial that an effective process of consultation 
had been conducted by the State. In the reasoning of the Committee, although some Maori 
tribes had opposed the settlement, this had been concluded for the benefit of the community 
as a whole.29 Although the Committee did strike a balance between, on the one hand, the 
need to ensure the attainment of general conservation goals and the needs of Maori with, 
on the other hand, the individual positions of the group’s members, it seems to adhere to a 
vision of majoritarian democracy that is not necessarily in line with indigenous culture. At 
the same time, the reasoning of the Committee is centred on the importance of negotiation 
and settlement when it comes to the definition of the fundamental rights of indigenous 
peoples, which goes in the direction of the recognition of a subjectivity of those peoples.30
In some residual, although ground-breaking cases, that are to be subsumed under 
the third trend, the interference of States’ action with resource and land use, due to 
the environmental degradation caused by development activities, has been considered 
so extensive as to impair the survival and the profitability of indigenous practices, thus 
resulting in a violation of Article 27. In Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada,31 the Committee 
found a violation of Article 27, based on the argument that the granting of leases for oil and 
gas and the construction of a pulp mill in the land set aside as a reserve for the Band was 
27  The general measure was the adoption of the Fisheries Act (1988), which determined a system of quotas 
for the commercial exploitation of fishing resources. After negotiations with Maori, the government adopted 
the Maori Fisheries Act (1989); a Memorandum of understanding was also concluded.
28  The quota system was in contrast respectively with the Fisheries Act, which excludes any effects on Maori 
fishing rights, and with the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), which affirmes Maori’s right to self-determination 
and their control over fishery. A settlement with the government was agreed upon, whereby Maori, with 
respect to commercial fishing rights, were allocated more quotas than other stakeholders in exchange for 
the withdrawal of any pending litigations on fishing quotas and the support for the repeal of the provision 
concerning their fishing rights in the Fisheries Act. As for non-commercial fishing rights, the settlement 
provided for a change of status of Maori’s rights so that these did not give rise to obligations on the part 
of the government, although they were not formally extinguished. This settlement, however, was approved 
only by some members of the Maori community (slightly more than 50%). Furthermore, the Waitangi 
Tribunal concluded that the proposed extinguishment and change of status were contrary to the rights 
ensured in the Waitangi Treaty. The State argued that the settlement was needed to protect the fish stock 
from overexploitation, which is a duty of the State with regard to all New Zealanders: “this was based on the 
reasonable and objective needs of overall sustainable management” (Apirana Mahuika case, para. 7.5).
29  The process of consultation has been conducted by taking into account the spiritual role of fishing for 
Maori. In addition, the settlement provides for “effective possession” of fisheries (Apirana Mahuika case, 
para 9.7). As for non-commercial fisheries, the obligations contained in the Treaty of Waitangi are not 
extinguished. The same conclusion is reached with respect to the discontinuance of pending cases, since this 
was done through a settlement with the community.
30  This reasoning is developed in Chapter 2, section 4.2 and in the Conclusion, section 3.
31  Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/38/D/167/1984) (hereinafter Lubicon case)
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threatening the “right of persons, in community with others, to engage in economic and 
social activities which are part of the culture of the community to which they belong”.32 
The authors had built their argument on the fact that land dispossession was causing the 
destruction of the environment and of their economy so that the “Band’s existence [wa]s 
seriously threatened”.33
More recently, in Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru,34 the Committee was called to assess the 
effects of the diversion of surface and groundwater, carried out without the performance of 
an environmental impact assessment as required by national law, on the enjoyment of the 
right of private and family life granted under Article 17 of the ICCPR.35 Furthermore, the 
author had alleged violation of Article 1(2) on self-determination since her community had 
been deprived of its livelihood following the degradation of their land caused by the drilling 
of wells. In the author’s view, “legislation relating to the environment is the only means the 
indigenous communities have to safeguard their land and natural resources”.36 On the other 
hand, the State argued for the reasonable nature of the restrictions imposed on the author’s 
rights, based on the fact that the main aim of the water diversion project was to ensure the 
availability of drinking water to coastal regions. The Committee considered that it should 
review the author’s allegation against Article 27, thus excluding the legal bases originally 
invoked by the parties. In the interpretation of this provision, the Committee innovated, 
admitting that it could read Article 27 in light of Article 1 on self-determination.37 Self-
determination, therefore, becomes a contextual parameter to interpret the scope of the right 
to culture of indigenous peoples. This interpretative operation is conducted in spite of, 
and maybe because of, the fact that the right to self-determination cannot be reviewed 
by the Committee through the procedure of individual complaints.38 Furthermore, the 
32  Lubicon case, para. 32.2.
33  Lubicon case, paras. 2.3 and 12.
34  Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006 (27 March 2009), UN Doc. CCPR/
C/95/D/1457/2006 (hereinafter Poma Poma case).
35  The Committee found a violation of Art. 17 ICCPR in Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, 
Communication No 549/1993 (29 July 1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 (hereinafter 
Hopu and Bessert v. France). The circumstances were that France had authorised the construction of a touristy 
resort in a sacred territory of the community that had previously been dispossessed. The Committee could 
not conclude for the violation of Art. 27 ICCPR since France had made a reservation on the application of 
this article to its territory.
36  Poma Poma case, para. 5.2.
37  The same argument was used by the Committee in J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster 
Community) et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997 (6 September 2000), UN Doc. CCPR/
C/69/D/760/1997 (hereinafter Diergaardt case). In para. 10.3, the Committee stated that Art. 1 ICCPR 
can be relevant in the interpretation of other articles, such as Art. 25, 26 and 27. In this case, however, the 
Committee found no violation of Art. 27 following from the expropriation of the community’s land. The 
Committee concluded, indeed, that the authors had failed to demonstrate that the immemorial relationship 
with their land had contributed to the formation of a different culture.
38  See Kitok v. Sweden, para. 6.3; Lubicon case, para. 13.3; Diergaardt case, para. 10.3; Apirana Mahuika 
case, para. 7.6. See also, General Comment 23, para 3.1: “The Covenant draws a distinction between the 
right to self-determination and the rights protected under article 27. The former is expressed to be a right 
belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the Covenant. Self-determination is not 
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Committee found a violation of Article 27, in that the development activities conducted 
by the State, although legitimate, were substantially interfering with Article 27.39 The 
admissibility of such interference was further tested by the Committee with reference to 
the implementation of measures that ensure effective participation in the form of free, prior 
and informed consent.40 In addition, the community must be able to continue to benefit 
from the traditional activities that are affected by States’ actions. The interference must also 
be proportional in order not to compromise the survival of the people concerned.41 Further 
criteria assessed by the Committee were the lack of both impact assessment studies and 
measures to minimise the negative effects of water diversion.42
2.1.2. The Committee on the Elimination on Racial Discrimination
The CERD, although not having a specific mandate on indigenous rights, has been proactive 
in their defence. In General Recommendation No. 23 on the rights of indigenous peoples, 
the CERD clearly reaffirms that “discrimination against indigenous peoples falls under 
the scope of the Convention”.43 The CERD has also adopted a number of decisions on 
indigenous peoples under its early warning procedure, whereby it can adopt urgent reports 
to “prevent a serious, massive or persistent pattern of racial discrimination”,44 including the 
“[e]ncroachment on the traditional lands of indigenous peoples or forced removal of these 
peoples from their lands, in particular for the purpose of exploitation of natural resources”.45
a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, relates to rights conferred on 
individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal rights conferred on individuals, 
in Part III of the Covenant and is cognizable under the Optional Protocol.”
39  Poma Poma case, paras. 7.4 and 7.5: the diversion has caused the lama-raising activity to become 
unsustainable and it forced the community to abandon its land and their traditional activity.
40  On free, prior and informed consent, see Chapter 2, section 3.5.
41  Poma Poma case, para. 7.6.
42  Poma Poma case, para 7.7. The requirement of an impact assessment is in line with the right of communities 
to have access to information concerning decisions that might affected them, protected under Art. 27 
ICCPR. See General Comment No. 34 (Art. 19): Freedoms of opinion and expression, UN Doc. CCPR/C/
GC/34 (12 September 2011) (hereinafter General Comment 34). In para. 18, the Committee acknowledges 
that the right to have access to information finds resonance in other provisions of the Covenant. “Under 
article 27, a State party’s decision-making that may substantively compromise the way of life and culture of 
a minority group should be undertaken in a process of information-sharing and consultation with affected 
communities.”
43  CERD, General Recommendation No. 23 on the rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/52/18 (18 
August 1997), Annex V (hereinafter General Recommendation 23). The CERD identifies a causal link 
between deprivation of land and loss of culture (para. 3). In this sense, the CERD calls upon States to return 
lands and territories that indigenous peoples have been deprived of.
44  CERD, Working Paper on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination, Including Early Warning and 
Urgent Procedures, UN Doc. A/48/18 (15 September 1993), Annex III, para. 10(h). See Fodella 2013, 
at 351-352. The decisions taken under the early warning procedure can be adopted on the initiative of 
the CERD itself, of CERD members, or after the procedure is triggered by individuals and groups, thus 
mirroring the monitoring procedure of other human rights treaty bodies. On this last point, see S. James 
Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers 2009), at 199.
45  CERD, Guidelines for the Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedures, UN Doc. A/62/18 (August 
2007), Annex III, para. 12(h).
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In the series of decisions adopted on Suriname,46 the CERD specifically highlighted 
the environmental and health consequences of logging and mining projects initiated without 
the consultation of indigenous peoples and in spite of their land rights. The Committee 
explicitly concluded that Suriname should seek to reach an agreement with its indigenous 
peoples before granting any concessions.47 Furthermore, in the decisions regarding the 
situation of the Western Shoshone people, the United States was called to acknowledge the 
disruptive effects of measures threatening the environment on the enjoyment of cultural 
and health rights of the community.48 Environmental impacts were identified, in particular, 
as a consequence of indigenous land privatisation in favour of extractive industries, logging 
companies, waste storage activities, and nuclear testing initiatives.49 The Committee 
recognised that participation of indigenous peoples in the decisions affecting areas that have 
cultural and spiritual significance for them is instrumental for the enjoyment of substantive 
rights.50
Finally, recommendations and observations on countries’ report when it comes to 
indigenous rights have reiterated the importance of land rights, cultural practices linked 
to the use of natural resources, access to justice, environmental impact assessment, and 
participatory rights in the form of informed consent.51
46  CERD, Decision on Suriname 3 (62), UN Doc. CERD/C/62/Dec/3 (3 June 2003), para. 3; Decision 
on Suriname 1 (69), UN Doc. CERD/C/DEC/SUR/5 (18 August 2006), paras. 1-2. These decisions stand 
out inter alia because they concern Maroon tribes on which the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
will adopt an unprecedented judgment some years later. See Saramaka case, in section 2.2.1 of this chapter. 
In line with the decisions of Suriname, see also CERD, Decision on New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 
2004 1 (66), UN Doc. CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1 (25 April 2005), para. 6, where the Committee criticises, 
in particular, the discriminatory effects on Maori of the extinguishment of their customary titles over the 
foreshore and the seabed.
47  CERD, Decision on Suriname 1 (67), UN Doc. CERD/C/DEC/SUR/2 (18 August 2005), para. 4.
48  See Lorie M. Graham and Nicole Friederichs, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights, and the Environment’ 
[2012] Suffolk University Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 12-01 available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1979745, at 10-12. On the opposition of the US to the conclusions adopted by 
the CERD, see Introduction, note 86.
49  CERD, Decision on United States of America 1 (68), UN Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/1 (11 April 2006) 
(hereinafter Decision 1 (68)), paras. 7, 8, and 10. The CERD also directly referred to the report, adopted by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in the Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Merits, 
Case 11,140, Report No. 75/02 (27 December 2002) (hereinafter Dann case) (para. 6). On the Dann case, 
see infra section 2.2.1 in this chapter.
50  CERD, Concluding observations on United States of America, UN Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 
2008), para. 29. At para. 19, the CERD further reiterates its Decision 1 (68).
51  CERD Report, UN Doc. A/49/18 (19 September 1994), paras. 187, 192, 200, and 245. Concluding 
observations on Australia, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.101 (19 April 2000), paras. 8-9. Concluding 
observations on United States of America, UN Doc. A/56/18 (13 August 2001), para. 400. Concluding 
observations on Suriname, UN Doc. CERD/C/64/CO/9 (28 April 2004), para 15. Concluding observations 
on Guyana, UN Doc. CERD/C/GUY/CO/14 (4 April 2006), paras. 15-17. Concluding observations on 
India, UN Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19 (5 May 2007), para. 19. Concluding observations on Canada, 
UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (25 May 2007), paras. 17, 21, and 22. Concluding observations on 
Sweden, UN Doc. CERD/C/SWE/CO/18 (21 August 2008), paras. 19-21. Concluding observations on 
Philippines, UN Doc. CERD/C/PHL/CO/20 (28 August 2009), paras. 22-25. Concluding observations 
on Chile, UN Doc. CERD/C/CHL/CO/15-18 (7 September 2009), paras. 16, 20, 21, and 22. In this last 
paragraph, concerning the activities that are harmful to the environment, the Committee “recommends 
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2.1.3. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Land and resource rights, as well as consultation with indigenous peoples and their free, 
prior and informed consent have also been considered as fundamental elements in the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the environment in the monitoring activities 
of the CESCR. These requirements have emerged especially in the concluding observations 
that the CESCR has adopted for the last ten years.52
The main rights identified in the ICESCR as an operational framework for the 
protection of indigenous claims are the right to culture under Article 15 and the right to an 
adequate standard of living under Article 11, which includes the right to food and the right 
to adequate housing.53 The relationship between culture and living standards is recognised 
in General Comment No. 21 on Article 15, where the CESCR also emphasised the interplay 
between those rights and the right to self-determination protected under Article 1.54
In this sense, the right to culture is multifaceted since it might include methods of 
production, food, the economic and social life of groups, and a way of life associated with 
land, resources and biodiversity.55 The CESCR has also recognised the collective nature of 
indigenous cultural rights. In short, in the view of the CESCR, culture is something tangible, 
which may be associated with natural resources and with the ownership of a territory on 
the part of a community.56 In this sense, States are invited to protect indigenous rights to 
that scientific assessments should be carried out regularly”. Concluding observations on Argentina, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/ARG/CO/19-20 (29 March 2010), paras. 20-23. To my knowledge there are no individual 
or group complaints submitted under Art. 14 of the Convention related to indigenous rights to land and 
natural resources.
52  Some previous examples of this approach can be detected already in the Report on the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Sessions, UN Doc. CESCR/E/1998/22 (1997), paras. 100 and 116 (Russian Federation), 140, 
156, and 159 (Peru); Report on the Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions, UN Doc. CESCR/E/2000/22 
(1999), paras. 252 (Argentina), 337 (Cameroon), and 387 (Mexico); Report on the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-
Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Sessions, UN Doc. CESCR/E/2002/22 (2001), paras. 121, 130, 132, and 151 
(Honduras), 450 and 466 (Panama), 761 (Colombia); Report on the Thirtieth and Thirty-First Sessions, UN 
Doc. CESCR/E/2004/22 (2003), paras. 142, 143, 165, and 166 (Brazil), 403, 416, and 421 (Guatemala), 
453 (Russian Federation). It is important to highlight that, until recently, the ICESCR did not have a 
mechanism of communications to review alleged violations of rights committed by States. With the adoption 
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New 
York, 10 December 2008, in force 5 May 2013), this mechanism has been put in place. The main novelty is 
that communications can also be submitted by groups.
53  General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), UN Doc. CESCR/E/2000/22 (12 
May 1999), Annex V, para. 13(b); General Comment No. 7: Th e Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11(1)), 
UN Doc. CESCR/E/1998/22 (20 May 1997), Annex IV, para. 11.
54  General Comment No. 21: The Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15(1)(a)), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009) (hereinafter General Comment 21), para. 2. Concluding observations 
on Russian Federation, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94 (12 December 2003), paras. 11 and 39.
55  General Comment 21, para. 3: the right to culture is linked to “the rights of indigenous peoples to 
their cultural institutions, ancestral lands, natural resources and traditional knowledge” and paras. 7, 9, 13, 
15(b), and 36. See also, Concluding observations on Norway, UN Doc. E/C.12/NOR/CO/5 (13 December 
2013), para. 26.
56  General Comment 21, para. 16(a). Appropriateness and acceptability of measures to ensure the protection 
of the right to culture also implies a special understanding of cultural manifestations for communities.
Chapter 1
47
land and natural resources,57 as well as the manifestation of their cultural diversity, which is 
expressed by the use of traditional knowledge.
Restrictions are admissible if necessary, proportional, and, in a language that mimics 
the denial test adopted by the Human Rights Committee, compatible with the nature 
of the rights protected.58 In addition, States should respect the free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous communities or at least ensure consultation with them with a view 
to obtaining consent.59 In particular, consent is needed when extractive projects are to take 
place in indigenous territories, given inter alia the environmental effects of those projects.60 
57  General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000), para. 27. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Art. 11 and 
12) (20 January 2003), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para. 7. Concluding observations on Brazil, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.87 (26 June 2003), paras. 35-36 and 58-59. Concluding observations on Chile, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.105 (1 December 2004), paras. 13 and 33-34. Concluding observations on Ecuador, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100 (7 June 2004), paras. 28 and 53. Concluding observations on Norway, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.109 (23 June 2005), para. 26. Concluding observations on Paraguay, UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/
CO/3 (4 January 2008), paras. 23(b), 28, and 29. Concluding observations on Sweden, UN Doc. E/C.12/
SWE/CO/5 (1 December 2008), para. 15. Concluding observations on Australia, UN Doc. E/C.12/AUS/
CO/4 (12 June 2009), para. 32. Concluding observations on Brazil, UN Doc. E/C.12/BRA/CO/2 (12 June 
2009), para. 9. Concluding observations on Argentina, UN Doc. E/C.12/ARG/CO/3 (14 December 2011), 
para. 8. Concluding observations on Russia, UN Doc. E/C.12/RUS/CO/5 (1 June 2011), paras. 7 and 34. 
Concluding observations on Cameroon, UN Doc. E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3 (23 January 2012), paras. 24 and 
33.
58  General Comment 21, para. 16(c) and (e). Limitations to the right to culture are admissible, as stated 
in para. 19, as long as they are necessary for the protection of general welfare, have a legitimate aim, are 
compatible with the nature of the right, and are proportional. See also Concluding observations on Paraguay, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/CO/3 (4 January 2008), para. 34.
59  General Comment 21, paras. 36-37, 50(c), 55(e). In identifying the rights of indigenous peoples, the 
CESCR refers to the ILO Convention 169 and to the UN Declaration on indigenous rights. Concluding 
observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74 (6 December 2001), para. 33. Concluding 
observations on Brazil, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.87 (26 June 2003), para. 58. Concluding observations on 
Mexico, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (9 June 2006), para. 28. Concluding observations on Mexico, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (9 June 2006), para. 10, where the CESCR expresses its concern inter alia for the 
environmental effects of a dam project on indigenous rights. Concluding observations on Bolivia, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/BOL/CO/2 (8 August 2008), paras. 23 and 36. Concluding observations on Finland, E/C.12/FIN/
CO/5 (16 January 2008), paras. 11 and 20. Concluding observations on Nicaragua, UN Doc. E/C.12/NIC/
CO/4 (28 November 2008), para. 11: the CESCR only recommends to consult with indigenous peoples 
before granting concessions. Concluding observations on Russia, UN Doc. E/C.12/RUS/CO/5 (1 June 
2011), para. 7: free, prior and informed consent is requested for any granting of licences on the territories 
traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples. Concluding observations on New Zealand, UN Doc. E/C.12/
NZL/CO/3 (31 May 2012), para. 11: free, prior and informed consent is to be obtained any time a decision 
is liable to affect the use of indigenous lands and resources. Concluding observations on Peru, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/PER/CO/2-4 (30 May 2012), para. 23. Concluding observations on Gabon, UN Doc. E/C.12/
GAB/CO/1 (27 December 2013), para. 6: free, prior and informed consent is watered down to a principle 
of prior consultation.
60  Concluding observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100 (7 June 2004), paras. 12 and 35. 
Concluding observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (7 June 2010), para. 9. Concluding 
observations on Argentina, UN Doc. E/C.12/ARG/CO/3 (14 December 2011), para. 9. Concluding 
observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (13 December 2012), para. 9: the Committee 
refers to the Sarayaku decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (see infra). Concluding 
observations on Indonesia, UN Doc. E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (19 June 2014), paras. 28-29. It is important to 
highlight that the right to express consent does not arise automatically any time extractive projects are to 
take place. Consultation, “with a view to ensuring that these activities do not deprive the indigenous peoples 
of the full enjoyment of their rights to their ancestral lands and natural resources”, may be a sufficient 
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In this sense, mining activities are deemed to endanger the enjoyment of indigenous rights 
to land and natural resources due to the disrupting impact of extractive industries on the 
environment.61 In any event, both consultation and free, prior and informed consent are 
instrumental for preserving the substance of indigenous rights.62
The CESCR has also taken into account the environmental aspects of indigenous 
rights when development projects concerning the exploitation of natural resources negatively 
affect either the quality and diversity of natural resources or access to land.63 Importantly, 
the CESCR has recognised that even national measures aimed to protect nature, such as the 
establishment of natural reserves, may produce disrupting consequences in terms of access 
to land for indigenous peoples.64
2.1.4. The ILO monitoring system
The ILO Convention 169 is the only binding instrument specifically dedicated to the rights 
of indigenous peoples.65 Therefore, the analysis of its monitoring system may help to further 
clarify the relationship between indigenous rights and the environment.
The ILO Convention 169 is subject, as any other ILO treaties, to a mechanism of 
ordinary monitoring of its implementation, whereby State Parties prepare periodical reports 
that are examined by the Committee of Experts.66 In addition to that, Article 24 of the ILO 
measure. See Concluding observations on Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (12 June 2009), para. 
16. Concluding observations on Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009), para. 13. See 
also Concluding observations on Cameroon, UN Doc. E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3 (23 January 2012), para. 
10: the CESCR refers to the right of indigenous peoples to be involved in projects that affect them. The 
spectrum of participatory rights and the circumstances requiring consultation and free, prior and informed 
consent are examined in detail in Chapter 2, section 3.5.
61  A conflict of laws may arise when extractive activities are promoted by legislative measures that are in 
contrast with parallel legislative measures protecting indigenous rights. See Concluding observations on 
Philippines, UN Doc. E/C.12/PHL/CO/4 (1 December 2008), para. 16.
62  See Concluding observations on Cambodia 2009 supra, para. 16.
63  See Concluding observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74 (6 December 2001), para. 
12. Concluding observations on Paraguay, UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/CO/3 (4 January 2008), paras. 16 and 
27. Concluding observations on Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (12 June 2009), paras. 15 
and 16. Concluding observations on Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009), para. 
35. Concluding observations on Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (16 
December 2009), para. 14. Concluding observations on Madagascar, UN Doc. E/C.12/MDG/CO/2 (16 
December 2009), para. 33. Concluding observations on Argentina, UN Doc. E/C.12/ARG/CO/3 (14 
December 2011), para. 10. Concluding observations on Ethiopia, UN Doc. E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3 (31 
May 2012), para. 24. Concluding observations on Djibouti, UN Doc. E/C.12/DJI/CO/1-2 (30 December 
2013), para. 29.
64  Concluding observations on Sri Lanka, UN Doc. E/C.12/LKA/CO/2-4 (9 December 2010), para. 11. 
A more recent trend is the acknowledgment of the negative impacts of climate change on indigenous rights, 
including the right to food and the right to water. See Concluding observations on Australia, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/AUS/CO/4 (12 June 2009), para. 27.
65  On the origins of this treaty within the ILO system, see ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in 
Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 (ILO 2009) at 174 ff. and Rodriguez-Piñero 2005 at 291-331. 
On the significance of ILO Convention 107, see Introduction, section 3.1.
66  Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.
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Constitution provides for a special mechanism of complaint that is called “representation”.67 
Through this mechanism, association of workers or employers may submit a complaint 
alleging the violation of treaty provisions by State Parties that is examined by a Tripartite 
Committee upon decision of the ILO Governing Body.68
The representation procedure was activated several times since the end of the 1990s 
with regard to the ILO Convention 169.69 What has emerged from the reports adopted by 
the Governing Body is an emphasis on the establishment of mechanisms for the consultation 
of indigenous peoples any time a development project can impact on their rights. However, 
this general statement has two caveats. First, consultation is in some cases only formal, 
meaning that the mere existence of a consultation process is found to meet the requirements 
on participation that are included in Article 6, even when an inquiry on the effectiveness 
of consultation processes is not carried out.70 The acknowledgement of the existence of a 
consultation process is a modest undertaking considering that Article 6(2) stipulates that 
“[t]he consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in 
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent to the proposed measures”.
Second, there is often a mismatch between the innovative force of the provisions 
contained in the ILO Convention 169 on land and resources and the comments adopted by 
the Committee of experts,71 on the one hand, and the mild review of those rights undertaken 
under the representation procedure, on the other hand. For instance, in a report adopted on 
67  On the importance of the development of general international law for the monitoring process in the 
ILO, see ILO, Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights through ILO Conventions: A Compilation of 
ILO Supervisory Bodies’ Comments 2009-2010 (ILO 2010), at 8. Notwithstanding this, the representation 
procedure presents significant differences compared to the complaint procedures related to other international 
human rights bodies. First, the ILO procedure does not require the exhaustion of internal remedies. Second, 
when a representation is made, the Governing Body following the State’s allegations may decide whether or 
not to defer the issue to the Tripartite Body. Third, although individuals and groups other than employers’ 
and workers’ associations cannot initiate the procedure, the complainants are not expected to demonstrate 
a link with the alleged violation. This flexibility, however, is compounded by the abstention in the 
recommendations eventually adopted by the Governing Body of any concrete solution to the case at hand. 
See Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, ‘Historical Anomalies, Contemporary Consequences: international Supervision 
of the ILO-Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169)’ (2005) 12 Law & Anthropology 55, 
at 61, 82-83.
68  It is important to highlight that this mechanism does not allow indigenous peoples to present their 
complaints directly. This runs counter the logic of empowerment that is present in the ILO Convention 169.
69  See Fergus MacKay, A Guide to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the International Labour Organization (Forest 
Peoples Programme 2002), at 26 ff.
70  See Rodríguez-Piñero 2005, at 89; Federica Cittadino, ‘The Public Interest to Environmental Protection 
and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Procedural Rights to Participation and Substantive Guarantees’ in Eva 
Lohse and Margherita Poto (eds), Participatory Rights in the Environmental Decision-Making Process and the 
Implementation of the Aarhus Convention: A Comparative Perspective (Ducker&Humblot 2015). See also, 
section 3.5 in Chapter 2.
71  For a brief overview of these comments concerning land rights, see Mauro Barelli and others, Minority 
Groups and Litigation: A Review of Developments in International and Regional Jurisprudence (Minority 
Rights Group International 2011), at 33-35. See also Tanja Joona, ‘International Norms and Domestic 
Practices in Regard to ILO Convention No. 169 - With Special Reference to Articles 1 and 13-19’ (2010) 
12 International Community Law Review 213, at 245-258.
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Mexico in 1998 concerning the problem of land restitution to indigenous peoples in case 
private third farmers hold land titles, the Committee concluded that it was not competent 
to review the adequateness of restitution procedures that are already in place.72 In partial 
mitigation of this, the Committee indicated consultation as a central requirement when a 
government is to decide on the procedures to adjudicate land.73
More specifically on the relationship between indigenous peoples and the environment, 
consultation is the recurrent procedural element which is identified by the ILO Committee 
as a means to balance national development initiatives with indigenous rights. In this 
respect, the main problem lies in the fact that national projects for the exploitation of natural 
resources that are conducive to economic development may encroach on indigenous rights. 
As established by the Committee, timber and mineral resources are often located in the 
territories that belong to or are traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples.74 Furthermore, 
the exploration and exploitation of these resources has been found to produce direct negative 
effects on indigenous lands,75 which may be aggravated by the environmental degradation 
resulting frequently from these development projects.76 In this context, consultation is a 
72  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Trade Union Delegation, D-III-57, section XI of the National Trade Union of Education Workers 
(SNTE) (1998), para. 41.
73  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Peru of the 
Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP) (1998), para. 31. In para. 30, the Committee 
clarified that it is not competent to affirm the primacy of collective land arrangements for indigenous 
peoples. See also Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance 
by Denmark of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 
24 of the ILO Constitution by the National Confederation of Trade Unions of Greenland (Sulinermik 
Inuussutissarsiuteqartut Kattuffiat-SIK) (SIK) (2001), paras. 33 and 40, where the Committee affirmes that 
since the complainants cannot be distinguished from the main indigenous population of Greenlanders, the 
failure to consult with that specific tribe does not violate the ILO Convention 169.
74  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Bolivia of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Bolivian Central of Workers (COB) (1999), para. 10. Report of the Committee set up to examine 
the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederación Ecuatoriana de 
Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL) (2001), para. 10. The notion of traditional occupation of 
indigenous territories is crucial to the definition of the right to land under the ILO Convention 169. On 
this, see Geir Ulfstein, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land’ (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 1, at 18-19.
75  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Colombia 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union (CUT) (2001), paras. 28 ff. on the issuing of a petroleum 
exploration licence. Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance 
by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of 
the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union (CUT) and the Colombian Medical Trade 
Union Association (2001), para. 15: the construction of a hydroelectric dam and the consequent deviation 
of the river Sinù altered the indigenous peoples’ livelihood since it affected the population’s ability to fish and 
their traditional relation with the river.
76  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
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means to ensure that indigenous voices are taken into account and are integrated in the 
process of land and resource adjudication.
The main features of consultation and participation are those identified in Articles 6 
and 7 of the ILO Convention 169, in combination with Article 15 when natural resources 
are concerned. The first requirement is to put in place a regulatory framework which provides 
adequate means of consultation that are both culturally appropriate77 and conducive to 
reaching agreement or consensus.78 Although consent is not a requirement per se, as recalled 
by the Committee in the totality of its reports, consultation must strive to bring about an 
agreed solution. This integrates the second requirement for consultation. Good faith is the 
third requirement, which implies inter alia that consultation should be carried out from the 
very early stage of project conceptualisation before any project impacting on indigenous 
peoples is commenced.79
In addition, consultation is tightly bound to participation under Article 7, which 
is used by the Committee to call for the implementation of impact studies to assess the 
social, cultural, and environmental impacts of development projects.80 These studies must 
by the Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated Workers (1999), para. 9: the case concerned the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam which would flood areas inhabited by indigenous peoples. Report of the 
Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central 
Unitary Workers’ Union (CUT), para. 13: the impact on indigenous rights derived from the construction 
of a highway. Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by 
Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Union of Metal, Steel, Iron and Allied Workers (STIMAHCS) (2006), para. 14. In para. 
36, the Committee recalls article 7(3) [sic 7(4)] according to which “[g]overnments shall take measures, 
in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the territories 
they inhabit”. Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by 
Guatemala of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the 
ILO Constitution by the Federation of Country and City Workers (FTCC) (2007), para. 13. Report of the 
Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Peru of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the General 
Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP), paras. 12 and 17.
77  This means inter alia that consultation is to be conducted with the community’s representatives. See 
Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), paras. 43-44.
78  Representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by nine workers’ organizations (2004), para. 
89.
79  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated Workers, para. 41. Report of the Committee set up 
to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederación 
Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), para. 38.
80  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Bolivia of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Bolivian Central of Workers (COB), paras. 38-39. Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Guatemala of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Federation of Country and City 
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be undertaken with the collaboration of the indigenous peoples concerned. Moreover, they 
should be the basis for compensation when indigenous lands or practices are affected.81 
Furthermore, as far as natural resources are involved, consultation within the meaning of 
Article 15 is the central element even when States retain property over subsoil resources.82 
Finally, the Committee has recommended the implementation of measures that ensure the 
participation of indigenous peoples in the benefits deriving from development activities 
carried out on their territories.83
Although these requirements are clearly affirmed in the Committee’s reports, 
ambiguities remain as for the ascertainment of the violation of those standards. While in 
some cases the lack of sufficient information by the government on the respect of consultation 
requirements may result in a declaration of the violation of the ILO Convention 169, in 
some other cases insufficient or contradictory information provided by the parties make the 
Committee refrain from finding any violation.84 At the same time, while in some cases the 
Committee goes so far as to affirm that consultation and participation must be effective,85 
Workers (FTCC), para. 51: the conduct of impact studies should not replace consultation.
81  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated Workers, para. 40.
82  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Guatemala 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Federation of Country and City Workers (FTCC), para. 48.
83  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Bolivia of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Bolivian Central of Workers (COB), para. 40. Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union 
(CUT), para. 91.
84  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution 
by the Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated Workers, para. 43. Report of the Committee set up 
to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Union of Metal, 
Steel, Iron and Allied Workers (STIMAHCS), paras. 41 ff. Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Peru of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the General Confederation of Workers of Peru 
(CGTP), para. 33.
85  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Colombia 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union (CUT), para. 90. In Report of the Committee set up 
to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederación 
Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), para. 40: the Committee affirms that consultation 
is instrumental for the right of indigenous peoples to decide their developmental priorities. Report of the 
Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Brazil of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Union 
of Engineers of the Federal District (SENGE/DF), paras. 42-44: although the Committee requires effective 
consultation and participation, it concludes that the lack of provisions on the need to perform impact studies 
does not breach the standards on consultation.
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in some other cases it limits itself to assess whether a consultation process is in place.86 
Notwithstanding ambiguities, the requirement of consultation remains central to the ILO 
regime and has been enriched by other procedural requirements, such as the performance 
of impact assessments.
2.2. The regional mechanisms of human rights protection
2.2.1. The Inter-American system
The Inter-American system of human rights protection is centred on the monitoring 
and adjudicatory role of the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. The former may receive individual or group complaints alleging the 
violation of the rights contained in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Men.87 The latter’s jurisdictional role is activated on the initiative of the Commission and 
examines the alleged violations of the American Convention on Human Rights.88 Together 
these bodies have contributed enormously both to the regional and the global protection of 
indigenous rights. Their decisions have crystallised a number of rights, including the right 
to land and natural resources, drawing from both hard and soft law instruments.89
What is peculiar about the conclusions reached within the Inter-American system is 
that a system of indigenous collective rights is derived from the catalogues of individual 
rights contained in the Declaration and in the Convention.90 The general techniques of 
contextual and systemic interpretation have been (consciously) used to expand the scope 
of existing rights,91 in line with the precept that “human rights treaties are live instruments 
86  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Colombia 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union (CUT) and the Colombian Medical Trade Union 
Association, paras. 59-61. See also, Representation alleging non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by nine 
workers’ organizations, para. 106, where the Committee concludes that although more consultations would 
have been appropriate, they were not necessary to fulfil the ILO Convention’s requirements. Report of the 
Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Argentina of the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the 
Education Workers Union of Río Negro (UNTER), local section affiliated to the Confederation of Education 
Workers of Argentina (CTERA) (2008), paras. 68-69.
87  American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men, adopted by the Ninth International Conference 
of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, 1948 (hereinafter American Declaration).
88  American Convention on Human Rights (San Jose, 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978). On 
issues of jurisdiction, see Jo M. Pasqualucci, ‘The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-
American Human Rights System’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 281, at 282-283. On the functioning 
of both the Commission and the Court, see also Jorge Daniel Taillant, ‘Environmental Advocacy and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System’ in Romina Picolotti and Jorge Daniel Taillant (eds), Linking Human 
Rights and the Environment (University of Arizona Press 2003), at 126-144.
89  See Chapter 2, section 3.
90  Isabel Madariaga Cuneo, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Human Rights 
System’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 53, at 54.
91  On the relevance of contextual and systemic interpretation to the Inter-American system of human rights, 
see Lucas Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at 
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whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times”.92
As for the environmental dimension of indigenous rights, this has to be found once 
again in the interplay between the rights of indigenous peoples and the projects implemented 
at the national level that may affect both indigenous livelihood and the environment in 
which they live.93 The central elements of this relationship are the right to land and natural 
resources, as well as the procedural and substantive limits that are identified within the 
Inter-American system to the restriction of those rights.94
While the Yanomami case did not discuss the relevance of the right to property to the 
allegation that a mining project in the territory of Yanomami was violating the Declaration,95 
the decision of the Inter-American Court in the Awas Tingni case has established for the 
the Service of the Unity of International Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 585, at 
597-598. According to this author, article 29(b) of the American Convention is used to incorporate national 
and international standards in the interpretation of the rights protected by the regional instrument. See also, 
Dann case, paras. 124-125, where the Inter-American Commission argues that the American Declaration 
should be interpreted in light of the “broader corpus of international law”. This interpretative technique 
has been also used in the Yanomami v. Brazil, Merits, Case 76/15, Resolution No. 12/85 (5 March 1985) 
(hereinafter Yanomami case), paras. 3, 5 and 7 of the Commission’s decision; in Maya Indigenous Communities 
of the Toledo District v. Belize, Merits, Case 12,053; Report No. 40/04 (12 October 2004) (hereinafter Maya 
v. Belize), paras. 87, 95, and 97; in Saramaka case, paras. 92-94; in Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People 
of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Case No. 12,465 (27 June 2012) (hereinafter 
Sarayaku case), para. 161. The argument is also teleological, since the Inter-American Commission also 
refers to the purpose of the American Declaration. See Dann case, para. 131.
92  See Awas Tingni case, para. 146. See also Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Series C No. 125 (17 June 2005) (hereinafter Yakye Axa case), paras. 125-
126. The reference to the possibility to adapt the catalogue of fundamental rights to present times is in line 
with the ECtHR’s doctrine that portraits the ECHR as a living instrument. See S. James  Anaya and Claudio 
Grossman, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2002) 19 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, at 12. See also, Pasqualucci 
2006, at 285; Cuneo 2005, at 56. The system of collective rights influences the regional protection of 
indigenous rights in Africa, see infra section 2.2.2 in this chapter.
93  It important to highlight that, similarly to the environment-related case law before the ECtHR, petitioners 
must have a direct interest in pursuing their claim. In line with this, the Inter-American Commission has 
rejected the Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (7 December 2005), 
since it regarded the effects of climate change and related inaction of the State with regard to the rights of 
indigenous peoples. See Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ (2009) 09-002 Buffet Center 
for International and Comparative Studies - Working Paper Series 1, at 16-19; Sheila Watt-Cloutier, ‘Global 
Warming and Human Rights’ [2013] available at http://ieenvironmentorg/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
CIEL-and-Earthjustice.pdf, available at http://ieenvironment.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CIEL-and-
Earthjustice.pdf (last accessed October 2016). The petition is available at: http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/
files/library/legal_docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-
circumpolar-conference.pdf (last accessed October 2016).
94  See Chapter 2, section 3.
95  Yanomami case. The Commission did not discuss the right to property invoked by the petitioners, as 
highlighted by Efrén C. Olivares Alanís, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and the Extractive Industry: Jurisprudence 
From the Inter-American System of Human Rights’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 
187, at 195. The Commission, however, found a violation of the right to life under Art. I of the American 
Declaration. See Heinämäki 2012, at 449. Further elements of interest in this case are the following points. 
Brazilian national law protects indigenous rights to property at constitutional level. Moreover, a national 
law creates an obligation to demarcate indigenous lands, while establishing that the right to permanent 
possession shall not depend on demarcation. In reaching its decision, the Commission considered those 
elements in conjunction with Art. 27 ICCPR.
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first time the centrality of indigenous land rights. In this case, failure to demarcate the land 
and to ensure the respect for indigenous property was aggravated by the granting of logging 
licences without the consent of the community.96 The Court found inter alia a violation on 
the part of Nicaragua of Article 21, which protects the right to property and, by means of 
the evolutionary interpretation of the content of this right, also safeguards the “communal 
form of collective property” that is practiced by indigenous peoples.97 This form of property 
includes the resources traditionally used by the communities. Furthermore, property goes 
beyond the concept of material possession, since it encompasses the centrality of land for the 
physical, cultural, and spiritual survival of indigenous peoples so that land becomes key to 
cultural integrity and to the very existence of indigenous peoples as separated communities.98 
Therefore, any action threatening the environment and thus affecting indigenous lands and 
resources may pose a significant risk for the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples.99
The violation of Article 21 in the Awas Tingni case was also ascertained by considering 
the impact that logging licences would have on the rights of indigenous peoples to enjoy their 
resources. The granting of licences for the exploitation of natural resources was considered, 
together with the failure to demarcate, as violating the right to property protected under the 
American Convention on Human Rights.100 In this sense, the Court found that Nicaragua 
should abstain from engaging in any activities aimed at the exploitation of natural resources 
until traditional land would be demarcated.101 The main goal here was to prevent the State 
96  For background information on the case, see S. James Anaya, ‘The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect in 
Nicaragua’ (1996-1997) 9 St Thomas Law Review 157. See also, S. James Anaya, ‘The Mayagna Indigenous 
Community of Awas Tingni and its Effort to Gain Recognition of Traditional Lands. The Community’s 
Case before the Human Rights Institutions of the Organization of American States’ in Romina Picolotti and 
Jorge Daniel Taillant (eds), Linking Human Rights and the Environment (University of Arizona Press 2003).
97  Awas Tingni case, para. 149. On the evolutionary interpretation of Art. 21 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights in this case, see Mauricio Iván del Toro Huerta, ‘El derecho de propriedad colectiva de los 
miembros de comunidades y pueblos indégenas en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos’ (2010) 10 Anuario mexicano de derecho internacional 49, at 60.
98  See Maya v. Belize, paras. 120 and 154-156; Yakye Axa case, paras. 131, 135, and 154. Case of 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Series C No. 
146 (29 March 2006) (hereinafter Sawhoyamaxa case), para. 118. Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and 
Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Merits, Case 12,354, Report No. 125/12 
(13 November 2012), para. 208. Although property goes beyond material possession in the sense illustrated 
above, possession intended as a manifestation of ownership may suffice to determine indigenous property 
rights. See Awas Tingni case, para. 151. This is in line with the legal pluralism embraced by the Inter-
American Court, whereby indigenous customary law is integrated in the interpretation of the international 
human rights of indigenous peoples. A reference to the “customary land tenure system” is also made by the 
Inter-American Commission in the Dann case, para. 45, in the Maya v. Belize case infra para. 107, 115, 129; 
by the Inter-American Court in the Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 128, in the Saramaka case, para. 95. On the sui 
generis character of indigenous traditional property and its anchoring in the national jurisprudence of some 
States, see S. James Anaya and R. A. Williams Jr., ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands 
and Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2001) 14 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 33, at 43-48. See also Chapter 2, especially sections 3.1 and 3.3.
99  This argument is supported in the Dann case, para. 60.
100  Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 38.
101  Awas Tingni case, paras. 153 and 164. It is relevant to note that the titling and demarcation must be 
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from negatively affecting the enjoyment of indigenous rights, by excluding any activities 
that might produce any relevant interference, including projects carried out by private actors 
with the acquiescence of the State. A reference to the environmental aspects of national 
developmental activities is not explicit but can be derived from the insistence of the Court 
on the need to preserve the land and resources of the indigenous peoples concerned.102
With different nuances the granting of licences for the exploitation of natural resources 
was found to integrate the violation of Article 21 in a number of other cases. In the Dann 
case, the expropriation of indigenous lands was accompanied by the authorisation of gold 
prospecting activities, which had produced negative effects on the environment.103 In the 
decision taken by the Commission in the Maya of the Toledo District v. Belize, the granting 
of logging and oil concessions and the resulting environmental damages played a decisive 
role in the ascertainment of the violation of the right to property.104 Important elements 
of this decision were also the granting of precautionary measures to suspend the activities 
carried out “in accordance with the customary law, values, customs and mores of the Community” (para. 
138). Once again, property is a broader notion than the Western conception of individual property. This 
is reiterated in para. 144, where the Court gives a definition of property, including “incorporeal elements 
and any other intangible object capable of having value”, and in para. 151, which emphasises the role of 
indigenous customary law.
102  The stewardship role of indigenous peoples towards the preservation of natural resources is highlighted 
in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Cançado Trindade, Pacheco Goez and Abreu Burelli to the Awas 
Tingni case, para. 9: “Hence the importance of the strengthening of the spiritual and material relationship 
of the members of the Community with the lands they have occupied, not only to preserve the legacy 
of past generations, but also to undertake the responsibilities that they have assumed in respect of future 
generations. Hence, moreover, the necessary prevalence that they attribute to the element of conservation 
over the simple exploitation of natural resources.”
103  According to the petitioners’ allegations, the mining activity had “affected the Danns’ use of their 
ancestral lands and has contaminated the ground water” (para. 40). The establishment of land titles by the 
State was indicated as a way to remedy violation of the right to property (para. 171), as well as the right to 
equality (para. 143). Furthermore, the Commission stressed the obligation for States to take special measures 
to remedy past wrongs (para. 125). On the environmental aspects of the Dann case, see also Deborah Schaaf 
and Julie Fishel, ‘Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights: Victory for Indian Land Rights and the Environment’ (2002) 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 
175.
104  Maya v. Belize, para. 2, the petitioners argued that “the State’s contraventions have impacted negatively 
on the natural environment”. In line with the Awas Tingni case, the Commission further recommended that 
the State should “abstain from any acts that might lead the agents of the State itself, or third parties acting 
with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located 
in the geographical area occupied and used by the Maya people until their territory is properly delimited, 
demarcated and titled” (para. 6). At para. 136, the Commission added: “the Commission considers that 
the right to use and enjoy property may be impeded when the State itself, or third parties acting with 
the acquiescence or tolerance of the State, affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of that property 
without due consideration of and informed consultations with those having rights in the property. In this 
regard, other human rights bodies have found the issuance by states of natural resource concessions to third 
parties in respect of the ancestral territory of indigenous people to contravene the rights of those indigenous 
communities. In the Awas Tingni Case, for example”. At para. 148, the Commission went so far as saying 
that environmental damage had exacerbated the violation of the right to property. See Cuneo 2005, at 58.
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that posed a risk to indigenous livelihood,105 the emphasis on consultation rights,106 and 
the unprecedented order to repair the environmental damage caused by the logging and 
drilling activities.107 More recently, in the Garifuna v. Honduras, the Inter-American 
Commission went so far as to establish a direct link between development activities and 
resource exploitation, on the one hand, and the negative impact on indigenous territories 
and the violation of land rights, on the other hand.108
A change of paradigm came with the Inter-American judgment in the case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname.109 The case does not alter the well-established link between the 
granting of licences for the exploitation of natural resources and the violation of indigenous 
property rights. What is really innovative instead is the identification of the procedural 
undertakings that the State must perform to lawfully restrict the rights of indigenous 
peoples to land and natural resources while being in compliance with the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights. The case concerned the granting of gold-mining and 
logging concessions in the territory of the tribal community of Saramaka without prior 
consultation. The activities following from these concessions had caused environmental 
damages, thus impacting on the capacity of the Saramaka people to use their resources.110
Since the right to land implies also a right to use the natural resources that are 
traditionally employed and necessary for the survival of indigenous peoples,111 it is necessary 
in the view of the Court to verify to what extent restrictions placed on resource rights may 
amount to a violation of Article 21. This does not mean that those rights are absolute, as 
previously established in the Yakye Axa decision;112 however, there are limits to the possibility 
of States to restrict them, the respect of which should be evaluated by the judiciary. Those 
limits are the establishment of any restrictions by law with a view to pursuing a legitimate 
105  As for the granting of precautionary measures, see also the decision of admissibility of the Inter-American 
Commission in the case Community of San Mateo de Huanchor and its members v. Peru, Petition 504/03, 
Admissibility, Report No. 69/04 (15 October 2004), paras. 11-13. The measures had been requested to 
protect the indigenous community affected by the pollution produced by a field of toxic waste sludge. For a 
general view on the precautionary measures granted by the Inter-American Commission and the provisional 
measures ordered by the Inter-American Court, see Olivares Alanís 2013, at 207-208.
106  Ibid., at 199.
107  Maya v. Belize, para. 3 of the recommendations. At para. 49, the Commission refers to the Ogoni 
decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, infra.
108  Garífuna Community of ‘Triunfo de la Cruz’ and its Members v. Honduras, Admissibility, Petition 906-03, 
Report No. 29/06 (14 May 2006).
 (hereinafter Garífuna v. Honduras), para. 252.
109  For a comment on the Saramaka case, see Lisl Brunner, ‘The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: 
The Saramaka People Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 7 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 699.
110  Saramaka case, para. 154.
111  Saramaka case, para. 122.
112  Yakye Axa case, para. 149, according to which the right over natural resources has to do with the survival 
of indigenous peoples. However, this does not mean that indigenous rights must necessarily prevail over 
other rights or needs. In any case, the evaluation on the prevalence of indigenous rights over other interests 
must be performed by the State judiciary. See Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 136.
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interest in a democratic society, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the national 
measures aiming to restrict indigenous rights.113
Furthermore, those restrictions should not translate into a denial of indigenous rights, 
including the adoption of any measures that might impinge on the physical and cultural 
survival of indigenous peoples.114 Therefore, in order for national development activities not 
to amount to a denial of indigenous rights, the State must ensure the effective participation 
of indigenous peoples in any decision-making process that might affect their rights,115 the 
sharing of the benefits deriving from the development activities, and the performance of 
impact studies to evaluate the effect of those activities on indigenous livelihood.116 Although 
the community has not traditionally used subsoil resources, these conditions are to be 
applied also in the case of mining concessions, since mining may negatively affect the use of 
traditional resources on the part of the indigenous community concerned.117
In the Xákmok Kásek case,118 the community had suffered from progressive displacement 
and expropriation at the end of the nineteenth century. The complaint before the Inter-
American system, therefore, was aimed to recover traditional land. Unlike other decisions, 
in this case the State of Paraguay further interfered with the property of traditional land, 
by establishing a private protected nature reserve.119 This allegedly conservationist measure 
implied a prohibition for the community to live on the protected area or to use the natural 
resources therein located. In concluding inter alia for the violation of the right to property, 
the Inter-American Court took into account the lack of participation of the indigenous 
community affected in the decision of establishing a nature reserve, together with the fact 
that this establishment constituted an obstacle to the process of land recovery.120
The decision in Sarayaku v. Ecuador offers new elements for clarifying the relationship 
between the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples in the Inter-American system. 
113  These conditions were already enunciated in the Yakye Axa decision, at the paras. 144-146. Moreover, 
those limits are usually used by the European Court of Human Rights to assess the legality of the restrictions 
imposed on individual rights. See CoE 2012, at 51. The main difference lies maybe in the margin of 
appreciation that is left to public authorities when applying those guarantees within the European system of 
protection of human rights.
114  Saramaka case, paras. 122, 128. See Fodella 2013, at 355; Olivares Alanís 2013, at 204.
115  This implies at least a right of consultation. The obligation for the State to obtain the prior, informed 
consent of the peoples affected may arise under special circumstances, indicated in paras. 133-134 of the 
Saramaka decision.
116  Saramaka case, para. 129.
117  See Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, at 405; Heinämäki 2012, at 447. The Court also made reference to 
the continuity of its decision with the report adopted by the Human Rights Committee Apirana Mahuika 
case (para. 130). These standards are not surprising given the fact that the Saramaka decision was issued only 
three months after the adoption of the UNDRIP.
118  Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Case No. 12,440 (24 August 2010) (hereinafter Xákmok Kásek case).
119  Xákmok Kásek case, paras. 80-82. The establishment of a nature reserve was found to impinge on 
indigenous land rights also in the Garifuna v. Honduras case, paras. 264 and 266. 
120  Xákmok Kásek case, paras. 157 and 169.
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The case concerned the alleged violation of the rights of the Kichwa nation following the 
granting of licences for oil exploration and exploitation on their traditional territory with 
neither consent nor consultation. Unlike other cases, the land tenure of indigenous peoples 
was well established. The Court eventually established that the granting of oil licences had 
violated indigenous property rights by reason of the State’s failure to respect the requirement 
of prior consultation.121
The complainants further alleged the violation of their right to culture under Article 
26.122 The Court found that the right to consultation is inter alia grounded in the cultural 
rights of indigenous peoples.123 Furthermore, it concluded that the obligation to consult 
is a general principle of international law.124 Consultation in this sense is instrumental 
not only for protecting property rights in the narrow sense, but also for ensuring that the 
cultural component of land rights is effectively fulfilled.125 The Court upheld the criteria 
included in the ILO Convention 169 to evaluate the effectiveness of consultation; this must 
be done timely, in good faith, with the appropriate means, and with the aim of achieving 
an agreement.126
Most recently, the Kaliña and Lokono case has innovated in the matter since it has 
explicitly considered the compatibility of conservation measures with indigenous rights.127 
While in principle the two interests are not incompatible, the restrictions on indigenous 
rights stemming from the persistence of nature reserves on indigenous territories must be 
evaluated, beyond considering participation and benefit-sharing, also with reference to the 
continued possibility for indigenous peoples to have access to their resources.128 The Court 
has also acknowledged that indigenous peoples might be entitled in this case to restitution, 
although not reaching definitive conclusion on this point.129 In any event, the Court has 
not only explicitly recognised that conservation may encroach on indigenous rights, but 
it has also provided criteria for addressing those conflicts in a way that is compatible with 
indigenous rights.
This analysis of recent cases concludes that the Inter-American system places great 
emphasis on the procedural aspects of land rights, as well as on cultural integrity, which 
constitutes a broader concept encompassing land rights. Therefore, land rights can be 
121  Reparation in this case took inter alia the form of restitution. Ecuador was ordered to remove the explosives 
the private company had placed to carry out explorative activities and to proceed to the reforestation of the 
affected lands. See Sarayaku case, paras. 289-295.
122  Sarayaku case, para. 137.
123  Sarayaku case, para. 159.
124  Sarayaku case, para. 164.
125  Sarayaku case, paras. 171 and 212 ff.
126  Sarayaku case, para. 177. There is an ambiguity, which is discussed in Chapter 2, section 3.5, between 
the need to hold consultations as opposed to the need to seek consent. See Olivares Alanís 2013, at 209, 212.
127  Kaliña and Lokono case, paras. 161-198.
128  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 181.
129  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 168.
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infringed indirectly, even when land tenure is ensured, if activities that have an impact on 
the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples are carried out without the consultation of the 
peoples affected.
Once again what appears central in the reasoning of the Court is the recourse to 
contextual and systemic interpretation, with the incorporation into the Inter-American 
system of standards extraneous to the inter-American system, such as the ILO Convention 
169 or the UN Declaration on indigenous rights,130 and/or of national standards derived 
from national constitutions, internal laws, and national jurisdictions.
This contamination can be explained in two ways. First, the reference to national 
standards testifies of a regional consent on a number of rights.131 The dialogue between courts 
is multidirectional in the sense that national courts also apply international standards when 
adjudicating indigenous rights. Second, international treaty obligations that are outside the 
scope of the Inter-American system, such as those contained in the ILO Convention 169, 
can be invoked by the Inter-American Court in view of their ratification by the members 
of the Organisation of Latin American States by virtue of Article 29(b) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights132 and, more generally, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Indeed, 
there is an ambiguity in these patterns since, while in some cases the Court made reference 
to the ratification of the international instrument invoked, in other cases the integration 
of international standards was not justified by the ratification of those standards by the 
respondent State.133 A similar result could have been produced if the Inter-American Court 
had considered other international norms in the application of the American Convention, 
such as general principles of international law or international customary law. The Court, 
however, has never explicitly referred to these sources, except for the general principle of 
consultation in the Sarayaku case.
130  See Heinämäki 2012, at 447-448. See Saramaka case, paras. 92-93, 131 and 138, note 137; Sarayaku 
case, paras. 160, note 178, 166, note 217 and 185, note 242. See also, Endorois case, para. 154.
131  See Gerald L. Neuman, ‘Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 101. See also, ILO, Application of Convention 
No. 169 by Domestic and International Courts in Latin America (ILO 2009), and Adriana Fabra and 
Eva Arnal, ‘Review of Jurisprudence on Human Rights and the Environment in Latin America’ (2002) 
2 Yearbook of Human Rights & Environment 153. On the constitutional framework in Latin America 
with respect to indigenous peoples’ rights, see Alexandra Tomaselli, ‘Tutela dei popoli indigeni in America 
Latina: equilibrismi tra costruzioni costituzionali e standard internazionali’ in Giovanni Poggeschi (ed), Le 
iperminoranze (Pensa editore 2012), at 31-49.
132  Art. 29(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights reads as follows: “No provision of this 
Convention shall be interpreted as… restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized 
by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is 
a party”. See Lixinski 2010, at 597. Most of Latin American States have ratified the ILO Convention 169. 
See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_
ID:312314 (last accessed October 2016).
133  An example of the former case is the decision in Yakye Axa case, while an example of the latter is the 
Saramaka case.
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2.2.2. The African Commission
The monitoring system of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has provided 
a useful forum for African indigenous peoples to claim their rights.134 The Commission is 
competent to receive individual and group complaints alleging the violation of the African 
Charter. The Commission may hereby draw conclusion on the merits of a complaint and, 
when it finds that a State violated the African Charter, makes recommendations on the 
advised course of action.135
So far the complaint mechanism before the African Commission has only produced 
two decisions where the issue of the relationship between indigenous peoples and the 
environment clearly emerges.136 In the Ogoni case, the complainants alleged violation of 
the African Charter due to the oil licences granted by the Nigerian government to private 
companies and the consequent eviction of the Ogoni people from the area of the Niger 
delta.137 In the Endorois decision, unlawful restrictions to indigenous peoples’ rights stemmed 
134  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (Banjul, 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986) 
(hereinafter African Charter). On the relevance of the discourse on indigenous peoples in Africa, see 
Kealeboga N. Bojosi and George Mukundi Wachira, ‘Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis 
of the Approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 382, at 387-400; Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 2002, Ch. 10; 
Willem van Genugten, ‘Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position 
Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 29, at 35-
49; Jérémie Gilbert, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic Revolution of the Africa 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 245, 
at 245-254; Maria Victoria Cabrera Ormaza, ‘Re-thinking the Role of Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law: New Developments in International Environmental Law and Development Cooperation’ (2012) 4 
Goettingen Journal of International Law 263, at 275 ff.; Cittadino 2013-2014. As explained in section 3.1 
of the Introduction, the African Commission has elaborated criteria to identify indigenous peoples in Africa 
that go beyond the notion of ancestry. These are marginalisation and exclusion, cultural distinctiveness, 
attachment to land, and self-identification.
135  On the competence, jurisdiction and functions of the African Commission, see Morne van der Linde 
and Lirette  Louw, ‘Considering the Interpretation and Implementation of Article 24 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Light of the SERAC Communication’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 167, at 170-173 and 180-186.
136  It is important to highlight that a case concerning the Ogiek indigenous people is pending before the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. the 
Republic of Kenya, Application 006/2012, available at: http://en.african-court.org/images/Cases/Case%20
Summaries/APPLICATION_006_OF_2012_CASE_SUMMARY.pdf (last accessed October 2016). On the 
Court’s jurisdiction, see Art. 3 and 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ouagadougou, 9 June 1998, in 
force 25 January 2004).
137  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
Communication No. 155/96 (27 October 2001) (hereinafter Ogoni case). On the Ogoni case, see Fons 
Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 749; Dinah Shelton, ‘Decision Regarding Communication 
155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria). 
Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 937; Justice C. 
Nwobike, ‘African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Demystification of Second and 
Third Generation Rights under the African Charter: Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) 
and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria’ (2004-2005) 1 African Journal of Legal 
Studies 129; Solomon A. Dersso, ‘The jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights with respect to peoples’ rights’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 358, at 369-373.
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from the gazetting by the Kenyan government of the Lake Bogoria area, traditionally owned 
by the Endorois community, as a game reserve.138
Some aspects of the relationship between indigenous peoples and the environment 
as emerges from the African system are drawn from other regional and global human 
rights bodies, with a particular reliance on the part of the African Commission on the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court.139 In this respect, land rights are framed as 
the necessary link between environmental protection and cultural integrity. The Endorois 
decision, for instance, stresses the link between land, culture, and the peoples.140 Since 
land ownership is the precondition for cultural rights to be fulfilled, the environmental 
preservation of land and natural resources is the sine qua non for the respect of other rights. 
In the same vein, any restrictions to the rights protected under the African Charter related 
to the right to land, such as the right to property, the right to freely dispose of resources, 
and the right to development are subject to the same cautions that are identified by the 
Inter-American Court in the Saramaka decision. Therefore, for State interferences to be in 
line with the protection of these rights, they should be in accordance with law, necessary, 
and proportional to the realisation of a general need or a public interest.141 Furthermore, 
the requirements of participation in the form of consultation or free, prior and informed 
consent, benefit-sharing, and the performance of impact studies are required also within the 
African system.
It is interesting to note that these procedural safeguards applied in the decision 
concerning the Ogoni case in relation to the right to freely dispose of resources under 
Article 21 of the African Charter. In this decision, the Commission does not refer to the 
Ogoni as indigenous peoples. Notwithstanding this, the failure on the part of Nigeria to 
consult the people affected, to ensure their participation in the benefits deriving from the 
oil exploitation, and to conduct impact studies prior to the oil exploration was used by 
138  As it emerges from the decision, the game reserve progressively gave way to ruby mining licences, as well 
as alienation of land to private owners. On the environmental implications of the Endorois case, see Cynthia 
Morel, ‘Conservation and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Must One Necessarily Come at the Expense of the 
Other?’ (2010) 17 Policy Matters 174.
139  The Commission refers to other international instruments as subsidiary sources of international law 
under Art. 61 of the African Charter.
140  In the Ogoni case, the Commission, falling short of a reference to the collective rights to land, emphasizes 
the link between environmental degradation and the violation of some rights, including the right to health 
under Art. 16 of the African Charter (paras. 50-51).
141  Endorois case, paras. 172-173, 215-216, 227, and 266-267. It is interesting to note some remarkable 
peculiarities. First, the encroachment on the right to life should be part of the test assessing the public 
interest threshold. Second, compensation is often overlapping with the requirement of ensuring the sharing 
of the benefits of large-scale projects implemented on indigenous territories. Third, the respect for the right 
to freely dispose of natural resources under Art. 21 of the African Charter is subject to the tripartite test 
elaborated in the Saramaka case, since the African Commission interpretatively connects it to the right to 
land protected under article 14 of the Charter. This last element is particularly significant because Art. 14 
protects in principle only individual property rights in a context where the African Charter protects both 
individual and collective rights. In the absence of a collective right to property, the Commission interprets 
Art. 14 so as to encompass indigenous collective ownership rights over land.
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the Commission to assess the violation of both Article 21 and Article 24 on the right to a 
satisfactory environment.
Although the African Commission refers to the standards elaborated by other human 
rights bodies, the African system is also characterised by a good degree of autonomy and a 
number of innovative elements. For instance, the African Commission in the Ogoni case is 
cautious in framing the right to property as a collective right to land. Indeed, the Commission 
recognised the collective nature of the right protected under Article 14.142 However, it found 
a violation only due to the destruction of houses by the Nigerian militia, thus failing to 
consider the expropriation of land in light of Article 14. Other violations connected to the 
right to land were then recognised, such as the right to freely dispose of natural resources 
under Article 21 and the right to food as derived from extensive interpretation of the same 
provision. In this way, the African Commission highlighted the importance of rights that 
are closely connected to the right to land, while at the same time paving the way for the 
recognition of collective property rights in the Endorois case.143
Some of the innovations of the African system are linked to the intrinsically different 
nature of the rights protected under the African Charter, which inter alia includes collective 
rights. The right to a satisfactory environment is part of the catalogue of collective rights.144 
In this sense, it is no surprise that the African Commission, in the Ogoni decision, was able 
to frame environmental degradation as a separate violation of the Charter under Article 
24. The Commission, however, has gone further than this, operationalizing the right to 
environment through the identification of the obligation of Nigeria to proceed to a clean-up 
of the area devastated by the oil drills. In line with this, the Commission has acknowledged 
precise obligations that require the State to perform a number of duties, including the 
monitoring of environmental conditions, the performance of impact studies whenever a 
major development project is to be undertaken, and the spreading of the results of those 
studies.145 Significantly, this set of obligations is very much in line with the standards 
identified in the Inter-American system, which does not explicitly protect the right to 
environment.146
Another element that is worth analysing is the ambivalent nature of the relationship 
between indigenous rights and the protection of the environment. As already reminded, in 
the Endorois case, the eviction from traditional lands and the denial to access those lands 
142  Ogoni case, para. 63.
143  See Fodella 2013, at 358.
144  This is even more striking if compared with the other international human rights systems that, as 
reminded, do not include a right to environment. See supra note 14 in Introduction.
145  Ogoni case, paras. 52-53. On the implications of the application of Art. 24 of the African Charter, see 
van der Linde and Louw 2003, at 173-180; Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, ‘Right to a Satisfactory Environment and 
the African Commission’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 149.
146  As reminded, Art. 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights contains 
a provision protecting the right to the environment, but this Protocol has not been invoked yet by the Court 
for the purposes of ascertaining a violation of this right.
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was consequent to the decision of the Kenyan government to establish a nature reserve 
aimed at the conservation of some animal species. Notwithstanding the potential conflict 
between this measure and the enjoyment of rights by indigenous peoples, the Commission 
took up the complainants’ arguments that indigenous lifestyles are in line with conservation 
purposes.147 Most innovatively, it made the argument that the creation of a natural reserve 
does not necessarily require the eviction of indigenous peoples from their lands, thus 
implying that there is a possibility for the State to implement its conservation duties while 
respecting indigenous peoples’ rights.
A further element that may have a bearing in the relationship between indigenous 
rights and the environment is the interpretation of the right to development under Article 
22 of the Charter given by the African Commission in the Endorois decision. This right 
has both a substantive and a procedural content.148 While the procedural component 
is once more related to the requirements of consultation,149 the substantive component 
may offer a different perspective. Development implies both free choice, intended as the 
capacity to decide on development options, and empowerment, linked to improvement of 
living conditions. This opens up the way to an interpretation of the relationship between 
indigenous rights and the environment that is biased towards indigenous peoples. Their 
right to choose development options, in fact, may foreshadow the possibility for a conflict 
between indigenous ways of life and the conservation of the environment.
2.2.3. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights has played an important role in singling out the 
main elements of a human rights approach to environmental protection.150 This section 
aims to understand whether the case law specifically related to indigenous peoples presents 
some elements of innovation with respect to the trends already highlighted.
The main tenets of the human rights approach to environmental protection in the 
European regional context are two. First, environmental degradation may trigger the 
application of some rights protected in the European system, including the right to private 
and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Second, environmental degradation is only 
relevant insofar as it directly affects the particular enjoyment of rights protected in the 
European Convention.
Similarly to minorities, indigenous peoples within the European Convention do not 
enjoy a special status. Although minorities have progressively affirmed their rights building 
on Article 8,151 the condition of indigenous peoples has not received the same attention 
147  Endorois case, paras. 235 and 249. See Graham and Friederichs 2012, at 13.
148  Endorois case, para. 277.
149  Endorois case, paras. 290-291.
150  See note 13 in the Introduction.
151  On the evolution of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence on minority rights, see Gaetano Pentassuglia, 
Chapter 1
65
so far.152 In dealing with cases concerning indigenous peoples, the Strasbourg Court relied 
again on Article 8. However, the approach taken by the Court is merely negative in the 
sense that the Court has not identified positive measures to be taken by States to respect 
indigenous rights. On the contrary, the Court has limited itself to identify admissible 
restrictions imposed by States on those rights.153
Unlike the cases concerning individual complaints related to the environment, the 
decisions related to indigenous peoples set a higher threshold for the violation of Article 
8 to be ascertained. An example of this can be found in the decision of the European 
Commission on the G. and E. v. Norway case.154 The case concerned the construction of 
a hydroelectric dam that had resulted in the inundation of part of the applicants’ territory 
of Lapp origin. In relation to Article 8, the Commission asserted that the right to private 
and family life might be applicable to the protection of a particular lifestyle, especially in 
light of the environmental consequences of a dam construction project.155 However, when 
it comes to the assessment of the alleged interference of the dam project with the enjoyment 
of Article 8 by the applicants, the Commission concluded that, given the limited impact 
on the applicants’ rights, the interference was admissible. In this vein, the portion of the 
land submerged was so small that the interference was deemed proportional. Furthermore, 
the project also met the requirement of necessity since it was justified by the political 
goal of pursuing the economic well-being of the country. It is, therefore, clear that the 
Commission failed to consider the cultural impact of development activities in connection 
with foreseeable environmental impacts.
In line with the Strasbourg Court’s reluctance to consider the cultural implication of 
the restrictions imposed on indigenous rights, no interference with the rights protected under 
the European Convention has ever been found in the judgments concerning indigenous 
peoples. Perhaps this is also related to the fact that the link between the environmental 
consequences of development projects and indigenous rights is not well established in the 
case law of the European Court. This clearly emerges from the abovementioned G. and E. 
v. Norway.156 In the Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland case, the Court considered 
‘The Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a New Interpretive Ethos?’ (2012) 1 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1. See also, Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human 
Rights 2002, Ch. 12, at 290 ff. On the scope of Art. 8 for the purpose of minority protection, see Tavani 
2010, at 68-72.
152  On the reasons of this neglect and on the definition of indigenous peoples in Europe, see Rainer Grote, 
‘On the Fringes of Europe: Europe’s Largely Forgotten Indigenous Peoples’ (2006-2007) 31 American 
Indian Law Review 425.
153  Pentassuglia, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a New Interpretive 
Ethos?’ 2012, at 10-12.
154  G. and E. v. Norway, Applications No. 9278/81 and 9415/81 (3 October 1983).
155  See Pentassuglia, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a New Interpretive 
Ethos?’ 2012, at 3.
156  See Timo Koivurova, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous 
Peoples: Retrospects and Prospects’ (2011) 18 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1, at 
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that there was no interference with Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protecting 
property of the measures affecting the fishing rights of Sami.157 In the view of the Court, 
the applicants had failed to demonstrate the adverse consequences of the new provisions on 
their fishing rights.158
This means that, unlike the other human rights bodies, the Strasbourg Court did 
not infer the violation of indigenous rights from the potential impact of national measures 
on the cultural identity of indigenous peoples. In contrast, it required the applicants to 
demonstrate such link. The shift of the burden of proof is confirmed in the case Handölsdalen 
Sami Village v. Sweden,159 where the Court concluded that the existence of immemorial 
reindeer herding rights should be demonstrated by the Sami. Therefore, the burden of 
proof in national legal proceedings was legitimately placed on the Sami. This conclusion 
was contested by the dissenting Judge Ziemele, who emphasised the developments in 
international law concerning indigenous rights, together with the importance of the right 
to land to preserve culture. In the view of the dissenting judge, these elements should have 
led the Court to additionally find a violation of access to Court under Article 6.
Ultimately, the failure to recognise the link between environmental problems generated 
by development projects and indigenous rights is closely related to the lack of recognition 
of indigenous land rights in the European system.160 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, protecting 
the individual right to property, has been invoked in almost every indigenous-related case 
before the European Court. However, in no case there has been either the ascertainment of 
its violation or any recognition of collective land rights encompassing indigenous claims. 
Nor was the link between property and culture acknowledged. In the already cited case of 
G. and E. v. Norway, traditional use of resources, exemplified by reindeer herding, fishing, 
and hunting, were not found to fall under the purview of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.161
Closely related to that is the strong reliance of the Court on domestic authorities 
and national remedies for the definition and adjudication of indigenous land rights. In 
this sense, absent in the European Convention, the concept of indigenous property rights 
9-11.
157  Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland, Application No. 42969/98 (18 January 2005). National 
measures established the extension of fishing rights to non-Sami people.
158  Additionally, the provision requiring the exclusion of some fishing equipment was considered to be in 
line with the public goal of protecting the fish stock.
159  Handölsdalen Sami Village v. Sweden, Application No. 39013/04 (17 February 2009).
160  On this, see Nigel Bankes, ‘The Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Territory through the 
Property Rights Provisions of International Regional Human Rights Instruments’ (2011) 3 The Yearbook of 
Polar Law 57, at 62-63 and 84: “the cases coming out of the European Court suggest that it will be difficult 
for an indigenous community to establish the element of a successful case. The biggest challenge is caused by 
the duty to exhaust local remedies combined with the reluctance of the Court to look behind the judgment 
of a domestic court”.
161  G. and E. v. Norway, The Law, para. 3. See also, Barelli and others 2011, at 40. The authors contend that 
the denial of the cultural consequences stemming from the violation of property rights is mitigated in the 
cases concerning rural minorities.
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should be derived from national rules and through national procedures.162 The margin of 
appreciation doctrine both justifies and corroborates this attitude of the Court towards 
indigenous land rights.163 The Hingitaq 53 and others v. Denmark case is instructive in this 
sense.164 The case concerned the eviction of an Inuit tribe due to the expansion of a military 
air base run by the American forces.165 The Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction as 
for the alleged violation of the right to property under Article 1 since the eviction happened 
one year before the entry into force of Protocol No. 1 for Denmark. Therefore, unlike other 
international human rights bodies, the Court did not consider the ongoing effects of the 
original act. On the contrary, it claimed that expropriation was an instantaneous act that 
should be interpreted in light of the guarantees provided by national law. In this respect, 
since national jurisdictions had found that the original expropriation was both justified 
by the public interest and duly compensated, the Court could proceed not to examine the 
applicants’ claims.166
Furthermore, the failure to recognise indigenous substantive rights is compounded 
by the absence of procedural guarantees, such as the consultation requirements elaborated 
in the other regional and global mechanisms of international human rights protection. 
Participation is only broadly framed by the European Court as the individual right to take 
part in political life.167 This mild conception of participation is ill suited to respond to the 
162  See Pentassuglia, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a New Interpretive 
Ethos?’ 2012, at 10; Koivurova 2011, at 21.
163  According to Koivurova 2011, a way to protect indigenous peoples in the European system would 
be to “diminish the margin of appreciation afforded to states to interfere with the traditional lifestyle and 
livelihoods of northern indigenous minorities” (p. 35). In partial contradiction with this, in the Halvar From 
v. Sweden case, the margin of appreciation doctrine was used in favour of indigenous rights to argue that the 
decision to grant exclusive hunting licences to the Sami in the territory of the applicant was justified under 
domestic law. See Application No. 34776/97 (4 March 1998).
164  Hingitaq 53 and others v. Denmark, Application No.18584/04 (12 January 2006).
165  The same case has been examined through the ILO representation procedure. See the Report of the 
Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Denmark of the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the 
National Confederation of Trade Unions of Greenland (Sulinermik Inuussutissarsiuteqartut Kattuffiat-SIK) 
(SIK) supra.
166  Other cases testify of an excessive reliance of the ECtHR on domestic remedies. In Könkämä and 38 
other Saami villages v. Sweden, Application No. 27033/95 (25 November 2006), the Commission should 
determine whether the Sami fishing rights were exclusive. Hunting and fishing rights were framed as 
possessions under the right to property protected by the Protocol. However, the application was considered 
inadmissible for the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Commission furthermore referred to the 
national normative framework to conclude that exclusive rights are in any case not admissible. In the Chagos 
Islanders v. UK, Application No. 35622/04 (11 December 2012), the relocation of the islanders due to 
defence projects was compensated following the settlement of the dispute at the national level. In light of 
these, the Court rejected any violation for the failure of the applicants to qualify as victims. It is interesting to 
note, however, that with reference to the facts of the Hingitaq 53 and others v. Denmark case, a year before the 
ECtHR released its judgment, Denmark had submitted a periodic report to the CERD, where it apologized 
for the removal of the Inughuit tribe from their territory. See CERD, Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 9 of the Convention, Denmark, UN Doc. CERD/C/496/Add.1 (2 September 2005), para. 
218.
167  See Desgagné 1995, at 287; Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present and Future 
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need of protection of indigenous peoples. As emerges from the other human rights bodies 
examined in this section, the consultation of indigenous peoples whenever a project that 
may affect them is decided is particularly warranted to protect their cultural integrity. The 
absence of procedural rights is particularly striking if one compares the cases concerning 
indigenous peoples with the decisions taken in other environment-related cases regarding 
individual complainants. In Guerra v. Italy and Öneryıldız v. Turkey, for instance, a right to 
information was granted to the applicants. On the contrary, In the Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and 
others v. Finland case, the mere fact that indigenous peoples had their own representative 
bodies, such as the Sami Parliament, was a sufficient fulfilment of participation guarantees 
for the Court.168 In Hingitaq 53 and others v. Denmark, the Court did not even uphold the 
allegation that the Sami people had a right to consultation, thus failing to consider this 
issue.
2.2.4. Asia and Oceania: national cases and contamination
The lack of a regional instrument for the protection of human rights in Asia and Oceania 
does not account for the fact that international standards are primarily applied by national 
courts.169 This section, therefore, aims to present some of the major judgments, issued by 
national courts in Asia and Oceania touching upon the relationship between the rights 
of indigenous peoples and environmental protection.170 However, a word for caution is 
needed. The review of national cases is far too limited to draw any conclusions on regional 
emerging trends or on the legal status of some standards in Asia. This subsection limits itself 
to provide a partial illustration of how some international standards pertaining to indigenous 
rights and the environment have permeated national systems in Asia and Oceania.
The decisions that may have a bearing in the relationship between indigenous rights 
and the environment belong to two groups. The first group comprises the decisions dealing 
with the establishment of indigenous land tenure. One remarkable example is the case 
Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), where the Supreme Court of Australia concluded that the 
acquisition of sovereignty on the part of a State entity does not imply the automatic transfer 
of land ownership for the purposes of the application of internal law.171 These decisions are 
relevant because land rights are at the juncture between indigenous cultural integrity and 
the environmental protection of natural resources. These issues, however, are examined in 
Linkages and the Value of a Declaration’ 2009. On participatory rights, see Chapter 2, section 3.5.
168  Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland, at 16.
169  See Shyami Fernando Puvimanasinghe, Foreign Investment, Human Rights and the Environment: A 
Perspective from South Asia on the Role of Public International Law for Development (Martinus Nijhoff 2007), 
at 208-209.
170  For an account of the debate on the definition of indigenous peoples in Africa, see Benedict Kingsbury, 
‘The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of “Indigenous Peoples” in Asia’ in Joanne R. Bauer 
and Daniel A. Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 1999).
171  Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
Chapter 1
69
detail in Chapter 2, to which this section refers for full examination.
The second group of decisions are those cases where the environment plays a role in 
the awarding of indigenous rights. In the Minors Oposa v. Philippines case, the Supreme 
Court of Philippines accepted the locus standi of a group of minors who were representing 
unborn generations in the name of intergenerational equity.172 The group was pleading 
against the concession of timber licences in a rainforest that is both rich in biodiversity and 
home to indigenous peoples. In light of the constitutionally protected right to a balanced 
and healthful ecology, the Court derived a negative duty for the State to refrain from 
impairing the environment, thus eventually granting the revocation of the licences. The 
case is instructive because the need to protect the environment goes hand in hand with the 
secondary objective of protecting indigenous culture. The Court, however, was not asked to 
pronounce itself on the infringement of indigenous rights.
In the case of Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee, the Sapporo District 
Court of Japan was called to assess the legality of a dam project that had resulted in land 
expropriation in light of the consequences that this project might produce on the rights of 
the Ainu.173 Independently from the recognition of any land rights, the Court recognised 
the applicability of cultural rights stemming inter alia from Article 27 of the ICCPR. In the 
view of the Court, the Minister of Construction in charge of the authorisations for the dam 
failed to consider the environmental and cultural implication of the project. In particular, 
the Minister should have required the enterprises concerned with the project to carry out 
impact studies. In this respect, this case echoes the decisions reached by the international 
human rights bodies illustrated above.
Therefore, environmental protection emerges mainly as a way to enhance indigenous 
rights, both as a precondition for their enjoyment and as standard for ascertaining their 
violation.
2.3. Main common trends and differences
What emerges from the above discussion is a set of common trends, as well as important 
172  Supreme Court of Philippines, Minors Oposa v. Secretary of Department of the Environment and Natural 
Resources 33 ILM 173 (1994). On the principle of intergenerational equity, see Gregory F. Maggio, ‘Inter/
intra-Generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for Promoting the Sustainable 
Development of Natural Resources’ (1997) 4 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 161; Maggio, ‘Recognizing 
the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-
1998; Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (Transnational Publishers 1989); Laura Pineschi, ‘La rappresentazione degli interessi 
delle generazioni future tra proposte del passato e recenti manifestazioni della prassi internazionale’ in Studi 
in onore di Umberto Leanza (Editoriale Scientifica 2008).
173  Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee (27 March 1997), (1999) 38 ILM 397.  On the 
case, see Carl F. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis (Wolters Kluwer 2008), at 
254-256. The decision is landmark inter alia because it takes a decisive step in the recognition of the Ainu 
as indigenous peoples in Japan. For an overview of the situation of the Ainu people in Japan, see Yoko 
Tanabe, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Ainu of Japan: Development and 
Challenges’ (2014) 24 Indigenous Policy Journal.
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differences as regards the relationship between indigenous rights and the environment in 
the decisions of the international human rights bodies.
As for the common elements, there are four main trends that it is worth highlighting. 
First, the protection of the environment comes often to the fore in connection with the 
rights of indigenous peoples when development projects are undertaken. In those cases, 
the two elements are reinforcing each other, in the sense that indigenous peoples claim that 
they contribute to preserve the environment that is threatened by development projects. 
Furthermore, a good state of the environment is the precondition for the enjoyment of 
a number of rights on the part of indigenous peoples. This picture is incomplete since it 
mostly fails to consider the cases where other kinds of projects, such as the creation of nature 
reserves, may have an impact on indigenous rights.174
The second trend concerns the concrete interaction between indigenous rights and any 
other elements that may affect them. Indigenous rights are in many cases protected through 
the extensive interpretation of rights such as the right to private and family life, the right to 
culture, the right to development, and the right to property. Restrictions to protected rights 
are admissible in the human rights systems illustrated in the previous sections. A general 
common threshold for the assessment of potential violations is the limit of the denial of the 
protected rights. In other words, restrictions are admissible in so far as they do not result 
into the complete impairment of indigenous rights.175 This is clear also in the cases, such as 
those of the Human Rights Committee, where the rights of indigenous people are found to 
succumb.
Third, although the denial test is a common element, the way in which it is assessed 
may differ greatly. The assessment of denial is given in some cases against the fulfilment of 
procedural guarantees, such as the performance of consultation processes.176 In some other 
cases, what counts is the evaluation of the capacity of indigenous peoples to maintain their 
livelihood.177 In this sense, the reference to the notion of benefit might be read as a way to 
ensure that indigenous peoples’ way of life is sustainably carried out. Factual circumstances 
do also play a role in the evaluation of restrictions. Suffice it to think of the reports of 
the Human Rights Committee or of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the European 
system.
Fourth, there is a high level of cross-fertilisation between human rights bodies, which 
174  As said, a notable exception is represented by the Kaliña and Lokono case.
175  The main exception to this trend is perhaps represented by the ECtHR, which applies the normal 
proportionality/necessity test to restrictions without taking into consideration the impact of restrictions on 
essential elements such as the preservation of a distinct culture. The denial test is also discussed in Chapter 
2.
176  See Länsman II; Apirana Mahuika case. See also, ILO representation procedures in section 2.1.4 in this 
chapter. In the Saramaka case the denial of indigenous rights is assessed against procedural parameters.
177  See the decisions of the Human Rights Committee in section 2.1.1 in this chapter. The requirement of 
ensuring benefit-sharing in the Saramaka case may also reinforce the idea that indigenous livelihoods should 
be maintained.
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can explain the common elements highlighted above. The circulation of legal paradigms 
is facilitated by the nature of human rights treaties that are, as repeatedly pointed out by 
human rights bodies, living instruments, subject to the evolution of societal needs.178
Concerning the main differences that have a bearing on the relationship between 
indigenous rights and the environment, there are three points that it is important to make.
First, indigenous rights are protected more traditionally as the individual rights of 
the community members within the global human rights systems.179 Conversely, collective 
rights are recognised in all regional systems except for the European one. Although this 
divide is important and produces some consequences in the effectiveness of the protection 
of indigenous rights, it is not a decisive element. As recalled, for instance, the ILO 
Convention 169 is extremely far-reaching in terms of the articulation of indigenous rights. 
Their implementation, however, is by far less effective than in the Inter-American system. 
Furthermore, the circulation of standards of protection favours the incorporation of all-
encompassing standards even in human rights systems that are not originally provided with 
them.
Second, the interplay between indigenous rights and the environment lies in the 
centrality of land and natural resources for the preservation of indigenous communities 
as distinct peoples.180 Some human rights bodies have mainly relied on cultural rights to 
incorporate indigenous needs in the purview of their judicial or quasi-judicial review. This 
is the case both for the Human Rights Committee with Article 27 and for the European 
Court of Human Rights that has framed culture as the manifestation of private and family 
life. Ultimately, however, culture is framed in broad terms since it includes a particular 
relationship with the land and natural resources. Conversely, it can be argued that land 
does not merely boil down to the establishment of land tenure for indigenous peoples. In 
contrast, the effectiveness of land rights must be functional to the preservation of cultural 
diversity.181 In this framework, the requirement of consultation has both procedural and 
substantive connotations. As for the latter, consultation is to be activated any time a project 
may affect indigenous peoples as a way to ensure that the cultural component is integrated 
in the management of land. Concerning the former, the performance of consultation is a 
way to assess whether indigenous rights are taken into account.
178  See Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, at 399. In partial contradiction with this, see Mauro Barelli, ‘The 
Interplay between Global and Regional Human Rights Systems in the Construction of the Indigenous 
Rights Regime’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 951, at 960. The author argues that the different degree 
of indigenous rights’ protection reflects the regional peculiarities of each human rights system.
179  This has been done by the monitoring bodies of the UN Covenants, by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination and in the European system.
180  See General Comment 23, paras. 3.2 and 7; General Recommendation 23; the Inter-American 
jurisprudence, including e.g., Saramaka case, para. 128. On this issue, see more in Chapter 2, sections 3.1 
and 3.3.
181  General Comment 23, para. 7; Awas Tingni case, para. 149; Yakye Axa case, para. 135; Endorois case, 
para. 156.
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Third, the extent to which the link between land and culture is taken for granted within 
the different human rights systems may change considerably. This link is not established 
and must be demonstrated by the applicants in the European system. The Human Rights 
Committee has taken into consideration factual circumstances in the determination of the 
relationship between culture and land. In the Inter-American system, land is absolutely 
necessary for the preservation of indigenous culture.
To sum up, access to land and natural resources seems central in the interaction of 
indigenous rights with environmental protection. 182 As argued by the African Commission 
in the Endorois case, only land ownership may guarantee that indigenous peoples are actors 
rather than mere beneficiaries of prerogatives.183
2.4. An assessment of the traditional approach: the dimension of conflict
The review of the human rights approach to environmental protection as far as the rights 
of indigenous peoples are concerned confirms some general views. In spite of normative 
texts elaborated before the 1990s and thus not including within their scope more recent 
issues such environmental protection, this approach has been highly creative and innovative 
because it has allowed for the integration of environmental consideration into the protection 
of human rights. In this sense, since human rights treaties are living instruments, the 
adjudication of rights may adapt to circumstances so that their scope is enlarged to include 
environmental problems. In the case of indigenous rights, this integration has contributed to 
the empowerment of indigenous peoples because environmental degradation has been used 
as a further element to ascertain the violation of indigenous rights. Therefore, this approach 
represents a concrete way in which international human rights law and international 
environmental law can be connected and coalesce.
The open-ended question, indeed, is whether the human rights approach to 
environmental protection is the only available framework for the relationship between 
human rights and the environment. An analysis of the more recent debates, as well as of the 
critical aspects of the approach, corroborates the idea that it is necessary to go beyond it.
First, it is important to remind that the object of human rights protection and 
environmental conservation remains fundamentally different.184 It is true that environmental 
soundness is a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights. However, the normative 
goal of protecting the environment does not boil down simply to the purpose of creating 
an enabling environment for the enjoyment of human rights. This aspect is not sufficiently 
182  See Shawkat Alam, ‘Collective Indigenous Rights and the Environment’ in Shawkat Alam and others 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge 2013), at 585. This author argues 
that “environmental destruction has particular implications for indigenous peoples’ rights, due to their close 
affiliation with the land”.
183  Endorois case, paras. 204-206.
184  See Shelton, ‘Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present and Future Linkages and the Value of a 
Declaration’ 2009, at 30.
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acknowledged in the monitoring work of human rights bodies, whose mandate instead is 
only concerned with the implementation of human rights treaties. The truism that “human 
rights law does not protect the environment per se”185 is reinforced by the fact that, failing 
the existence of a right to environmental protection, environment-related allegations are 
found to integrate a violation only when the applicants can demonstrate a direct interest.186 
This means that international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in the field of human rights 
consider the environment only as a dimension of human rights protection. For instance, in the 
cases concerning indigenous peoples within the Inter-American system, the environmental 
soundness of territories and resources is merely instrumental for the protection of the right 
to property (“abstain to act…until land is demarcated”).
Second, the human rights approach to environmental protection in the decisions of 
human rights treaty bodies is neither the sole nor the main way to look at the relationship 
between indigenous rights and the environment. Scholars have failed to fully explore 
another important part of the debate, that is the integration of human rights law into 
the adoption and implementation of international multilateral environmental treaties.187 
A hybrid example of this integration may be found in the Aahrus Convention, a regional 
treaty that creates obligations for State Parties to provide information, ensure participation, 
and guarantee access to justice in environmental measures.188 The Convention is neither 
a purely environmental treaty nor a human rights instrument. However, it provides an 
exemplification of how human rights may permeate environmental issues.
The issue of the integration of human rights standards into environmental treaties 
is more complex than what may appear at first sight. The problem is that the scope of 
environmental treaties may overlap with that of human rights law. This is far from 
being unproblematic because, as illustrated in the Introduction to this dissertation, the 
relationship between international human rights law and international environmental law 
185  Boyle 2012, at 605 (quote), and 627-628.
186  See also Desgagné 1995, at 282: “the scope of environmental protection that can be achieved through 
human rights litigation is narrow because environmental harm is not in itself a cause for complaint, but 
must be linked to a protected right. Human rights and environmental protection admittedly have common 
objectives, but not all environmental issues can be formulated in terms of human rights violations”.
187  See Analytical study on the relationship between human rights and the environment, Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/34 (16 December 2011), at 6. See also, Anton 
and Shelton 2011, at 130 ff. According to these authors, “[h]uman rights and environmental protection 
interrelate at present in four different ways”: 1) considering human rights when drafting environmental 
treaties; 2) human rights approach to environmental protection; 3) the creation of a human right to 
environment; 4) the protection of the environment is not a right, is a duty of all human beings. Resolution 
2005/60 of the UN Human Rights Commission, Human Rights and the Environment as a Part of Sustainable 
Development, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/60 (20 April 2005), further suggests that human rights should 
be taken into account “when promoting environmental protection”, as part of sustainable development.
188  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998, in force 30 October 2001). On the Convention, see e.g. Marc 
Pallemaerts, ‘Proceduralizing Environmental Rights: The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in a Human Rights 
Context’ [2004] Human Rights and the Environment Proceedings of a Geneva Network Roundtable 14.
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is not regulated by lex posterior, lex specialis, or hierarchical criteria. In this context, when 
environmental norms are potentially in contrast with parallel obligations that State Parties 
have contracted in the field of human rights, other criteria for the resolution of conflict 
should operate
Furthermore, a comprehensive reading of the rights of indigenous peoples shows that 
these rights underlie issues pertaining to access and management of natural resources. In 
this respect, Chapter 2 argues that the powers of indigenous peoples are so extensive that 
they may interfere with the State’s sovereignty over natural resources, which lies at the basis 
of the international regime of biodiversity as enshrined in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. This tripartite dimension of conflict is often ignored both in human rights case 
law and in the literature and therefore deserves more attention since it lies at the core of the 
relationship between indigenous rights and conservation.
3. The integration of indigenous rights into the Convention on Biological Diversity: 
state of the art and underlying problems
The CBD explicitly addresses the relationship between indigenous peoples and biodiversity. 
While the Preamble recognises “the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous 
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources”, the body 
of the Convention regulates some aspects of the use of traditional knowledge by Parties. 
Article 8(j) creates a legal framework for preserving indigenous peoples’ traditional culture 
while protecting biodiversity. In this respect, Parties shall respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity 
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of 
such knowledge.
Furthermore, the same provision creates an obligation for Parties to “encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization” of traditional knowledge. Intra-
State benefit-sharing is, therefore, framed as an instrument to acknowledge the contribution 
of indigenous and local communities to conservation and sustainable use.189
189  See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’ 2010, at 167. These authors have coined the category of intra-State benefit-sharing, in relation 
to which they identify different functions in the context of the CBD. These functions are analysed in 
Chapter 3. See also, Lyle Glowka and et al., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN 1994), 
at 4. An isolated interpretation is put forward by Maggio, according to whom “[a] careful reading of the 
text of Article 8j) does not say that the equitable sharing will necessarily include the local communities”. 
See Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for 
Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998, at 213. This interpretation, however, does not seem to be grounded 
on solid arguments. In their Guide to the CBD (above), Glowka and other authors already recognise that 
“the [preambular] paragraph implies that such communities should receive benefits when techniques or 
knowledge from their traditional practices become more widely used” (at 11). In addition, Morgera and 
Tsioumani (ibid.) have carefully demonstrated that “a clear trend seems to emerge from the multitude of 
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Although representing an important step for the incorporation of indigenous issues 
into the CBD regime, Article 8(j) is problematic due to some deficiencies concerning its 
interpretation, scope, implementation, and legal nature.
Regarding the interpretative blind spots of this provision, Article 8(j) is conditioned 
upon national legislation. The locution “subject to its national legislation” oscillates 
between two possible interpretations. One of these is that national legislative frameworks 
on indigenous peoples should be taken into account190 so as to preserve national agreements 
concluded between State Parties and indigenous peoples located in their territory, thus 
having a protective function with respect to established indigenous rights. While this is 
a laudable policy objective, it does not take into account that treaties between States and 
indigenous peoples have often been imposed on the latter during colonisation times and 
they frequently imply the loss of sovereign prerogatives on the part of indigenous peoples.191 
When these treaties contain instead provisions that are favourable to indigenous peoples, 
their implementation is oftentimes flawed. According to the second interpretation of the 
locution “subject to its national legislation”, the prevalence of national standards over the 
obligations contained in Article 8(j) implies that the protection of traditional knowledge, its 
use, and the obligation to encourage intra-State benefit-sharing should succumb to contrary 
national laws.192 
Another interpretative blind spot concerns the locution “knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.193 Some authors have argued that 
the obligation to protect indigenous traditional knowledge only applies to those contents 
and practice that are instrumental for the conservation of biodiversity.194 This interpretation 
decisions adopted by the CBD COP in referring to the concept of State- to-community benefit-sharing in 
the context of various programmes of work” (at 34).
190  According to some commentators, this was the original purpose of some of the negotiating countries, 
such as the United States. See Melinda Chandler, ‘The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest 
to the International Lawyer’ (1993) 4 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 
141, at 154; Glowka and al. 1994, at 48; Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in 
International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998, at 212: “It has been suggested 
that the above qualifier in the CBD was actually inserted at the behest of countries such as the United 
States, where the government’s relationship with the nation’s indigenous communities is governed by federal 
treaties”. Maggio correctly points out that this clause is not appropriate for the application of the CBD by 
countries where there is no recognised status for indigenous peoples. Furthermore, even in countries where 
some tribes are protected, others may be neglected.
191  See Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Treaties with’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. See also note 121 in Chapter 4.
192  Glowka and al. 1994, at 48: “Strictly speaking, however, the paragraph’s objectives could be defeated, 
since the wording implies that all national legislation, including future rules, will take precedence”.
193  Emphasis added.
194  See Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments 
for Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998, at 210: “The language “embodying traditional lifestyles” is 
controversial. The IUCN commentary to the CBD implies that these words would exclude groups recently 
descended from “indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles,” but which at present 
do not maintain “traditional lifestyles””. See also, Morel 2010, at 176.
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would imply that the right to culture of indigenous peoples is unduly restricted under the 
CBD and would represent a case of overt conflict of norms between the standards of the 
CBD and international human rights.195 However, this interpretation is not supported by 
subsequent CBD practice on traditional knowledge, which is examined in Chapter 3. In 
this sense, the specification that traditional knowledge should be relevant for conservation 
is a natural consequence of the limited scope of the provision, which only deals with the 
conservation of biodiversity. A similar locution is found in Article 10(c) on sustainable use 
and the same considerations apply thereon.196
A last interpretative doubt is related to the expression “approval and involvement” of 
indigenous and local communities, which according to Article 8(j) should constitute the 
precondition for the “wider application” of traditional knowledge. This locution does not 
provide a sufficiently clear framework to understand what participatory duties are required 
from State Parties.197 This dissertation aims to verify in Chapters 3 and 4 to what extent 
subsequent CBD practice has managed to solve these apparent ambiguities.
The failure to adopt a human rights language on indigenous issues is also related to 
the second of the deficiencies about Article 8(j), which concerns the limited scope of the 
provision. With respect to the obligation to preserve and use traditional knowledge for 
conservation purposes, the CBD does not specify that indigenous culture and traditional 
practices are intimately linked to the possibility for indigenous peoples to access and manage 
their lands and natural resources. Furthermore, the obligation to encourage benefit-sharing 
is only triggered when the use of traditional knowledge is concerned, thus leaving aside 
the issue of access to genetic resources that are traditionally owned or used by indigenous 
peoples. These concerns are partially reflected in subsequent CBD practice, including the 
Nagoya Protocol, and are therefore analysed and further expanded in Chapters 3 and 4, as 
previously.
Interpretative uncertainties and the failure to include human rights language in the 
CBD have contributed both to create obstacles to the implementation of Article 8(j) and 
to generate doubts about the legal value of this provision. These constitute the third and 
fourth categories of deficiencies about Article 8(j). Regarding the lack of implementation, 
the creation of a specific Working Group to favour the application of this provision testifies 
to this deficiency.198 Concerning the legal nature of the obligations contained in Article 8(j), 
special doubts have arisen with respect to the obligation to “encourage” intra-State benefit-
195  The right to culture emerges from the decisions examined in section 2 of this chapter. For a full analysis 
of this right, see Chapter 2, section 3.3.
196  Article 10(c) CBD reads: “Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate…Protect 
and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are 
compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements”.
197  This point is discussed in more details in Chapter 3, section 2.1.2.
198  See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’ 2010, at 160. For more information on the Working Group on Article 8(j), visit https://www.
cbd.int/convention/wg8j.shtml (last accessed October 2016).
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sharing. While the provisions of a treaty are normally per se binding on its parties, the 
difficulty to identify the content of this obligation may generate doubts about the concrete 
value of its binding nature. However, one must distinguish between the obligatory nature 
of an international obligation and its self-executing nature. It should be reminded that the 
CBD is a framework treaty, which demands to subsequent Protocols the specifications of 
some of its obligation.199
The Nagoya Protocol, which has recently entered into force, has introduced some 
relevant innovations when it comes to the issue of access to traditional knowledge and 
related benefit-sharing. The Protocol makes express reference in its Preamble both to the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the rights of indigenous peoples, thus 
partially remedying to the failure to embrace a human rights language.200 Among these rights, 
indigenous peoples are entitled to “identify the rightful holders of traditional knowledge”. 
Most importantly, the protocol creates an obligation for its Parties to adopt legislation “with 
the aim of ensuring” the sharing of benefits “arising from genetic resources that are held by 
indigenous and local communities”.201 This introduces at least two fundamental novelties. 
First, the Nagoya Protocol creates a specific and unmistakable obligation incumbent on 
State Parties, that is to adopt national legislation on benefit-sharing.202 This obligation 
partially dissipates the vagueness of Article 8(j) CBD on benefit-sharing. Second, benefit-
sharing is to be ensured not only for the use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources,203 but also for the access to genetic resources themselves, when these are “held” 
by indigenous peoples. Furthermore, in relation to access to traditional knowledge, this is 
conditioned upon “the prior and informed consent or approval and involvement of these 
indigenous and local communities”, as well as the establishment of mutually agreed terms.204
With all due differences, however, the Nagoya Protocol suffers from the same 
deficiencies as the CBD in that it does not fully acknowledge the whole body of international 
human rights concerning indigenous peoples. For instance, indigenous peoples are referred 
to as “indigenous and local communities” and the free, prior, and informed consent is 
watered down to prior informed consent or approval.205 These language ambiguities reflect 
199  See Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for 
Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998, at 214-215. This author describes the institutional functioning of the 
CBD and the role of the CBD COP in the interpretation and evolution of the Convention’s provisions. 
See also Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’ 2011, at 4-11. On these points, see Chapters 3 and 4.
200  Preambular para. 26 Nagoya Protocol. Reference to the rights of indigenous peoples are made in 
preambular paras. 24 and 27.
201  Art. 5(2) Nagoya Protocol.
202  See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’ 2011, at 15.
203  See Art. 5(5) Nagoya Protocol.
204  Art. 7 Nagoya Protocol. Other novelties are explored in Chapter 3, which also delves in the interpretation 
of these provisions.
205  See Elisa Morgera, Matthias Buck and Elsa Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
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the disagreement of some Parties about the relevance of indigenous rights within the 
international regime of biodiversity conservation. The issue of to what extent States are free 
to limit the application of the rights of indigenous peoples, together with other problems 
resulting from the interaction of these two regimes, are therefore explored in detail in the 
following chapters.206
In addition to the concerns illustrated about Article 8(j) and the Nagoya Protocol, 
problematic issues for the interaction of the CBD with indigenous rights may be linked 
to the implementation of Article 8(a). In the context of in-situ conservation, this article 
creates the obligation for CBD Parties to establish protected areas to realise the objective 
of conservation.207 In the practice, when nature reserves are established, indigenous peoples 
are often excluded from land and resource access. Even when indigenous peoples are not 
fully excluded from land management, they are often not free to decide, or they cannot 
contribute to decide, over the destination of land.208 Restrictions on resource use may also 
come from the more general obligation contained in the CBD to conserve biodiversity and 
realise the sustainable use of its resources.209 In this sense, indigenous peoples might be 
prohibited from or restricted to carry out their traditional activities, such as hunting and 
fishing.210 Measures that are intended as a means to ensure the conservation of nature and 
biological diversity may encroach on indigenous peoples if these are excluded from land 
management.211
Although the implementation of Article 8(a) may encroach in numerous ways on the 
protection of indigenous rights, the CBD does not provide criteria to solve these conflicts. 
Once again, however, the text of the CBD must be interpreted in the context of subsequent 
practice. To this end, Chapter 4 examines the COP decision adopting the Programme of 
Work on Protected Areas (PoWPA),212 as well as other relevant decisions. The PoWPA 
Benefit-sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2013). On the locution “indigenous and local communities”, see recent CBD COP practice in 
Introduction, section 6.
206  For a reading of the Protocol that is in line with the human rights regime on indigenous peoples, see 
Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ 2013. See also, Elisa 
Morgera, ‘Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity to International 
Human Rights Law’ in Dennis Alland and others (eds), Unity and Diversity of International Law: Essays in 
Honour of Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Martinus Nijhoff 2013).
207  See section 3.
208  Sophie Lavallée, ‘Le Protocole de Nagoya sur l’accès et le partage des avantages découlant de l’utilisation 
des ressources génétiques (APA): brève présentation’ (2016) 1 Liason Énergie-Francophonie 9. On this 
point, see Chapter 4, section 3.
209  Art. 1 CBD.
210  Conflict might be avoided, for instance, by creating exceptions to conservation-related obligations 
tailored on indigenous peoples. See Alexander Gillespie, Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), Ch. 9 titled “Exceptions for indigenous peoples, science and the military”.
211  See Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/
Communities, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 28th ordinary 
session (2005), at 20.
212  Established by COP dec. VII/28, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/28 (13 April 2004).
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encourages the involvement of indigenous peoples in the creation of protected areas and it 
can thus be seen as the basis for a synergic interpretation of the CBD with human rights 
standards. In this context, Chapter 4 investigates to what extent this practice is able to fill 
the gaps contained in the CBD and in which measure it can solve practical conflict between 
the implementation of the CBD and the need for CBD Parties to respect, protect and fulfil 
indigenous rights.
All difficulties highlighted so far have to do with the fact that the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and conservation encompasses complex issues, such as the role of 
traditional knowledge for indigenous peoples, its link with traditional use of natural resources, 
the enormous economic potential of the exploitation of traditional knowledge, and issues 
about sovereignty over the resources to which indigenous traditional knowledge relates.213 
Some other difficulties are linked to the fact that, notwithstanding the incorporation of 
indigenous issue in the international regime on biodiversity, conservation and indigenous 
rights continue to have different rationales. This difficulty is common to the human rights 
approach to the environment applied by human rights treaty bodies to indigenous issues.
With this background in mind, this dissertation aims to verify to what extent the 
consideration of indigenous and local communities within the CBD regime is sufficient to 
realise an integration of the rights of indigenous peoples into the CBD regime. In analysing 
the CBD some years later its adoption, Maggio concluded that conservation regimes were 
inadequate at that time to ensure a synthesis of indigenous rights and conservation.214 The 
purpose of subsequent chapters is to verify whether this conclusion still holds true and, to 
the extent that the CBD regime is still inadequate, how its deficiencies can be remedied in 
light of current international law.
In any event, it is worth highlighting that Maggio has identified three main gaps in 
the CBD, namely the lack of clear obligations to ensure benefit-sharing with communities, 
the need to ensure access to land and resources by indigenous peoples, and the need to 
secure “effective participation of local communities over resource management decisions 
and in the implementation of legal instruments”.215 While the first issue has been partially 
resolved through the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, the other two problems still need to 
be addressed.
213  See Jona Razzaque and Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Human Rights 
Obligations: The Status of Discussion in International Organisations’ (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 401.
214  Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for 
Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998.
215  See ibid., at 226.
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4. Indigenous peoples and biodiversity: a case study for conflict
The way in which the relationship between indigenous rights and environmental protection 
has been conceptualised in the case law of human rights bodies corresponds to a vision 
where environmental protection and the advancement of indigenous rights may be 
mutually supportive. In other words, a sound environment has been often framed as the 
precondition for the enjoyment of indigenous rights. Although this approach may hold 
true when development projects are concerned, it is only one part of the story.216 As 
illustrated in this chapter, there are situations where indigenous rights and the protection 
of the environment may be at odds.217 This potential for conflict is scantly reflected in the 
decisions of human rights treaty bodies.218 The previous section has illustrated that the CBD 
regime presents critical elements that overshadow such conflict. However, the dimension 
of conflict is not sufficiently reflected in international legal scholarship. When the issue of 
the potential conflict between the international regime on conservation and indigenous 
rights is addressed, the problem too quickly leads to two opposite and mutually exclusive 
conclusions, namely either that biodiversity conservation inevitably leads to conflicts or that 
conservation and indigenous rights are always supportive of one another. On the contrary, 
this dissertation aims to present a comprehensive analysis of conflict, as well as indications 
on the possible ways to reconcile these two international regimes.
This is not an easy task and two caveats should be retained. First, when the collective 
interest to the protection of the environment poses a strain to the collective human rights 
of indigenous peoples, the human rights monitoring bodies are ill-placed to balance the 
contrasting interests at stake.219 The solution of these conflicts, therefore, should frequently 
be found outside the realm of international human rights. This is due to the fact that issues 
going beyond the realm of human rights are involved, including the exercise of sovereignty 
over natural resources. Furthermore, political choices are often implied so that political 
processes such as negotiations among the relevant actors would produce sounder, although 
not necessarily fairer, results than the mere balance of rights with the notion of public 
interest on the part of human rights bodies.
Second, the presumption that indigenous rights and conservation should always go hand in 
hand fails to recognise that the interaction between these two elements should be framed in 
light of the possibility for indigenous peoples to decide over their development priorities.220 
216  See Heinämäki 2009.
217  See throughout section 2 supra: Apirana Mahuika case; CESCR, Concluding observations on Sri Lanka 
(2010); Xákmok Kásek case; Endorois case; Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland.
218  See Xákmok Kásek case; Endorois case.
219  In this sense, Shelton argues that it is easier to use a human rights approach to environmental protection 
when environmental pollution is at stake. See Dinah Shelton, ‘The Environmental Jurisprudence of 
International Human Rights Treaties’ in Romina Picolotti and Jorge Daniel Taillant (eds), Linking Human 
Rights and the Environment (The University of Arizona Press 2003), at 16.
220  See Cherie Metcalf, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving International Law’ (2003-2004) 
35 Ottawa Law Review 109, at 127-128.
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The refocusing on the problem under these terms gives sufficiently account of the dimension 
of conflict. In this respect, Chapter 2 shows that the international regimes on the human 
rights of indigenous peoples and the conservation of biodiversity are based on a conundrum 
centred on the access to natural resources and the exercise of sovereignty over them. If these 
issues are not analysed, the disruptive dimension of conflict that characterises the interaction 
of the two regimes cannot be solved. Therefore, the aim of the following two chapters is to 
propose an interpretative approach where issues such as sovereignty over natural resources 
are sufficiently taken into account. This approach is tested against the cases of both the 
regime on access and benefit-sharing to genetic resources and the conservation of natural 
resources in the form of the institution of protected areas in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Principles Governing Access to Natural Resources between 
the State and Indigenous Peoples: An Interpretative Approach
1. Introductory remarks
Rights over lands and resources have emerged as a central aspect of the relationship 
between indigenous peoples’ rights and the environment. Chapter 1 has revealed that 
conflicts may arise between the regimes of international human rights and biodiversity 
protection that are applicable to the management of natural resources. This chapter 
argues that these conflicts can be explained through a more fundamental conflict between 
the underlying principles of the international regime laying down the human rights of 
indigenous peoples and the international regime on biodiversity protection. While the 
management of territory and natural resources for environmental purposes is mostly 
regulated on the basis of the fact that States exercise exclusive sovereign powers on these 
aspects,1 the exclusivity of these powers is challenged in this study by reference to the 
principle of self-determination, which—this chapter argues—underlies the international 
body of indigenous rights.
In this light, the following of this chapter first clarifies what is problematic about 
the relationship between the sovereign powers of States over natural resources and the 
self-determination of indigenous peoples. Second, it investigates the content of these two 
principles. Finally, it goes back to the issue why their parallel application may cause a 
conflict to answer the question of how this conflict can be resolved.
The conceptualisation of the research problem under these terms might be regarded 
as problematic. While the sovereignty of States over natural resources is a well-established 
principle in international law, the self-determination of indigenous peoples has 
characterised indigenous vindications from the very beginning but remains contentious. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to propose a method to assess the content and status 
of the principle of self-determination as applicable to indigenous peoples. The approach 
chosen is to derive this principle inductively from the established corpus of indigenous 
rights. These rights, in turn, are explored by looking at the classic sources of international 
law. Although international treaties dedicated to the protection of indigenous rights are 
limited in number and their geographical scope of application, a decisive boost to the 
recognition of indigenous rights has come from the decisions and reports adopted by 
the treaty bodies of both international and regional human rights treaties. This chapter 
therefore recognises the auxiliary role of international cases and jurisprudence in the 
1  Barral 2016 forthcoming, at 6, shows how sovereignty and environmental objectives are mutually 
constitutive.
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ascertainment of legal sources.2
The result is the elaboration of an interpretative approach that is used in the 
following substantive chapters on ABS (Chapter 3) and nature conservation and protected 
areas (Chapter 4) to guide the analysis over the relationship between indigenous peoples’ 
rights and the protection of biodiversity. What this research intends as an interpretative 
approach and how this is relevant to respond to the research questions already illustrated 
is explained in section 5. Suffices it to say at this stage that looking at the interaction 
between the sovereignty of States over natural resources and the self-determination of 
indigenous peoples is instrumental for dealing with the question of how conflicts between 
the international regime on indigenous rights and the regime on biodiversity protection 
can be solved.
1.1. The relationship between the permanent sovereignty of States and 
indigenous peoples’ self-determination
The relationship between the permanent sovereignty of States over natural resources 
and the rights of indigenous peoples over the same resources is characterised again by 
the dimension of conflict. Control over resources is an aspect of the sovereignty of 
States over their national territory. At the same time, self-determination in its human 
rights dimension, as enshrined in the UN Covenants, contains an aspect of economic 
empowerment that is closely linked to the right of peoples to exercise control over the 
determination of their destinies.3 Therefore, the dimension of conflict emerges in that 
the permanent sovereignty of States and peoples’ right to freely dispose of resources 
under human rights law insist, at least partially, on the same material objects, i.e., the 
resources located on any national territory.4 This aspect is relevant since, as analysed in 
2  On these methodological issues, see more in the Introduction of this study, section 4. E.g. see Abi-
Saab 1987, at 129-131 and 134, where the author recognises that international case law may contribute 
to the development of international law in so far as judges play a pivotal role when it comes to the 
definition of the content and status of any international rule.
3  See common Art. 1 UN Covenants. Art. 1(2) reads: “All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may 
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” For arguments in support of the interconnectedness 
of the political, economic and social aspects of self-determination contained in paragraph 1 and the 
control over natural resources contained in paragraph 2, see Jérémie Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose 
of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
314, at 315-316. See also, Stefania Errico, ‘The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing 
States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), 
Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011), at 334.
4  See Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Final report of the Special 
Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (13 July 2004) (hereinafter Daes 
report (2004)), para. 18. Daes argues against the existence of a potential conflict by maintaining that 
indigenous peoples are not placed at the same level as States. The merits of this argument are discussed 
in the following sections. See also Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of 
Natural Resources in International Law’ (2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 33, at 
50. According to the latter author, the State’s permanent sovereignty over resources ambiguously overlaps 
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next sections, the rights of indigenous peoples include prerogatives over land and natural 
resources that are similar to the economic component of self-determination. Hence, the 
possibility of conflict.
Schrijver offers a classical interpretation on this potential conflict with its seminal 
work on sovereignty over natural resources.5 In his understanding of the problem, 
although permanent sovereignty and indigenous rights to land and resources may seem 
to overlap, the main difference between the two lies in the fact the indigenous peoples 
are not subjects of international law. The State, notwithstanding its duty to respect and 
protect indigenous peoples’ rights, holds the “ultimate authority” on the exploitation of 
natural resources.6
In contrast with this argument, this chapter contends that the problem of conflict 
is still relevant for two main reasons. First, the scope of indigenous rights has expanded 
in such a way that these rights may constitute a substantive limit to the way in which 
the sovereignty of States is exercised; the constraints imposed are so profound that its 
content may even be challenged by indigenous rights. Second, and again following from 
the strengthening and widening of indigenous peoples’ rights, indigenous peoples might 
not be mere objects of international law. Instead, the existence of a number of rights, as 
well as indigenous peoples’ ever-growing presence in international fora to discuss issues 
that directly concern them, represents a factor in the direction of an emerging “actorness” 
of indigenous peoples in international law.7
Sovereignty implies duties, alongside with rights, for States.8 These may derive 
for instance from the respect of fundamental rights, including the rights of indigenous 
peoples.9 These rights are more extensive than originally claimed and their content, as 
well as their legal status, is analysed so as to verify whether they have a bearing on the way 
with self-determination.
5  Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University 
Press 1997).
6  See ibid., at 318-319.
7  Both the premises and the implications of this claim are discussed in the following sections. As a 
general reference, see Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From 
Victims to Actors (Transnational Publishers 2006). The Conclusion of this dissertation also contains 
further considerations on the role of indigenous peoples in current international law (see section 3).
8  Pertile shows that duties are inherent in the notion of sovereignty as formulated in UNGA resolutions 
and case law, especially when it comes to the existence of a duty of vigilance on private actors. See Marco 
Pertile, ‘On the Financing of Civil Wars through Natural Resources: Is There a Duty of Vigilance for 
Third States on the Activities of Trans-National Corporations?’ in Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica 
Bonfanti and Francesco Seatzu (eds), Natural Resource Grabbing: An International Law Perspective 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2016), at 401-406. See also, Francesco Francioni, ‘Human Rights: Natural Resources 
and Human Rights’ in Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi (eds), Research Handbook on International Law 
and Natural Resources (Edward Elgar 2016 forthcoming), especially at 83-87.
9  See Schrijver 1997, at 390: “the interests of peoples, indigenous peoples and humankind are receiving 
increasing attention in international instruments in the sense that States are under an obligation to 
exercise permanent sovereignty on behalf and in the interests of their (indigenous) peoples”. Indeed, the 
author is silent as to the way in which this objective may be realised.
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in which permanent sovereignty over resources is exercised.
The conflict between conservation and indigenous peoples’ rights in international 
law becomes even more fundamental for the present research since the sovereignty of 
States over natural resources is the cornerstone of environmental treaties. This founding 
principle in the design of many multilateral environmental treaties, including the CBD, 
must be balanced against the bodies of rights of indigenous peoples protected under 
current international law. 
2. The permanent sovereignty of States over natural resources
2.1. The evolution of the principle
Sovereignty is one of the founding principles of modern international law.10 This principle 
is indirectly enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter as a consequence of the sovereign 
equality of States. It also lies at the basis of principles such as the duty not to interfere 
with the internal affairs of other States. Furthermore, it entails the supreme authority of 
the State over its national territory, which is related to the allocation of natural resources 
to States. The problem of the allocation of natural resources under international law, 
however, cannot be entirely subsumed under the principle of sovereignty and lacks a 
unitary regime.11 Instead, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
can offer a more suitable framework to understand the economic powers exercised by 
States over the natural resources located under their territorial sovereignty.12
Although permanent sovereignty is deemed to have reached the status of customary 
10  For an extensive bibliography on the principle of sovereignty in international law, see ibid. On the 
content and evolution of the principle, see James N. Hyde, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth 
and Resources’ (1956) 50 American Journal of International Law 854; Karol N. Gess, ‘Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analytical Review over the United Nations Declaration and 
its Genesis’ (1964) 13 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 398; Ian Brownlie, ‘Legal Status of 
Natural Resources in International Law’ (1979) 162 Recueil des cours 245. See also Gilbert, ‘The Right 
to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 2013; Ricardo Pereira 
and Orla Gough, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: Natural Resource 
Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’ (2013) 
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 451, at 462-463, where the authors refer to the main ICJ 
decisions affirming the fundamental character of the principle. It is to be reminded here that sovereignty 
has also been qualified as a mere fact rather than a principle in international law. For an account of that 
view, see Treves 2005, at 243. This view however refers more to sovereignty intended as the capacity to 
control the territory, thus being connected to the idea of effectivity. See Conforti 2013, at 205. Moreover, 
the view of sovereignty as a fact presupposes a conception of international law as a legal system completely 
dominated by States, which is not embraced in this dissertation. See Introduction, section 4.
11  See Marco Pertile, La relazione delle risorse naturali e conflitti armati nel diritto internazionale (CEDAM 
2012), at 47. See also, Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 49: “For States, the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources must be regarded as an attribute of State sovereignty”.
12  On the relationship between sovereignty and permanent sovereignty, see Abi-Saab 1987, at 331-334. 
See also, Dam-de Jong 2015, at 47-48: “the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
one of the organising principles of international law relating to natural resources”.
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international law,13 its precise content has evolved to respond to different societal needs 
(i.e., development, decolonisation, environmental concerns) so as to determine an 
underlying ambiguity both as for the meaning and the addressees of the principle.14
The consolidation of permanent sovereignty as a customary rule in international law 
has mainly taken shape through the UN resolutions that have referred to this principle 
interchangeably as an attribute of peoples, States, or developing countries.15  Therefore, 
the main problem is to understand in which circumstances and to what extent permanent 
sovereignty empowers States concerning the management of natural resources.
Contrary to the principle of sovereignty that predates the State-centric organisation 
of the international society, the origins of permanent sovereignty over natural resources can 
be traced back to the decolonisation movements of the 1960s and the formation of new 
States emerging from the ashes of previous colonies.16 In this sense, permanent sovereignty 
was an articulation of the economic conception of self-determination, according to 
which peoples shall freely dispose of their resources to be able to freely determine their 
status.17 In a group of resolutions that run across the 1950s up to the 1970s, permanent 
sovereignty was intended as the right of “under-developed” or “developing countries” to 
use their natural resources for achieving economic development.18 This trend partially 
mirrored the agenda of developing countries, first emerging from decolonisation and 
then struggling to build a strong economic position in the international arena.19
13  See ICJ, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 
Judgment (30 June 1995), at 124. See also, ICJ, Case concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of 
the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment (19 December 2005), para. 244: “The Court recalls that the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is expressed in General Assembly resolution 
1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and further elaborated in the Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order (General Assembly resolution 3201 (S.VI) of 1 May 1974) and 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 
December 1974). While recognizing the importance of this principle, which is a principle of customary 
international law…” (emphasis added). The customary nature of the principle is also affirmed in Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. the Government of the Lybian Arab 
Republic (1977), 53 ILM 422, paras. 84-91. See Nico Schrijver, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at paras. 18-19, 23: “The principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources did not evolve through conventional methods of international law-
making such as the evolving State practice or treaty-making…As far as legal doctrine is concerned, hardly 
any contemporary international lawyer would deny the principle of permanent sovereignty legal value”.
14  Concerning the evolution of the principle in international law, see Dam-de Jong 2015, at 35-46.
15  Although the resolutions adopted within the UN General Assembly are not per se binding, they may 
concur to the formation of customary international law, by the crystallisation of State practice and opinio 
juris. For a deeper discussion on that, see section 3.6 in this chapter.
16  See Schrijver 1997, at 1, 3, and 255 ff.
17  See Abi Saab 1987, at 335.
18  See UNGA Res. 523 (VI), UN Doc. A/RES/523(VI) (12 January 1952), first preambular para.: 
under-developed countries for purposes of economic development have a “right to determine the use of 
natural resources”. See also, UNGA Res. 2158 (XXI), UN Doc. A/RES/2158 (XXI) (25 November1966), 
preamble: in order to ensure the realisation of permanent sovereignty the highest possible rate of growth 
of developing countries must be ensured; UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (24 
October 1970), para. 74: full exercise over their natural resources on the part of developing countries.
19  Indeed, there is also a paternalistic thread recognisable in some resolutions. This paternalistic view 
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When the agenda of developing countries became prominent with the advent of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO), development was framed as a general 
objective of any States. In this context, permanent sovereignty over natural resources was 
seen as an attribute of the State, aimed to achieve economic development.20 The priority 
for the newly formed States or States in the process of emerging from colonisation was to 
be able to affirm their sovereign powers over national resources against both foreign States 
and foreign companies.21 Therefore, a second group of resolutions conferred permanent 
sovereignty to all States. In the exercise of sovereign powers, however, States should be 
guided both by national development and the well-being of the national people.22 In 
this sense, the State’s permanent sovereignty appears to be qualified by the objective of 
promoting the interests of the people.23
The apparent convergence of the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources towards a State-centric conception of resource management is complicated 
by the intrinsic ambiguity of the principle’s formulation in some of the most widely 
relates the State’s permanent sovereignty to the objective of the full and proper use of natural resources. 
This renders permanent sovereignty conditional upon the notion of an acceptable degree of development. 
See UNGA Res. 626 (VII), UN Doc. A/RES/626(VII) (21 December 1952), whose preamble contains 
a reference to the need to encourage under-developed countries “in the proper use” of their resources.
20  See UNGA Res. 3171 (XXVIII), UN Doc. A/RES/3171(XXVIII) (17 December 1973), preamble: 
right of each State to national sovereignty; again an intrinsic condition is that the full exercise is ensured in 
order to achieve development objectives. See also UNGA Res. 3201 (S-VI), UN Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 
(1 May 1974) (NIEO declaration), para. 4(e): among the tenets of the NIEO, the permanent sovereignty 
of States over resources and economic activities plays a major role. UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN 
Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (12 December 1974) (Charter of economic rights and duties of States), Art. 
2:“Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and 
disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities”. For a viewpoint on the value of 
the Charter of economic rights and duties, see Pereira and Gough 2013 at 457: the Charter was adopted 
by a majority of developing countries with virtually no favourable developed countries; in this sense, 
its legal significance should be limited since it does not reflect the legal views of a significant portion of 
States. See also UNGA Res. 1515 (XV), UN Doc. A/RES/1515(XV) (15 December 1960): States are 
indicated as holders of sovereign powers as concerns natural resources, in the context of a resolution 
aimed to address the problems of less developed countries. See Dam-de Jong 2015, at 38-40.
21  The problem here was to guarantee that States emerging from decolonisation could freely dispose of 
their natural resources without the risk of incurring into international responsibility for the infringement 
of international investment treaties. For early reflections on the issue of the control of foreign investments, 
see Abi-Saab 1987, at 338-351. On the rationale behind NIEO, see Schrijver 1997, at 96-100.
22  See UNGA Res. 2158 (XXI), para. 1: “inalienable right of all countries…in the interest of national 
development”. See also, UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII), UN Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) (14 December 1962), 
para. 1: “The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of 
the State concerned”; UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) , Art. 7: “Every State has the primary responsibility to 
promote the economic, social and cultural development of its people.”
23  Note that permanent sovereignty is also an unqualified attribute of States; it has been used to specify 
the extent and scope of States’ territorial sovereignty over resources that are physically located beyond 
the terrestrial portion of States’ territory. The notions of sea-bed and superjacent waters are relevant 
in this sense. See UNGA Res. 3016 (XXVII), UN Doc. A/RES/3016(XXVII) (18 December 1972), 
para 1: right of States “over all their natural resources, on land within their international boundaries 
as well as those found in the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof within their national jurisdiction and in 
the superjacent waters”; UNGA Res. 3171 (XXVIII), para. 1: inalienable rights of States to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, land, sea-bed etc.
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accepted UN resolutions concerning the exercise of sovereign powers over resources. The 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 is emblematic in this 
sense.24 This Declaration refers to a tripartite pool of subjects as potential addressees of 
permanent sovereignty. On the one hand, States have an “inalienable right…freely to 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests”.25 
On the other hand, both peoples and nations should exercise permanent sovereignty “in 
the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned”.26
Although States and peoples are different legal subjects in international law, one 
solution to this ambiguity would be to argue that the reference contained in resolution 
1803 to “the people of the State concerned” may qualify the interpretation of this 
ambiguous clause in favour of a State-centric articulation of permanent sovereignty. In 
other words, peoples and nations would be entitled to sovereign powers in the field 
of natural resources when they are constituted in a State-form.27 This interpretation, 
however, does not fully respond to the additional ambiguity of the reference to the UN 
Charter, which indicates both the equality of States and self-determination as its founding 
principles.28 Moreover, the reference to permanent sovereignty as a right of peoples is not 
isolated,29 so that the ambivalence of the principle as a right of both peoples and States 
cannot be fully resolved by reference only to the principle as it has developed in the UN 
practice.
The ambiguity in the subjects may be better explained as a result of the parallel 
evolution of the principle in two different bodies of law. While the principle is often 
24  Res. 1314 (XIII) of 1958 had originally called for a full survey of both the right to self-determination 
and permanent sovereignty. This call has resulted in Res. 1803. The resolution of 1958, however, already 
contained the seeds of the ambiguity between peoples and States that is fully reflected in Res. 1803. See 
preamble: “noting that the right of peoples and nations to self-determination…includes “permanent 
sovereignty””. On the relationship between the two resolutions see, Schrijver, at para. 9.
25  UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) , preamble.
26  UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII), para. 1.
27  See Arhén 2016, at 32; Cassese 1995, at 99-100; Crawford in Alston 2005, at 22.
28  UNGA Res. 1803(XVII), para 7: the violation of the rights of peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty runs counter the UN Charter.
29  See UNGA Res. 626 (VII), preamble: “right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth 
and resources is inherent in their sovereignty”; operative part: “Member States, in the exercise of their 
right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources”. See also, UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), UN 
Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) (Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples), preamble: “affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources”. See further, Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties (Vienna, 23 August 1978, in force 6 November 1996), Art. 13; Vienna Convention on Succession 
of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (Vienna, 8 April 1983, not yet in force), Art. 
15(4) and 38. The ambiguity between peoples and States emerges again in the African regional context. 
Art. 21 of the African Charter ambiguously refers to the rights of “all peoples” to “freely dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources”, while affirming in the same article the duty of States to exercise their “right 
to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources” with a view to strengthening the “African Unity”. 
See African Charter, Art. 21(1) and (4).
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conceived as the natural corollary of States’ sovereignty,30 it is also very much related 
to the parallel evolution of self-determination in the human rights realm.31 Both the 
sovereignty aspect and the self-determination aspect have been used for decolonisation 
purposes. In this sense, decolonisation contains within itself a duality of subjects, i.e., 
the peoples that need to exercise self-determination and the States formed through the 
exercise of self-determination.32
Therefore, the ambiguity about the subjects entitled to exercise permanent 
sovereignty is ultimately linked to the historical development of the principle. As argued 
by Schrijver, the diversified formulations of permanent sovereignty can be traced back to 
different historical moments where insisting on peoples rather than States, or vice-versa, 
reflected both different political backgrounds and purposes.33 Along these lines, the 
resolutions of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s were imbued with decolonisation 
ideals. In this sense, permanent sovereignty was instrumental for the nationalisation of 
resources with the aim to achieve self-determination. The inclusion of economic self-
determination in common Article 1(2) of the UN Covenants may be also read in those 
terms.34 The emphasis on peoples was subsequently set aside starting from the mid-1960s 
30  Schrijver, at para. 3. See also, Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or 
Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 318.
31  See Pertile, La relazione delle risorse naturali e conflitti armati nel diritto internazionale 2012, at 79-80: 
“il principio in oggetto [permanent sovereignty] si pone…sia come elemento costitutivo del principio 
di autodeterminazione dei popoli, sia come attributo inerente della sovranità statale”. See also, Dam-de 
Jong 2015, at 34; Duruigbo 2006, at 50: ““Sovereignty,” as used in framing PSNR indicates an intent 
to vest control in the state. Yet sovereignty is only one aspect of the origin of the principle of PSNR, 
which is twofold: the sovereignty of states and the self-determination of peoples”; Gilbert, ‘The Right to 
Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 316: “there is a fundamental 
dichotomy in international law when it comes to control over natural resources since two legal personalities 
are entitled to some form of control over the resources: States and peoples. This dichotomy is the result of 
the development of two branches of international law that focus on different actors but address the same 
right: the right to dispose of the natural resources.” See, furthermore, Federica Violi, ‘Land Grabbing 
e sovranità territoriale: spunti critici di riflessione’ in Adriana Di Stefano (ed), Un diritto senza terra? 
Funzioni e limiti del principio di territorialità nel diritto internazionale e dell’unione europea; A Lackland 
law? Territory, effectiveness and jurisdiction in international and EU law Atti e contributi del X incontro di 
studio fra i giovani cultori delle materie internazionalistiche Catania, 24-25 gennaio 2013 (Giappichelli 
2015), section 2.
32  See UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII), preambular para. 2: the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources is “a basic constituent of the right to self- determination”. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry, Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), at 111: “Sovereignty over their economic 
resources is, for any people, an important component of the totality of their sovereignty. For a fledgling 
nation, this is particularly so.” ICJ, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski, Case concerning East 
Timor (Portugal v. Australia), at 242: “The status of the Territory of East Timor as non-self-governing, 
and the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, including its right to permanent sovereignty 
over wealth and natural resources, which are recognized by the United Nations, require observance by all 
Members of the United Nations” (emphasis added).
33  For a detailed discussion on that, see Schrijver 1997, Ch. 2, especially at 49 ff. and 3.
34  See Art. 1(2) and 47 ICCPR; Art. 1(2), 11(2)(a), and 25 ICESCR. For a full analysis of these articles, 
see sections 4.1 and 4.2. in this chapter. The already cited Res. 626 (VII) and Res. 1514 (XV) also go in 
this direction. See also, ibid., at 57: “In 1954, the Commission on Human Rights had recommended 
that the General Assembly, through ECOSOC, establish a Commission with the task of conducting a 
full survey of the right of peoples and nations to ‘permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
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when the States emerging from decolonisation started to claim a right to development. 
Within this framework, permanent sovereignty over resources was conceived mainly an 
instrument to realise a new international economic order.35
Most recently, permanent sovereignty emerges clearly as an attribute of States.36 
This is the case when the principle is qualified by obligations concerning the protection 
of the environment at the international level. Suffices it to think of Stockholm Principle 
21 and Rio Principle 2 that, while presupposing the sovereignty of States over resources, 
proclaim the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm in the use of national 
resources.37 The State’s permanent sovereignty lies also at the foundation of the CBD, 
where it is reaffirmed both in relation to the obligation not to cause harm when utilising 
natural resources and with respect to access to genetic resources.38 In environmental 
instruments, therefore, the right to exploit natural resources is framed as an attribute of 
the sovereignty of States. Of course, this right finds inherent limitations in the objective 
to protect environmental resources contained in METs.39
In sum, the principle of permanent sovereignty has served a number of purposes 
in international law. Hence, its multifaceted content cannot come as a surprise. Instead, 
when permanent sovereignty is at stake, it must be contextualised within the legal 
framework of reference. Although the principle of sovereignty over resources has evolved 
resources’, which they labelled a ‘basic constituent of the right to self-determination’”. Schrijver, at 58, 
highlights the strong opposition of Western States to the understanding that self-determination and 
permanent sovereignty should be read together.
35  In the words of Schrijver 1997, at 83: “Since it had ‘proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced 
growth of the international community under the existing international economic order’, according to 
the NIEO Declaration, the developing countries set out to change the rules of the game in order to put 
a halt to the widening of the gap between rich and poor nations and to promote the redistribution of 
wealth and power. Permanent sovereignty was perceived as an essential component of these efforts”.
36  See Marco Pertile, ‘Economic Self-Determination in the 21st Century: Tracing the Origin and the 
Evolution of a Chamaleonic Concept’ in Peter Hilpold (ed), Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung in Europa 
and im internationalen Vergleich (Nomos, Dike and facultas 2016), at 357-387, for the new tendencies. 
See also Francioni, ‘Human Rights: Natural Resources and Human Rights’ 2016 forthcoming for the 
qualification of sovereignty in light of human rights and the well-being on the people.
37  Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21: “States 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992), A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Principle 2 (same text as 
Principle 21 above). On the legal status and content of this principle and the corresponding rule, see e.g., 
Dinah Shelton, ‘Stockholm Declaration (1972) and Rio Declaration (1992)’ Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law; Sands, Principles of International Law 2003, at 235-246; Bodansky 2010, at 
200-202; Dupuy and Viñuales 2015, at 55-58.
38  Preambular para. 4 CBD: “States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources”; Art. 3 
reiterates what is affirmed in Stockholm Principle 21 and Rio Principle 2 supra; Art. 15(1): “Recognizing 
the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic 
resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation”. These rules are 
transposed in equal terms in the Nagoya Protocol, preambular para. 4 and Art. 6.
39  See Barral 2016 forthcoming.
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in parallel with that of States’ sovereignty and with the principle of self-determination, it 
is important not to equate them since these legal principles have been used to different 
ends.40 For the purposes of the present research, when it comes to the protection of 
biological diversity at the international level, the sovereignty of States over natural 
resources is strongly affirmed in the CBD and constitutes the relevant framework for 
reference.41
2.2. The limits to permanent sovereignty
In the field of biodiversity conservation, the powers of States over natural resources are 
mainly an attribute of sovereignty. This sovereignty, however, does not come unqualified 
and is subject to a number of limits.42 It would be ingenuous to conclude that these 
limits diminish the nature of the State’s sovereignty or the relevance of States in the 
international arena.43 However, this section argues that these limits qualify the content 
of sovereignty to the extent that its exercise is very much constrained and its content is 
thus abundantly regulated.44
The limits to States’ powers over resources are classified in this research into four 
categories: (1) limits stemming from other founding principles of international law; (2) 
intrinsic limits deriving from the content of the principle of sovereignty over natural 
resources; (3) so-called practical limits descending from the nature of the problems 
underlying international legal regimes; and (4) limits imposed by sub-disciplines of 
international law.
40  In this sense, Dam-de Jong 2015, at 58, argues: “The principle of permanent sovereignty accrues both 
to States and to peoples. For States, the right to freely dispose of their natural resources is an attribute of 
their sovereignty, while for peoples, the right to freely dispose of their natural resources is an inherent part 
of their right to self-determination”. For a contrary view, see Daes report (2004): throughout her report, 
Daes refers indifferently both to permanent sovereignty and self-determination, thus blurring the lines 
between these two principles.
41  Indeed, Barral 2016 forthcoming, at 3, stresses that there is “an inherent tension between 
the organization of the international society of States on the basis of territorial sovereignty and the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of the resources of the biosphere”.
42  See Schrijver 1997, at 255.
43  For a debate on the absolute character of sovereignty, apart from the already cited contributions by 
Barral 2016 and Francioni 2016, see Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: 
The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of Pennsylvania 1990), at 15, 19-22: in the view 
of this author, self-imposed limitations to sovereignty deriving from the ratification of multilateral 
treaties do not diminish the absolute character of sovereignty; on the contrary, they are a confirmation 
of this. See also, Nico Schrijver, ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’ (1999) 70 British Yearbook 
of International Law 65, who argues that States remain indispensable actors. See, Siegfried Wiessner, 
‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1141, at 1148: “The limitations that international 
law places on sovereigns largely emanate from self-restraint”.
44  Some authors argue that these limits are inherent in the principle of permanent sovereignty that is 
to be exercised in the interest of the people. See Dam-de Jong 2015, chapters 3 and 4, where the author 
stresses the fact that peoples are also beneficiaries of permanent sovereignty as exercised by States (see 
conclusion at 152). 
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First, the sovereignty of States does not imply the absence of any limitations. States’ 
liberty, in fact, is most naturally limited by the sovereignty of other States.45 This is 
expressed through some of the founding principles of international law, namely State 
equality and non-intervention in other States’ internal affairs. Both principles are at the 
core of the UN Charter and have been elaborated on in the UN resolution on friendly 
relations.46
Second, the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources presents intrinsic 
limits that derive from the content of the principle as formulated in the UN resolutions. 
These limits consist in the conditionality that is usually attached to the exercise of 
permanent sovereignty, namely that the free disposal of natural resources is aimed to 
the well-being of the national people.47 In this sense, the use of natural resources on the 
part of the State, as well as national development initiatives, should be qualified by and 
assessed through their impact on the whole population of a State. In the view of Schrijver, 
this aspect emerges first from the UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty, which aim 
to strike a balance between ensuring national development and ensuring that this is done 
45  The exercise of sovereignty on the part of other States may also create limits. See Jona Razzaque, 
‘Resource Sovereignty in the Global Environmental Order’ in Elena Blanco and Jona Razzaque (eds), 
Natural Resources and the Green Economy: Redefining the Challenges for Peoples, States and Corporations 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2012): throughout the chapter, the author suggests that the sovereignty of States is 
anyway limited by the extraterritorial effects of some other States’ measures.
46  See Charter of the United Nations, (San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945) 
(hereinafter UN Charter), Art. 2(1) (State equality) and 2 (7) (non-intervention of the UN in the 
internal affairs of States). See also, UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), affirming both the “principle of sovereign 
equality of States”, and the “principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter”. For an account of the historical 
evolution of the principle, see Juliane Kokott, ‘States, Sovereign Equality’ Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, Part B. Concerning the latter, non-intervention has been affirmed in the 
Case concerning the Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 
Judgment (25 March 1948), para. 35, as well as in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, UNGA Res. 
2131 (XX), UN Doc. A/RES/2131(XX) (21 December 1965), paras. 1-3, 5, and 8. The principle is also 
contained in Art. 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, (Bogotá, 30 April 1948, in 
force 13 December 1951). See also, Hellen Keller, ‘Friendly Relations Declaration (1970)’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, paras. 18-19.
47  See note 22 in this chapter. See also, Pereira and Gough 2013, at 458, 460: the sovereignty of States 
should be exercised for the well-being of peoples, thus there are limits to its exercise and duties for the State; 
Lila Barrera-Hernandez, ‘Sovereignty over Natural Resources under Examination: The Inter-American 
System for Human Rights and Natural Resource Allocation’ (2006) 12 Annual Survey of International 
and Comparative Law 43, at 44; Duruigbo 2006, at 65-67: the author specifically makes reference to 
the fact that in the Ogoni case, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights derived State 
duties from article 21 of the African Charter; Errico 2011, at 341-342: the author makes the argument 
that the duty for States to benefit the whole population is also closely linked to the emergence of a right 
to development. In this sense, she refers to the Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA Res. 
41/128, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128 (4 December 1986), Art. 2(3) and the World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993), para. 
10. Another intrinsic limit to the State’s sovereign rights over natural resources is given by the diminished 
importance of one of the premises of the exercise of sovereignty, i.e., territoriality. On this, see Austen 
L. Parrish, ‘Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of Indigenous Rights’ 31 
American Indian Law Review 291.
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in the interests of peoples. These limits are also contained in treaty law, such as the UN 
Covenants that establish a duty not to deprive peoples of their means of subsistence.48 
Within this framework, participatory rights in decision-making can be seen as one of the 
practical consequences of this qualification.49
Third, there are some practical limits deriving from the acknowledgment that 
sovereign States are not self-sufficient anymore when it comes to the conduct of their 
internal affairs. This argument is particularly strong when it comes to the governance 
of natural resources. States are increasingly aware that they “have become” more and 
more “interdependent” as for the management of natural resource—the limitation of 
sovereignty is therefore practical and is exemplified by the need to cooperate in certain 
areas.50 In this vein, States conclude international treaties in the field of environmental 
protection, whose aim may be for instance to avoid negative transboundary impacts 
of States’ activities on the natural environment of other States, to commonly manage 
transboundary natural resources, or to ensure that some species, habitats, ecosystems, 
or functions of the natural environment are preserved. At the same time, cooperation 
between States is possible by virtue and as an expression of the State’s sovereignty.51
Fourth, and as a consequence of the previous trend, the State’s sovereignty intended 
as the liberty of States to manage their own affairs is restricted by the emergence of 
detailed rules in many sub-fields of international law.52 The sub-disciplines of interest 
to the present research are mainly international environmental law and international 
human rights law. These are very much representative of the limits imposed on the 
sovereignty of States in that they create both constraints and positive duties for States. 
Although these limits are self-imposed and, thus, an expression of sovereignty, they may 
affect sovereignty in different ways depending on the nature of limits that States agree to. 
In this sense, it is important to distinguish between limits deriving from international 
environmental law and limits imposed by human rights law.53
48  See Schrijver 1997, for the first aspect, at 308; for the second aspect, at 309.
49  See Barrera-Hernandez 2006, at 57. See also, Errico 2011, at 345; Francioni, ‘Human Rights: Natural 
Resources and Human Rights’ 2016 forthcoming.
50  Schrijver 1997, at 249; Barral 2016, at 8-15.
51  This argument needs to be qualified. Although it is true on a formal level that sovereignty is what 
allows States to conclude agreements in the field of environmental cooperation, it is important to remind 
that this cooperation is not necessarily the expression of the unilateral self-interest of the State. States 
tend to enter into multilateral agreements that go beyond the mutual concessions of one State to the 
other. Instead, these agreements are the expression of the “common concern of humankind”, that is 
problems that supersede actual national impacts. See Stephen Stec, ‘Humanitarian Limits to Sovereignty: 
Common Concern and Commen Heritage Approaches to Natural Resources and Environment’ (2010) 
12 International Community Law Review 361, at 364.
52  More broadly, the State’s sovereignty has been restricted by the emergence of common values. See 
Federico Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2006-2007) 42 Texas International Law Journal 155, at 159.
53  Some authors argue that alleged limits to the sovereignty of States may derive from the nature of the 
problems regulated. In this sense, environmental protection would not constitute a limit to sovereign 
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Concerning international cooperation in matters related to the protection of the 
environment, this can be framed first as a reaffirmation of sovereign equality.54 In line 
with this view, the sovereignty of States lies at the basis of the main UN resolutions 
dealing with the environment, as well as of most multilateral environmental treaties.55 
In this sense, environmental norms do not constrain sovereignty; they merely qualify 
it.56 This is the case, for instance, for the prohibition to cause transboundary harm while 
exploiting natural resources.57 Although de facto restricting the ways in which resources 
are managed,58 this norm primarily aims to protect the mutual interests of neighbouring 
States.
Second, and in a more nuanced way, indeed, the values underlying environmental 
treaties pose limits that may supersede the “logic behind the primacy of the law of 
sovereign states” and that have repercussions on the way in which activities affecting the 
national environment are regulated internally.59 This is the case when States’ activities are 
so dangerous that they threaten human survival.60
Third, there are environmental treaties that impose obligations that need to be 
implemented nationally in order to achieve objectives agreed upon at the international 
level. This is the case of most international conservation treaties, including the CBD.
Although in the last two examples States’ powers on natural resources are limited by 
international obligations, it is important to remind that the ultimate foundation of these 
obligations remains the sovereignty of States. The CBD, in particular, is premised on the 
powers. Rather obligations restraining the liberty of States to dispose of their natural resources would 
derive from considerations of opportunity and mutual interest. Limits stemming from the need to protect 
the environment to the advantage of human beings would therefore represent an “acceptable constraint”. 
On this point, see Barral 2016 forthcoming, at 4 and 26. Similarly, the protection of human rights can 
be seen as mutually supportive with respect to realising the permanent sovereignty of States in the interest 
of people. On this point, see Francioni, ‘Human Rights: Natural Resources and Human Rights’ 2016 
forthcoming, at 82-83. The latter author shows how sovereignty has been pivotal in the development of 
human rights.
54  See André Nollkaemper, ‘Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in International Law’ in Jonas 
Ebbeson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University 
Press 2009), at 255-258.
55  See e.g. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21; Institutional and financial arrangements for international 
environmental cooperation, UNGA Res. 2997 (XXVII), UN Doc. A/RES/27/2997 (15 December 
1972), preambular para. 4; World Charter for Nature, UNGA Res. 37/7, UN Doc. A/RES/37/7 (28 
October 1982), preambular para. 5 and para. 22; Principle 2 Rio Declaration; Art. 3 CBD.
56  See Schrijver, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, para. 24. See also, Dam-de Jong 
2015, az 40-43.
57  See note 37 in this chapter on Principle 21. See also, Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. 
Canada); ICJ Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (8 July 1996), para. 29; 
ICJ, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (20 April 2010), 
para. 72.
58  See Pereira and Gough 2013, at 457.
59  Stec 2010, at 364.
60  Ibid. The author in particular refers to the effects of nuclear weapons on the survival of humankind.
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principle of national sovereignty over biological and natural resources.61 In this context, 
sovereignty may be seen first as a means for developing countries not to be deprived of 
their resources while granting access to them for conservation purposes. Second, as long 
as States are the main holders of biological diversity, they are also the main duty-bearers 
when it comes to its conservation. Furthermore, the fundamental role of the State is 
compounded by the legal recognition that “the conservation of biological diversity is 
a common concern of humankind”.62 Unlike common heritage, the common concern 
category presupposes sovereignty and calls for the cooperation of States for achieving 
common objectives.63
Regarding the limits to sovereignty deriving from human rights law, the main 
argument, in short, is that human rights constrain States’ behaviour with regard to their 
nationals and peoples subject to their jurisdiction.64 In the case of indigenous peoples, 
the limitations posed on States have an effect on the latter’s permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.65 This is related to the fact that indigenous peoples hold extensive rights 
on their territories and the natural resources therein located. Since these territories are 
under the jurisdiction of national States, there is a problem of overlapping authorities on 
lands and resources held by indigenous peoples in various forms. Moreover, indigenous 
territories are often rich in terms of the natural and subsoil resources that they contain. 
As has emerged in the case-law of human rights bodies, the abundance of natural and 
mineral resources may create situations in which a State’s rights to exploit these resources 
for the purposes of national development conflict with indigenous peoples’ rights on the 
same lands and resources. Finally, the overlapping of legal titles may be problematic also 
when States’ conservation policies are at stake, since the obligation to create protected 
areas or restrictions on resource use deriving from international law may similarly 
encroach on the rights of indigenous peoples.
For these reasons, and with a view to study the relationship between conflicting legal 
norms, it is fundamental to analyse the content and legal status of indigenous peoples’ 
61  Art. 3 and 15 CBD.
62  Preambular para. 3 CBD.
63  See e.g., Barral 2016, at 12-15. On the difference between common concern and common heritage, 
see e.g., Dupuy and Viñuales 2015, at 84-86.
64  See Patrick Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2015), at 33-34; 
William J. Aceves, ‘Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through Human Rights 
Litigation’ (2002) 25 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 261; Michael K. Addo, The 
Legal Nature of International Human Rights, Series: International Studies in Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2010), at 20-22; Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’ (1996) 25 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 31, at 32-33. For a more nuanced view of this argument, 
see Francioni, ‘Human Rights: Natural Resources and Human Rights’ 2016 forthcoming; Jack Donnelly, 
‘State Sovereignty and International Human Rights’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 225, at 
235.
65  See Razzaque 2012, at 84-87; at 86, this author argues that the rights of indigenous peoples are 
shaping the sovereignty of States.
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rights. Arguing, as some authors have done,66 that indigenous rights do not conflict 
with permanent sovereignty over resources since the latter belongs to peoples is of little 
practical use because it does not provide guidance on the interaction between States and 
indigenous peoples over natural resources. Instead, the main claim of this chapter is that 
indigenous peoples’ rights are especially restricting the sovereignty of States over natural 
resources.67 Although the link between the permanent sovereignty of States over natural 
resources and indigenous peoples’ rights is rarely spelled out in legal documents,68 a 
joint reading of the two in light of human rights law may confirm this view. By virtue 
of indigenous rights, States must not only restrict their sovereign powers but also act to 
ensure the respect for those rights.
3. The rights of indigenous peoples
The rights of indigenous peoples are a multifarious body of individual, as well as group 
rights that have emerged mainly within the UN framework. The survey conducted in 
Chapter 1 on the main decisions concerning indigenous peoples and the environment 
gives a clear idea of the global significance of indigenous rights. The Human Rights 
Committee, the CESCR, the CERD, as well as regional human rights bodies have 
found violations of indigenous peoples’ rights, mainly by interpreting in an extensive 
way individual rights that were not directly concerned with the indigenous struggle. 
This equals to say that there is an approach according to which indigenous peoples are 
safeguarded through the general body of human rights law.69 Thus, the decisions of 
human rights bodies are once again relied upon in this section with a view to identifying 
the content and assessing the status of indigenous rights.
In addition to case law, this section is also directly relying on primary sources, i.e., 
the analysis of treaties and relevant legal documents on indigenous peoples’ rights. This 
trend corresponds to a second, complementary, approach whereby legal instruments are 
66  See Pereira and Gough 2013, at 454: these authors purport that there is no contradiction between 
the sovereignty of States over natural resources and self-determination of indigenous peoples, since both 
belong to peoples.
67  See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Tensions between States and Indigenous Peoples over Natural Resources in 
Light of the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Including Relevant National 
Legislation and Case-Law)’ (2012) 4 The Yearbook of Polar Law 227, at 236: the State’s permanent 
sovereignty is limited by the collective rights of indigenous peoples.
68  See, at the regional level, the Amazon Declaration (Manaus, 6 May 1989), para. 4: “sovereign right 
of each country to manage freely its natural resources, bearing in mind the need for promoting the 
economic and social development of its people and the adequate conservation of the environment”. See 
also, Daes report (2004).
69  See Katja Göcke, ‘Protection and Realization of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights at the National and 
International Level’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 87, at 126. See also, Bankes 2011, 
at 59. According to the latter author, the main advantage of relying on general human rights treaties is 
that they are widely ratified.
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specifically designed to protect indigenous rights.70 As reminded, there are two main legal 
instruments that deal specifically with indigenous rights, namely the ILO Convention 
169 and the UN Declaration on indigenous rights. In principle, both documents are 
tainted with formal limitations to their universal applicability. The former, while being a 
binding treaty, has been ratified only by twenty-two States.71 Indeed, some of the rights 
enshrined in the Convention text have been relied upon by human rights treaty bodies 
outside the ILO framework and with reference to cases involving States that are not 
party to the ILO Convention.72 The latter is a non-legally binding document officially 
endorsed by the UNGA. Notwithstanding these limitations, both documents have been 
used as interpretative tools in the case law of international human rights bodies and 
national courts. Furthermore, the Declaration has contributed to the consolidation of 
the rights of indigenous peoples in a way that is explained throughout this section.73 At 
this stage, suffices it to mention that the resolution adopting the Declaration has been 
voted, after more than two decades of negotiations, almost unanimously by UN member 
States. The original opposition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States 
has been most recently reversed so that a consensus can be deemed to have consolidated 
on the content of the rights contained in the UN Declaration.74 It is important to note 
that, although the Declaration has clarified the content of some rights, fundamental 
70  Göcke 2013, at 124-125.
71  On the state of ratifications, see http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::
NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last accessed October 2016).
72  See Göcke 2013, at 125. See also Endorois case, para. 154, where the African Commission refers to 
the ILO Convention 169 “even though many African countries have not” ratified it. See also, S. James 
Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 
(2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13, at 40: “government statements 
to the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations and other international bodies confirm general 
acceptance of at least the core aspects of the land rights norms expressed in the Convention No. 169”. 
Some of these statements are listed at 41, note 114. In line with this interpretation, the ILO Convention 
169 has been invoked as an interpretative instrument or as a benchmark to define the content of land 
rights also in cases where the respondent State has not ratified the ILO treaty. See Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sergio García Ramírez, in Awas Tingni case, paras 7-9; Dann case, para. 130, note 89. See also, 
ILO, Application of Convention No. 169 by Domestic and International Courts in Latin America 2009.
73  For a more focused analysis on the nature of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights, see section 
3.6. For a general appraisal of soft law instruments within this dissertation, see Introduction, section 4.
74  On the supervening endorsement of the Declaration on the part of Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States, see, Pereira and Gough 2013, at 473, note 128. See in particular, Jenny Macklin 
MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Statement on the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Parliament House Canberra, 3 April 2009 
(hereinafter Australia’s statement); Hon. Dr. Pita Sharples, Minister of Maori Affairs, Announcement 
of New Zealand’s support for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ninth Section of the 
United Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 19 April 2010 (hereinafter New Zealand’s statement); 
Government of Canada, Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 12 November 2010 (hereinafter Canada’s statement); Ambassador Susan E. Rice, 
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement on the Announcement of U.S. Support 
for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, New York, 16 December 2010 
(hereinafter US statement). In the following sections, it is clarified that these endorsement declarations 
present fundamental differences as for the recognition of indigenous rights. On the relevance of the UN 
Declaration, see, Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010.
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disagreements on some key rights, such as the right to land, remain.75
This section focuses exclusively on group rights, as they have consolidated in 
international human rights law, since these have the potential to challenge the State’s 
prerogatives over natural resources. The rights analysed in the following sections are the 
right to land, the right to natural resources, cultural rights, participatory rights, and 
the right to autonomy. These rights have been selected because they are the clusters 
around which the discussion between States and indigenous peoples has taken shape. 
As argued by Lenzerini, these rights are profoundly interconnected to one another so 
that the realisation of one of them cannot be fully realised in the absence of the others.76 
In light of this, this section focuses in particular on land rights. Land rights are both 
essential to indigenous peoples’ physical survival and to their existence as distinct peoples. 
Furthermore, these rights are potentially the most intrusive in terms of the impact they 
can produce on the sovereignty of States. For these reasons, the other collective indigenous 
rights are examined only to the extent that they are connected to land rights.
The aim of the following subsections is to verify around which of these rights 
both the acceptance of States and indigenous claims have gathered. To this end, beyond 
looking at the relevant human rights instruments, indigenous peoples’ views are taken 
into account to see to what extent they align with the obligations currently undertaken 
by States. Whereas the obligations of States are assessed against the traditional sources 
of international law, as a matter of discourse indigenous peoples’ voices are considered 
an indispensable element in the shaping of the legal debate around their rights. States’ 
practice, indeed, is assessed not only against States’ individual behaviour and declarations; 
reports of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples are also used since 
they reflect the consolidation of the continuous dialogue with both States and indigenous 
peoples and provide an independent source of States’ behaviour regarding the respect for 
indigenous rights.77
75  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Victoria Tauli Corpuz, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/27/52 (11 August 2014), para. 23.
76  Siegfried Wiessner and Federico Lenzerini, Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Law Association, 
Sofia Conference 2012), at 43 (the section referred to has been elaborated exclusively by Federico 
Lenzerini).
77  The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights has been established in Human 
Rights Council Res. 15/14, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/14 (6 October 2010). Accordingly, the Special 
Rapporteur must “gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from all 
relevant sources, including Governments, indigenous peoples and their communities and organizations, 
on alleged violations of the rights of indigenous peoples” and  “work in close cooperation and coordination 
with other special procedures  and subsidiary organs of the Council, in  particular with the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, relevant United Nations bodies, the treaty bodies and 
regional human rights organizations” (para. 1(b) and (d)). In this sense, the activities carried out by 
the Special Rapporteur are an opportunity for States and indigenous peoples to present their views on 
thematic and/or country-specific issues. The Special Rapporteur in turn takes into account those views 
to inform his/her recommendations on the issues at stake. Concerning the ways in which States and 
indigenous peoples may interact through the work of the Special Rapporteur, see Victoria Tauli-Corpuz 
and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, Engaging the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People: Opportunities and 
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3.1. The right to land
The relationship of indigenous peoples with their territories is quintessential in that it 
is both central to the identification/self-identification of groups as indigenous78 and 
to the protection of indigenous rights. Land represents, in this sense, the fundamental 
link between indigenous peoples and their cultural specificity, which is not easily 
accommodated within the legal paradigm of individual property. Indigenous peoples do 
not only hold land in physical possession, but they also establish spiritual and religious 
ties with land. In this regard, land is not simply a commodity that can be alienated.79 
Instead, it belongs to indigenous peoples in a mutual relationship in which indigenous 
culture and customs are nurtured through the management of land,80 while the land also 
provides the physical space in which the life of indigenous peoples takes place.81 In the 
words of some indigenous representatives, indigenous peoples “belong to the land”.82
Challenges (Tebtebba and DANIDA 2004), at 24-31. Although these recommendations have no binding 
value and are mostly intended as pursuing fact-finding and monitoring functions, they contribute in 
ways that are similar to judicial bodies to the progressive development of international law in the field 
of indigenous rights. This contribution can be explained by the consideration that every time Special 
Rapporteurs perform monitoring functions, they are interpreting existing human rights to assess what 
violations, if any, have been committed by concerned States. On the functions of Special Rapporteurs in 
the UN system, see Surya P. Subedi, ‘Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special 
Rapporteurs’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 201, at 203-204. On the role of Special Rapporteurs 
in the development of international law, Surya P. Subedi, ‘The UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs 
and the Impact of their Work: Some Reflections of the UN Special Rapporteur for Cambodia’ (2016) 6 
Asian Journal of International Law 1, at 3. For a general discussion about the normative role of judicial 
bodies in international law, see Introduction, section 4.
78  For a detailed account of the debate over the definition of indigenous peoples and the dichotomy 
between identification and self-identification, see Introduction, section 3.1. On the importance of land 
rights, see Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 20.
79  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 (11 December 1997), at 1014: “It is inalienable 
and cannot be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown”.
80  The Human Rights Committee has clearly spelled out the link between the exercise of cultural rights 
and the practices of land and resource management. See General Comment 23, para. 7: “With regard 
to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the Committee observes that culture 
manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, 
especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing 
or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law.”
81  See José Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations, Final Report (last part), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (30 September 1983), 
para. 509: “for indigenous populations, land does not represent simply a possession or means of 
production. It is not a commodity that can be appropriated, but a physical element that must be enjoyed 
freely. It is also essential to understand the special and profoundly spiritual relationship of indigenous 
peoples with Mother Earth as basic to their existence and to all their beliefs, customs, tradition and 
culture”. See Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Joji Cariño, Reclaiming Balance: Indigenous Peoples, Conflict 
Resolution and Sustainable Development (Tebtebba Foundation 2004), at 45. See also, Jeremie Gilbert and 
Cathal Doyle, ‘A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent’ in 
Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011), at 291 and 293.
82  See Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter, Kari-Oca Conference (25-30 May 1992), para. 31. At the 
same international conference, indigenous peoples also adopted the Kari-Oca Declaration, available at 
http://www.forestpeoples.org/nl/node/3454 (last accessed October 2016).
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The decisions of the human rights monitoring bodies have spelled out these 
elements most clearly,83 with the Awas Tingni case of the Inter-American Court being 
paradigmatic in this sense: “[f ]or indigenous communities, relations to the land are not 
merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which 
they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations”.84 The Saramaka decision is also instructive since it affirms that the limits 
imposed on indigenous land rights should not result in the denial of the cultural integrity 
of the indigenous peoples concerned.85 In the African system, the African Commission 
has highlighted the defining nature of the relationship between indigenous peoples, 
83  Apart from the decisions listed in the text, see also, UN Doc. CERD/C/USA/DEC/1, para. 8: 
“The State party is urged to pay particular attention to the right to health and cultural rights of the 
Western Shoshone people, which may be infringed upon by activities threatening their environment and/
or disregarding the spiritual and cultural significance they give to their ancestral lands” (emphasis added). 
The US has opposed this position in UN Doc. CERD/C/USA/6, para. 345.
84  Awas Tingni case, para. 149. The rest of the paragraph reads as follows: “some specifications are 
required on the concept of property in indigenous communities. Among indigenous peoples there is 
a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense 
that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and its community. 
Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; 
the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental 
basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival”. It is interesting 
to note that Nicaragua has officially acknowledged the need to comply with this judgment. See CERD, 
Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Nicaragua, UN Doc. CERD/C/
NIC/14 (17 October 2007), paras. 147-169. These elements are incorporated in the subsequent case law. 
A good example of this is the judgment in Yakye Axa case, para 131: “the close relationship of indigenous 
peoples with the land must be acknowledged and understood as the fundamental basis for their culture, 
spiritual life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and transmission to future generations”; 
para. 154: “land is closely linked to their oral expressions and traditions, their customs and languages, 
their arts and rituals, their knowledge and practices in connection with nature, culinary art, customary 
law, dress, philosophy, and values.” See also, Xákmok Kásek case, para. 85: “This Court has considered 
that the close relationship of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands and the natural resources 
relevant to their culture that are found there, as well as the intangible elements resulting from them, must 
be safeguarded under Article 21 of the American Convention”. See further, Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 
118: “Applying the aforementioned criteria, the Court has considered that the close ties the members of 
indigenous communities have with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated with their 
culture thereof, as well as the incorporeal elements deriving therefrom, must be secured under Article 21 
of the American Convention. The culture of the members of indigenous communities reflects a particular 
way of life, of being, seeing and acting in the world, the starting point of which is their close relation with 
their traditional lands and natural resources, not only because they are their main means of survival, but 
also because the form part of their worldview, of their religiousness, and consequently, of their cultural 
identity”; Dann case, para. 128; Maya v. Belize, para. 114.
85  Saramaka case, para. 128: “in analyzing whether restrictions on the property right of members 
of indigenous and tribal peoples are permissible, especially regarding the use and enjoyment of their 
traditionally owned lands and natural resources, another crucial factor to be considered is whether the 
restriction amounts to a denial of their traditions and customs in a way that endangers the very survival of 
the group and of its members.” It is interesting to note that Suriname has always officially stated that it is 
willing to implement the judgments and never contested the scope of the rights adjudicated by the Inter-
American Court. See CERD, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the 
Convention, Suriname, UN Doc. CERD/C/SUR/13-15 (11 April 2014), paras. 13-19. See also, Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding observations on Suriname, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SUR/3 (7 March 2014), 
paras. 101-147.
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culture, and land.86 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has broadly interpreted 
Article 27 of the ICCPR on minority cultural rights to include particular forms of land 
management.87
This relationship is reaffirmed in the legal texts dedicated to indigenous rights. 
While the ILO Convention 169 creates an obligation for States to “respect the special 
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their 
relationship with the lands or territories”,88 the UN Declaration on indigenous rights 
couches the relationship between land and culture in the language of a right to “maintain 
and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands”.89 Furthermore, Article 8 of the UN Declaration 
assimilates land dispossession to an activity aimed at the “assimilation or destruction” of 
indigenous culture.90
Another important element of indigenous peoples’ relationship with land is that 
material occupation and possession of a territory, as well as the conduct of activities 
such as hunting, fishing, or even the performance of spiritual rituals, are oftentimes 
the expression of customary land tenure. 91 In this sense, although indigenous peoples 
86  Endorois case, para. 154: “there is a common thread that runs through all the various criteria that 
attempts to describe indigenous peoples – that indigenous peoples have an unambiguous relationship 
to a distinct territory and that all attempts to define the concept recognise the linkages between people, 
their land, and culture”; para. 156: “Endorois culture, religion, and traditional way of life are intimately 
intertwined with their ancestral lands”.
87  General Comment 23, para. 3.2: “one or other aspect of the rights of individuals protected under that 
article - for example, to enjoy a particular culture - may consist in a way of life which is closely associated 
with territory and use of its resources”; para. 7: “culture manifests itself in many forms, including a 
particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. 
That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves 
protected by law”.
88  ILO Convention 169, Art. 13.
89  Art. 25 UNDRIP. Preambular para. 7 clearly spells out “the urgent need to respect and promote the 
inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures 
and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their 
lands, territories and resources”.
90  Art. 8 UNDRIP reads as follows: “1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be 
subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2. States shall provide effective mechanisms 
for prevention of, and redress for…(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of 
their lands, territories or resources”.
91  The term “customary” refers to usually unwritten and traditional forms of law that regulate community 
life. See Brendan Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights - Why Living Law Matters 
(Routledge 2014), at 29: “Indigenous peoples’ worldview or cosmovision and distinct epistemologies 
underlie their systems of law, custom and tradition, which are rooted in land spirituality and culture”. 
Law, therefore, is embedded in traditional practices and traditional visions of the world. The relationship 
between customary law, as a general category of law, and positive law is explored throughout Tobin’s 
volume. See also, Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 43-44 and 46. According to Anaya and Williams, 
customary law is central in the identification of indigenous land: “An increasing number of state legal 
systems now recognize indigenous peoples’ oral history and their own documentation and mapping of 
their lands as evidence in legal proceedings determining land rights. In addition, expert testimony from 
anthropologists, geographers and other qualified scholars with relevant knowledge of indigenous peoples’ 
customs and culture is also recognized by domestic legal systems as relevant to establishing indigenous 
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may lack any formal titles to their territories, their relationship with land is in itself a 
form of traditional ownership or aboriginal title that has been recognised by human 
rights bodies,92 while being frequently ignored by States. The alleged lack of a formal 
title to land that could be framed within the Western standards of land tenure has been 
consistently used throughout history to deprive indigenous peoples of their territories 
and natural resources. The doctrine of terra nullius is only one example of the multiple 
techniques used by colonisers to acquire property over indigenous territories.93 The lack 
of statutory titles is still used in present times to justify eviction practices or alienation of 
property to third actors.
In overt contrast with the practices of dispossession and denial of indigenous title, 
human rights bodies have indicated traditional or ancestral possession as a sufficient 
element to establish property.94 Possession, in turn, is not strictly couched in Western 
legal terms as an uninterrupted control over land. Rather, it is founded on traditional 
occupation and traditional use, which better reflect indigenous peoples’ ways of life—
i.e., nomadic lifestyles or low-intensive uses of land and natural resources.95 The UN 
Declaration on indigenous rights has consolidated a consensus on this issue since 
possession is recognised in Article 26(2) as a form of “traditional ownership or traditional 
occupation or use”, thus encompassing all possible practices that amount to possession. 
Moreover, possession is invoked as a right in Article 14 of the ILO Convention 169. 
This right can be exercised “over the lands which they [indigenous and tribal peoples] 
peoples’ property rights based on traditional systems of land tenure.” At 47 ff., the authors cite a number 
of national cases where oral testimony of indigenous peoples has been used to prove indigenous land title.
92  Awas Tingni case, para. 151 and 164. The value of customary law has been affirmed in other cases 
that are not related to land rights. See Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Move toward the Multicultural State’ 2004, at 48-49.
93  On the doctrine of terra nullius and the other legal techniques used to justify colonisers’ encroachment 
on indigenous land, see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2004), Ch. 1. See also, Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations 
Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land (Cambridge University Press 2007), at 243-244; Marine 
They, Le contrôle des communautés autochtones sur leurs terres et ressources naturelles traditionnelles (Pedone 
2013), at 24; Federica Cittadino, ‘Applying a UNDRIP Lens to the CBD: A More Comprehensive 
Understanding of Benefit-Sharing’ (2014) 24 Indigenous Policy Journal, at 227-228. See also, Åhrén 
2016, at. 16-18 and 24-26.
94  Awas Tingni case, para. 151: “As a result of customary practices, possession of the land should suffice 
for indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that 
property”. Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Case No. 11,821 (15 June 2005) (hereinafter Moiwana v. Suriname), para. 131.
95  See Mattias Åhrén, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), 
Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 
2009), at 204 and 208. See also, Göcke 2013, at 140-141: “possession and control are not to be defined 
solely according to the European concept but indigenous views are also to be taken into account”; “if a 
nomadic people permanently and exclusively ranges a definite area of land, thereby visiting religious sites, 
using natural resources in accordance with their culture and way of life, and returning annually to good 
campgrounds they can claim ownership rights to land”. More generally on nomadic peoples, see Jérémie 
Gilbert, ‘Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to Nomadic Peoples’ Land Rights’ (2007) 7 
Human Rights Law Review 681; Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Peoples and Human Rights (Routledge 2014).
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traditionally occupy”.
The lack of possession does not automatically result into the extinguishment of any 
rights to land for indigenous peoples. It is not uncommon that indigenous peoples are 
deprived of their lands without their consent and in violation of their rights. Given these 
practices, the exclusion from the enjoyment of land rights by reason of the lack of traditional 
occupation or use in such cases would constitute an unacceptable discrimination.96 
Legal responses, in this respect, have been relatively diversified. International human 
rights bodies in the Inter-American and African systems have found that continuous 
possession is not necessary to establish property when indigenous peoples have been 
forced to leave their land.97 The possibility to claim land rights also in the absence of 
possession is an acknowledgment of the fact that, although the physical occupancy has 
been interrupted, the spiritual and cultural bonds of indigenous peoples with their lands 
remain unaffected.98
National cases have also marginally touched upon the issue of possession in 
some paradigmatic cases, concurring with the views expressed by international bodies. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,99 was called to 
examine a claim for aboriginal title. As the Court put it, the establishment of this title 
closely depends on the proof of possession. Possession should in principle refer to an 
uninterrupted period going from the acquisition of sovereignty on the part of Canada on 
the claimed territories up to present times. The Court, however, has found three caveats 
to this general principle on the establishment of possession. First, the proof of possession 
can be given also by providing evidence of current possession in the form of traditional 
occupation or use. Second, possession can also regard an area that is different from the 
pre-sovereignty area. Third, possession should not be exclusive but can be shared with 
other communities.100
The lack of possession is addressed in rather different terms in those instruments 
spelling out indigenous land rights. Article 14(1) of the ILO Convention 169 establishes 
that in case of non-exclusive occupation, rights to use lands to which indigenous peoples 
96  See Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 171-174.
97  See Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 128: “the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left 
their traditional lands, or lost possession therof [sic], maintain property rights thereto, even though they 
lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith”; Xákmok 
Kásek case, para. 109; Endorois case, para. 209.
98  Xákmok Kásek case, para. 112: “Regarding the possibility of recovering the traditional lands, on 
previous occasions, the Court has established that the spiritual and physical foundations of the identity 
of the indigenous peoples are based, above all, on their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so 
that as long as this relationship exists, the right to claim those lands remains in force. If the relationship 
ceases to exist, so would this right”.
99  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, at 1017-1020.
100  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, at 1020. See also Oliver de Schutter, ‘The Emerging Human Right 
to Land’ (2010) 12 International Community Law Review 303, at 313-314.
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“have traditionally had access” shall be ensured.101 Furthermore, although the ILO 
Convention bans any form of dispossession by means of forced relocation under Article 
16, this provision does not in principle extend to cases of evictions that preceded the 
entry into force of the treaty. However, the ILO Committee of Experts has clarified that 
the application of the Convention 169 extends to the effects of past actions that are 
continuing in the present.102 This means that the responsibility of States for violating 
the right to land as protected under the ILO Convention 169 can be found also in 
cases that would not formally fall under the purview of the Convention if a formalistic 
approach to dispossession as a one-time event of the past were applied. In contrast, the 
ILO Committee focuses on the consequences of past actions that still produce effects on 
the enjoyment of rights in the present.103
The UN Declaration regulates the case of forced dispossession under Article 28. 
Contrary to the ILO Convention, this provision applies to the “lands, territories and 
resources…traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been 
confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior, and informed 
consent”. In such cases, remedies such as restitution or compensation are available, so 
that the lack of possession is indirectly recognised as not extinguishing land rights. The 
101  See Göcke 2013, at 130, who draws a distinction between exclusive occupation, which gives rise to 
full ownership, and non-exclusive possession, which instead only amount to the recognition of rights to 
use.
102  See ILO Committee of Experts, Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation 
alleging non-observance by Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), 
made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Radical Trade Union of Metal and Associated 
Workers, para. 36: “This being the case, the Committee considers that the provisions of the Convention 
may not be applied retroactively…However, the effects of the decisions that were taken at that time 
continue to affect the current situation of the indigenous peoples in question, both in relation to their land 
claims and to the lack of consultations to resolve those claims. The Committee therefore considers that 
the Convention does currently apply with respect to the consequences of the decisions taken prior to its 
entry into force”. Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance 
by Denmark of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 
24 of the ILO Constitution by the National Confederation of Trade Unions of Greenland (Sulinermik 
Inuussutissarsiuteqartut Kattuffiat-SIK) (SIK), para. 29: “the Committee notes that the effects of the 1953 
relocation continue today, in that the relocated persons cannot return to the Uummannaq settlement 
and that legal claims to those lands remain outstanding”. Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederación Ecuatoriana de 
Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL), para. 30. Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers’ Union 
(CUT) and the Colombian Medical Trade Union Association, para. 56.
103  See Rodriguez-Piñero 2005, at 83. This interpretation by the ILO Committee supports the idea 
that there exist violations of a continuing character, as codified in Article 14(2) of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, elaborated in 2001 by the International Law Commission. What characterises 
dispossession as a continuing violation, however, is not the endurance of its material consequences, but 
the continued failure to recognise, protect, and enforce indigenous land rights. See Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), at 60, available 
at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (last accessed October 
2016).
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general duty to return traditional lands in case of forced dispossession had been affirmed 
prior to the adoption of the UN Declaration, also by the CERD Committee, as well as 
regional human rights bodies.104
Although the extent of land rights is not well defined and it may vary according 
to the circumstances, it seems clear that land rights must be based on indigenous 
customary law.105 While the extent of recognition of aboriginal title may vary widely 
across countries,106 the variety of national paradigms for the recognition of land rights is 
irrelevant for the purposes of international law.107 Traditional ownership lies at the core of 
indigenous rights to “own, use, develop and control the lands” under Article 26(2) of the 
UN Declaration. This formulation is in accordance with the decisions taken by human 
rights treaty bodies, thus confirming the declaratory nature of the UN Declaration 
with respect to pre-existing land rights under international law. Furthermore, in light 
of national jurisprudence, indigenous title to land has not been extinguished by the 
acquisition of sovereignty on the part of colonising powers.108
104  General Recommendation 23, para. 5: “The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize 
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, 
territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally 
owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return 
those lands and territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution 
should be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation.” See also, Sawhoyamaxa case, 
para. 131; Endorois case, paras 209-210. For a contrary view, see They 2013, at 28. This author argues, 
without much support for this claim, that a broad formulation of the right to restitution is not supported 
by national practice. Although national provisions on the return of lands are not widespread, it must be 
noted that it is not the case that remedies are denied at national level. Therefore, it cannot be said there 
is a consistent State practice against the remedial restitution of indigenous lands. In contrast, there are 
cases where this restitution is established by law. See the Treaty of Waitangi Act of New Zealand (1975), 
Section 6(3), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1975/0114/latest/DLM435368.html 
(last accessed October 2016). On this see, Göcke 2013, at 116; Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the 
International Legal System 2016, at 194-195.
105  This is also true when determining the extent of indigenous rights at the international level. See 
Yakye Axa case, para. 124: “In its analysis of the content and scope of Article 21 of the Convention in the 
instant case, the Court will take into account, in light of the general rules of interpretation set forth in 
Article 29 of that same Convention, as it has done previously, the special meaning of communal property 
of ancestral lands for the indigenous peoples” (emphasis added). See national case law: Supreme Court of 
Belize, Aurelio Cal, in his own behalf and on behalf of the Maya Village of Santa Cruz, et al. v. The Attorney 
General of Belize and the Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment, Claim No. 171/2007 (18 
October 2007) (hereinafter Aurelio Cal 2007), at 101 and 136; Supreme Court of Sweden, Nordmaling 
case, Case No. T 4028-07 (27 April 2011), 109 NJA 2011, paras 5-10, 12, and 56. See Åhrén, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 184-186.
106  See Göcke 2013, at 99-100. The author provides examples of different understanding of indigenous 
titles within the legal systems of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US.
107  See ibid., at 127. Of course, this may cause relevant problems in the practice when it comes to the 
application of land rights. As a point of principle, however, aboriginal title, that must be determined 
according to the traditions and uses of the indigenous people concerned, is sufficient to establish land 
rights.
108  See Supreme Court of Canada, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313, at 
328, 375, and 390; Constitutional Court of South Africa, Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor 
Ltd and Another, Case No. CCT 19/03 (14 October 2003), [2003] ZACC 18 (hereinafter Richtersveld 
case), para. 68; Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), paras. 39 and 62; High Court of New Zealand, Te Weehi v. 
Regional Fisheries Officer (19 August 1986), [1986] 1 NZLR 680, at 687. On this, see ibid., at 97-98.
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Another point that emerges in a consistent way from both international case law 
and State practice is the collective dimension of indigenous property.109 This can also be 
partially derived from Article 26(3) of the UN Declaration of indigenous rights since 
the recognition of indigenous customary regimes over land encompasses the collective 
dimension of indigenous land rights. The content of these collective rights over land 
comprises both strictly speaking property rights, including ownership, control, and 
rights to use, as well as cultural rights in the form of the rights to exercise and preserve 
indigenous culture.110 The joint reading of Article 26(1) of the UN Declaration, which 
refers broadly to the “right to lands, territories and resources”, with the already cited 
Article 25 on the “spiritual relationship” of indigenous peoples with land, confirms the 
interdependency between property and cultural aspects of land rights.111 As recalled, this 
interconnection has also emerged in the case law of human rights bodies, thus confirming 
the functional nature of indigenous land tenure systems to the preservation of unique 
indigenous peoples’ culture.
Given the extensive recognition of indigenous land rights, it remains to explore 
the extent of the powers that indigenous peoples may exercise on their lands. The precise 
determination of those powers, however, is uncertain.112 Article 14 of the ILO Convention 
109  See e.g. Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 45: “the ownership of land is vested in the indigenous 
community or group as a whole”. See Yakye Axa case, para. 143; Moiwana v. Suriname, para. 133; 
Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 120; Dann case, para. 128; Maya v. Belize, para. 114; Kaliña and Lokono case, 
para. 103; Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by 
Peru of the Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the 
ILO Constitution by the General Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP), para. 32(b); Supreme 
Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, paras. 194, 199, and 201; Richtersveld case, para. 62. 
See also, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UN Doc. A/65/281 (11 August 2010), 
para. 12: “Property, as protected under article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is 
considered to constitute a collective right of indigenous people, since land ownership is often centred 
not on the individual, but rather on the group and its community”, and para. 26. Collective ownership 
is also reflected in the declarations made by indigenous peoples. See e.g., Charter of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests (Penang, 15 February 1992), Art. 16; Indigenous Peoples’ Earth 
Charter, Kari-Oca Conference, (25-30 May 1992), para. 2; Indigenous Peoples’ Plan of Implementation 
on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2 September 2002), para. 6; Kimberley Declaration, 
International Indigenous Peoples Summit on Sustainable Development Khoi-San Territory, (Kimberley, 
20-23 August 2002), para. 7; Corobici Declaration (San José, 6-7 December 2004), General Principle 
1. Output document, Indigenous Peoples International Conference on Sustainable Development and 
Self Determination (Rio de Janeiro, 17-19 June 2012), principle 2; Alta Outcome Document, Global 
Indigenous Preparatory Conference for the United Nations High Level Plenary Meeting of the General 
Assembly to be known as the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (Alta, 10-12 June 2013), Theme 
1 that reaffirmed indigenous land tenure systems.
110  See Åhrén, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ 2009, at 209.
111  This is also highlighted in national case law. See Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 44.
112  Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 23. See also Åhrén, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and 
Natural Resources in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ 2009, 
at 203: “Today, international law recognises that the intrinsic connection between indigenous peoples 
and their traditional territories results in their holding certain material rights to LTRs [lands, territories, 
and resources] traditionally occupied and used. How far these rights stretch has been subject to intense 
debate. But some general conclusions can be drawn”.
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169 distinguishes between “the rights of ownership and possession” that indigenous 
peoples may exercise “over the lands which they traditionally occupy” and “the right…to 
use lands not exclusively occupied by them”. As for the latter, ownership and possession 
encompass the broadest range of property powers so that what is not expressly forbidden 
is otherwise permitted.113 Rights to use are not as exclusive as full property rights.
Notwithstanding these differences, two elements serve to characterise the scope of 
rights to use in a way that is as protective as full ownership rights.114 First, in the case 
of nomadic peoples, that are explicitly referred to in Article 14(1), traditional use of 
land and resources may constitute sufficient elements to prove traditional occupation.115 
Second, the scope of the right to use should be determined by bearing in mind the 
functional importance that land rights play for the safeguard of indigenous culture.116 
As emerges from the ILO Guide to the Convention 169, the emphasis on occupation 
as a basis to protect indigenous ownership rights is to be intended in opposition with 
the irrelevance of the formal recognition of land titles by the State.117 Furthermore, 
non-exclusive occupation only points to the fact that the land might be shared among 
different communities.118 The basis for protection is in any event provided by traditional 
occupation.119 What happens when indigenous lands are covered by third parties’ formal 
titles is examined in the following with respect to acceptable restrictions to indigenous 
land rights.
Along the same lines, the UN Declaration on indigenous rights does not 
differentiate between exclusive and non-exclusive occupation. In contrast, Article 26(2) 
confers “the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources 
that” indigenous peoples have in possession or “have otherwise acquired”. Under Article 
26(1), these rights are to be ensured also on the lands that have been traditionally used 
by indigenous peoples.
Notwithstanding the need to distinguish between different factual situations, the 
property component of indigenous land rights cannot be framed as a mere privilege to 
use. This is confirmed by the decisions of the human rights bodies that have elaborated 
on the content of land rights both in the Inter-American and African systems. In the 
Saramaka decision, the Inter-American Court held that for land rights to be meaningful, 
the property title granted to indigenous peoples should ensure that indigenous peoples 
113  See Ulfstein, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land’ 2004, at 20-22.
114  The ILO Committee has not elaborated on the right to use in the context of representation procedures.
115  See supra notes 96-97.
116  Wiessner and Lenzerini 2012, at 28.
117  ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 2009, at 94.
118  See Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 45: “Indigenous communities, for example, may migrate over 
time and may have overlapping land use and occupancy areas”.
119  ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 2009, at 96: 
“such non-exclusive land rights are established on the basis of traditional occupation”.
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can “effectively control their territory without outside interference”.120 In the Endorois 
case, the African Commission found that ownership, as a requirement imposed by 
international law, ensures that indigenous peoples are not “vulnerable to further violations/
dispossession by the State or third parties”, thus becoming “active stakeholders” rather 
than “passive beneficiaries” of rights.121
Furthermore, the content of indigenous right to land can be grasped by looking 
at the obligations it imposes on States.122 These can be classified into two main general 
categories, namely negative and positive obligations. The former mainly concerns States’ 
duties to abstain from carrying out activities that directly or indirectly deprive indigenous 
peoples of their land rights. An important example of negative obligations of States when 
it comes to land rights is the duty to refrain from carrying out development activities on 
the same territories upon which indigenous claims are pending.123 The latter category, 
that of positive obligations, includes specific actions to be carried out by States and 
deserves a deeper analysis.
States are equally obliged to adopt positive measures, including recognising national 
legal safeguards, in order to ensure the protection of and the respect for indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. This obligation has been both repeatedly affirmed by human rights 
bodies, whether global or regional, and crystallised in human rights instruments. The 
Human Rights Committee, in connection to the cultural manifestations of land rights, 
has emphasised the importance for the State to adopt positive measures to ensure 
indigenous peoples’ participation in decisions that affect their rights.124 The CERD 
Committee has spelled out that States’ positive duties imply the adoption of national 
legislation to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.125 Furthermore, the obligation to 
120  Saramaka case, para. 115.
121  Endorois case, para. 204. Kenya has formalised its will to implement the African Commission’s 
recommendations. See CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 
16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Kenya, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/KEN/2-5 (26 February 2014), para. 33.
122  Some limitations of an approach that is merely concentrated on States may lie on the fact that 
most indigenous peoples have been dispersed throughout different national territories or they have 
found themselves “trapped” in the borders of newly created nation-States. In this sense, a State-centric 
protection of indigenous rights might not duly take into account the cultural integrity of communities. 
See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 21-22. These authors contend that the same difficulty arises for 
the recognition of the right to self-determination since some indigenous peoples are subject to different 
States’ jurisdiction.
123  See e.g. Awas Tingni case, paras. 153 and 164. Saramaka case, para. 115. Xákmok Kásek case, para. 
291.
124  General Comment 23, para. 7; Apirana Mahuika case, paras 7.1, 9.5; Poma Poma case, para. 7.2. 
The CESCR Committee refers in more general term to the States’ duty to adopt “positive action”. See 
CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (Art. 15), UN Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009), para. 6. See also, CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/BRA/CO/2, para. 9; 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/RUS/CO/5, para. 7.
125  CERD, Concluding observations on Argentina, UN Doc. CERD/C/65/CO/1 (10 December 2004), 
para. 16. It is interesting to note that the CERD recommended the adoption of national legislation to 
implement the ILO Convention 169.
Chapter 2
110
“give legal recognition” to land rights is also central to the UN Declaration on indigenous 
rights, while the ILO Convention 169 calls for the adoption of “special measures” to 
ensure inter alia the protection of indigenous property rights.126 In the Inter-American 
system, national measures must ensure the effectiveness of indigenous land rights, as well 
as bringing about the legal recognition of indigenous land titles, for instance through 
demarcation.127 The African Commission links positive discrimination in favour of 
indigenous peoples, through the recognition of legal titles to land, to the realisation of 
indigenous rights and the redress of past injustices.128
As convincingly argued by Göcke, the recognition of a legal status to indigenous 
land rights does not automatically translate into the conferral of formal titles to land, 
provided that the substance of indigenous rights to land is protected.129 In this sense, 
the right to land is substantially protected when it both implies control over land and 
resources on the part of indigenous peoples and it ensures the preservation of indigenous 
distinctiveness, whatever practical form it takes to reach these objectives.
One of the cornerstones of the legal recognition of indigenous land rights is 
the duty, incumbent upon States, to demarcate indigenous territories. As established 
in Article 14(2) of the ILO Convention 169, demarcation means first of all the 
identification of indigenous territories. Furthermore, the UN Declaration on indigenous 
rights creates an obligation for States to “establish a process” in order to “adjudicate the 
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands”.130 This process must ensure the 
participation of indigenous peoples. In addition, the duty to demarcate must be read in 
light of Article 26(3) of the UN Declaration, which establishes that the recognition of 
indigenous land rights must be done in accordance with indigenous peoples’ “customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems”. The obligation to demarcate is also reflected in the 
decisions of human rights bodies,131 as well as in the observations concerning individual 
countries.132
126  Art. 26(3) and Art. 38 UNDRIP. See also, Art. 4 ILO Convention 169.
127  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in 
Paraguay, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.110 (9 March 2001), The rights of indigenous peoples, Ch. IX, para. 
13. See also, Moiwana v. Suriname, para. 133; Dann case, para. 130; Maya v. Belize, para. 115; Yakye Axa 
case, paras. 124 and 155. Saramaka case, paras. 85, 98, and 115; Sarayaku case, para. 146.
128  Endorois case, para. 196: “It is of the view that in certain cases, positive discrimination or affirmative 
action helps to redress imbalance”; para. 205: recognition of “de jure ownership”.
129  Göcke 2013, at 147-150. The requirement of a legal title is neither warranted in legal texts, nor 
affirmed by human rights bodies. Furthermore, it “is also not required from a teleological point of view” 
(at 148).
130  Art. 27 UNDRIP.
131  Awas Tingni case, paras. 153, 164, and in the operative part; Moiwana v. Suriname, paras. 209 (duty 
to demarcate) and 210 (“with the participation of the victims”); Yanomami case, recommendations, point 
3(b); Maya v. Belize, paras. 132, 152, 193, and 197.
132  Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on Brazil, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.66 
(24 July 1996), para. 32; CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, para. 11. For an overview of national 
demarcation processes in New Zealand, Canada, and the US, see Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 23. 
Chapter 2
111
Another central duty that the State may be called to fulfil is the obligation to return 
those lands taken without the consent of indigenous peoples. Under Article 28 of the 
UN Declaration on indigenous rights, indigenous peoples are entitled to restitution in 
case of dispossession of or damages to their lands in the absence of their free, prior and 
informed consent.133 The UN Declaration on indigenous rights also establishes a general 
prohibition of forced eviction, as well as the requirement of the free, prior and informed 
consent in case of relocation. The possibility of return, instead, is only framed as an 
option in case relocation is agreed between the parties.134 The requirement of consent in 
case of relocation is confirmed by Article 16(2) of the ILO Convention 169.135 Under 
Article 16(3), moreover, indigenous peoples have the “right to return” when the causes 
for relocation “cease to exist”.136 This right has been construed more clearly as a duty of 
the State in some decisions within the Inter-American and African systems.137 The Inter-
American jurisprudence, in addition, has dealt with the difficult case of dispossessions 
taking place before the entry into force of instruments protecting indigenous rights. In 
those cases, an evaluation of the effects of past wrongs must be carried out. In particular, in 
cases indigenous territories have been transferred to bona fide third parties, lost properties 
can be replaced with lands having similar characteristics.138
It may be inferred that there are commonalities in the way in which indigenous 
rights to land are defined both in the instruments dedicated to indigenous rights and from 
the interpretative process of the more widely ratified global and regional human rights 
treaties. Article 27 of the ICCPR, Article 21 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, and Articles 14 and 22 of the African Charter have been interpreted as implying 
at a minimum the intangibility of indigenous customary title to land. Furthermore, a 
cluster of common obligations is imposed on ratifying States so that the legal recognition 
of indigenous rights can be deemed global.139
See also, Göcke 2013, at 144-151.
133  The issue of the free, prior and informed consent is examined in section 3.5 in this chapter.
134  Art. 10 UNDRIP.
135  Human rights bodies have also concurrently affirmed the requirement of consent in case of relocation. 
CERD, General Recommendation 23, para. 5; Dann case, paras. 130-131, 141, 165; Endorois case, para. 
226. See Göcke 2013, at 135: the author argues that this requirement is providing a higher protection 
to indigenous peoples than it is usually granted in the case of individual property where consent is not 
needed for expropriation. 
136  Both the UN Declaration and the ILO Convention 169 establish that, in case restitution is impossible 
or too burdensome, indigenous peoples may alternatively be granted with compensation. See Art. 16(4) 
of the ILO Convention 169; Art. 28 UN Declaration.
137  See Xákmok Kásek case, paras. 281, 283. See also, Endorois case, paras. 232-234. See also, Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on indigenous issues, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/77 
(6 March 2007), para. 8.
138  Yakye Axa case, paras. 131 and 137. Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 128. Xákmok Kásek case, para. 109. 
Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 131.
139  A broader discussion on the legal status of indigenous peoples’ rights is conducted in section 3.6 in 
this chapter.
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Although imposing clear duties upon States, indigenous land rights are not absolute. 
Indigenous collective rights to land might either conflict with individual property 
titles140 or, more significantly for the purposes of the present research, be threatened by 
development projects promoted, initiated, or carried out by States. This last occurrence 
has been thoroughly examined in the case law of human rights bodies, with the Saramaka 
case being particularly instructive in this sense.141 In line with the Saramaka doctrine, 
restrictions to land rights should be established by law, pursue a legitimate aim in a 
democratic society, and be necessary and proportional to the pursued objective.142 The 
requirement that restrictions should be in accordance with law has been interpreted as 
implying inter alia that national policies affecting indigenous peoples should be in line 
with international law standards.143
The Inter-American Court has translated this argument into reality by placing a 
teleological limit to the restrictions that can be deemed acceptable. Since land rights are 
intended to protect the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous peoples, any restrictions 
cannot go so far as to result into a denial of land rights.144 This means that the mere 
respect of formal criteria is not sufficient to ensure the protection of indigenous land 
rights from external interference. The rationale for this teleological interpretation can 
be found in the quasi-totality of the Inter-American decisions, i.e., that land rights are 
instrumental for the survival of indigenous groups as distinct peoples.145 The Inter-
American Court, therefore, implicitly recognises the link between land rights and 
indigenous self-determination.
As reminded in Chapter 1,146 the so-called denial test has been operationalized by 
the Inter-American Court through the recognition of procedural obligations that States 
need to fulfil in order not to violate the substance of land rights, namely consultation 
140  On the conflict between individual rights to property and the collective title of indigenous peoples, 
see Yakye Axa case, paras. 146-151. To sum up the arguments of the Court, whenever possible, indigenous 
land rights should be given precedence over individual rights. This is due to the fact that land rights are 
instrumental for the protection of indigenous distinctive culture. As well noted by They 2013, at 34, the 
priority given to indigenous rights would be justified in terms of redressing a situation of historical and 
ongoing discrimination against indigenous property.
141  For a deeper discussion of the case, as well as a contextualisation of this decision in the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court, see Chapter 1, section 2.2.1.
142  Saramaka case, para. 127. See also, Sawhoyamaxa case, paras. 137-139.
143  This has been an argument put forward by the complainants in the Endorois case, para. 113.
144  Saramaka case, paras. 122 and 128. The parameter of the denial of rights as a threshold limit to any 
restrictions has also been upheld by the Human Rights Committee with respect to the right to culture: 
Länsmann I, paras 9.4 and 9.5; Länsmann II, para. 10.7; Apirana Mahuika case, para. 9.4.
145  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 130: “the protection and guarantee of the right to use and enjoyment 
of their territory is necessary in order to safeguard not only the survival of these communities, but also 
their development and evolution as a people”. See also Yakye Axa case, para. 124; Garífuna v. Honduras, 
para. 194.
146  See Chapter 1, section 2.2.1.
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and seemingly veto powers when it comes to extractive projects,147 impact assessments, 
and benefit-sharing.
Most recently, the Inter-American Court has elaborated a specific test for the 
case in which indigenous land and cultural rights are restricted due to the creation of 
protected areas. While the ultimate standard is to ensure that indigenous rights are not 
substantively compromised, this threshold must be appraised against specific criteria. 
Beyond effective participation and the sharing of benefits, the Inter-American Court 
has concluded that indigenous peoples must be able to continue to access and use their 
traditional territories.148 In evaluating this last standard, the Court found that, although 
certain restrictions on access and use are admissible, indigenous lands must not be 
affected in their entirety.149 Furthermore, States must ensure that indigenous peoples 
participate not only in the decision concerning the establishment of natural reserves, 
but also in their management.150 Co-management is also an abstract possibility since the 
Court refers to the role of States as possibly providing supervision. The Court has not 
discussed the possibility that protected areas are managed solely by indigenous peoples. 
This possibility, however, seems to be compatible with the supervisory role of the State.
The African Commission has espoused the same teleological reasoning.151 Although 
conceding, in the Endorois decision, that development and conservation are public 
interest objectives, it has concluded for the violation of cultural and land rights152 since 
the reference to public interest cannot justify any encroachment on “the very essence of 
the right”.153
Once again, the link between land and the survival of indigenous distinct culture 
is crucial. In this sense, the need to ensure indigenous survival can pose important limits 
to the sovereignty of States. The State can dispose of its natural resources by virtue 
of its sovereign rights. At the same time, indigenous peoples are holders of rights so 
encompassing, due to their instrumental role for the preservation of indigenous peoples, 
that any infringements of these rights stemming from the exercise of States’ sovereign 
powers find an insurmountable limit, that is the preservation of the substance of 
indigenous rights.
This reasoning is particularly topical when it comes to land rights. The substance 
of land rights is to ensure that indigenous peoples can exercise control over their land 
147  See infra section 3.5 in this chapter.
148  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 181. See also Chapter 1, section 2.2.1, and Chapter 4, section 2.1.2.
149  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 189.
150  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 192. This objective needs a certain and well-established legal framework, 
according to the Inter-American Court (para. 194).
151  Endorois case, para. 172: “such a restriction must be established by law and must not be applied in a 
manner that would completely vitiate the right” (emphasis added).
152  Endorois case, para. 173.
153  Endorois case, para. 215. Other relevant passages are contained in the paras. 211-214.
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and resources with a view to preserving their culture. In this sense, the exercise of States’ 
sovereignty in the form of development or conservation projects may encroach on the 
right of indigenous peoples to control their lands and resources.154 Significant examples 
of States’ activities that may clash with the rights of indigenous peoples are the disposal 
of hazardous materials and the conduct of military activities in indigenous territories. 
The UN Declaration on indigenous rights, respectively in Articles 29(2) and 30, bans 
these activities unless an agreement with the affected indigenous peoples can be reached. 
Extractive activities (sometimes in combination with the creation of protected areas) 
have similarly emerged in the decisions of human rights treaty bodies as heavily affecting 
the enjoyment of indigenous land rights.155
The effects of this potential conflict might be limited when traditional occupation 
cannot be demonstrated and only use rights are awarded.156 However, even if a bold 
dividing line is struck between full ownership rights and use rights, it should be reminded 
that the exercise of the latter must also be functional to the preservation of indigenous 
distinctiveness. This would imply that, even in the absence of ownership, States might have 
a limited margin of manoeuvre when it comes to the exploitation or disposal of territories 
and resources that interfere with the use rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, 
although the distinction between ownership rights and use rights serve the purpose of 
giving a differentiated response to two seemingly different situations, this distinction 
might not be meaningful for indigenous peoples in that their conception of ownership 
does not necessarily coincide with the Western notion of property.157 Therefore, since 
indigenous land rights must be determined in accordance with indigenous customs and 
tenure systems, a too strict distinction between ownership and use prerogatives might 
infringe international law standards.
Some authors have interpreted the pervasiveness of land rights as implying 
sovereignty. The recognition of sovereign powers is mainly framed as a compensation for the 
historical wrongs suffered by indigenous peoples.158 In this sense, sovereignty is intended 
as the acknowledgment of the fact that indigenous peoples have the right to exercise 
some powers over land and natural resources. The problem with this conceptualisation 
is not only terminological, but it also touches upon substance. The term “sovereignty” 
in modern international law is historically bounded to the State, mainly referring to the 
absolute powers of States as the legal foundation of the modern international society. 
154  See Pereira and Gough 2013, at 475.
155  See infra sections 3.2 and 3.5. in this chapter.
156  For this distinction, see above. See also Göcke 2013, at 130.
157  On this point, see Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 171: 
“When the right to property was understood against the backdrop of a right to non-discrimination 
that merely required that equal cases be treated equally, the way in which the intensity, continuity, and 
exclusivity criteria were applied rendered it difficult for indigenous communities to establish property 
rights over land in practice.”
158  See Lenzerini 2006-2007, at 182.
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Although limits have been posed to States’ sovereignty as illustrated in the previous section, 
sovereignty continues to be conceptualised as a term corresponding to States’ powers and 
prerogatives. Also, in international documents sovereignty is almost exclusively attached 
to States. In this context, using the term “sovereignty” to indicate indigenous peoples’ 
powers may generate confusion, as well as being considered unacceptable for both States 
and indigenous peoples.159
Furthermore, sovereignty is not the only term of reference when it comes to describe 
the nature and effects of indigenous powers to their lands. Self-determination, as a right 
that belongs to peoples, may represent a more suitable term of reference for reasons that 
are explored in the following sections. Suffices it here to mention that economic self-
determination under Article 1(2) of the UN Covenants offers a suitable legal framework 
to conceptualise indigenous land rights and their consequences for the sovereignty of 
States.160
3.2. The right to natural resources
Natural resources are an essential component of both land and cultural rights. First, land 
rights are instrumental for the exercise of control over natural resources.161 In other words, 
land rights would be meaningless if they did not ensure parallel rights over the natural 
resources located in indigenous territories.162 Second, the exercise of rights to natural 
resources is fundamental to the preservation of indigenous culture. Many traditional 
practices involve the utilisation of natural resources; in addition, the management of 
resources is an essential aspect of indigenous peoples’ cosmology. In this context, the 
provisions protecting indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources in global and 
regional human rights instruments are the same as those identified for the right to land. 
159  With regard to the latter aspect, Wiessner argues that indigenous sovereignty, which is mainly linked 
to the need to ensure cultural integrity, may be extremely distant from the Western conceptualisation 
of sovereignty. See Wiessner 2008, at 1167 and 1170 ff. On the historical divarication of sovereignty 
and property rights, see Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 18. 
According to this author, the doctrine of terra nullius has produced the distinction between sovereign 
rights and private property rights, which originally did not exist in indigenous conceptions of land 
ownership. While this doctrine was elaborated to justify the occupation and dispossession of indigenous 
lands on the part of colonizers, it has equally produced longer term effects in that it has imposed a 
normative discourse that is not able to depict indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands and the 
related powers following on from this relationship. Ahrén also highlights that this distinction carries 
positive legal effects because it means that, even if States exercise sovereign rights on indigenous lands, 
they do not automatically acquire property rights on the same lands.
160  See Xanthaki 2007, at 239; Göcke 2013, at 128; Heather A. Northcott, ‘Realisation of the Right 
of Indigenous Peoples to Natural Resources under International Law through the Emerging Right to 
Autonomy’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Human Rights 73, at 74; Anaya, ‘International Human 
Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 2004, at 36.
161  See Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 21. See also, ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice: 
A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 2009, at 107.
162  Saramaka case, para. 122. Yakye Axa case, para. 140: “nor is there any discussion of the fact that 
hunting, fishing and gathering are essential components of their culture”.
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Natural resources are also protected in pair with land rights in the instruments 
dedicated to indigenous peoples. The ILO Convention 169 adopts a broad definition 
of land that includes “the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned 
occupy or otherwise use”.163 Natural resources are, therefore, comprised in this definition. 
Moreover, Article 15 is specifically dedicated to the protection of the “rights of the 
peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands”. This article draws a 
sharp distinction between surface and subsoil resources, which seems to reflect the state 
of the art as for the development of international rules concerning indigenous rights to 
natural resources. Therefore, the following of this subsection is organised according to 
this divide.
Concerning the resources that can be found on the surface, the ILO Convention 
169 does not specify the precise extent of those rights. As follows from a contextual 
interpretation of the international treaty, however, these rights are to be considered very 
extensive since they cover in principle all resources located in their lands. In this respect, 
Article 15(1) establishes that “[t]he rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources 
pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded” and Article 13(2) as reminded 
gives a broad definition of lands as also encompassing natural resources.164
Concerning the concrete powers that indigenous peoples can exercise on these 
resources, these might include in principle a wide range of prerogatives. The lack of an 
exhaustive list of prerogatives, as well as the use of the locution “these rights include” 
supports this conclusion, although it also seems to leave some leeway to States. However, 
when comparing this provision on surface resources with the regime delineated for 
subsoil resources, it seems that States’ manoeuvring space cannot go so far as to retaining 
ownership since this is an option explicitly contemplated only for mineral resources.165 
In this light, participation in the use, management and conservation of surface resources 
are only instances of the activities that indigenous peoples may undertake with their 
resources. Indeed, these procedural rights represent the most frequent expression of the 
protection of resource rights within the ILO framework.166 The practice within ILO has, 
therefore, enacted resource rights in a way that seems more restrictive than what would 
be actually required from a textual interpretation of the ILO Convention 169.
Regarding subsoil resources, the ILO Convention 169 strikes a balance between 
States’ powers and indigenous rights as follows. While States can legitimately retain 
163  Art. 13(2) ILO Convention 169.
164  Emphasis added. See ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention 
No. 169 2009, at 107. See also, MacKay, A Guide to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the International Labour 
Organization 2002, at 17.
165  Art. 15(2) ILO Convention 169.
166  ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 2009, 
at 112. For further decisions by the ILO Committee on participatory rights when resource rights are 
restricted, see infra section 3.5 in this chapter.
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the ownership of these resources, they need to guarantee the respect for a number of 
standards when they “undertak[e] or permit[…] any programmes for the exploration or 
exploitation of such resources” on indigenous territories. First, they must consult with 
indigenous peoples prior to the commencement of development activities. Second, they 
are obliged to conduct studies in cooperation with indigenous peoples with a view to 
establishing the impacts of development activities on the communities affected. Third, 
they need to guarantee “whenever possible” the sharing of the benefits stemming from 
the exploitation of resources with the indigenous peoples concerned. Fourth, they must 
compensate these peoples “for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such 
activities”.167 The ILO Committee has specified that these standards apply even to 
projects that have commenced before the entry into force of the ILO Convention 169 to 
the extent that the effects of such policies continue in the present.168 
Under the UN Declaration on indigenous rights, the legal regime on natural 
resources is assimilated to that of land rights. In other words, the Declaration recognises 
the cultural significance of natural resources,169 as well as framing resource rights in terms 
of a range of powers, from full ownership to access prerogatives, that can be adapted 
to circumstances.170 The case of subsoil resources is not explicitly contemplated in the 
Declaration. This omission, however, is per se very telling since it reflects the difficulties 
incurred by indigenous peoples and States in agreeing upon new international standards 
on subsoil resources.171 During the negotiations on the UN Declaration, States could not 
accept the position that indigenous tenure should be extended to mineral and extractive 
resources.172
National practice confirms the trend for States to retain ownership rights over 
subsoil resources even in the presence of indigenous rights to land.173 In residual cases, 
167  For a comment on these duties, see ibid., at 107-108. Some of these standards will be analysed more 
closely in the following subsections.
168  The ILO Guide provides a useful example, by referring to the representation procedure of 2001 
concerning Ecuador, ibid., at 109-112 and 183-184. See Rodriguez-Piñero 2005, at 83. See also Report 
of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the 
Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL).
169  Art. 24(1) and 25 UNDRIP.
170  Art. 26(2) UNDRIP. The same reasoning is applicable to land rights, see section 3.1 in this chapter. 
See also, Daes report (2004), para. 41.
171  See Göcke 2013, at 131-132. See also at 99, 112, 113, and 118-119. At 131: “Under international 
law, the inherent ownership rights of indigenous peoples do not necessarily have to comprise sub-surface 
rights”.
172  See Daes report (2004), para. 43. See also, Errico 2011, at 340.
173  See ibid., at 337: “international, regional and national practice suggest that, at present, States do 
retain ownership of subsoil resources”. See High Court of Australia, Northern Territory of Australia v. 
Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (30 July 2008), [2008] HCA 29, para. 128. In Commonwealth v. 
Yarmirr (11 October 2001), [2001] HCA 56, the High Court of Australia had to determine whether 
indigenous claims could extend beyond internal waters, up to the sea-bed, to the exclusion of others. 
After finding that this is in contrast with common law, it also established that “the claimants had never 
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however, States might be obliged to recognise indigenous rights over subsoil resources, 
in observance of the principle of non-discrimination. In other words, when rights over 
subsoil resources are granted to other landowners, indigenous peoples might benefit from 
the same legal protection.174 Openings to the recognition of indigenous rights over subsoil 
resources may also derive from the circumstance that indigenous peoples have traditionally 
practiced extractive activities.175 This argument is in line with the finding of the Inter-
American Court in the Saramaka case that “the natural resources found on and within 
indigenous and tribal people’s territories that are protected under Article 21 are those 
natural resources traditionally used and necessary for the very survival, development and 
continuation of such people’s way of life”.176 Furthermore, the Indigenous Peoples Rights 
Act, adopted in the Philippines, gives indigenous peoples priority in the exploitation of 
mineral resources to be found in their ancestral areas.177
Even when States retain ownership of mineral resources, it may happen that these 
are located in the subsoil of indigenous territories. In this case, the same procedural 
limits applicable to the restrictions placed on land rights apply.178 When the exploitation 
of extractive resources is at stake, more restrictive standards limit the capacity of States 
to encroach on indigenous peoples’ rights. Given their potentially disruptive impacts 
on indigenous rights, extractive projects would not only require consultation aimed 
at consent, but also the obtainment of free, prior and informed consent. Section 3.5 
on participatory rights problematizes the meaning of this requirement in more depth. 
Suffices it here to say that the reason for this enhanced guarantee is the acknowledgment 
that extractive industries may result in the denial of indigenous substantive rights to land 
and natural resource. Therefore, the rationale is again to ensure that indigenous peoples 
do not lose their distinctive relationship with land.
sought in any way to exploit any minerals or other valuable resources that might lie beneath the sea-bed. 
They were never, in short, of any interest to them and their pursuit never formed part of any particular 
custom or practice such as could give rise to a native title right or interest in them, or any right to deny 
others access to them” (para. 338). Federal Court of Australia, Attorney-General of the Northern Territory 
v. Ward (9 December 2003), [2003] FCAFC 283, para. 7.
174  See Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural 
State’ 2004, at 39: “Pursuant to the norm of non-discrimination, however, indigenous peoples must not 
be denied subsurface and mineral rights where such rights are otherwise accorded to landowners”. The 
same argument is shared by Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 
215.
175  Richtersveld case, paras. 62-64.
176  Saramaka case, para. 122. A similar reasoning has been voiced by the Court in the most recent Kaliña 
and Lokono case, para. 139.
177  See Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), Republic Act No. 8371 (29 October 1997), section 
57. Claims of individual petitioners to challenge the rights granted under the IPRA were dismissed by 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines in Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa v. Secretary of Environment and 
Natural Resources, Secretary of Budget and Management and Chairman and Commissioners of the National 
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, GR No. 135385 (6 December 2000).
178  Errico 2011, at 341. See supra section 3.1 in this chapter.
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3.3. Cultural rights
Cultural rights are as central to the preservation of indigenous distinctiveness as land 
and resource rights. In the words of Wiessner, the safeguarding of indigenous culture 
is the “telos” that should be duly taken into account while giving content to other 
indigenous rights.179 In this sense, the special attachment to land is instrumental for 
the preservation of indigenous peoples’ distinct culture. Furthermore, it represents the 
distinguishing cultural element that tells apart indigenous peoples from other groups and 
communities.180 This mutually reinforcing relationship has been recognised in human 
rights law.181
Apart from the strong connection with land rights, cultural rights are independently 
protected in human rights instruments. First, the foundation of cultural rights, as 
far as indigenous peoples are concerned, lies in the well-established norm of non-
discrimination.182 Indigenous peoples have been discriminated against by reason of their 
diversity. In this sense, the principle of non-discrimination requires both the prohibition 
to interfere with indigenous culture and the need to adopt positive measures to redress 
discriminatory practices. The latter includes the adoption of measures that positively 
discriminate indigenous peoples, by ensuring them a preferential treatment.183
179  Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing 
Challenges’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 121, at 129.
180  Ibid., at 121, 129, and 134. The special link between land and culture is emphasised in Art. XIII of the 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Doc. AG/doc.5537/16 (8 June 2016), where 
cultural integrity is protected mainly through the restitution of property. The American Declaration has 
been adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS on 15 June 2016. See press release at http://www.oas.
org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-075/16 (last accessed October 2016).
181  Yakye Axa case, para. 135: “The culture of the members of the indigenous communities directly relates 
to a specific way of being, seeing, and acting in the world, developed on the basis of their close relationship 
with their traditional territories and the resources therein, not only because they are their main means 
of subsistence, but also because they are part of their worldview, their religiosity, and therefore, of their 
cultural identity”. For a full analysis of the relationship between land and culture for indigenous peoples, 
see section 3.1.
182  Art. 1(3) UN Charter; Art. 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 2(1) ICCCPR; Art. 2(2) 
ICESCR; Art. 1(1) CERD; Art. II American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. 
XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, Doc. 
OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (31 January 2003); Art. 1(1) American Convention on Human Rights; Art. 2 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Art. 14 ECHR. On the link between culture and non-
discrimination, see Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the 
Multicultural State’ 2004, at 16-19.
183  On positive measures, see section 3.1 in this chapter. Art. 1(4) of the CERD, explicitly establishes the 
legality of positive discrimination. More specifically on cultural rights, see Xanthaki 2007, at 202 ff.: the 
author maintains that the need for the State to adopt positive measures to realise cultural rights is mandated 
by Art. 27 ICCPR. Xanthaki, at 202-203, also cites a number of concluding observations adopted by 
the Human Rights Committee in the sense of recognising the obligation for States to adopt positive 
measures. See also, Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing 
Challenges’ 2011, at 133, who also reads General Comment 23 on Art. 27 as implying positive duties 
for the State. According to this author, however, positive duties would not be mandated under customary 
international law. See Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of 
ILA Resolution No. 5/2012’ (2013) Festschrift für Eckart Klein zum 70. Geburtstag Der Staat im Recht 
1357, at 1366. See also, Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, Ch. 7, 
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Second, the need to positively discriminate in favour of indigenous peoples may 
be also read between the lines of the decisions of human rights treaty bodies where 
general human rights concerning individuals are extensively interpreted so as to include 
indigenous peoples’ cultural features. The interpretation of Article 27 of the ICCPR 
according to which culture “manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way 
of life associated with the use of land resources” is an example of this trend.184 The 
interpretation of the right to culture as protected under Article 15 of the ICESCR is 
even more expansive, since its scope has been extended to include the cultural heritage 
and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples.185
Third, non-discrimination standards and techniques are accompanied by more 
specific rules contained in the specialised instruments on indigenous rights, which address 
the multiple aspects of indigenous peoples’ culture. In Article 5 of the ILO Convention 
169, cultural practices and values are to be taken into account when implementing other 
treaty provisions.186 Therefore, cultural integrity is couched as the linking thread in the 
protection of indigenous rights under the Convention. Furthermore, Article 8 creates 
an obligation to consider indigenous customs and customary law in the implementation 
of national laws. The same provision protects the right of indigenous peoples “to retain 
their own customs”.187 In addition, Article 23 specifically qualifies the protection of 
where the author explains how the interpretation of the equality principle has evolved with reference to 
indigenous peoples to include the possibility of a differential treatment in order to mitigate the effects of 
discrimination and marginalisation of indigenous groups.
184  General Comment 23, para. 7. See Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: 
The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 2004, at 32: the author also refers to the Hopu and Bessert v. 
France case, where the Human Rights Committee interprets the right to family (Art. 17 ICCPR) and the 
right to privacy (Art. 23 ICCPR) so as to include indigenous peoples’ attachment to their burial sites. 
For a complete analysis of this technique, see section 3.1 in this chapter, which explains how indigenous 
land rights have been derived from other well-established rights, such as the right to property, the right 
to development, and the right of minorities to enjoy their culture and others.
185  CESCR, General Comment No. 17: Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral 
and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or 
She is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) (hereinafter General 
Comment 17), para. 32 and General Comment 21, para. 37. On this point, see Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 100.
186  Art. 5 ILO Convention 169 reads as follows: “In applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) 
the social, cultural, religious, and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and 
protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups 
and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be 
respected” (letter c has been omitted).
187  Indigenous customs should also be taken into account “in regard to penal matters” (Art. 9(2) ILO 
Convention 169), “in imposing penalties” (Art. 10(1) ILO Convention 169), to communicate their 
rights to indigenous peoples (Art. 30 ILO Convention 169). “Cultural conditions” are to be taken into 
account also when providing health services to the communities (Art. 25(2) ILO Convention 169). 
Furthermore, education programmes should be couched so as to “incorporate” the “histories”, values 
and “cultural aspirations” of indigenous peoples (Art. 27(1) ILO Convention 169). Participation of 
indigenous communities in the formulation and implementation of these policies, as well as the creation 
of autonomous institutions are, therefore, central elements. On participatory rights, see section 3.5 in 
this chapter. On the right to autonomy, see section 3.4 in this chapter. Art. 28-29 ILO Convention 169 
also concerns cultural aspects; however, they are not examined because they go beyond the scope of this 
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activities such as “hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering” as “important factors in the 
maintenance” of culture that should be “strengthened and promoted”, including through 
“technical and financial assistance”.188 It is also significant that the ILO Convention 169 
creates an obligation for governments to encourage cross-border cooperation among 
indigenous peoples living in different States.189
The UN Declaration on indigenous rights is also very much centred upon the 
significance of the preservation of the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous peoples. 
The centrality of culture is boldly affirmed in Article 7, which recognises the right of 
indigenous peoples “to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples”.190 More 
specifically, Article 8 establishes a prohibition of “forced assimilation and destruction” of 
indigenous culture, identifying land dispossession as one of the actions that States should 
prevent in order to abide by the general prohibition.191
The extensive notion of indigenous cultural rights is confirmed in the decisions 
of human rights bodies. The African Commission has probably adopted an isolated 
approach in accepting almost no restrictions to cultural rights.192 Indeed, limits in other 
human rights systems are also couched in very cautious terms. The Human Rights 
Committee, for instance, has only allowed for restrictions to Article 27 that do not 
amount to a denial of the right to culture. Similarly to the case of land rights, setting such 
a demanding threshold for States to ensure the acceptability of the restrictions posed on 
cultural rights is significant in that it testifies to the intangibility of indigenous identity.193 
research.
188  Art. 23 ILO Convention 169 reads as follows: “1. Handicrafts, rural and community-based industries, 
and subsistence economy and traditional activities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, 
trapping and gathering, shall be recognised as important factors in the maintenance of their culture and 
in their economic self-reliance and development. Governments shall, with the participation of these 
peoples and whenever appropriate, ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted. 2. Upon 
the request of the peoples concerned, appropriate technical and financial assistance shall be provided 
wherever possible, taking into account the traditional technologies and cultural characteristics of these 
peoples, as well as the importance of sustainable and equitable development”.
189  Art. 32 ILO Convention 169.
190  Art. 7(2) UNDRIP, emphasis is added. This article also establishes the prohibition of genocide, whose 
meaning can be retrieved with reference to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. The Convention is deemed to have reached customary status and to represent jus 
cogens. Since genocide indicates a very specific practice in international law, it is not possible to enlarge 
the scope of Art. 7 so as to include cultural genocide. See Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 17.
191  See Art. 8(2)(b) UNDRIP. The scope of this prohibition is very extensive since any action potentially 
affecting indigenous culture is to be prevented by States. On this point, see Art. 8(2)(a) UNDRIP: “(a) 
Any action which has the aim or the effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of 
their cultural values and ethnic identities”. The rest of the article reads as follows: “(c) Any form of forced 
population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d) Any 
form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite 
racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them”.
192  Endorois case, para. 249: “the drafters of the Charter envisaged few, if any, circumstances in which it 
would be appropriate to limit a people’s right to culture”.
193  See Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 16: “The recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to 
determine their own identity and maintain and develop their cultures is deeply rooted in indigenous self-
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In light of the UN Declaration of indigenous rights, States must also adopt positive 
measures to ensure the fulfilment of indigenous cultural rights, namely by providing for 
“redress” opportunities, facilitating the restitution of “ceremonial objects and human 
remains”, concretely protecting indigenous languages, and adopting measures to ensure 
non-discrimination.194 Specific positive measures, however, have rarely been addressed by 
human rights treaty bodies that, as reminded, have rather focused on both the material 
implications of culture195 and the link between cultural preservation and the enjoyment 
of land rights.196
Culture manifests itself in material terms, as attachment to land, resources, religious 
sites, and the object connected to traditional practices.197 At the same time, sufficient 
protection must be ensured to the intangible elements of culture, such as histories, 
cosmovisions, spiritual and religious traditions, and the practices therein related. The 
dual nature of indigenous culture is expressed in Article 31 of the UN Declaration on 
indigenous rights, which affirms the right to safeguard indigenous “cultural heritage” 
together with “the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and 
flora”.198 Therefore, culture is more intended as the evolving expression of indigenous 
peoples’ relationship with their lands than conceived in a static way. Furthermore, the 
practical implementation of cultural rights depends on the extent to which indigenous 
peoples can both freely exercise their traditional practices and participate in the protection 
determination”.
194  See Art. 11-13 and 15-16 UNDRIP. Art. 24 also protects a specific aspect of indigenous culture, 
namely “health practices”.
195  General Comment 23.
196  See section 3.1 in this chapter.
197  The protection of the material elements of indigenous culture potentially intersects with the 1972 
WHC. In this respect, the inscription of sites into the World Heritage List may create conflicts with the 
rights of indigenous peoples since their role is not taken into account in the Convention. See Wiessner 
and Lenzerini 2012, at 17. A conflict may arise in three cases. First, the inscription might be done by the 
State without seeking the consent of indigenous peoples. Second, the State might refuse to undertake the 
inscription procedure in case indigenous peoples have requested it. Third, the management of resources 
after inscription might exclude indigenous peoples. These aspects are explored in Chapter 4, section 2.2.
198  The immaterial elements of indigenous culture also fall in the purview of the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, (Paris, 17 October 2003, in force 20 April 2006). 
This international treaty, which is widely ratified, is aimed to protect the intangible cultural heritage 
of humanity defined as immaterial cultural products, “as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and 
cultural spaces associated therewith”, that communities, groups, and individuals identify as such (Art. 
2). The 2003 Convention creates a system of listing of intangible heritage that is mainly centred on 
States, which are the only subjects responsible for the identification of the cultural elements that deserve 
international protection. States, however, must also “endeavour to ensure the widest possible participation 
of communities” and any other actors responsible for the creation and maintenance of intangible heritage 
(Art. 11(b) and Art. 15). Although the obligatory language of this provision is weak, recent developments 
have stressed the importance of communities and groups for the inscription of the intangible cultural 
heritage in the lists created under the Convention. See Federico Lenzerini, ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage: 
The Living Culture of Peoples’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 101, at 107-118.
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and management of their cultural products.199
3.4. The right to autonomy
The right to autonomy, although largely undefined under general human rights law,200 
acquires a specific dimension when it comes to indigenous peoples. The foundation 
of such a right would lie once again in the cultural distinctiveness of the peoples;201 
hence, the need to recognise a special legal framework that protects as well as enhancing 
this diversity. In fact, indigenous peoples already possess an autonomous legal system 
in the form of their customary law. These diverse customs, which regulate the life of 
communities, are the expression of indigenous peoples’ special relationship with their 
lands. In the words of Tobin, “law is not only linked to the land it comes from the 
land”.202
The UN Declaration on indigenous rights recognises the right to autonomy of 
indigenous peoples in its Article 4. This article is important for its drafting history that 
has led to the recognition that the right to autonomy is part and parcel of indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination.203 Moreover, and most remarkably, autonomy in the form of 
self-government has been explicitly recognised as a right.204 Although framing the scope 
of this right in broad terms, self-government on “internal and local affairs”, as well as 
financial autonomy have been identified as the main elements of autonomy. Scholars 
have emphasised that the broad framing of the right of autonomy allows for the flexibility 
needed in its implementation.205 In practical terms, the definition of autonomous 
199  See Wiessner, ‘The State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 
5/2012’ 2013, at 1367. On participatory rights, see section 3.5 in this chapter.
200  See Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, 
at 227-231. In particular, at 227-228, the author compares the lack of recognition of autonomy as an 
independent right by the Human Rights Committee and the instances of recognition of this right within 
the Council of Europe and OSCE systems. See also, Geoff Gilbert, ‘Autonomy and Minority Groups: A 
Right in International Law’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 307, at 308 and 319-325. For 
a seminal study on autonomy, see Hannum 1990.
201  Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ 
2011, at 126.
202  See Tobin 2014, at xix. See also, Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: 
From Victims to Actors 2006, at 226: autonomy and land rights are “two sides of the same coin”.
203  The link with self-determination is explored in section 4.2 in this chapter.
204  Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 66. The right to self-government 
for indigenous peoples is also recognised in Art. XXI of the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.
205  Northcott 2012, at 84. See also, Gilbert 2002, at 340: without referring to the UNDRIP, the author 
argues that “autonomy is a continuum, providing an appropriate degree of control to each group within 
society over its own affairs”. The same author at 353 contends: it “is wrong to assert that the content 
of autonomy is indeterminate, for it is no more indeterminate than the acknowledged right to freedom 
of religion. What is indeterminate is its implementation. However, the fact that the right can only be 
concretized by reference to local facts does not mean that the right itself is uncertain; merely that its 
implementation must be case specific”.
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arrangements is a matter of negotiation between indigenous peoples and the State.206
The UN Declaration further specifies the different nuances of the right to autonomy 
for indigenous peoples. This right is buttressed by the recognition of and the support 
for autonomous indigenous institutions. Under Article 5, indigenous peoples have the 
right “to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and 
cultural institutions”.207 In this sense, autonomous institutions are instrumental for the 
conduct of self-government over a number of issues. Furthermore, the safeguarding or 
the establishment of these diverse institutions may be read as a precondition for the 
exercise of land and cultural rights. Articles 14 and 16 protect the right to “establish and 
control” cultural institutions, such educational bodies and media. Articles 18 and 20 
establish a connection between the creation of indigenous institutions and, respectively, 
the furtherance of their decision-making and the conduct of their development activities. 
Indigenous land tenure systems can also be read as autonomous institutional arrangements 
to be recognised by the State under Article 27.
Although the ILO Convention 169 does not explicitly recognise a right to autonomy 
for indigenous peoples, this is reflected in a number of provisions. While autonomy 
cannot be considered absolute, the multiple references to indigenous institutions and 
practices confirm the need for States to recognise a variable degree of autonomy to 
indigenous peoples. Articles 4, 5, and 6 create an obligation for States to safeguard inter 
alia indigenous institutions. The Convention also confirms the importance of indigenous 
customs in dealing with criminal matters concerning indigenous individuals.208 In 
addition, some form of autonomy is recognised with regard to educational matters.209 
Article 7 also establishes a link between “the right to decide their own priorities for 
the process of development” and the effects that development may have on indigenous 
institutions.210 Albeit an indirect recognition of indigenous autonomous institutions, 
this provision highlights two elements. First, autonomous institutions are not isolated 
from the development choices that are taken at the State level and that affect indigenous 
206  Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 66.
207  A similar right is protected under Art. 34 UNDRIP, which also specifies the limits of these autonomous 
arrangements: “Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases 
where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards”.
208  Art. 9 ILO Convention 169 establishes that “the methods customarily practised by the peoples 
concerned for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be respected”. In addition, para. 
2 of the same article reads as follows: “The customs of these peoples in regard to penal matters shall be 
taken into consideration by the authorities and courts dealing with such cases”.
209  See Art. 27(3) ILO Convention 169.
210  The link between autonomy and development under Art. 7 of the ILO Convention 169 is recognised 
by Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 
230. More generally, on the link between indigenous rights and the right to development, see Joshua 
Castellino, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Right to Development: Emerging Synergies or Collusion?’ in 
Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011), at 367 ff.
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peoples. Second, even when development priorities are decided by indigenous peoples, 
these have an effect on the traditional organisations of the community.
In line with the model of cultural autonomy, intended as the creation of autonomous 
institutions for regulating indigenous matters,211 both the UN Declaration on indigenous 
rights and the ILO Convention 169 emphasise the role of indigenous institutions. Only 
the UN Declaration, however, provides explicitly both for the devolution of powers, 
synthetized in the concept of “self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs”,212 and for financial autonomy, intended as the need that autonomous functions 
must be financially sustained in an autonomous way.213 In this sense, the link between 
the practical realisation of autonomy and the need to ensure that indigenous peoples 
may financially provide for self-government reinforces the argument that autonomous 
arrangements are closely related to the full realisation of land and resource rights by 
indigenous peoples. The latter rights may guarantee both indigenous livelihood and the 
capacity to sustain indigenous ways of living, including as expressed in their institutions.
The requirements provided by the UN Declaration do not say much of the concrete 
model to be promoted at the national level. In other words, it is left to the flexibility of 
local needs to implement either a model that is more leaned on the devolution of powers 
towards thematic institutions or a territorial arrangement where more autonomous 
powers are granted to territorially-based indigenous peoples.214 Both models are widely 
211  See Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 
232 ff. Cultural autonomy implies the granting of indigenous institutions with the regulation of cultural 
affairs through a devolution of powers that is often promoted via constitutional arrangements (at 234). 
The problem with this model is that powers over land and resources are usually not devolved as part of 
these arrangements (at 240). It suffices to think of the Sami parliaments that mostly exercise consultative 
functions (at 236) and of the Panchayat system in India, where the decisions taken by indigenous bodies 
can be subverted by the upper government levels (at 238).
212  Art. 4 UNDRIP.
213  Northcott 2012, at 86-87, argues that financial autonomy is essential to realise other forms of 
autonomy (cultural and participatory autonomy). This reinforces the link between autonomy and the 
right to land and resources.
214  The distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy is illustrated by Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 232 ff. Territorial autonomy is 
defined as the granting of powers over a territory to “a territorially defined group” (at 240). The main 
problem with this model lies in the fact that some forms of autonomy are imposed (at 241-244). Anaya 
also distinguishes between cultural and territorial forms of autonomy. See Anaya, International Human 
Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 67. Other authors adopt different categorisations of the models of 
autonomy. See John B. Henriksen, ‘Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2001) 3 Indigenous Affairs 6, at 18 ff. He distinguishes between four types of autonomous 
arrangements to be applied to five case studies: Philippines (regional autonomy), Finland (Sami 
Parliament), Greenland (overseas territory, delegated powers), Canada (regional autonomy), Panama 
(indigenous territorial base). Other authors also introduce the category of participatory autonomy, thus 
arguing for the interconnectedness of autonomy and participatory rights. See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 
2004, at 34: self-government may be made effective either by devolving jurisdiction on a number of 
matters or by ensuring effective participation in decision-making on the same matters. See also, Wiessner 
and Lenzerini 2010, at 12. On the difference between territorial and non-territorial autonomy, see also, 
Tove H. Malloy and Francesco Palermo (eds), Minority Accommodation through Territorial and Non-
Territorial Autonomy (Oxford University Press 2016).
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implemented in the practice of autonomous arrangements recognised by States to 
indigenous peoples.215
Territorial arrangements may also imply the devolution of sovereign powers 
over a well-identified territory. This is the case of the 1993 Nunavut arrangements in 
Canada.216 After years of negotiation, part of the Nunavut territory was demarcated 
and has acquired territorial autonomy, thus mirroring the legal status of Autonomous 
Provinces in Canada. The agreement also regulates the exercise of indigenous powers 
over natural resources—both surface and subsoil. Apart from the functioning of the 
autonomous arrangement, it is interesting to note that the Nunavut agreement was the 
result of mutual concessions on the part of the governmental and indigenous actors 
involved. While Canada surrendered part of its sovereignty on the resources located in 
the Nunavut territory, the Inuit communities of the Nunavut area surrendered their land 
rights on any territories going beyond the Nunavut Settlement Area.217 The example of 
Nunavut in Canada teaches two main lessons. First, autonomous models do not imply 
a fixed arrangement on land and resource rights; the parties of the autonomy agreement 
must negotiate the concrete declination of those rights.218 Second, the extent of land rights 
does not necessarily depend on the level of institutional autonomy that is guaranteed to 
indigenous peoples.
3.5. Participatory rights
The duty to consult indigenous peoples when carrying out projects that may affect 
them has emerged as a procedural requirement that is transversal to most of the rights 
analysed so far. Participatory rights have been correctly indicated as a means to “protect 
215  For an extensive analysis of national practice, see Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under 
International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 231 ff. See also, Alexandra Tomaselli, ‘Autonomía 
Indígena Originaria Campesina in Bolivia: Realizing the Indigenous Autonomy?’ (2012) 1 European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers. See also, Alexandra Tomaselli, ‘Exploring Indigenous Self-governments 
and Forms of Autonomies’ in Corinne Lennox and Damien Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights (Routledge 2016).
216  See Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area 
and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, available at http://www.tunngavik.com/documents/
publications/LAND_CLAIMS_AGREEMENT_NUNAVUT.pdf (last accessed October 2016). For 
further references, see Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to 
Actors 2006, at 244-246.
217   Art. 2(7)(1) Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act: “In consideration of the rights and benefits 
provided to Inuit by the Agreement, Inuit hereby: (a) cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty The 
Queen in Right of Canada, all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any, in and to lands 
and waters anywhere within Canada and adjacent offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of 
Canada”.
218  In this sense, see Northcott 2012, at 89: autonomy is a “solution to ease the tension between state 
sovereignty and indigenous rights”. The ILA report on indigenous peoples’ rights, however, proposes 
a teleological interpretation of the right to autonomy for indigenous peoples, according to which “the 
recognition of autonomy” must come in pair with some form of “control by indigenous peoples of the 
lands and territories that they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”. See 
Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 13.
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indigenous peoples’ land rights against infringements threatening their cultural or physical 
survival”.219 Human rights treaty bodies have emphasised the instrumental link between, 
on the one hand, the right of indigenous peoples to be consulted and to participate in the 
decision-making process and, on the other hand, land and cultural rights.220 In particular, 
the lack of participation has been used as a parameter to assess the infringement of 
land and cultural rights. Suffices to mention here the Saramaka case, where the Inter-
American Court has indicated effective participation, together with the sharing of the 
benefits deriving from development activities and the performance of impact studies, as 
requirements that States should meet in order not to incur in the denial of indigenous 
rights.221 In this sense, participation has both procedural and substantive effects, since it 
is used to operationalized substantive rights.
Furthermore, the instrumental role of participation for the fulfilment of substantive 
rights is only one part of the story. Several provisions in human rights instruments confer 
an autonomous status to participatory rights. In other words, participation is not only an 
indirect requirement to fulfil other rights, but it is also an independent right. Although 
some authors have argued that this right has reached a customary status,222 the precise 
content of participatory rights has been object to heated debates. Some guidance as to 
the definition of this right comes from a range of legal documents, going from legal 
documents such as the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights223 to 
the hard law rules contained in the ILO Convention 169.
Special Rapporteur Anaya has rightly identified the main precondition for the 
application of the safeguards concerning consultation and participation.224 While 
potentially any governmental decisions in the form of a legislative act or development 
project may have an effect on indigenous rights, the duty to consult is triggered every 
219  Göcke 2013, at 138.
220  Cesare Pitea, Diritto internazionale e democrazia ambientale (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2013), at 
110.
221  Saramaka case, paras. 129 ff. The Inter-American Court refers to a similar approach adopted by the 
Human Rights Committee in the Apirana Mahuika case, while the African Commission has used the 
same safeguards in the Endorois case. See also section 3.1 in this chapter and Chapter 1, section 2.
222  See S. James Anaya, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural 
Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands 
and Resources’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 7, at 7: “the norm of 
consultation…has become part of customary international law”; Pereira and Gough 2013, at 477. In a 
different way, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Sarayaku case, para. 164, has recognised 
that “the obligation to consult, in addition of being a conventional standard, is a general principle of 
International Law”. The issue of the legal status of indigenous rights is treated in the next section.
223  Concerning their legal significance, see supra note 76.
224  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (15 July 2009). It is interesting to note that 
participation has been discussed also in the context of the relationship between armed conflict and 
environmental protection. See Third report on the protection of the environment in relation to armed 
conflicts, Submitted by Marie G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/700 (3 June 2016), 
paras. 121-129.
Chapter 2
128
time States’ actions affect indigenous peoples “in ways not felt by others in society”.225 
This precondition should be interpreted in broad terms as any circumstances that may 
affect indigenous peoples in a particular way, including when States’ actions only affect 
interests of indigenous peoples rather than formally recognised rights. This interpretation 
stems inter alia from the letter of Article 6(1)(a) of the ILO Convention 169, where 
consultation is warranted “whenever consideration is being given to legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly”.226 Concurrently, Article 19 of 
the UN Declaration on indigenous rights establishes that consultation must occur “before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them”.
Three basic requirements in the conduct of consultations are also identifiable from 
a closer exam of both legal texts and the legal practice of human rights treaty bodies.227 
First, good faith is required in the conduct of consultations as a way to establish an 
effective and purposeful dialogue with indigenous peoples.228 This implies that indigenous 
peoples must be involved in the early stages of legislative or administrative procedures.
Second, this mindful effort must be directed to possibly obtaining the consent of 
indigenous peoples regarding projects that affect them.229 Although consent usually does 
not imply a duty for States to achieve an agreement with indigenous peoples,230 both the 
ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration indicate the reaching of a consensus as 
the objective of any consultation. Indeed, as explained in the following, the requirement 
of free, prior and informed consent has also been interpreted as the obligation to obtain 
consent under certain—exceptional—circumstances.
Third, consultations shall be conducted in a manner that is culturally appropriate, 
by involving indigenous peoples’ legitimate representatives in line with indigenous 
customs and traditional patterns.231 Furthermore, in light of the conclusions of human 
rights treaty bodies, the requirement of conducting impact studies may complement 
225  UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 43.
226  Emphasis is added. Under Art. 7(1) of the ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples “shall participate 
in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional 
development which may affect them directly”.
227  See e.g. Olivares Alanís 2013, at 205.
228  See Art. 6(2) ILO Convention 169; Art. 19 and 32 UNDRIP.
229  Art. 6(2) of the ILO Convention 169 establishes that consultations should be carried out “with the 
objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures”. The UN Declaration is more 
precise since it indicates the objective of obtaining the “free, prior and informed consent” of indigenous 
peoples, thus specifying the characteristics of this consent (Art. 19 and 32). See Report of the Special 
Rapporteur 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 46.
230  UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 46: “This provision of the Declaration [Art. 19] should not be 
regarded as according indigenous peoples a general “veto power” over decisions that may affect them”. 
The argument that an absolute veto would undermine national constitutional systems and the principle 
of equality has been used by Australia, Canada and New Zealand when voting against the UNDRIP. See 
Official record of the 107th UNGA plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 September 2007).
231  Art. 6(2) ILO Convention 169: “in a form appropriate to the circumstances”. Art. 19 UNDRIP: 
“through their own representative institutions”.
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participation in order to preserve indigenous cultural distinctiveness when indigenous 
rights are restricted in such a way that they can be substantively compromised.232
The argument appears circular since the extent of impacts cannot be fully evaluated 
without performing an impact assessment. The Inter-American Court has found 
that this requirement was to be met for large-scale, extractive projects.233 The denial 
test suggests that it would at least be prudent for States to conduct assessments when 
projects are likely to impact significantly on indigenous peoples. Indeed, the threshold 
for considering impact assessments obligatory also for smaller projects might be lower. 
In this respect, Article 7(3) of the ILO Convention 169 considers impact studies “as 
fundamental criteria for the implementation” of development activities likely to affect 
indigenous peoples. Furthermore, informed consent under Article 32(2) of the UN 
Declaration on indigenous rights would certainly be diminished if information provided 
to indigenous peoples were not based on independent assessments.234 Moreover, Article 
19 of the UN Declaration requires informed consent also when States intend to adopt 
“legislative and administrative measures” affecting indigenous peoples. This means that 
not only development projects may require impact assessment since legislative measures 
might be hardly understandable without accompanying studies that assess their meaning 
and policy impacts.
Beyond these uniform requirements, the content of participatory rights is flexible 
depending both on the legal framework that is applicable and the contextual circumstances 
of the case. In the practice of human rights bodies, participation and consultation, as 
interchangeable facets of the same right,235 can be classified along a spectrum that contains 
four main categories: political rights, formal participation, effective participation, and 
the duty to obtain consent.236
232  Poma Poma case, para. 7.7; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, para. 18; Saramaka 
case, para. 129; Endorois case, paras. 227-228. On the teleological interpretation of these requirements, 
see section 3.1 in this chapter. Art. 7(3) of the ILO Convention 169 also refers to the duty of States to 
conduct impact studies, “whose results shall be considered as fundamental criteria for the implementations 
of these [development] activities”.
233  See Saramaka case, para. 129; Sarayaku case, paras. 204-207; Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 201.
234  For an interpretation that is in line with this argument, see Sarayaku case, para. 208.
235  While participation and consultation are different concepts in the legal texts, they are not easily told 
apart in the practice of human rights.
236  This section draws from previously published work, Cittadino, ‘The Public Interest to Environmental 
Protection and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Procedural Rights to Participation and Substantive 
Guarantees’ 2015. Several other classifications have been put forward. It is worth citing Tobin 2014, 
at 45-46. This author identifies four forms of participation: 1) participation to the cultural, political, 
economic life of the State, which includes participation in the decisions that affect indigenous rights and 
the adjudication of lands; 2) the State’s duty to consult indigenous for matters concerning them; 3) the 
duty to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples; 4) the right to remedy when 
intellectual or material property is taken without free, prior and informed consent or in contrast with 
indigenous traditions or customs. Furthermore, drawing from 2009 Anaya’s report as Special Rapporteur 
(UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34), Tobin argues that consultation must be carried out by the State and must not 
be devolved to private actors. 
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Political rights are a standard according to which indigenous peoples—as groups 
or individuals—are entitled to participate in the political life of the State. This can be 
done either by exercising their voting rights or by elective representative bodies, such 
as the Sami Parliament in Finland, which can be consulted by the State on certain 
subject matters. This approach, taken up by the European Court of Human Rights,237 is 
probably in contrast with international standards on indigenous peoples’ participation 
and consultation. Indeed, these standards call for the recognition of the special position 
of indigenous peoples and the adoption of special measures to protect their rights. Since 
participation is instrumental for the safeguarding of land rights and, ultimately, of 
indigenous cultural distinctiveness, the mere exercise of voting prerogatives seem to go 
against the general standard according to which land and cultural rights can be restricted 
only to the extent that these restrictions do not result into a denial of rights.
The same considerations may be appropriate in the case of the second model along 
the participation spectrum, i.e., formal participation. Although the adoption of legislative 
measures establishing a legal framework on indigenous participation may respond to the 
need of adopting special measures to fulfil indigenous rights, the mere acknowledgment 
that these measures are in place may not suffice to preserve the substance of land and 
cultural rights. In some cases, however, this has happened in the decisions and reports of 
the ILO Committee concerning the application of the ILO Convention 169. While this 
treaty is very advanced in the protection of participatory rights, the application of these 
standards in the work of the ILO Committee has been ambiguous.238 The practice of the 
ILO Committee, however, cannot overshadow the letter of the Convention that, under 
Article 6(1)(a), prescribes instead consultation for any “legislative and administrative 
measures which may affect” indigenous peoples. Moreover, Article 15(2) establishes 
that consultation must be guaranteed even for projects concerning subsoil resources, 
although indigenous peoples do not have property rights on them.239 In other cases the 
ILO Committee has indeed given application to those principles.240
237  See Chapter 1, section 2.2.3.
238  See the detailed analysis carried out in Chapter 1, section 2.1.4.
239  This is in line with the interpretation given by Special Rapporteur Anaya in 2009 (UN Doc. A/
HRC/12/34) that consultation must be performed even when indigenous peoples cannot formally claim 
any rights on the land concerned by States’ projects. This requirement is meant to ensure that States 
cannot disregard international human rights obligations, by eluding international standards through 
the lack of land titling or demarcation. This last circumstance would amount to admit that national 
circumstances can exclude the State’s international responsibility for the violation of international norms. 
Art. 27 VCLT: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty”.
240  Report of the Committee set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Bolivia 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution by the Bolivian Central of Workers (COB), paras. 39-40; Report of the Committee 
set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance by Peru of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the General 
Confederation of Workers of Peru (CGTP), para. 34; Report of the Committee set up to examine the 
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The third model—effective participation—implemented by a number of human 
rights bodies, is in line with international standards since effectiveness is operationalized 
by the reference to a number of specific standards, i.e., good faith, cultural appropriateness, 
and the qualification that participation must be accompanied by the substantive 
protection of land and cultural rights.241 With reference to these standards, the Inter-
American Court concluded that, given the widespread State practice and implied opinio 
juris, the norm of consultation is “a general principle of International Law”.242 Although 
the reference to general principles is ambiguous when it comes to the identification of 
the duties imposed on States, the Court has highlighted that consultation standards are 
relevant beyond treaty regimes.
Consent is the fourth model of participation.243 It has already been reminded that it 
is not to be intended as a general veto power, i.e., as the right of indigenous peoples to stop 
any project affecting them.244 Indeed, the provisions on free, prior and informed consent 
contained in the UN Declaration on indigenous rights have been heatedly debated within 
the Human Rights Commission’s Working Group on the draft declaration, due to the 
opposition of States to a formulation of this right as conferring indigenous peoples the 
power to unilaterally reject any States’ projects or legislative interference.245 In contrast, 
indigenous peoples see the duty to obtain their consent as a manifestation of their right 
representation alleging non-observance by Brazil of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169), made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Union of Engineers of the Federal 
District (SENGE/DF), paras. 43-44.
241  Apirana Mahuika case, paras. 9.5-9.8; Poma Poma case, pras. 7.6-7.7; Saramaka case, paras. 129-137; 
Sarayaku case, paras. 180-220.
242  Sarayaku case, para. 164: “Various Member States of the Organization of American States have 
incorporated these standards into their domestic legislation, and through their highest courts”.
243  On free, prior, and informed consent, see as a general background, Doyle 2015. See also, Errico 
2011, at 357-363. 
244  See also national case law. Supreme Court of Canada, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister 
of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, at 520: “Good faith consultation may in turn lead to an obligation to 
accommodate Haida concerns in the harvesting of timber, although what accommodation if any may 
be required cannot at this time be ascertained. Consultation must be meaningful. There is no duty to 
reach agreement”; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 
3 SCR 550, at 562: “the honour of the Crown placed the Province under a duty to consult with the 
TRTFN in making the decision to reopen the Tulsequah Chief Mine. In this case, the process engaged 
in by the Province under the Environmental Assessment Act fulfilled the requirements of its duty”; “The 
Province was under a duty to consult. It did so, and proceeded to make accommodations. The Province 
was not under a duty to reach agreement with the TRTFN”. 
245  See Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 24: “Article 32 was contentious because it brings to the fore some 
of the most pressing contemporary concerns for indigenous peoples: competing States’ and indigenous 
peoples’ claims to natural resources”. See also Mauro Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the 
Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges 
ahead’ (2012) 16 International Journal of Human Rights 1, at 11: some States (New Zealand, Canada, 
Australia) explicitly rejected the interpretation of free, prior and informed consent as implying any veto 
power. See CESCR, Concluding observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74, paras. 12, 33; 
Concluding observations on Brazil, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.87, para. 58; Concluding observations on 
Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100, paras. 12 and 35.
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to self-determination that is included in the declaration.246 The result is a compromise 
between the two opposing views. However, an overly restrictive interpretation is 
unwarranted since the provision is a compromise between States’ and indigenous peoples’ 
views, which have both eventually rejected a formulation that imposes on States a duty 
merely to seek consent.247 Indeed, what States firmly oppose is an “unqualified right to 
veto”.248
The rejection of unqualified veto powers does not exclude that under certain 
circumstances States are in fact obliged to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples. This 
argument is confirmed by the fact that the Declaration on indigenous rights explicitly 
recognises two cases under which consent must be obtained.249 First, under Article 10, 
“[n]o relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the 
indigenous peoples concerned”.250 The same obligation is mandatory on the Parties of 
the ILO Convention 169, under Article 16(2), which also establishes further obligations 
in case consent cannot be obtained. Second, Article 29(2) of the UN Declaration foresees 
the same duty of States to obtain consent in case hazardous materials are stored on 
indigenous territories.
Furthermore, participation in the specific form of consent may be pivotal to the 
realisation of land and natural resources rights under certain circumstances.251 Barelli 
argues that free, prior and informed consent must be interpreted in line with the general 
purposes of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights, that is to safeguard indigenous 
246  See Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 9; Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 219: “Indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination is at the heart of the emergence of such a right to free, prior and informed consent”; 
Report of Special Rapporteur Anaya of 2009 (UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34), para. 41. The right to self-
determination is examined in section 4.2 in this chapter.
247  See Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 11: “Representatives of indigenous 
peoples sat at the negotiating tables on an equal footing with states. This means that states could hardly 
imposed their uncompromised views on any provision of the UNDRIP. This per se calls for a balanced 
interpretation of each article of the document”.
248  Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012.
249  Doyle implicitly calls for a third case based on Art. 28 UNDRIP, which confers a right to redress 
whenever indigenous lands are “confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent”. This argument, however, cannot be retained since it does not distinguish between 
a very different set of options going from dispossession, which is comparable to relocation, to use, under 
which cases more nuances apply. See Doyle 2015, at 140.
250  Other requirements are an agreement on compensation and the possibility to return dispossessed 
lands. Consider that indigenous peoples can be relocated also due to the creation of protected areas. This 
case is examined in Chapter 4.
251  See Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 9: “it would seem difficult to 
reconcile the right of indigenous peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development 
with the fact that development projects could take place on their lands without their consent”; and 11.
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lands and culture.252 This relationship is inter alia recognised in the jurisprudence of 
national bodies253 that have elaborated on this point, by identifying cases in which 
effective consultation requires not only that the consent of indigenous peoples is sought, 
but also that it is obtained.254 Significantly, the CERD has noted that
[a]s to the exploitation of the subsoil resources of the traditional land 
indigenous communities, the Committee observes that merely consulting 
these communities prior to exploiting the resources falls short of meeting the 
requirements set out in the Committee’s general recommendation XXIII on 
the rights of indigenous peoples. The Committee therefore recommends that 
the prior informed consent of these communities be sought.255
Based on the decisions of human rights treaty bodies, large-scale development 
projects, with a particular focus on extractive industries, are considered as such since 
they bear extensive environmental, economic, and social consequences.256 Under these 
circumstances, the only means to preserve indigenous peoples’ rights is to provide 
indigenous peoples with the possibility to have a final say on those projects.
The Inter-American Court in the Saramaka decision is extremely clear on this point. 
While restrictions on indigenous land rights normally only require the performance of 
consultations, in case of large-scale development projects that are likely to have a major 
impact, States must obtain the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned.257 The 
252  Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 11.
253  See Supreme Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, at 1113: “Some cases may even 
require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing 
regulations in relation to aboriginal lands”.
254  See General Comment 21, paras. 33 and 55.
255  CERD, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/2 (2 June 2003), para. 
16. See also General Recommendation 23, para 4(d). In spite of this bold statement on the need to 
obtain consent, some ambiguities emerge from subsequent practice. See Concluding observations on 
Australia, UN Doc. CERD/C/AUS/CO/14 (14 April 2005), paras. 11 (obligation to obtain informed 
consent) and 16 (obligation to seek informed consent; Concluding observations on Guatemala, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/GTM/CO/11 (15 May 2006), para. 19: “endeavour to obtain their informed consent”; 
Concluding observations on India, UN Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19, para. 19: “The State party should 
seek the prior informed consent of communities affected by the construction of dams”; Decision 1(67) 
on Suriname, UN Doc. CERD/C/DEC/SUR/2, para. 4: “Strive to reach agreements with the peoples 
concerned, as far as possible, before awarding any concessions”; Decision 1(69) on Suriname, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/DEC/SUR/5, para. 2. For other references to reports where ambiguities as to the existence of 
an obligation to obtain consent emerge, see Wiessner and Lenzerini 2012, at 5.
256  For a discussion on the possible relevance of small projects, see infra in this section.
257  Saramaka case, paras. 134-137. According to Barelli, the conditions laid down in the Saramaka 
decision can be used to define the scope of the free, prior, and informed consent obligations contained 
in the UNDRIP. See Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 14. It is remarkable 
that the Court further clarified that until demarcation and titling of indigenous lands are not completed, 
States must obtain consent for every act that can interfere with indigenous property rights. See Case of 
the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment of Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Case No. 12,338 (12 August 2008). This interpretative judgment 
falls in the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 67 of the American Convention on Human Rights. See 
Rombouts 2014, at 270-273.
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African Commission, in reviewing the alleged violation of the right to development under 
Article 22 of the African Charter, has recognised that consent must be obtained for “any 
development or investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois 
territory”.258 However, ambiguities emerge on the requirement of consent when property 
rights under Article 14 of the African Charter are at stake, since the Commission only 
spelled out the obligation “to consult and to seek consent”.259 Indeed, whatever is the legal 
basis under which the obligation of obtaining consent arises, the factual circumstance 
that a major impact is likely to happen on the territories of indigenous peoples is clearly 
identified by the African Commission as a situation in which mere consultation is not 
sufficient. Consent is also conceived as the right of indigenous peoples to have a final say 
on the realisation of extractive projects in the concluding observations of the CESCR 
and CERD, thus beyond the regional framework.260
Moreover, the same human rights treaty bodies have concluded that States also 
have obligations to monitor, ensure the enforcement, and provide remedies for the 
implementation of free, prior and informed consent when extractive projects are 
conducted by corporations.261 These conclusions are in line with both States’ duty to 
258  Endorois case, para. 291.
259  Endorois case, para. 226.
260  See CESCR, Concluding observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3, para. 9, and UN 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100, para. 12; CESCR, Concluding observations on Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/
COL/CO/5, para. 9, and UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74, para. 33. CERD, Concluding observations on 
Guatemala, UN Doc. CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13 (19 May 2010), para. 11(a); CERD, Concluding 
observations on Chile, UN Doc. CERD/C/CHL/CO/15-18, para. 22; CERD, Concluding observations 
on Ecuador, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/2, para. 16. See also, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (6 July 2012), para. 65: 
“As established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, consistent with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples and other sources, where the rights implicated are 
essential to the survival of indigenous groups as distinct peoples and the foreseen impacts on the exercise 
of the rights are significant, indigenous consent to the impacts is required, beyond simply being an 
objective of consultations. It is generally understood that indigenous peoples’ rights over lands and 
resources in accordance with customary tenure are necessary to their survival. Accordingly, indigenous 
consent is presumptively a requirement for those aspects of any extractive operation that takes place 
within the officially recognized or customary land use areas of indigenous peoples, or that has a direct 
bearing on areas of cultural significance, in particular sacred places, or on natural resources that are 
traditionally used by indigenous peoples in ways that are important to their survival”.
261  In the Sarayaku case concerning oil concessions, the Inter-American Court has confirmed the active 
role of the State in para. 164: “the State must ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples are not 
disregarded in any other activity or agreement reached with private or third parties, or in the context of 
public sector decisions that would affect their rights and interests. Therefore, where applicable, the State 
must also carry out the tasks of inspection and supervision of their application and, when appropriate, 
deploy effective means to safeguard those rights through the corresponding judicial organs”. In the Ogoni 
case, the African Commission upheld a similar notion of care. See Ogoni case, para. 54: “Undoubtedly 
and admittedly, the government of Nigeria, through NNPC has the right to produce oil, the income 
from which will be used to fulfil the economic and social rights of Nigerians. But the care that should 
have been taken as outlined in the preceding paragraph and which would have protected the rights of the 
victims of the violations complained of was not taken”; para. 57: “Governments have a duty to protect 
their citizens, not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting 
them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties”. The CESCR has also adopted a 
similar reasoning. See CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Indonesia, UN Doc. 
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protect and the standard of due diligence as recognised in the UN Report on business 
and human rights, adopted by Special Rapporteur John Ruggie and endorsed by States 
through a resolution of the Human Rights Council.262 Beyond extractive projects, 
the Human Rights Committee has recently concluded that consent is warranted with 
respect to any “measures which substantially compromise or interfere with the culturally 
significant economic activities of a minority or indigenous community”.263
Therefore, a teleological approach seems to characterise the protection of indigenous 
participatory rights. This teleological approach has allowed human rights bodies to 
derive consent obligations from generic participatory rights, based on the argument that 
consultation and consent are fundamental procedural requirements for the preservation 
of indigenous land and cultural rights and, ultimately, for indigenous peoples’ very 
existence as distinct peoples.264 Thus, it is not sufficient merely to look at the scale of 
E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (19 June 2014), paras. 28; CESCR, Concluding observations on Ecuador, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.100 (7 June 2004), para. 35. See also CERD, Concluding observations on Canada, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (25 May 2007), para. 17. For a concurrent view, see also Anaya’s report 
2012, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (6 July 2012), para. 67, as well as James Anaya, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/24/41 (1 July 2013), paras. 44-46. See also Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Follow-up report on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, with a 
focus on extractive industries, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2 (30 April 2012), para. 26 and World 
Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10, at 18: conditionality on funds meaning that the Bank “does not proceed 
further with project processing if it is unable to ascertain that support exists” on the part of indigenous 
peoples (para. 11). For the history of the human rights approach to development within the Bank and 
the incorporation of the concerns of indigenous peoples, see Fergus MacKay, ‘The Draft World Bank 
Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples: Progress or More of the Same?’ (2005) 22 Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 65; Stefania Errico, ‘The World Bank and Indigenous 
Peoples: the Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples (O.P. 4.10.): Between Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
to Traditional Lands and to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent’ (2006) 13 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 367, at 368-371.
262  Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2001), endorsed by Res. 17/4, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011). The Special Rapporteur Anaya has recognised that companies 
concurrently have a duty of due diligence to respect indigenous rights, i.e., corporate responsibility. 
See Anaya’s report 2012, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47, para. 67. For an overview of the legal problems 
posed by the recognition of corporate responsibility in international law, see Elisa Morgera, Corporate 
Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2009). On the relevance of 
the debate on corporate responsibility for the present dissertation, see Introduction, section 4.
263  Poma Poma case, para. 7.6. This approach adopted by the Human Rights Committee does not reflect 
the more prudent stance adopted in previous reports. See HRC, Concluding observations on Panama, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (17 April 2008), para. 21; Concluding observations on Nicaragua, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (12 December 2008), para. 21(c); Concluding observations on Mexico, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (17 May 2010), para. 22; Concluding observations on Colombia, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/COL/CO/6 (4 August 2010), para. 25. Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the 
Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges 
ahead’ 2012, at 8. On this decision, see also Katja Göcke, ‘The Case of Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru before 
the Human Rights Committee: The Concept of Free Prior and Informed Consent and the Application of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the Protection and Promotion of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 337, at 357.
264  In support of this argument, see the Report of Special Rapporteur Anaya of 2009 (UN Doc. A/
HRC/12/34), para. 47: “the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent varies according 
to the circumstances and the indigenous interests involved”; para. 65: “The specific characteristics of the 
required consultation procedures will vary depending on the nature of the proposed measure, the scope 
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the measures concerned to determine which grade of participation States must ensure. 
Instead, the potential effects of the concerned measures as well as the substance of the 
rights protected must be taken into due account.265 This is the approach adopted by 
the Human Rights Committee in the Jouni Länsman decision. Although not dealing 
specifically with consent, the Committee has concluded that 
if logging plans were to be approved on a scale larger than that already agreed 
to for future years in the area in question or if it could be shown that the 
effects of logging already planned were more serious than can be foreseen 
at present, then it may have to be considered whether it would constitute a 
violation of the authors’ right to enjoy their own culture within the meaning 
of article 27.266
Hence also small-scale projects, if reiterated in time and incrementally affecting 
indigenous rights, must be intended as requiring indigenous peoples’ consent since they 
are likely to significantly impinge on indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness.267 
Substantive impacts may come not only from development projects, but also from 
the creation of nature reserves and protected areas,268 as well as from access to natural 
resources located in indigenous peoples’ territories.269 In acknowledging this issue, the 
COP of the CBD has endorsed the PoWPA,270 which both calls for the full respect 
of indigenous rights when establishing protected areas and requires States to obtain 
free, prior and informed consent when indigenous peoples are relocated following the 
establishment of protected areas.271 These requirements are very innovative, especially 
of its impact on indigenous peoples, and the nature of the indigenous interests or rights at stake. Yet, 
in all cases in which the duty to consult applies, the objective of the consultation should be to obtain 
the consent or agreement of the indigenous peoples concerned. Hence, consultations should occur early 
in the stages of the development or planning of the proposed measure, so that indigenous peoples may 
genuinely participate in and influence the decision-making”.
265  On these points, see also Doyle 2015, at 149-155.
266  Länsman II, para. 10.7.
267  See Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 15.
268  Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress report on the study on indigenous 
peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2 (17 May 
2010), para. 34: “Particular emphasis is placed on free, prior and informed consent for projects or 
measures that have a substantial impact on indigenous communities, such as those resulting from large-
scale natural resource extraction on their territories or the creation of natural parks, reserved forests, game 
reserves on indigenous peoples’ lands and territories” (emphasis is added).
269  These issues are explored in full in Chapter 4.
270  See Chapter 3.
271  COP dec. VII/28, para. 22: the COP “Recalls the obligations of Parties towards indigenous and local 
communities in accordance with Article 8(j) and related provisions and notes that the establishment, 
management and monitoring of protected areas should take place with the full and effective participation 
of, and full respect for the rights of, indigenous and local communities consistent with national law and 
applicable international obligations”. See also, Goal 2.2: “To enhance and secure involvement of indigenous 
and local communities and relevant stakeholders” in management and establishment of protected areas 
“in full respect of their rights and recognition of their responsibilities” by implementing specific plans 
and initiatives (suggested activity 2.2.2) and involvement in decision-making (2.2.4); suggested activity 
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compared to the human rights treaty bodies’ decisions that have not articulated so far the 
requirement of free, prior and informed consent with respect to the creation of protected 
areas. Indeed, the Inter-American Court in the Kaliña and Lokono case does refer to 
the duty to seek consent in order to ensure effective participation when creating nature 
reserves but it does not say whether and when consent must be obtained.272 In the same 
case, the Court also acknowledges that the creation of protected areas on indigenous 
territories is not threatening indigenous rights per se, especially when indigenous peoples 
can effectively participate in the decisions concerning nature reserves, can have access to 
their lands and resources, and can benefit from conservation projects.273
This reasoning is justified by the fact that indigenous rights are not absolute and 
may legitimately be restricted. Even when fundamental rights are at stake—land and 
cultural—safeguards must be proportional to expected restrictions. In this light, consent 
cannot be but an exceptional requirement. Apart from the hypotheses when consent is 
explicitly required, the UN Declaration frames consent as an objective of consultation.274 
Concurrently, former Special Rapporteur Anaya has clarified that, even in those cases 
where consent is required, indigenous peoples’ decisions on developments that might 
affect them cannot be framed as veto powers. This is due to the fact that indigenous 
peoples’ will cannot be imposed on legitimate and important societal needs.
Therefore, in case consent cannot be reached on activities that do not put in danger 
the basic needs of indigenous peoples, States should not necessarily stop their projects. 
This might be true when States create protected areas for the purpose of protecting 
nature, while at the same time they ensure the above-mentioned safeguards to indigenous 
peoples. In contrast with that, in the case of extractive industries Special Rapporteur 
Anaya has specified that it is difficult to demonstrate that the requirements of necessity 
and proportionality for valid restrictions to indigenous rights have been met when 
1.4.1: in order to ensure effective planning and management, Parties should “Create a highly participatory 
process, involving indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders”; suggested activity 2.1.5: 
Parties should “Engage indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders in participatory 
planning and governance, recalling the principle of the ecosystem approach”. See also suggested activity 
2.2.5: “Ensure that any resettlement of indigenous communities as a consequence of the establishment or 
management of protected areas will only take place with their prior informed consent that may be given 
according to national legislation and applicable international obligations”.
272  Kaliña and Lokono case, at 49, note 230.
273  Kaliña and Lokono case, paras. 173 and 181.
274  Art. 11(2) UNDRIP establishes that effective redress should be guaranteed in case indigenous 
“cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property” is taken without free, prior and informed consent. 
Restitution, however, is only one of the available remedies. This obligation is mirrored in Art. 27 as 
concern the “lands, territories and resources…which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or 
damaged” without free, prior and informed consent. Again, if restitution is not possible, compensation 
should be provided. Art. 32(2) reads as follows: “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free 
and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources”.
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consent is not sought and obtained.275
In any event, it is important to highlight here that even when consent is not to be 
obtained, States bear a number of demanding obligations connected to participatory 
rights, since they need to engage with indigenous representatives in good faith and at 
an early stage, to minimise the impact of new development activities, and to provide for 
compensation.276 “These principles are designed to build dialogue in which both States 
and indigenous peoples are to work in good faith towards consensus and try in earnest to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement”.277 
Both in the sense of an objective for consultation and as an obligatory requirement, 
free, prior and informed consent must be intended as process rather than a static concept. 
This process should start at the earliest stages of any decision-making process (prior) and 
must seek for the mindful (informed) agreement of indigenous peoples without coercive 
measures (free).278 In this sense, consultation and consent are logically linked to one 
another, the former being the precondition for the latter.279 Consultation, indeed, allows 
for the acknowledgement of the interests at stake, the foreseen impact, the importance 
of the land for specific indigenous cultures, and the relevance of undisturbed and non-
competitive resource use for indigenous peoples concerned. At the end of this spectrum, 
consent is required when the integrity of indigenous peoples is at stake, either for the 
nature of the project concerned (extractive) or for the scale of possible impacts on the 
ability of indigenous peoples to enjoy their land and cultural rights in a way that preserves 
their integrity as a group.
A last form of participation is worth exploring in this section, i.e., participation in 
the benefits deriving from activities that are conducted on indigenous territories, make use 
of indigenous peoples’ resources, or employ traditional knowledge.280 Although benefit-
sharing is not specifically related to participation in decision-making, it has emerged 
275  Report of Special Rapporteur Anaya, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/
HRC/24/41, para. 36.
276  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, S. James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9/Add.1 (15 August 2008), Annex I, 
Observaciones del Relator Especial sobre la situación de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales 
de los indígenas acerca del proceso de revisión constitucional en el Ecuador, paras. 33-40.
277  Special Rapporteur Anaya’s report 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, para. 49.
278  Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 2. For a complete review of the 
diffusion of free, prior and informed consent in international instruments and reports of human rights 
treaty bodies, see Rombouts 2014, at 195-218.
279  See Lisl Brunner and Karla Quintana, ‘The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal 
Standards after Sarayaku’ (2012) 16 American Society of International Law: Insights, available at http://
www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/35/duty-consult-inter-american-system-legal-standards-after-
sarayaku: “The [Inter-American] Court appeared to find it unnecessary to make specific reference to 
the requirement of consent in Sarayaku because Ecuador did not satisfy the preliminary obligation to 
consult”.
280  Benefit-sharing is analysed in depth in Chapter 3, section 2.3.
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in conjunction with it within human rights law. Furthermore, likewise the other forms 
of participation, the sharing of the benefits has both a procedural component and a 
substantive effect. From a procedural point of view, human rights bodies must verify the 
undertaking of this obligation to assess the legitimacy of restrictions imposed by States 
on protected rights. From a substantive perspective, benefit-sharing can be intended both 
as an instrumental element for the realisation of indigenous rights and as a remedial 
requirement to compensate for the compression of indigenous rights. Although, these 
elements are explored in more detail in Chapter 3, the main components of benefit-
sharing are delineated here as they emerge both from human rights law and biodiversity 
law.
Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169 protects indigenous peoples’ right to natural 
resources. As stated in paragraph 1 of this provision, “[t]hese rights include the right of 
these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources”. 
Thus, participation is intended as a form of co-management.281 In paragraph 2 concerning 
subsoil resources, indigenous peoples “shall participate in the benefits” of explorative and 
exploitation activities. From this scant provision, two elements emerge. First, benefit-
sharing is not defined and is subject to the circumstances of the case (“wherever possible”). 
Second, benefit-sharing is different from compensation; while compensation is only due 
when damages are produced, the sharing of the benefits must be ensured under any 
circumstances. 
The Human Rights Committee has concluded that, whenever a restriction of 
cultural rights occurs, consultation alone is not sufficient. In addition, States must ensure 
that indigenous peoples continue to benefit from their traditional activities.282 Although 
the Committee does not mention any positive action of the State to ensure that benefits 
are shared with indigenous peoples, there emerges a material component of participation 
that is linked to the underlying rationale of benefit-sharing. The sharing of benefits comes 
either as a result of consultation or as an additional requirement for an agreement cannot 
be reached.
In the Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court identifies benefit-sharing as one 
of the elements to assess the acceptability of restrictions on indigenous peoples’ land 
rights, together with effective consultation and the conduct of impact studies.283 The 
281  See Göcke 2013, at 151. The author argues that, in a residual meaning, participation is aimed to 
ensure co-management of lands and resources when only usage rights on resources are guaranteed.
282  Apirana Mahuika case, para. 9.5: “In its case law under the Optional Protocol, the Committee 
has emphasised that the acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the culturally significant 
economic activities of a minority depends on whether the members of the minority in question have had 
the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether 
they will continue to benefit from their traditional economy”.
283  The Court speaks of “[s]afeguards against restrictions on the right to property that deny the survival 
of the Saramaka people”, title preceding paras. 129ff. See Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 83: “The 
right of indigenous peoples to benefit from economic activities con- ducted on their lands is an essential 
element of their right to property”.
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formulation used by the Court is vague in that it only refers to the need that States 
ensure that indigenous peoples “receive a reasonable benefit from any such [development, 
investment, exploration, or extraction] plan within their territory”.284 Benefits here seem 
to be couched in very generic terms as any beneficial consequences stemming from the 
development activities concerned. The Court further elaborates on benefit-sharing in 
the same decision, by connecting this requirement to the right to fair compensation 
protected under the American Convention on Human Rights as a remedial restriction of 
the right to property. Inherent in this notion of compensation is not the production of 
damages but the mere imposition of restrictions on land rights.285 The Court explicitly 
refers to the fact that the requirement of ensuring the equitable sharing of the benefits has 
also been used by the CERD with reference to extractive activities.286
The African Commission in the Endorois case concludes that benefit-sharing 
“serves as an important indicator of compliance for” both property and development 
rights of indigenous peoples.287 In this sense, benefit-sharing is a procedural requirement 
for courts or monitoring bodies to verify the fulfilment of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
The other rationale for granting benefit-sharing is to ensure that fair compensation is 
guaranteed in case indigenous rights are restricted.288 A fair form of compensation is 
represented by the granting of new substitutive lands to conduct traditional activities.289 
In the final recommendations, the Commission has indicated practical ways in which 
benefit-sharing may be put in practice, namely the payment of compensation “for the loss 
suffered”, the payment of royalties “from existing economic activities”, and the granting 
of job opportunities to community members.
Under the CBD, Article 8(j) establishes that the contracting Parties should 
“encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization” of indigenous 
traditional knowledge and practices “relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
284  Saramaka case, para. 129.
285  Saramaka case, paras. 138-140.
286  CERD, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/2, para. 16. In 
Concluding observations on India, UN Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO 19 (5 May 2007), para. 19, the CERD 
speaks of “compensation” rather than benefit-sharing in relation to the construction of a dam.
287  Endorois case, para. 294.
288  Endorois case, paras. 295-296: benefit-sharing “may be understood as a form of reasonable equitable 
compensation resulting from the exploitation of traditionally owned lands and of those natural resources 
necessary for the survival of the Endorois community”. In para. 297, the Commission recounts the 
material losses suffered by the Endorois community as a consequence of the deprivation of their rights.
289  Endorois case, para. 298: “The African Commission agrees that the failure to provide adequate 
compensation and benefits, or provide suitable land for grazing indicates that the Respondent State did 
not adequately provide for the Endorois in the development process”. This obligation must be interpreted 
in light of the remedial provisions contained in the both ILO Convention 169 (Art. 16) and the UNDRIP 
(Art. 28). See also Yakye Axa case, para. 151: “Selection and delivery of alternative lands, payment of fair 
compensation, or both, are not subject to purely discretionary criteria of the State, but rather, pursuant 
to a comprehensive interpretation of ILO Convention No. 169 and of the American Convention, there 
must be a consensus with the peoples involved, in accordance with their own mechanism of consultation, 
values, customs and customary law”.
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biological diversity”. Article 5 of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol creates an obligation for 
State Parties to take measures to ensure that the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
is ensured from the utilisation both of genetic resources held by indigenous peoples 
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, based on mutually agreed 
terms. Chapter 3 clarifies to what extent these standards are in line with the human 
rights obligations of contracting Parties and how human rights obligations can feed into 
the interpretation and application of these provisions. It is interesting to note at this 
stage that, compared with human rights standards, the Nagoya Protocol identifies in 
its Annex some concrete manifestations of the material and non-material benefits that 
can be provided to indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the scope of benefit-sharing in the 
Nagoya Protocol is different from that of international human rights law since it is not 
necessarily connected to the restrictions on indigenous peoples’ rights, as explained in 
Chapter 3.290
3.6. The legal status of indigenous peoples’ rights
The above analysis of indigenous rights as emerged from human rights law has reinforced 
the argument that indigenous land rights are central in the preservation of indigenous 
communities as distinct peoples. In particular, previous sections have shown that a 
teleological approach is underlying both human rights instruments on indigenous 
peoples and international practice. In this respect, the recognition of other rights, such as 
cultural rights, autonomy rights, or participatory rights, is either instrumental for or the 
product of the recognition of land rights.
Collective land and resource rights, including the duty to demarcate indigenous 
peoples’ territories, cultural rights, which comprise both the right to exercise culture 
and the right to have indigenous peoples’ relationship with land preserved, the right 
to autonomy, and the right to free, prior and informed consent declined either as an 
objective or an obligation to reach consensus, are at the core of indigenous peoples’ 
identity. These rights, to which indigenous peoples are specifically entitled, have both 
been included in human rights instruments and applied by universal and regional human 
rights treaty bodies.291 In particular, previous sections have shown that all of these rights 
have been interpreted in a teleological way so as to guarantee indigenous peoples’ very 
existence as distinct groups. Consequently, the interconnectedness of indigenous peoples’ 
rights292 is to be taken into account when assessing their legal status.
As reminded, land and resource rights occupy a prominent role, both for they 
have been widely relied upon by human rights treaty bodies and play a central role in 
290  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 105.
291  See Siegfried Wiessner, ‘Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Legal Analysis’ (1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57, at 109.
292  Wiessner and Lenzerini 2012, at 43-44.
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the fulfilment of other rights. Anaya and Williams have indicated a “consistent pattern 
of international and domestic legal practice that recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to 
lands and natural resources”.293 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the formulation 
of land rights of the draft UN Declaration on indigenous rights has not been renegotiated 
within the General Assembly that has agreed to the version previously elaborated within 
the Working Group on the draft declaration and agreed upon by the Human Rights 
Council. 294 This would testify to the broad recognition of these rights. Therefore, there 
is a strong expectation that core indigenous rights must be protected, respected, and 
fulfilled by States.295 In addition, some authors maintain that customary international 
law concerning these rights has already emerged.296 The remaining of this section aims to 
verify the legal status of indigenous rights.
From a purely positivist legal perspective, indigenous rights can have a mandatory 
nature either for those States that are party to international treaties whereby indigenous 
rights are protected or through customary international law. Concerning obligations 
deriving from treaty law, it must be underlined that indigenous property rights over 
lands and natural resources and participatory rights are protected under all universal 
and regional human rights treaties. The only exception is represented by the practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights, which only assimilates indigenous rights to the 
cultural rights of minorities, as illustrated in Chapter 1.297 Indeed, virtually all European 
States are also bound by general human rights treaties. This means that a more restrictive 
interpretation of indigenous rights could only apply to the regional European context, 
293  Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 53. Concerning international practice, these authors refer to the 
adoption of both the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, as well as the negotiations on the American 
Declaration on indigenous rights (at 55-58). At 57-58, they state boldly, “Every major international 
body that has considered indigenous peoples’ rights during the past decade has acknowledged the crucial 
importance of lands and resources to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples and communities”. 
These authors also refer to the relevance of national legislative and constitutional reforms (at 59ff.). See 
also, S. James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-empowerment’ [2007] JURIST. See Fitzmaurice, ‘Tensions between States and Indigenous 
Peoples over Natural Resources in Light of the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Including Relevant National Legislation and Case-Law)’ 2012, at 259: “The right of indigenous 
peoples to natural resources on the territories they live is undisputed by human rights law”. Furthermore, 
see Mauro Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 957, at 973. This author identifies as undisputed rights the right not be subjected to genocide, 
the right to exercise culture, the right to participation, and the right to land, including the aspect of an 
existing spiritual link between indigenous peoples and their lands.
294  Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 20.
295  Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009, at 960: “in the light of the context in which it has 
been established and its very normative content, the Declaration has important legal effects and generates 
reasonable legal expectations of complying behaviour”.
296  Wiessner, ‘The State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 
5/2012’ 2013, at 1362.
297  Chapter 1, section 2.2.3.
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both within European States and in the reciprocal relations of European States. However, 
it has to be reminded that the European Court has adopted a denial test that is comparable 
to that utilised by other human rights treaty bodies to assess the legitimacy of restrictions 
on indigenous rights. In this light, it is not unthinkable that in future cases the European 
Court may apply this test in a way that is more favourable to indigenous prerogatives. 
Furthermore, the existence of a denial test has consequences on the discussion about the 
emergence of the principle of self-determination explored in section 5 in this chapter.
Another consideration is to be made here on the relevance of treaty law for the 
emergence of general international law. Although international treaty law might be 
considered as evidence of State practice for the purposes of the formation of customary 
international law, this dissertation does not aim to reach conclusions on the issue of 
whether or not indigenous rights have reached the status of customary international law. 
This assessment would be too burdensome as it would require the analysis of widespread—
although not universal—State practice, as well as the problematic evaluation of their 
opinio juris. This study would be extremely complex not only in terms of the amount of 
materials that must be evaluated, but also because the nature of customary international 
law and its constitutive elements are still very much discussed and difficult to apprehend.298 
Although the binary conception—usus and opinio juris sive necessitatis—is consolidated, 
the evaluation of the two constitutive elements is far from being settled.299 Therefore, 
truly engaging with such debates would probably require a dissertation on its own.
The other argument not to concentrate on the assessment of the customary nature 
of indigenous rights is that this analysis would also be not decisive. Indeed, the mandatory 
nature of indigenous core rights, as demonstrated in previous sections, can be motivated 
298  See e.g., Brian D. Lepard, Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications 
(Cambridge University Press 2010), at 9-10. For a non-exhaustive overview on the theoretical debates 
on the nature, function and development of customary international law, see Anthony A. D’Amato, The 
Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press 1971); Luigi Ferrari Bravo, ‘Méthodes 
de recherche de la coutume internationale dans la pratique des Etats’ (1985) 192 Recueil des cours 233; 
Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 146; 
Alain Pellet, ‘The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making’ (1988-1989) 
12 Australian Year Book of International Law 22; Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: 
International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press 1999); Andrew T. 
Guzman, ‘Saving Customary International Law’ (2005) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 115; 
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Customary Law: A Few More Thoughts about the Theory of “Spontaneous” 
International Custom’ in Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (Bruylant 
2007); Peter Tomka, ‘Custom and the International Court of Justice’ (2013) 12 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 195.
299  See Stefan Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between 
Induction, Deduction and Assertion’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 417, who 
argues that even when the ICJ concludes for the existence of rules of customary international law, its 
methodology is indefinite and its finding are determined by assertion. As an acknowledgment of this 
complexity, the UNGA has mandated the International Law Commission to conduct a thorough study 
on the constitutive elements of customary international law. The initial mandate was to explore the 
formation and evidence of customary international law, subsequently changed in 2013 into “Identification 
of customary international law”. See note 100 Introduction.
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by the membership of States to international human rights that recognise and protect 
such rights. In particular, although ICCPR,300 ICESCR,301 ICERD,302 the American 
Convention303 and the African Charter304 do not specifically protect indigenous rights, 
they have been interpreted as providing a suitable legal basis for the recognition of legal 
obligations of States as to the protection of indigenous rights. The legal bases for such 
protection have been found mainly in Article 27—sometimes in combination with 
Article 1305—of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the ICESCR, Articles 1 and 2 of the CERD, 
Article 21 of the American Convention, and Articles 21 and 22 of the African Charter. 
Those limited States having ratified the ILO Convention 169 also derive their obligations 
from this specialised treaty.306
The almost universal membership of some of these treaties makes it so that the 
obligation to protect indigenous rights can be considered widespread. Depending on 
the combination of particular treaties and the jurisdiction that is called to decide on 
particular cases, these rights may have slightly different contents that must examined 
on a case-by-case basis. Although there cannot be doubts over their mandatory nature 
for the contracting Parties of the human rights treaties cited above, some issues can 
be raised as to the lack of review or enforcement mechanisms. A case in point is the 
fact that the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which establishes a system of individual 
communications to the Human Rights Committee, has not been ratified by a significant 
number of countries.307 These limitations in the enforcement of indigenous rights, 
300  For the parties of the ICCPR, see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last accessed October 2016). An important non-party is China. The 
adjective important is used here and in the following notes to indicate that the lack of ratification may 
have a significant impact on the protection of indigenous peoples.
301  For the parties of the ICESCR, see https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_
no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en (last accessed October 2016). An important non-party is the United 
States.
302  For the Parties of the ICERD, see http://indicators.ohchr.org/. An important non-party is Malaysia.
303  For the Parties of the American Convention on Human Rights, see http://www.oas.org/dil/
treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm. Important non-parties are Belize, 
Canada, and the United States. These countries however are subject to the non-judicial review mechanism 
of the Inter-American Commission since they have endorsed the American Declaration of Human 
Rights.
304  For the parties of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see http://www.achpr.org/
instruments/achpr/ratification/. The only non-party is South Sudan.
305  On this, see section 4.2 in this chapter.
306  On the legal value of the ILO Convention 169 beyond its mandatory status for its State Parties, see 
Göcke 2010, at 359: “since it is often referred to by international bodies, its contribution goes beyond 
the limited number of ratifications and therefore it is an appropriate starting point for investigations on 
recognised indigenous peoples’ rights”. Similar points are made by Anaya, ‘International Human Rights 
and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State’ 2004, at 13 ff. and Barelli, ‘The Role 
of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009, at 958.
307  See http://indicators.ohchr.org/. Particularly problematic is the lack of ratification by the United 
States and a number of Asian countries.
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however, do not affect the mandatory nature of these rights under the abovementioned 
human rights treaties. Furthermore, this research has also verified that States have not 
opposed the concluding observations and the views adopted by human rights treaty 
bodies on the content and scope of indigenous rights. As explained in the Introduction, 
this has been done by looking at the States’ declarations submitted periodically to human 
rights treaty bodies, which have been analysed starting from 2005. It emerges from these 
declarations that States rather tend either to illustrates examples of national measures 
complying with human rights treaties’ obligations or to provide justifications for their 
non-compliance.308 This practice proves that States fundamentally adhere to the extensive 
interpretation of indigenous rights provided for by human rights treaty bodies.
Notwithstanding the decision not to engage with the debate whether or not 
indigenous rights have reached the status of customary international law, it is worth 
discussing in the remaining of this section some elements that may contribute to the 
emergence of customary international law in the field of indigenous rights in order to 
anticipate possible future developments. One of these elements concerns the role of 
the UN Declaration on indigenous rights. The other is related to the specificities of 
international human rights law.
The UN Declaration on indigenous rights represents a fundamental step towards 
the global recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. The document is not binding per 
se;309 indeed, some authors argue that it has a declaratory function of custom, since some 
indigenous rights have already reached a customary status.310 While this argument is not 
308  Some footnotes in this chapter specifically refer to examples of declarations where States formally 
accept the interpretation of human rights treaty bodies. Footnotes have also referred to the isolated 
opposition of the US but has not included the reference to the documents proving the acceptance of the 
rest of global human rights treaties. These constitute the rest of the declarations examined since 2005.
309  Barelli argues that the choice of a soft law instrument may have some advantages in terms of 
acceptability of the norms and the practical impact. See Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International 
Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009 at 
964-966: increased possibility to reach a consensus on more defined content and to produce a document 
whose impact is not based on the number of ratifications or on the need to wait for the entry into force; 
participation of non-State actors.
310  On this point, see Dwight G. Newman, ‘Norms of Consultation with Indigenous Peoples: 
Decentralization of International Law Formation or Reinforcement of States’ Roles?’ in Andrew Byrnes, 
Mika Hayashi and Christopher Michaelsen (eds), International Law in the New Age of Globalization 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013), at 282: “The relevant practice of states and international institutions establishes 
that, as a matter of customary international law, states must recognize and protect indigenous peoples’ 
rights to land and natural resources in connection with traditional or ancestral use and occupancy 
patterns”. See also, Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of 
Indigenous Peoples’ 2006-2007, at 186: “the recent evolution of international law concerning indigenous 
peoples demonstrates that a principle has emerged requiring States to recognize a given degree of 
sovereignty in favor of such peoples. The fact that nearly all States concerned have adjusted their relevant 
internal law to the above principle and have accepted rules which often go against their own interests 
(since the recognition of indigenous autonomy may generate serious obstacles to the exercise of certain 
governmental prerogatives, such as the exploitation of natural resources), confirms that they actually 
feel themselves bound to conform to such international obligation”. See Wiessner and Lenzerini 2012, 
at 23: “indigenous peoples’ land rights…have attained the status of customary international law”. See 
further Wiessner, ‘Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International 
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discussed in its merits for the reasons above, other arguments can be plausible.
Some authors for instance maintain that the Declaration has favoured the 
crystallization of international custom as for the rights reiterated in the international 
practice of human rights treaty bodies.311 This argument, however, simply shifts the duty 
to provide proofs on the customary nature of indigenous rights to the treaty-related 
practice of States. In particular, if it cannot be demonstrated that the conclusion of 
human rights treaties and subsequent human rights reports can be considered as a general 
practice of States accepted as law, the customary nature of indigenous rights cannot 
be legitimately concluded. This proof, indeed, is certainly a difficult one for two main 
reasons. First, human rights treaties protecting indigenous rights have a general scope 
and have not been originally conceived to protect indigenous rights. Second, it might be 
particularly difficult to reconstruct State practice in relation to the reports, decisions, and 
judgments adopted by human rights treaty bodies and courts. Similarly, the endorsement 
of the UN Declaration by UN bodies312 or within other treaties, such as the Nagoya 
Protocol313 might provide evidence of State practice but it can also be argued that it is not 
sufficiently conclusive. One of the major obstacles to the ascertainment of custom could 
be represented by the argument that treaty practice only concerns the content of treaty 
rules and not its binding nature as general international law.314
Another strand of arguments points to the fact that the Declaration can be and 
has been used to interpret existing indigenous rights protected under human rights 
treaties.315 In this sense, in the long term this interpretative function can contribute to 
Legal Analysis’ 1999; Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2008; Anaya and Wiessner 3 October 2007; Anaya and Williams 
Jr. 2001.As said, this dissertation is not concerned with proving or disproving the customary nature of 
indigenous rights. 
311  S. James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-Empowerment’ [2007] JURIST; Erica-Irene Daes, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Background and Appraisal’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), 
Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011), at 38.
312  On this point, see Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 105 ff.
313  Preambular para. 26 Nagoya Protocol.
314  See Conforti 2013, at 40, who argues that the existence of opinio juris sive necessitatis is fundamental 
to ascertain whether the conclusion of a number of treaties can be intended as establishing relevant 
practice for the formation of international custom. This reasoning can be also extended to the relevance 
of soft law for the formation of custom. The dilemma described by Conforti is also known as the Baxter 
paradox, from the name of the scholar that has fully illustrated the problem of treaty ratification as an 
expression of State practice for the purpose of the emergence of customary rules. See Richard R. Baxter, 
‘Treaties and Custom’ (1970) 129 Recueil des cours 27, at 64: “as the number of parties to a treaty 
increases, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary international law dehors 
the treaty”. See also, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, ‘The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations’ (1972) 137 Recueil des cours 419, at 
476-479; Treves 2005, at 286-287; Daillier, Forteau and Pellet 2008, at 366; Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s 
Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge 1997), at 40.
315  Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future 
Developments’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27, at 27, where the author argues 
that the UNDRIP provides an interpretation of pre-existing rights that has received the consensus of 
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the emergence of customary international law as long as it stimulates State practice and/
or opinio juris. In this respect, it is important to highlight that, notwithstanding the non-
binding nature of the Declaration, this is already playing a role in the interpretation of 
other instruments by enlarging the scope of existing rights.316
Furthermore, some authors highlight the special nature of the UN Declaration on 
indigenous rights. This Declaration has undergone an exceptionally long negotiation 
process that has lasted for more than twenty years.317 The length of the process indicates 
a thorough negotiation and the coming to agreed positions on a number of otherwise 
contested rights. The consolidation of a consensus on far-reaching rights has been possible 
inter alia due to the structure of negotiations that was characterised by the participation 
of indigenous representatives in the drafting process. A first draft of the Declaration had 
been elaborated within the WGIP. At that stage, only indigenous peoples were involved in 
the elaboration of the text that would be used as the basis for negotiation. The involvement 
of both indigenous peoples and States in the operations of the abovementioned Working 
Group on the draft declaration starting from 1995 has allowed for the formulation of 
a truly shared text.318 Hence, the negotiation process has resulted in a full endorsement 
of the General Assembly, which on 13 September 2007 has adopted the Declaration 
with a resolution.319 An overwhelming majority, with only four oppositions and eleven 
States. See also, Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 103; Patrick 
Thornberry, ‘Integrating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into CERD Practice’ 
in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011). See further, CERD, Concluding observation on the US, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6, para. 29; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Comment on Article 11, 
UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/11 (2009), para. 82; CESCR, Concluding observation on Nicaragua, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/NIC/CO/4, para. 35.
316  See infra note 336.
317  Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009, citing the Chairperson of the UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, Victoria Tauli Corpuz, at 969-970: “the Declaration has been one of the 
most extensively discussed and negotiated texts in the history of the UN”. On the drafting history of the 
Declaration, see Stefania Errico, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Is Adopted: 
An Overview’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 756. See also, Daes 2011; Kenneth Deer, ‘Reflections 
on the Development, Adoption and Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ in Jackie Hartley, Paul Joffe and Jennifer Preston (eds), Realizing the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and Action (Purich Publishing 2010).
318  Barelli, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ 2012, at 10: the participation of indigenous 
peoples’ organisations in the drafting stages both within the Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
and within the Working Group on the Draft Declaration is quite uncommon by UN standards. This makes 
the UNDRIP a sui generis soft law instrument. See Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International 
Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009, 
at 960, arguing that there are different kinds of soft law instruments. These arguments highlighting 
the importance of context, however, are not decisive when it comes to assessing the legal nature of the 
Declaration or its role on the formation of corresponding customary rules. On this point, see Abi-Saab 
1987, at 160-161. This author argues that contextual elements, such as the degree of agreement, the 
extent to which content is detailed, and the existence of compliance mechanisms, are more revealing of 
the probability that a given resolution will be implemented than its intrinsic legal value.
319  It is also relevant that UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) 
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abstentions, has voted for the resolution adopting the Declaration.
Given that the opposition to the Declaration came from Australia, Canada, the US, 
and New Zealand, this has casted a shadow over the universal value of the Declaration.320 
It is equally relevant, however, that all of these countries have reversed their opposition 
and eventually endorsed the Declaration.321 Whereas this late endorsement has virtually 
recomposed the consensus that could not be found in 2007, the terms of this endorsement 
are telling of remaining tensions and are briefly explored in the following.
A first cluster of statements concern the legal value of the Declaration. Australia has 
explicitly stated that the Declaration contains “important international principles” that 
reflect “Australia’s existing obligations”.322 At the same time, the Declaration has been 
defined as only containing “aspirations”.323 This ambiguity concerning the legal impact of 
the Declaration can similarly be found virtually in all declarations of vote attached to the 
adoption of the UNGA resolution in 2007 and later.324 In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that, notwithstanding the clear status of UNGA resolutions in international law as 
non-binding legal documents, States have specified what legal consequences may derive 
from the Declaration. In some cases, however, like for Australia, they have done so in 
contradictory terms. It seems therefore that the capacity of the Declaration to influence 
the development of international law with respect to indigenous rights would not depend 
has started a dialogue over an additional protocol to UNDRIP. See http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
unpfii/documents/EGM/2015/Concept-note.pdf and http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
EGM/2015/Experts-papers/James-Anaya.pdf (last accessed October 2016).
320  Barelli highlights that, concerning the value of a UNGA resolution for the formation of customary 
international law, the fact that the majority of the States affected by any resolution vote in favour should 
suffice as a proof of a generalised opinio juris. This would be the case also for the UNDRIP, since “these 
four States represent only a minority of States specifically affected by the Declaration. In fact, indigenous 
peoples live in more than sixty States”. Moreover, other States (except for New Zealand) have a higher 
proportion of indigenous peoples living in their territories. See Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the 
International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ 2009, at 967-968.
321  See supra note 73.
322  In particular, Australia has emphasised the importance of the principle according to which indigenous 
peoples should “maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with land and waters”, 
as well as the principle of equality. On participation, Australia has not dismissed the importance of the 
free, prior and informed consent, stating instead that “[w]hile there is continuing international debate 
about the meaning of ‘free, prior and informed consent’, we will consider any future interpretation in 
accordance with Article 46”. Article 46 of the UNDRIP protects the territorial integrity of States. Finally, 
the Australia’s declaration also explicitly recognises “the right of Indigenous Australians to practice, 
revitalise and sustain their cultural, religious and spiritual traditions and customs”. Article 46 lays down 
the terms under which indigenous peoples’ self-determination can be recognised. “Through the Article 
on self-determination, the Declaration recognises the entitlement of indigenous peoples to have control 
over their destiny and to be treated respectfully. Article 46 makes it clear that the Declaration cannot be 
used to impair Australia’s territorial integrity”.
323  Australia’s statement. A similar ambiguity is contained in the US statement, at 1 and 2: “while not 
legally binding or a statement of current international law—has both moral and political force”; “[t]he 
United States aspires to improve relations with indigenous peoples by looking to the principles embodied 
in the Declaration”.
324  UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 and A/61/PV.108 (13 September 2007).
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so much on the contradictory declarations of vote made by States on the occasion of their 
endorsement, but rather on subsequent and/or parallel practice and opinio juris. Another 
conclusion is that the Declaration may contain different types of legal standards going 
from mere aspirations to customary obligations and/or general principles.325
Second, and in connection with the previous point, late supporters have insisted 
on the prevalence of their national legal framework on indigenous peoples.326 Similarly 
to what has been argued above, the impact of the Declaration on national laws will 
not depend that much on these statements, but rather on the level of consolidation of 
indigenous rights under international law. Whereas it is still contentious whether these 
have reached customary status, it seems that national standards cannot ignore international 
obligations stemming from treaty law, as illustrated above. In this sense, therefore, the 
principled assumption that national standards would prevail over international ones 
does not seem legally sound or particularly convincing, unless it can be demonstrated 
that a parallel custom derogating from treaty law has developed. Another approach 
could be that foreshadowed by New Zealand according to which its national system 
has developed independently from international law. In addition, municipal law better 
reflects indigenous customs and is grounded on bilateral treaties concluded with Maori.327
Third, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US have offered useful indications 
on the nature of indigenous rights. Australia has recognised the special status of indigenous 
peoples in international law.328 Furthermore, all statements emphasise that partnership 
lies at the foundation of indigenous rights. In particular, the US have also highlighted 
that the decision to eventually endorse the Declaration came about after consultation 
with indigenous tribes.329
Fourth, concerns over the formulation of specific rights have not disappeared. This 
325  See for instance New Zealand’s statement: “New Zealand now adds its support to the Declaration both 
as an affirmation of fundamental rights and in its expression of new and widely supported aspirations”.
326  Australia’s statement: “Australia’s laws concerning land rights and native title are not altered by our 
support of the Declaration”. Canada’s statement: “Although the Declaration is a non legally binding 
document that does not reflect customary international law nor change Canadian laws, our endorsement 
gives us the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to continue working in partnership with Aboriginal 
peoples in creating a better Canada” (emphasis added); Canada can “interpret the principles expressed in 
the Declaration in a manner that is consistent with our Constitution and legal framework”; the national 
legal framework “will continue to be the cornerstone of our efforts to promote and protect the rights of 
Aboriginal Canadians”. Indeed, reference to national law is also made in various declarations of vote also 
to demonstrate that those countries are protecting indigenous rights nationally. See US statement and 
UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 and A/61/PV.108.
327  New Zealand’s statement: “where the Declaration sets out aspirations for rights to and restitution of 
traditionally held land and resources, New Zealand has, through its well established processes for resolving 
Treaty claims, developed its own distinct approach”; “That approach respects the important relationship 
Māori, as tangata whenua, have with their lands and resources both currently and historically, and the 
complementary principles of rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga that underpin that relationship”.
328  Australia’s statement: the UNDRIP “reflects and pays homage to the unique place of Indigenous 
peoples and their entitlement to all human rights as recognised in international law”. New Zealand’s 
statement: “The Declaration acknowledges the distinctive and important status of indigenous peoples”.
329  US statement, at 2.
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is clear, for instance, in Australia’s insistence on the principle of territorial integrity that 
is in any event included in the UN Declaration. Moreover, Canada has explicitly stated 
that the concerns expressed when voting against the Declaration in 2007 remain but can 
be overcome through interpretation.330
In contrast with the qualified support on the part of those States, some authors 
have highlighted that the UN Declaration reflects the “recent normative developments 
related to indigenous peoples’ rights in the context of international human rights”.331
In this connection, it is worth briefly touching upon the more general debate 
concerning the legal value of general resolutions by the UNGA since it can shed some 
light on the influence that the UN Declaration on indigenous rights may have on the 
emergence of customary international law. International scholars rightly point out that, 
although resolutions of the UNGA are neither legally binding nor international custom 
per se, they have a strong legal value in that they can stimulate practice and opinio 
juris.332 In particular, Abi Saab defines the resolutions of the UNGA as initial steps in 
the international law-making process, which is cumulative by its very nature.333 In this 
sense, UN resolutions can represent a reinforced form of opinio juris that precedes State 
practice, thus contributing to the formation of international customary law.334
330  See A/61/PV.107, at 12. These concerns regard “the wording of the current text, including the 
provisions on lands, territories and resources; on free, prior and informed consent when used as a veto; 
on self- government without recognition of the importance of negotiations; on intellectual property; on 
military issues; and on the need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of 
indigenous peoples, Member States and third parties”.
331  Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2009, at 962.
332  See as general reference to this topic, Arangio-Ruiz 1972. On the legal value of UNGA resolutions 
see also, Abi-Saab 1987, at 158-160.
333  Abi-Saab 1987, at 167-169: “La résolution représente dans un tel cas une première approximation 
rapide d’une réponse juridique, un premier pas ou une première étape, ainsi qu’une mesure provisoire 
ou conservatoire (stop-gap), jusqu’à ce qu’une réponse normative plus complète et définitive soit prête”; 
“Nous retrouvons ici le processus cumulatif qui caractérise la fonction législative international”.
334  Ibid., at 171: “les résolutions ont inversé l’ordre chronologique et l’importance relative des deux 
éléments de la coutume”. See also, Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 
(Cambridge University Press 1995), at 69. According to this author, concerning the consolidation of a 
customary rule on self-determination in the case of decolonisation, the formation of customary rules did 
not initially conform with the two-pronged theory according to which customary rules are the result 
of the repetition of a practice accompanied by opinio juris. Instead, the political will took precedence 
through the adoption of resolutions of the UNGA. “Strictly speaking, these resolutions are neither 
opinio juris nor usus. Rather they constitute the major factor triggering (a) the taking of a legal stand by 
many Member States of the UN (which thereby express their view on the matter) and (b) the gradual 
adoption by these States of attitudes consistent with the resolutions”. See further, ICJ, Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 70: “General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, 
may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important 
for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is 
true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its 
adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series 
of resolutions may show the gradua1 evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new 
rule”. In support of these arguments, ILC draft conclusions on the identification of custom (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.872) confirm that the resolutions adopted by international organisations can provide proof 
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To this argument it is possible to oppose at least one significant counterargument, 
i.e., that States may cast votes in favour of resolutions by the UNGA precisely because they 
know these legal documents are not binding.335 Therefore, in order to assess the role of the 
Declaration on indigenous rights on the emergence of customary law, the declarations 
of vote associated to the Declaration may be revealing. Indeed, as reminded, statements 
have been mixed so that it is not possible to conclude that a univocal opinio juris has 
emerged from the declarations that States have made on the occasion of the adoption of 
the Declaration or its subsequent endorsement.336 Another element concurring with this 
conclusion is that the Declaration has not been adopted by consensus as usually happens 
with the resolutions of the UNGA of some significance.
Notwithstanding these theoretical limitations, some elements indeed suggest 
that State practice and opinio juris might already be evolving. The Declaration has not 
only been referred to in the decisions and reports of human rights treaty bodies,337 but 
for the two elements: “conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization 
or at an intergovernmental conference” is a form of State practice and opinio juris” (Draft conclusion 
6 and 10). In Draft conclusion 12, although the ILC argues that resolutions cannot “of itself ” create 
custom, at the same time they “may provide evidence for establishing the existence and content of a rule 
of customary international law, or contribute to its development”.
335  See Emmanuel Voyakis, ‘Voting in the General Assembly as Evidence of Customary International 
Law?’ in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011), at 209: “On the one hand, it seems sensible to take States’ 
attitudes towards the propositions stated in a given Resolution as a defeasible indicator of whether they 
would accept those propositions as law. On the other hand, just as participation in a treaty does not 
necessarily allow inferences about the views of States parties regarding customary international law, we 
have some reason to doubt whether GA votes can tell us that much about the views of voting States on 
international custom”. See also, Pellet 1988-1989, at 32: “These factors are certainly relevant - but not 
crucial in the present context. They can (and must) be taken into consideration to establish if the rule 
enunciated in the resolution is an expression of customary law - as the International Court did in the 
Nicaragua case in 198655 - but the reinforced legal value of the norm is not based on the resolution itself 
but on the custom of which the resolution is either an expression or a constitutive element”.
336  It is interesting to note that New Zealand in its original declaration of vote implied that the Declaration 
is not aspirational and must be taken seriously. This is why they voted against in the first place. At the 
same time, the Declaration was considered too divisive to be considered as State practice or the basis 
for general principles (UN Doc. A/61/PV.107, at 15). A similar argument was made by Namibia (UN 
Doc. A/61/PV.108, at 3). Although many States highlighted the non-binding nature of the Declaration, 
some have stressed its legal value (Guyana: “potential legal implications”; Suriname: “the international 
community came to agreement on principles to govern the rights of indigenous peoples”).
337  For instance, in the Saramaka case, para. 131, Art. 32 UNDRIP on free, prior and informed consent 
is relied upon, by saying that Suriname has endorsed the Declaration, to reinforce the procedural 
requirement of effective participation in decisions concerning development projects. In the Kaliña and 
Lokono case, para. 122, the Court states: “As established by this Court in 2007 in the case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, the domestic laws of Suriname do not recognize the right to communal property of 
the members of its tribal peoples and it has not ratified ILO Convention 169. However, Suriname has 
ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and voted in favor of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”. UNDRIP Articles are then referred upon along the 
whole judgment. In Endorois case, para. 232, the African Commission refers to the UNDRIP even 
though Kenya has abstained in the vote about the resolution. On the decisions of the CERD, see also, 
Thornberry, ‘Integrating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into CERD Practice’ 
2011. See also, Tobin 2014, at 36
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also in international treaties such as the Nagoya Protocol, States’ submissions before 
international human rights courts,338 and national case law and legislation.339 In this 
last respect, national practice is burgeoning in the direction of progressively recognising 
indigenous peoples’ rights within national systems. Worldwide, indigenous peoples 
have been recognised as separate groups within national societies that deserve special 
protection.340 Furthermore, there is an increasing recognition of indigenous land rights 
with measures ranging from the set-up of procedures to recognise land rights to the 
acknowledgment of customary collective property.341 This has happened either via the 
338  In the Sarayaku case, the Inter-American Court considers Ecuador’s argument, according to which: 
“the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ILO Convention 169 and a wide 
range of collective and comprehensive constitutional rights were implemented as of 1998” (para. 133). 
This means that Ecuador had invoked the implementation of the UNDRIP as proof that it had respected 
the rights of the Kichwa indigenous people.
339  See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, S. James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (11 August 2008), para. 41: “Albeit clearly 
not binding in the same way that a treaty is, the Declaration relates to already existing human rights 
obligations of States, as demonstrated by the work of United Nations treaty bodies and other human rights 
mechanisms, and hence can be seen as embodying to some extent general principles of international law. 
In addition, insofar as they connect with a pattern of consistent international and State practice, some 
aspects of the provisions of the Declaration can also be considered as a reflection of norms of customary 
international law. In any event, as a resolution adopted by the General Assembly with the approval of 
an overwhelming majority of Member States, the Declaration represents a commitment on the part of the 
United Nations and Member States to its provisions, within the framework of the obligations established 
by the United Nations Charter to promote and protect human rights on a non-discriminatory basis” 
(emphasis added).
340  Notable exceptions are represented by China and India. See Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Indigenous 
Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime’ (2004) 30 Queen’s Law Journal 348, at 383. 
Furthermore, some African States are reluctant to recognise the existence of indigenous peoples within 
their societies.
341  On the consolidation of State practice concerning land rights, see Wiessner, ‘Rights and Status of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis’ 1999, at 67-92. This author 
analyses State practice globally, by looking at legal developments in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, 
the US, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, Belize, Guatemala, Japan, India, 
and Papua New Guinea. See also, Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 47-48, on the Mabo v. Queensland 
case, in which the High Court of Australia dismisses the terra nullius doctrine. The same authors, at 
59-74, illustrate State practice in both Latin-America, including Mexico, and North-America, as well 
as Australia, Malaysia, and Philippines; at 80-81, they are concerned with State practice concerning 
participatory rights. See Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward 
the Multicultural State’ 2004, at 38, where the author criticises the institutional settlement in the US, 
where indigenous land rights can be extinguished unilaterally by the Federal State. The same is reported 
by Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples’ 
2006-2007, at 167, and by Göcke 2013, at 101. The latter author specifies that in the US there exists a 
system of “tribal trust land”, which grants indigenous peoples powers that are equivalent to ownership. In 
this author’s analysis, this system satisfies the demands of American Indian tribes and is thus in line with 
international law standards. This is due inter alia to the fact that indigenous land rights, as recognised at 
the international level, are flexible enough to include any form of arrangement that satisfies indigenous 
peoples’ needs. Concerning land rights, it is important to remind that these do not coincide with the 
Western concept of property. Therefore, differentiated legal arrangements can fulfil the implementation 
of these rights at the national level. Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 22-23, list a number of legislative 
and constitutional reforms, as well as national cases that recognise indigenous land rights, in Mexico, 
Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Canada, 
Belize, and South Africa. Constitutional and legislative reforms in Colombia, Panama, Greenland, 
Norway, Finland, and Sweden are also examined by Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 35-38. More 
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adoption of constitutional or legislative measures or in national case law. National practice 
has also converged on the need to ensure to indigenous peoples some form of autonomy 
and participatory rights in national decision-making. Most recently, innovative forms 
of recognising and implementing self-determination have been recognised in Europe, 
such as the Draft Nordic Saami Convention.342 In this process, the UN Declaration 
has indirectly influenced these processes; more overtly, the Declaration has both been 
transposed into national legislation in Bolivia343 and been used as a benchmark for the 
adoption of the IPRA in the Philippines.344 The Declaration has also been relied upon 
by the Supreme Court of Belize, which has inter alia recognised the customary nature of 
indigenous peoples’ rights.345
Notwithstanding practice and opinio juris that may be stimulated by the UN 
Declaration, a last remark on the special nature of international human rights law 
concludes this review over the possible crystallisation of custom in the field of indigenous 
rights. The very telos of human rights instruments is to protect individual rightholders 
and groups from the unilateral dominium of States. In this sense, human rights norms 
aim to limit the unrestricted exercise of States’ sovereign powers on their citizens to 
ensure the respect for human dignity and the corollaries that have developed in human 
on this can also be found in Barelli and others 2011, at 354-355, concerning Brazil, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Philippines, Taiwan, Greenland, and Nicaragua. More recently, see Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘State 
Obligations Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Their Ancestral Lands: Lex Imperfecta’ (2012-
2013) 28 American University International Law Review 1129, who analyses the practice in Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Japan, Kenya, Peru, and Malaysia. At the regional level, see also the Amazonia Declaration of 
1989, made by the Presidents of the State Parties to the Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela), para. 3: “we reiterate our full respect 
for the right of indigenous peoples to have adopted all measures aimed at maintaining and preserving 
the integrity of these human groups, their cultures and their ecological habitats, subject to the exercise 
of that right which is inherent in the sovereignty of each State”. It can be classified as practice also the 
use of ILO Convention 169 into national case law in Latin-American countries. See ILO, Application of 
Convention No. 169 by Domestic and International Courts in Latin America 2009. On the extent to which 
the UNDRIP has been incorporated into national legislation, see Jackie Hartley, Paul Joffe and Jennifer 
Preston, Realizing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and Action 
(Purich Publishing 2010); Elvira Pulitano, Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge 
University Press 2012).
342  On the Draft Nordic Saami Convention, see Mattias Åhrén, Martin Scheinin and John B. Henriksen, 
‘The Nordic Sami Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central 
Provisions’ (2007) 3 Gáldu Čála – Journal of indigenous Peoples Rights 8; Timo Koivurova, ‘The Status 
and Role of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic International Governance’ (2010) 3 The Yearbook of Polar 
Law 169, at 205-207; Grote 2006-2007, at 436-442. More in general on the practice of Scandinavian 
countries related to indigenous peoples’ rights, see Fitzmaurice, ‘Tensions between States and Indigenous 
Peoples over Natural Resources in Light of the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Including Relevant National Legislation and Case-Law)’ 2012, at 244; Else Grete Broderstad, 
‘The Promises and Challenges of Indigenous Self-Determination: The Sami Case’ (2010-2011) 66 
International Journal Canadian Institute of International Affairs 893, at 903.
343  Ley No. 3760, Gaceta Oficial No. 3039 (7 November 2007).
344  See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 25: the draft UNDRIP in 1993 inspired the Filipinos national 
act, IPRA (note 176 supra in this chapter).
345  Supreme Court of Belize, Aurelio Cal 2007, paras. 127, 131 and 132.
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rights treaties. The very purpose of human rights law makes it so that States are not the 
only relevant actors that participate in human rights law formation.346 In light of this, 
when it comes to the formation of customary norms in human rights law, the way in 
which diuturnitas and opinio juris are to be assessed might be evaluated in different terms.
Concerning the interplay between practice and opinio juris, if States’ violation 
of human rights’ norms agreed at the international level were to be taken as the sole 
parameter of customary law-making, the risk would be to nullify the value of human 
rights norms. When human rights standards are both generally affirmed in treaty law and 
in human rights international practice, relying only on States’ misconduct to ascertain 
the customary value of certain human rights standards would run counter the very logics 
of both the rights protected and the mechanisms designed for their protection.347 In this 
sense, some authors argue that opinio juris must weigh more than State practice, when 
it comes to assessing the customary nature of international human rights. This revised 
version of the binary theory on customary law, therefore, proposes in line with the ICJ’s 
judgment in the Nicaragua case that when opinio juris is well affirmed, State practice 
can also be very limited. Moreover, if opinio juris is strong, “there must be evidence 
of sufficient coherent contradicting State practice to deprive a declaration of its legal 
implications”.348
Furthermore, the role of non-State actors in the shaping of human rights norms 
must not be underestimated. In particular, the UN and indigenous representatives have 
played a pivotal role in determining the content of indigenous rights. Equally, it must be 
recognised that the same actors will heavily influence State practice and opinio juris in the 
future. In this sense, the reliance on soft law instruments to develop human rights norms 
on indigenous rights may be already considered as a means to include indigenous peoples 
in the international norm-making process.349
346  See Anaya and Williams Jr. 2001, at 54.
347  Wiessner and Lenzerini 2012, at 27. See ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment (27 June 1986), para. 186: “In 
order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States 
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a 
given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition 
of a new rule”.
348  Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 63. See again Nicaragua v. 
United States of America. In paras. 184-206 of this decision, the ICJ also gives precedence to opinio juris, 
demonstrated mainly by UNGA resolutions. Only once it has established opinio juris, the Court starts 
looking for confirmative practice, which—the Court concludes—can also be very limited.
349  Newman 2013, at 278-280. This author proposes a new methodology for ascertaining customary law 
concerning indigenous peoples’ rights, according to which the formation of customary international law 
must only be judged against opinio juris, thus disregarding State practice. This new theorization would 
be justified by the fact that a State-centric approach would be “at theoretical odds with the very norm at 
issue”, particularly given the legal pluralism that is necessary when approaching indigenous issues. The 
“pluralisation of processes of norm formation” is also closely linked to the diversification of international 
law fields. See Lepard 2010. In Part Five of the book, the author applies his new theory on customary 
law formation to “international rules for allocating income for tax purposes” and human rights law. At 
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Notwithstanding these developments in theory and practice, the ascertainment 
of custom would require an analysis that is not conclusively carried out in this thesis. 
The evolution of human rights treaty practice, as well as the considerations made about 
the UN Declaration of indigenous rights might be used to assess the existence of other 
sources of international law. The rest of this chapter analyses to what extent a general 
principle of self-determination can be derived from indigenous rights and which role 
this principle can play in the interplay between indigenous rights and the protection of 
biodiversity under current international law.
4. From collective rights to self-determination
The link between the rights of indigenous peoples under international human rights law 
and self-determination stems, first, from the telos underlying indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Previous sections have underlined that the recognition of these rights serves the purpose 
of preserving indigenous peoples’ distinct culture, as well as their specific ways of living 
entrenched with land tenure.350 Along the same lines, the right to self-determination 
as recognised in the UN Covenants is centred upon the autonomous determination 
of one people’s status. In this sense, indigenous collective rights and the right to self-
determination are mutually bound to one another by a common underlying purpose.351
An operationalization of indigenous peoples’ rights requires a discussion on self-
determination for two additional reasons.352 First, indigenous peoples have “articulated 
their demands” in this way.353 The introductory chapter of this dissertation has already 
explained why indigenous peoples’ claims are to be taken into account in the reconstruction 
of the legal framework applicable to them.354 Second, although some authors maintain 
8, the author summarises this theory as follows: “A customary international law norm arises when states 
generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative legal principle or 
rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain conduct. This belief constitutes opinio juris, and it is 
sufficient to create a customary law norm. It is not necessary in every case to satisfy a separate “consistent 
state practice” requirement. Rather, state practice can serve as one source of evidence that states believe 
that a particular authoritative legal principle or rule is desirable now or in the near future”.
350  See Anaya, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural 
Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands 
and Resources’ 2005, at 137.
351  See Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, 
at 200: “Self-determination contains all the aspirations of freedom and represents the ideal of a people 
entitled to pursue its own destiny. Regarding territorial rights, because indigenous peoples’ land rights 
are often understood as rights to collective territorial ownership, they are frequently linked to the right 
of peoples to self- determination. In this regard, for many indigenous representatives, self-determination 
appears as the best vehicle to embark upon the recognition of their right to live on their lands”.
352  Northcott 2012, at 75.
353  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 97.
354  See Introduction, section 4. Furthermore, the previous section in this chapter has shown how 
indigenous peoples have influenced the content of indigenous rights in the UN context.
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that the legal principle of self-determination is not applicable to indigenous peoples,355 it 
is argued in the following that self-determination is to be framed as a right attributable 
inter alia to indigenous groups. In contrast with the traditional approach, according to 
which the scope of the right to self-determination should be examined with respect to 
the qualification of people attributable to a given group, the following sections argue that 
the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples can be derived inductively from 
the body of collective rights of indigenous peoples protected under international human 
rights law.
In order to corroborate these claims, the first subsection deals with the origins and 
the established notion of self-determination, while the second unravels the specificities of 
this right when it comes to indigenous peoples. The third subsection explores the extent 
to which the attribution of self-determination to indigenous peoples adds to the debate 
on how indigenous peoples’ rights interact with State sovereignty. This last point is the 
underlying question that hold together the whole section. In this sense, self-determination 
is analysed to the extent it can be relevant to solve the conflict between indigenous rights 
and the sovereignty of States over natural resources, which lies at the basis of the CBD.
4.1. The right to self-determination: origins, content, and emerging trends
Although this subsection does not purport to be exhaustive in presenting the traditional 
content of self-determination, it aims to give an overview of how this right has emerged 
and what is its consolidated content in order to put this research in context. Also, this 
subsection presents emerging trends of scholarly analysis that are relevant to the right of 
self-determination as referred to indigenous peoples.
The first point to be made concerns the legal nature of self-determination, which 
has consolidated from its inclusion in the UN Charter. The Charter was the first binding 
treaty that has included self-determination among the principles upon which “friendly 
relations among nations” should be based.356 In the years following the adoption of the 
355  A further argument is that the logic underlying self-determination is incompatible with the framing 
of the principle within the realm of human rights. The argument goes that while self-determination 
posits itself in direct contradiction with the sovereignty of States, human rights law is a body of law 
that is grounded on this sovereignty. See Ulfstein, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land’ 2004, at 3. 
This approach fails to acknowledge both the inclusion of self-determination in the UN Covenants. 
Furthermore, as shown in this chapter, there is hardly a contradiction between the sovereignty of States 
and the qualifications and limits applicable to this principle. See especially, section 2.
356  Art. 2 and 55 UN Charter. See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 42-
43, where the author highlights that the principle of self-determination boils down to self-government 
and it is more intended as a negative concept excluding secession for minorities, decolonisation, 
democratic regimes, and national purism. The same point is made by Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in 
the International Legal System 2016, at 28-29. On the history of the principle, see also Ian Brownlie, ‘An 
Essay on the History of the Principle of Self-Determination’ in Charles H. Alexandrowicz (ed), Grotian 
Society Papers: Studies in the History of the Law of the Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 1968). Hannum 1990, at 
27 ff., gives account of the evolution of self-determination from a political principle to a right. At 37, this 
author highlights that the right has been applied inconsistently, even in colonial cases. On the affirmation 
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UN Charter and throughout the 1960s, the principle of self-determination has evolved 
in an unexpected way through the decisive adoption of resolutions of the UNGA.357 
Indeed, it is through these resolutions, and in particular resolutions 1514 (XV) of 1960, 
1541 (XV) of 1960,358 and 2625 (XXV) of 1971,359 that self-determination has become 
the legal provision to which actions to “bring a speedy end to colonialism” has been 
anchored. The unexpected turn, however, was not really represented by the qualification 
of self-determination as an anti-colonial principle; instead, the focus on the end-result of 
decolonisation has put an emphasis on statehood that was originally not included in the 
UN Charter.360 
As to the content of the principle, the instrumental use of self-determination for 
decolonisation purposes makes it so that independence has been the most common 
consequence deriving from the exercise of the right. However, the content of the right to 
self-determination goes beyond secession and independence. As highlighted by Cassese, 
external self-determination, which implies independence and is to be attributed to a 
limited number of subjects,361 must be distinguished from internal self-determination, 
which refers instead to the capacity for peoples to determine their destiny within an 
existing State.362 Furthermore, it is important to note that there is a difference between 
the “precept of the norm”, its core, and its “remedial prescriptions” that may vary 
depending on the context and on the subjects that exercise self-determination. In this 
sense, secession and independence would represent only one of the multiple remedial 
options to be activated when self-determination is violated. 363 
of this principle as an international custom, see Abi-Saab 1987, at 391-399.
357  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 44. Relevant early resolutions 
are: UNGA Res. 545 (VI), UN Doc. A/RES/545(VI) (5 February 1952) (Inclusion in the International 
Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an article relating to the right of peoples to self-determination), 
637 (VII), UN Doc. A/RES/637(VII) (16 December 1952) (The right of peoples and nations to self-
determination), and 837 (IX), UN Doc. A/RES/837(IX) (14 December 1954) (Recommendations 
concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination).
358  Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to 
transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter, UNGA Res. 1541 (XV), UN Doc. 
A/RES/1541(XV) (15 December 1960).
359  Indeed, the scope of this resolution is much broader than the need to end colonialism, and mirrors 
the letter of common Art. 1 of the UN Covenants. See Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 
2002, at 91-97.
360  See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 45. See also, Hannum 1990, 
at 46-47, who argues that the right to self-determination is traditionally limited to colonial peoples so 
that self-determination is in fact attributed to States rather than peoples. This is due to the fact that self-
determination needs to be balanced against territorial integrity.
361  Entire populations of sovereign States, colonial populations, and populations living under foreign 
military occupation. See e.g., Cassese, International Law 2005, at 61.
362  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 352 ff., the author explores internal 
self-determination as applied to minorities.
363  Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 103-104. The author emphasises that 
self-determination does not coincide with independence, which is mainly an attribute of statehood, 
while self-determination is a universal principle. On the same vein, see James Crawford, ‘The Right of 
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This research does not aim to fully account for the issue of external self-determination 
since this remedial aspect is not relevant to the puzzle of the interaction between States’ 
powers and indigenous peoples’ rights over land and natural resources. In fact, the main 
objective of this chapter is to elaborate an interpretative approach for the interaction 
of parallel rights when coexistence between States and indigenous peoples is in act or 
potentially relevant. Notwithstanding the limited applicability to indigenous peoples of 
external self-determination,364 the potential attainment of independence would wipe out 
Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples’ 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2001), at 66: “self-determination and the cognate right to democratic 
self-government…are critical standards; they do not themselves determine particular institutions or 
outcomes. They can be used to disqualify institutions or outcomes which are evidently inconsistent with 
self-determination or democratic rule, and to justify attempts to remedy them”. This argument is also 
implied in Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995 when he talks of a possible 
evolution and broadening of the principle, as well as when it analyses the implications of external self-
determination in chapter 4. See also, Ian Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ 
in James Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford University Press 1988), at 6; Northcott 2012, at 75; 
Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ 2011, 
at 139; Mauro Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 
(2011) 13 International Community Law Review 413, at 414; Gerry J. Simpson, ‘The Diffusion of 
Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age’ (1996) 32 Stanford Journal of International 
Law 255, at 258, 275, and 285; Marco Pertile, ‘Self-Determination Reduced to Silence: Some Critical 
Remarks on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’ in Maurizio Arcari and Louis Balmond (eds), 
Questions de droit international autour de l’avis consultatif de la Cour internartional de justice sur le Kosovo - 
International Law Issues Arising from the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Kosovo (Giuffré 
2011), at 120-125.
364  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 104: Anaya recognises that “the remedial 
regime developing in the context of indigenous peoples is not one that favors the formation of new 
states”; Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 131. See also, Erica-
Irene A. Daes, ‘An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination and the United 
Nations’ (2008) 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 7, at 23-24: as emerges from the drafting 
history of the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples have no right to secession. The debates of the possibility for 
indigenous peoples to exercise external self-determination are rich and touch upon various aspects of this 
right. On the applicability of remedial secession to indigenous peoples, see Martin Scheinin, ‘Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ [2004] available 
at http://irlibuwoca/cgi/viewcontentcgi?article=1249&context=aprci, at 9-10: after describing the criteria 
elaborated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re Secession of Quebec (20 August 1998, (1998) 
2 SCR 217), the author argues that there are forms of external self-determination other than secession, 
for instance the right for indigenous peoples to participate in negotiations taking place in international 
fora. On remedial secession, see also Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or 
Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 2011, at 423, and Northcott 2012, at 83. On the justifications for granting 
indigenous peoples with external self-determination, see Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-Determination 
and Indigenous Peoples’ 1993. At 47, the author argues that it is a question of decolonisation although 
not in overseas territory; at 48-49, he concedes that there are limitations in recognising external self-
determination to indigenous peoples. Among these, international law is made by States for States; the 
principle of territorial integrity must be preserved; and uncontrolled secession could jeopardise the 
maintenance of peace. For these reasons, at 50, he concludes that indigenous peoples do not have a 
right to external self-determination. See also, Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 33-34, who maintains 
that the fight for independence is still a viable option for some communities, depending on their special 
circumstances and the history of their struggle. At 39: “Armed revolution and uprisings still remain 
viable forms of struggle for some indigenous peoples, especially in Asia”. In this sense, the failure to 
recognise indigenous peoples and their claims may lead to violent clashes. At 40: in any case, the option 
of “independent statehood…should not be barred”. Finally, see Pereira and Gough 2013, at 470, who 
purport that there is no reason why indigenous peoples should not be recognised a right to external self-
determination, given that they are peoples subject to oppression and subjugation.
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the possibility for the sovereignty of States and indigenous self-determination to interact. 
Therefore, this hypothesis falls beyond the scope of this research. Furthermore, it needs 
to be highlighted that independence is not particularly relevant in practical terms since 
indigenous peoples do not generally seek to secede from the States of which they are 
citizens.365
Another scholarly conundrum is the issue of defining who are the peoples entitled to 
exercise the right to self-determination. Although in the practice the most common end-
form of self-determination coincides with statehood,366 the right to self-determination is a 
rule that goes beyond the State.367 This interpretation emerges clearly from the codification 
of the right to self-determination in common Article 1 of the UN Covenants.368 This 
article significantly reads, “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination”. Any 
attempts to circumscribe the scope of this provision to colonial peoples have failed from 
the outset. India had made a reservation to Article 1, interpreting the term “peoples” as 
only encompassing entire populations under foreign domination. France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands, however, strongly opposed this restrictive interpretation, by appealing 
365  See Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘The Right to Self-Determination: Meaning and Scope’ in Nazila Ghanea 
and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick 
Thornberry (Martinus Nijhoff 2005), at 32-33: secession is not an issue because indigenous peoples’ 
understanding of self-determination does not imply statehood; Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights 
under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 220; Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A 
Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2008, at 1160; Pereira 
and Gough 2013, at 468. See also, Robert T. Coulter, ‘The Law of Self-Determination and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law 
and Foreign Affairs 1, at 13: the author reports that there were no secession claims in the negotiation of the 
UNDRIP concerning the right to self-determination. See Sharon H. Venne, ‘Self-Determination Issues 
in Canada: A First Person’s Overview’ in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: 
International Perspectives (Macmillan Press 1996), at 292, where she explains that indigenous peoples 
in Canada are not claiming independence. This is confirmed by Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Reconciling Five 
Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law’ 
in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press 2001), at 91.
366  On the link between self-determination and statehood, see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-
Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 241. According to this author, self-determination buttresses national patriotism, while at 
the same time being a challenge to States.
367  Hurst Hannum, ‘Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era’ in Donald Clark and Robert 
Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: International Perspectives (MacMillan Press 1996), at 27-28.
368  On the history of the inclusion of common Art. 1 into the UN Covenants, see Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 47 ff. The inclusion of self-determination was a 
result of the diplomatic effort of the Soviet countries backed by developing countries. The author delves 
into the meaning of this right, by highlighting the nature of “continuing right”, that is a permanent right 
that “does not end with independence” (at 54-55). The nature of continuing right has been challenged 
by the subsequent practice for the external self-determination of colonial peoples, where the creation of 
an independent State satisfied the conditions for the realisation of self-determination (at 73). Regarding 
internal self-determination, the continuity of the right still holds (at 101). See also, Pereira and Gough 
2013, at 459. These authors interpret the inclusion of self-determination in the UN Covenants as an 
element of State practice confirming the fact that permanent sovereignty must be referred to peoples. 
However, this argument is ill founded since sovereignty is a specific concept related to States. In this 
sense, it would be better to frame the formulation of self-determination in the UN Covenants as a 
practice that reinforces the argument that self-determination is to be attributed to all peoples.
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inter alia to the “clear language of the provision”.369 Therefore, Article 1 has been conceived 
from the very beginning as a right that applies to all peoples.370
Although the scope of the right is sufficiently broad to go beyond colonial peoples, 
it should not be inferred that national minorities can be considered peoples under Article 
1. In identifying the categories of peoples within the meaning of Article 1, Cassese 
traditionally refers to entire populations of sovereign States, colonial populations, and 
populations living under foreign military occupation, thus firmly excluding minorities 
from the realm of de lege lata.371 This reading, however, is warranted if self-determination 
is intended mainly as conferring a right to independence. Indeed, Cassese recognises de 
lege ferenda the need to combine self-determination with the protection of minorities 
through a renewed emphasis on internal self-determination in an attempt for States to 
“compensate past injustices”.372
Indeed, an argument in favour of self-determination for all peoples comes from the 
need to trace back the right to the underlying values of the principle, which are equality 
and legitimacy.373 According to Anaya, the principle of self-determination has two main 
aspects. First, the “constitutive aspect” requires that the formation of any government 
reflects the will of peoples. In this sense, although a particular result is not mandated—
e.g., a democratic form of government—participation in the formation of government 
should be ensured. Second, the “ongoing aspect” highlights the importance that the 
constituted government should be instrumental for peoples’ life and development. 
Accordingly, peoples must be able to make choices about their destiny.374 In light of 
369  Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 32. See also, Pereira and Gough 2013, at 467, note 95.
370  See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 29. See also, Christian Tomuschat (ed) Modern Law of Self-
Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 1993), at 2. However, at 16, not all peoples in the ethnic sense should 
be entitled to self-determination intended as a right to secession because this would entail disruptive 
consequences. In his view a proceduralisation of self-determination could be a solution. Crawford in 
Alston 2001 at 27 ff.: peoples “in general sense”, not limited to colonial peoples. Beyond a restricted 
colonial interpretation of self-determination, see Gilbert 2002, at 327 ff.
371  See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 59-62. His reading is based on 
a comprehensive interpretation of the Covenant, which recognises separate rights to individuals belonging 
to minorities, and travaux préparatoires. See also, Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International 
Legal System 2016, at 34, according to which decolonisation has contributed to an understanding of self-
determination as a right attributed to peoples other than national populations (“populations of territories 
that had not yet attained independence”). Interestingly, this argument was espoused already by Abi-Saab 
1987, at 407: “la réclamation du droit à l’autodétermination n’est plus nécessairement une réaction, mais 
peut être également une demande initiale pour la reconnaissance de l’identité collective du groupe, et 
pour sa protection et sa préservation dans le cadre plus large de l’État composé…Cette idée gagne du 
terrain dans le domaine des droits de l’homme, par exemple pour ce qui est des « peuples autochtones » 
et autres groupes vulnérables. Mais cela s’accompagne, dans ces cas, de la recherche d’autres issues que 
l’indépendance”.
372  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 352-353. In the eyes of Cassese, 
the added value of this approach would be the recognition of group rights. Plus, it would give minorities 
enough leeway to choose the way in which self-determination should be realised (“autonomy, regional 
self-government, participation in the national decision-making”, at 352).
373  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 98 ff.
374  Ibid., at 104-105.
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this, it is possible to conclude that self-determination cannot be a right whose exercise is 
limited to the peoples that can identify with a State.375
In contrast, States are only one part of the story both since the State-form is not 
necessarily the ultimate result of self-determination and because the principle of self-
determination responds to the need to account for diversified societies. In this sense, 
the “challenge of diversity”376 from within the State can be accommodated through 
internal self-determination. At the same time, diversity in the international society can 
be accounted for by recognising that peoples, together with States, should be involved 
in the definition of the principle of self-determination.377 In the words of Knop, “the 
practice of self-determination thus becomes a struggle for inclusion, not only a people’s 
struggle to become part of the world of sovereign states, but their struggle to incorporate 
their own story into international law”.378 In this sense, self-determination is not simply 
“a norm to be applied, but an opportunity to expose the exclusions and the inequalities 
of international law”.379
In this light, this section proposes a reconceptualization of the right to self-
determination that is in line with indigenous peoples’ needs. The starting point is again 
common Article 1 of the UN Covenants. By virtue of this provision, not only can 
peoples “freely determine their political status”, but they also have some form of so-called 
economic self-determination. Article 1(2) reads:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.
Although the right freely to dispose of resources seems to be limited by international 
economic cooperation, it is reiterated in Article 47 ICCPR and Article 25 ICESCR, which 
both insist on the central importance to preserve “the inherent right of all peoples to 
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources”.380 As a consequence, 
control over natural resources is a central aspect of self-determination, which must not be 
separated from the political component under Article 1(1).381
375  Ibid., at 105. For a more recent reformulations of this argument, see Anaya, International Human 
Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 60: statehood is not the essence of self-determination, which 
instead is an attribute of peoples with freedom and equality at its core.
376  Knop 2002, at 2.
377  See ibid., at 3 and 8. 
378  Ibid., at 13.
379  Ibid., at 14.
380  Concerning the ambiguity of the double formulation of economic self-determination, see Gilbert, 
‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 321, 323-324. 
On the drafting history of Art. 1(2), see Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, 
at 49: the proposal of this article came from Chile and was backed by Soviet and developing countries.
381  Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 321. 
Chapter 2
162
Control over natural resources is the precondition for the exercise of meaningful 
internal self-determination.382 As for the content of economic self-determination, the 
traditional interpretation is that there is a right for peoples to decide how their governments 
should use the resources, and a corresponding duty for the State to use the resources in 
a way that is not detrimental to its peoples.383 However, this interpretation falls into 
the trap of equating peoples with governments, and ultimately States. Indeed, self-
determination is a right that goes beyond States. Therefore, the exercise of economic self-
determination on the part of peoples may also take other forms than the mere delegation 
of powers to national governments. In fact, the acknowledgment that economic self-
determination may be exercised directly by peoples is one of the more pressing challenges 
to the permanent sovereignty of States.384
Within the framework of the present research, the conflict between States’ powers 
and economic self-determination as attributable to peoples presents some specific 
nuances. Indigenous peoples’ powers over natural resources could conflict with States’ 
permanent sovereignty not only because these insist on the same resources, but also in 
the sense that indigenous powers might impair the general duty of the State to exercise 
its sovereignty over resources in a way that is beneficial to the whole population. In this 
sense, one aspect of this dilemma is the potential conflict between an identified group, 
that of indigenous peoples, and the public interest.385 In the case of the exploitation 
of natural resources, the conflict between the general interest and indigenous peoples’ 
rights might be less salient, since in the practice the concession over the exploitation of 
natural resources to foreign companies rarely, if ever, benefits the whole population of 
a State.386 Different considerations apply when conservation measures are concerned, 
since the protection of the environment is more generally recognised as having diffused 
benefits for the society at large.
The conceptual difficulties linked to the possibility that the right to self-
determination of a given group may trump the public interest can be also traced back 
See also, Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination’ 
in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: International Perspectives (Macmillan 
Press 1996), at 74-75; Pertile, ‘Economic Self-Determination in the 21st Century: Tracing the Origin 
and the Evolution of a Chamaleonic Concept’ 2016, at 390; M.K. Nawaz, ‘The Meaning and Range of 
the Principle of Self-Determination’ (1965) 14 Duke Law Journal 82, at 94.
382  Daes report (2004), para. 17.
383  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 55-57.
384  See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 40. These authors argue that one of the main difficulties is the 
challenge that indigenous peoples’ rights pose to the fiction according to which self-determination, apart 
from cases of decolonisation, can only be exercised within the State and by the State.
385  See Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ 1988, at 7, where the author 
accounts for the possibility of a conflict between collective interests. When such a case occurs, it is 
important that the differential treatment of some groups is not disproportionate, and thus in violation of 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination (at 9-10).
386  On this point, see Schrijver 1997, at 9. The author recalls that the way in which profits should be 
distributed nationally is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. 
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to the debate on the recognition of collective rights.387 In this respect, one of the most 
contentious elements is the fact that group rights may prevail over individual rights.388 In 
contrast with this argument, it is easy to identify reasons why the recognition of group 
rights is fundamental under certain circumstances. Indeed, there might be cases where 
some collective needs cannot be satisfied through the protection of individual rights, 
such as when indigenous peoples’ interests are involved. In this case, the recognition 
of collective rights is instrumental for the enjoyment of individual rights.389 It seems, 
therefore, that the main difficulty with recognising self-determination as belonging to 
indigenous peoples lies in the issues related to the recognition of collective rights over 
resources since this recognition reverberates on the capacity of the State to regulate the 
management of national natural resources. This is due to the fact that ultimately “self-
determination is about the relation between state and community”.390
4.2. The right to self-determination of indigenous peoples
In the previous subsection, self-determination has been framed as a right applicable to 
387  On the theoretical foundations of recognising group rights, see Peter Jones, ‘Human Rights, 
Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 80, at 84-85: based on Raz’ 
definition of what is a right, collective rights are founded on the idea that the collection of the individual 
interests of group’s members is sufficient to justify the imposition of the duties correlated to a right on 
another subject. Along these lines, the rights of minority groups sharing a common identity are morally 
comparable to those of groups that only share a contingent interest. One of the differences between the 
two groups could be that the interests vested in a minority group might not easily exist if vested on a single 
minority member. At 86 ff., Jones presents another conception of group rights, the so-called “corporate 
conception”, where the moral justification for collective rights does not lie on the individual members’ 
interests, but on the group as such, so that “the holder of the right is the group conceived as a single, 
integral entity”. According to this conception, the identity of a group becomes crucial and precedes the 
existence of corporate rights. In the view of Jones, corporate rights may not be limited by individual 
human rights simply because they belong to two separate conceptions of rights (at 93). I personally do 
not agree with the conclusion that corporate right might represent a greater danger for the individual 
members of a group. In my view, members of a group would always retain their individual rights. The 
divide between corporate rights and individual rights is artificial, because the issue of identity-sharing is 
not simply based on nationhood and pre-defined ethnical characteristics. Identity is a complex notion 
that may encompass a variety of significances even in a corporate conception of group rights. See also, 
Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ 1988, at 15-16, where the author claims 
that group rights should be treated as a unitary issue without differentiating between peoples, indigenous 
peoples and minorities.
388  Duruigbo 2006, at 57-58. See also, Philip Alston, People’s Rights (Oxford University Press 2001), at 
269; Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, ‘Self-Determination and Cultural Rights’ in Francesco Francioni and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), at 41-42; Wiessner, ‘The State and 
Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 5/2012’ 2013, at 1358-1359. 
This preoccupation is also reflected in the declarations of vote on the occasion of the adoption of the 
UNDRIP. See UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 and A/61/PV.108.
389  See Duruigbo 2006, at 59-60. See also, HRC, General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to self-
determination) (13 March 1984), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), para. 1: “The right of self-
determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the effective 
guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those 
rights”.
390  Kingsbury, ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in 
International and Comparative Law’ 2001, at 92.
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all peoples, whose precise content depends on the subjects involved and the claims to be 
considered. Self-determination has primarily meant independent statehood for colonial 
peoples. Internal self-determination has been generally accorded to the populations of 
sovereign States. The principle, however, is evolving so that new subjects can claim self-
determination under new conditions.391 Although identifying a limited number of peoples 
entitled to external self-determination, Cassese has already in 1995 acknowledged that a 
customary rule on the internal dimension of self-determination is developing for some 
groups, including indigenous peoples.392 Indeed, the principle of self-determination has 
fundamentally changed since its inclusion in the UN Charter; there is no reason why it 
cannot continue to evolve “in response to the changing needs of the time”.393
Far from a limited account of self-determination based on the divide between 
internal and external dimensions of the principle, indigenous peoples have a clear vision 
of what self-determination implies for them. Self-determination is first seen as a remedial 
provision to mitigate the on-going effects of the loss of sovereignty suffered by indigenous 
peoples during the first wave of colonisation and the establishment of sovereign States.394 
Second, self-determination should be attributable to indigenous peoples by virtue of 
the need to preserve indigenous cultural distinctiveness.395 Third, self-determination is 
considered as both a collective right and the necessary precondition for the realisation 
of the other indigenous rights.396 In this respect, internal self-determination in the form 
of self-government only represents one of the steps to be taken for indigenous peoples 
to attain full self-determination.397 Fourth, indigenous claims to self-determination are 
fundamentally based on the awareness that common Article 1 of the UN Covenants 
391  On the argument that self-determination is evolving, see Alfredsson, ‘Different Forms of and Claims 
to the Right of Self-Determination’ 1996, at 79. See also Pertile, ‘Self-Determination Reduced to Silence: 
Some Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’ 2011.
392  Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 103. See also Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 1990, at 95 ff. The author 
recognises that internal self-determination in the form of autonomy could be attributable to indigenous 
peoples, although it is not supported by State practice.
393  Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 2011, at 
435.
394  See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 17. These authors suggest that self-determination is needed to 
“rectify” a “historical wrong”, namely colonisation and assimilation. See also Pertile, ‘Self-Determination 
Reduced to Silence: Some Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’ 2011, at 121-122, 
where he refers to self-determination as an emergency clause.
395  Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 9.
396  Ibid., at 28-29. See also, Tobin 2014, at xix, where the author argues that self-determination is 
both a precondition for and the result of the respect of indigenous customary law. At 33 and 38, Tobin 
lists a number of prerogatives that derive from the way in which indigenous peoples see their rights to 
self-determination: self-government within their territory, including establishing their own institutions; 
negotiation processes with the State to redefine their status; the “establishment of mechanisms for joint 
control” with the State; a clear division of competences with the State; the “establishment of conflict 
resolution mechanisms”; the possibility to enter into relations with other indigenous peoples living in 
other States.
397  Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 38.
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equally applies to all peoples. Accordingly, indigenous peoples “are not asking for special 
rights”.398
In this sense, the argument that the international norm on self-determination 
is evolving cannot go so far as to imply that there should be a special notion of self-
determination specifically tailored on indigenous peoples.399 On the contrary, the norm 
on self-determination as applied to indigenous peoples represents a new piece to be added 
to the general puzzle of self-determination in international law.
The argument that indigenous peoples are beneficiaries of self-determination 
under general international law brings back the problematic issue of the definition of 
peoples under common Article 1 of the UN Covenants. There are several reasons why 
indigenous groups should be identified as peoples.400 The first reason has to do with 
the deprivation of indigenous sovereignty during the colonial past. As put by Sanders, 
identifying indigenous communities simply as national minorities would wipe out their 
colonial history.401 Second, and perhaps most importantly, a minority approach to the 
indigenous question would exclude the territorial aspect of indigenous identities, which 
is fundamental for their cultural integrity.402 Along the same lines, minorities are not 
entitled to collective rights in the practice of human rights bodies. Collective land tenure, 
however, lies at the basis of indigenous identity. Third, the identification of indigenous 
398  Ibid., at 32. “Claims to the contrary are discriminatory, racist and perpetuate further inequalities 
among peoples” (at 33).
399  This is what some States, such as the UK and implicitly India, claim. See UN Doc. A/61/PV.107, at 
21 and A/61/PV.108, at 2. Several other States, however, highlight that indigenous self-determination 
must be exercised in accordance with international law, thus implicitly recognising that the same rules 
apply to indigenous self-determination. See UN Doc. A/61/PV.107, at 22 (Norway), 23 (Jordan and 
Liechtenstein), and A/61/PV.108, at 8 (Guatemala): “The Declaration does not create new rights, but 
reaffirms the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination so that they can freely determine their 
own economic, political, social and cultural development”.
400  See Erica-Irene A. Daes, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to “Self-Determination” in the 
Contemporary World Order’ in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds), Self-Determination: 
International Perspectives (Macmillan Press 1996), at 53: this is what Daes defines as “belated State-
building”. In other words, since indigenous peoples could not take part in the process of State-building, 
due to their marginalisation and assimilation, they should now be able to negotiate their status within 
the States, as a form of “belated State-building”. At 51, the author also expresses the view that self-
determination should apply in equal terms also to indigenous peoples since they are fully peoples in light 
of their cultural distinctiveness. On the interpretation of common Art. 1 (ICCPR and ICESCR), see 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 103: the term “peoples” should be “interpreted 
according to their plain meaning”. See also, Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 
2009, at 62-63. This author makes the general point that, although in the UNDRIP human rights are 
specifically construed as attributes of indigenous peoples, they derive from more general rights already 
protected in human rights treaties. This means that the UNDRIP “seeks to accomplish what should 
have been accomplished without it: the application of universal human rights principles in a way that 
appreciates not just the humanity of indigenous individuals but that also values the bonds of community 
they form”. This argument is in line with the point that self-determination is a universal human right 
applicable to indigenous peoples.
401  Douglas Sanders, ‘Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ in Christian Tomuschat (ed), Modern 
Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 1993), at 75.
402  Ibid.
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groups as peoples must be read in light of the definition issue.403 Self-identification has 
been recognised as the general standard under international law to tell apart indigenous 
groups from other communities. Indeed, self-identification has both an internal and an 
external dimension. While this standard implies that the decision on the membership 
of indigenous communities is to be taken by the community itself,404 similarly the 
identification of a group as indigenous must be done by the community itself. In 
this sense, indigenous peoples are those who define themselves as such.405 Fourth, the 
argument that self-determination should not apply to indigenous peoples because it is 
a rule that did not exist when indigenous peoples were deprived of their sovereignty is 
untenable.406 In fact, this norm did apply to colonial situations that had been created well 
before self-determination as a legal norm came into existence.407
While self-determination can, at least formally, be applicable to indigenous 
peoples,408 it is important to look at the international practice to see to what extent 
this norm, and in particular Article 1 of the UN Covenant, has found application with 
regards to indigenous claims.
The practice in human rights law about the direct application of the right to self-
determination to indigenous peoples has been mixed. With regard to the decisions of 
human rights treaty bodies, the right of self-determination has been either deemed not 
subject to review or not upheld in the final decision.409 Most recently, however, self-
403  See Introduction, section 3.1.
404  In partial contrast with this argument, see Lovelace case.
405  This notwithstanding, Wiessner and Lenzerini 2010, at 7, maintain that clearer definitional criteria 
should be established to ensure more effectiveness in the implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
406  This argument is voiced by Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel 
Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples’ 2006-2007, at 174.
407  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 83: self-determination has already been 
applied in spite of the “law contemporaneous” to colonial situations. In the same vein, Pertile, ‘Self-
Determination Reduced to Silence: Some Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’ 
2011, at 110, highlights that self-determination is to be considered an “emergency principle”, whose 
relevance emerges any time either the legal system is not sufficiently regulating a given phenomenon 
or the factual situation is so exceptional that existing rules would produce an unjust outcome. In the 
case of indigenous peoples, the exceptional situation would be represented by the unprecedented 
marginalisation of these communities and their level of oppression. This argument would also be in line 
with Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ 1994, 
at 262.
408  In this sense, see also Dam-de Jong 2015, at 62, who argues that the notion of peoples is “a dynamic 
concept that can be applied to different groups, depending on the context and the particular right that is 
invoked”.
409  Examples of the first trend are the decisions of the Human Rights Committee. The monitoring 
body of the ICCPR has reiterated that it only has mandate to review individual complaints under the 
Optional Protocol. Since self-determination is a collective right, its application cannot be reviewed by 
the Human Rights Committee. See Kitok v. Sweden, para. 6.3; Lubicon case, para. 13.3; J.G.A. Diergaardt 
(late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, para. 10.3; Apirana Mahuika case, 
para. 7.6. See also, General Comment 23, para 3.1: “The Covenant draws a distinction between the right 
to self-determination and the rights protected under article 27. The former is expressed to be a right 
belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the Covenant. Self-determination 
is not a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, relates to rights 
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determination has been significantly used as a parameter to assess States’ compliance with 
indigenous peoples’ rights in the conclusions adopted on States by the Human Rights 
Committee and the CESCR.410 Therefore, these reports are in line with the conclusion 
conferred on individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal rights conferred 
on individuals, in Part III of the Covenant and is cognizable under the Optional Protocol.” As for the 
second trend, see Maya v. Belize, paras. 55 and 154, where the Commission has not followed suit from 
the applicants’ invocation of a right to self-determination.
410  See HRC, Concluding observations on Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add105 (7 April 1999), 
para. 8: “The Committee notes that, as the State party acknowledged, the situation of the aboriginal 
peoples remains “the most pressing human rights issue facing Canadians”. In this connection, the 
Committee is particularly concerned that the State party has not yet implemented the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). With reference to the conclusion by RCAP 
that without a greater share of lands and resources institutions of aboriginal self-government will 
fail, the Committee emphasizes that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples 
must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that they may not be deprived of 
their own means of subsistence (art. 1, para. 2). The Committee recommends that decisive and urgent 
action be taken towards the full implementation of the RCAP recommendations on land and resource 
allocation. The Committee also recommends that the practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights be 
abandoned as incompatible with article 1 of the Covenant” (emphasis added); Concluding observations on 
Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add112 (1 November 1999), para. 17; Concluding observations on 
Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR(C/79/Add109 (27 July 1999), para. 19: “Appropriate measures should also 
be taken to increase their participation in the country’s institutions and the exercise of the right to self-
determination”; Concluding observations on Australia, UN Doc. A/55/40 Vol. I (24 July 2000), paras. 
498-528; Concluding observations on Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (24 April 2002), para. 15: 
“The Committee is concerned at the limited extent to which the Sami Parliament can have a significant 
role in the decision-making process on issues affecting the traditional lands and economic activities of 
the indigenous Sami people, such as projects in the fields of hydroelectricity, mining and forestry, as well 
as the privatization of land (arts. 1, 25 and 27 of the Covenant)”; Concluding observations on Finland, 
UN Doc CCPR/CO/82/FIN (2 December 2004), para. 17; Concluding observations on Canada, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/CA/CO/5 (20 April 2006), para. 8: “The Committee, while noting with interest 
Canada’s undertakings towards the establishment of alternative policies to extinguishment of inherent 
aboriginal rights in modern treaties, remains concerned that these alternatives may in practice amount 
to extinguishment of aboriginal rights (arts. 1 and 27)”; Concluding observations on Norway, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5 (25 April 2006), para. 5; Concluding observations on United States, UN Doc. 
CCPWC/USA/Q/3/CRP.4 (10-28 July 2006), para. 37; Concluding observation on Chile: Addendum 
2009, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5/Add.1 (22 January 2009), para. 19. See Scheinin 2004, at 11, 
as for the relevance of Art. 1(2) in the case of Australia. See also CESCR, Concluding observations on 
the Russian Federation, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.94, paras. 11 and 39. On the practice of the HRC 
and CESCR on this point, see Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, 
at 98-100. Concerning State practice on the protection of self-determination for indigenous peoples, 
see Art. 2 Mexican Constitution, as amended in 2007, available at https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Mexico_2007.pdf (last accessed October 2016). This right comprises the preferential access 
to natural resources, although under certain conditions, as well as the right to the preservation of the 
living environment. See also, Art. 2 Bolivian Constitution, available at https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf: “free determination, consisting of the right to autonomy, self-government, 
their culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their territorial entities” (last 
accessed October 2016); Section 13 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act in the Philippines, available at http://
www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ph/ph083en.pdf (last accessed October 2016): “The State recognizes 
the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to self-governance and self-determination and respects the integrity of 
their values, practices and institutions. Consequently, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs 
to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. On this point, see Doyle 2015, at 
119, note 145. Furthermore, on State practice, it is useful to look also at the declarations of vote in 
connection with the adoption of the UNDRIP (A/61/PV.107). Sweden (at 24) has declared it recognizes 
self-determination in national law through national recognition of Sami as people. Sweden also explicitly 
recognizes that “[t]he political discussion on self-determination cannot be separated from the question 
of land rights”. However, Swedish legislation conceive indigenous land rights as simply rights to use in 
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that self-determination under general international law applies to indigenous peoples. 
African States have also declined indigenous self-determination in more concrete terms, 
as comprising 
the full participation in national affairs, the right to local self-government, the 
right to recognition so as to be consulted in the drafting of laws and programs 
concerning them, to a recognition of their structures and traditional ways of 
living as well as the freedom to preserve and promote their culture.411
Furthermore, Article 1 of the UN Covenants has served as an interpretative criterion 
for the application of other rights, such as minority cultural rights under Article 27 of the 
ICCPR.412 In looser terms, a reference to the substance of self-determination has been 
derived from the application of a right to development to the Endorois people of Kenya, 
under the African Charter. In this sense, the right to choose among forms of development 
is seen as upholding the very substance of the right to self-determination.413 Indeed, the 
Inter-American Court has been more explicit in using the right to self-determination as 
qualifying the obligations of Suriname to recognise indigenous land rights.414 In light 
of the above, it can be concluded first that States are increasingly discussing indigenous 
issues under the rubric of Article 1 of the UN Covenants.415 Second, self-determination 
in the context of indigenous rights is not only relevant with respect to its prescriptive 
content, but also and foremost for its interpretative nature as a general principle. Section 
5 further discusses the extent to which this interpretative role is relevant to this research.
relation to properties held by third parties. Mexico (at 23) has recalled Art. 2 of its Constitution. Norway 
(at 22) has made reference to the Sami Parliament. 
411  Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, para. 27.
412  See J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, para. 10.3: 
“the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, 
in particular articles 25, 26 and 27”. See also, Apirana Mahuika case, para. 3.
413  Endorois case, para. 298. See Dersso 2006, at 362-364. According to Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status 
in the International Legal System 2016, at 108, Ogoni constitute a people for the purposes of international 
law due to their control over land and resources.
414  Saramaka case, para. 93: “Suriname’s domestic legislation does not recognize a right to communal 
property of members of its tribal communities, and it has not ratified ILO Convention 169. Nevertheless, 
Suriname has ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The CESCR has interpreted common 
Article 1 of said instruments as being applicable to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, by virtue of the 
right of indigenous peoples to self- determination recognized under said Article 1, they may “freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development”, and may “freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources” so as not to be “deprived of [their] own means of subsistence”. Pursuant to Article 29(b) of 
the American Convention, this Court may not interpret the provisions of Article 21 of the American 
Convention in a manner that restricts its enjoyment and exercise to a lesser degree than what is recognized 
in said covenants. This Court considers that the same rationale applies to tribal peoples due to the similar 
social, cultural, and economic characteristics they share with indigenous peoples (supra paras. 80-86)” 
(emphasis added). See also, Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 122. The Inter-American Commission in the 
Maya v. Belize report interprets indigenous rights in light of the “principle of self-determination” (para. 
154).
415  Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 
2007, at 173.
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Concerning the instruments dedicated to indigenous rights, while the ILO 
Convention 169 has excluded “any implications” connected to the term “peoples”,416 
the UN Declaration on indigenous rights has explicitly incorporated the right to self-
determination in Article 3. This provision almost literally mirrors common Article 1 of the 
UN Covenants,417 the only difference being the subjects entitled to self-determination: 
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”. The very inclusion of this provision in the UN Declaration is a historical 
achievement. Indeed, the inclusion of self-determination has been subject to heated 
debates in the negotiations leading up to the final text of the Declaration. The right 
was first introduced in the text of the Declaration by indigenous peoples representatives 
elaborating a draft within the WGIP.418 After the final text had been adopted, the 
recognition of a right to self-determination was one of the main reasons why Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the US initially rejected the Declaration, and several other 
States abstained in the vote within the UNGA.419
A significant novelty in the UN Declaration is that, as emerges from the 
negotiations,420 the right to self-determination is qualified by Article 4 on the right 
416  Art. 1(3) ILO Convention 169: “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed 
as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law”. 
See Scheinin 2004, at 8. The author argues that this saving clause is meant to exclude that tribal groups 
that are included in the scope of the Convention but do not qualify as peoples may benefit from the 
rights belonging exclusively to peoples. However logical, this reasoning can be disproved in light of the 
preparatory works of the Convention, as well as the fact that the ILO Convention does not contain a 
right to self-determination.
417  UNDRIP preambular paragraph 16 makes reference to the UN Covenants. See Tauli-Corpuz and 
Cariño 2004, at 29-30. These authors make the argument that, since the formulation of Art. 3 is almost 
the same as that of the Covenants, it can be inferred that “indigenous peoples are included in the category 
of “all peoples””.
418  See Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 2011, 
at 416: the author shows the centrality in the negotiations of self-determination for indigenous peoples. 
See also Daes, ‘An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination and the United 
Nations’ 2008.
419  UN Doc. A/61/PV.107. On the history of the negotiations about the right to self-determination in 
the UNDRIP, see Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ 1993, Ch. 3. 
See also, Errico, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Is Adopted: An Overview’ 
2007; Stefan Oeter, ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples in International Law Revisited - From 
Non-Discrimination to Self-Determination’ in Holger P. Hestermeyer and others (eds), Coexistence, 
Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Martinus Nijhoff 2012), at 485-490. On 
the contrary votes and abstentions to the final text of the UNDRIP, see Lenzerini, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: 
International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples’ 2006-2007, at 175; Wiessner, ‘The 
State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 5/2012’ 2013, at 1361; 
Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 70, concerning the observations of 
the US while rejecting the Declaration. Concerning how these positions have been reversed, see Coulter 
2010, at 2, Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 57, and section 3.6 in this 
chapter.
420  It emerges from the negotiation history of the UNDRIP that the right to autonomy was moved 
after the right to self-determination as a compromise for some States to accept the recognition of self-
determination.
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to autonomy. Therefore, it would seem that indigenous peoples are entitled only to 
internal self-determination in the form of a right to self-government. In addition, this 
interpretation would be warranted by a joint reading of Article 3 on self-determination 
with Article 46, which specifically safeguards the territorial integrity of States.421
Notwithstanding the need for an overall reading of the UN Declaration, it is equally 
relevant that the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples has been explicitly 
recognised in the final text of the Declaration. Plus, the Declaration Preamble significantly 
acknowledges that “nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their 
right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law”.422 Given 
these elements, self-determination in the Declaration cannot be limited to political self-
government; on the contrary, it must be read in light of general international law. This 
means that, although political independence should be generally excluded,423 given the 
limited recognition it has under general international law, other prerogatives must be 
derived from the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. Surely enough, self-
government is one of these prerogatives; nevertheless, it is not the only one.
In fact, as far as the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples is concerned, 
there is a need to go beyond the classical debates on who are the peoples, or the distinction 
between internal and external self-determination. These debates are inadequate to 
understand the implications of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination for 
a number of reasons. First, they are biased towards a State-centric conception of self-
determination, that is a conception where the State is the only possible end-form deriving 
from the exercise of self-determination.424 Second, the divide between internal and external 
self-determination is not relevant to indigenous peoples since external self-determination 
assumes a meaning different from independence in the case of indigenous peoples.425 This 
is due to the fact that indigenous peoples are not generally claiming independence.426 
External aspects of self-determination would rather regard the possibility for indigenous 
421  Art. 46(1) reads: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of 
the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States”. 
Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 35, argue that the joint reading of Art. 3 with Art. 46 creates an 
ambiguity as for the exact scope of the indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
422  Preambular para. 17 UNDRIP.
423  See Barelli, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 2011, 
at 427. See also, Coulter 2010, at 2.
424  See Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 104. See also, Kingsbury, ‘Reconciling 
Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative 
Law’ 2001, at 94. For a general discussion on the potential for disrupting the State-centric order of 
international law, see Metcalf 2003-2004.
425  See Marc Weller, ‘Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’ (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 111, at 164. This author argues that the divide between internal and external 
aspects of self-determination has faded in practice, even beyond the realm of indigenous peoples’ rights.
426  See section 4.1 in this chapter.
Chapter 2
171
peoples that are citizens to a given State to engage into a meaningful relationship with 
keen communities residing in other States.427 Third, and most importantly, the classical 
debate on internal self-determination has focused on the political component of self-
government, thus downplaying the territorial aspect of control over lands and resources, 
which instead is fundamental to indigenous peoples’ integrity as a people.428
The main point, however, is that the classical debates on self-determination do not 
shed light on the content of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples.429 In 
fact, investigating the content of this right is instrumental for understanding what are the 
implications of indigenous peoples’ self-determination on the permanent sovereignty of 
States.430 In order to unravel the meaning of self-determination for indigenous peoples, 
an inductive approach is needed. This means that the right to self-determination must be 
substantiated by looking at the collective rights of indigenous peoples protected under 
human rights law.431 In the words of Hannum, “[t]his linkage between human rights 
and self-determination is mandated by the latter’s inclusion in the two international 
Covenants on human rights”.432 Furthermore, as highlighted by Brownlie,
there is a sort of synthesis between the question of group rights as a human 
rights matter and the principle of self-determination. The recognition of 
group rights, more especially when this is related to territorial rights and 
regional autonomy, represents the practical and internal working out of the 
concept of self-determination.433
427  See Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 31. See also, Alfredsson, ‘Different Forms of and Claims to the 
Right of Self-Determination’ 1996, at 70. The latter author reads the bilateral treaties concluded between 
indigenous peoples and States during colonial times as an instance of external self-determination.
428  Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 205.
429  Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 32. See also, Alfredsson, ‘The Right of Self-Determination and 
Indigenous Peoples’ 1993, at 53. The latter author claims that the label of internal self-determination 
is generally unsatisfactory and liable to produce illusions. For the purpose of giving meaning to self-
determination, it would be better to stay within the framework of existing rights, namely the right to 
autonomy, democracy, and participation.
430  Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 225.
431  Graham and Friederichs 2012, at 4. These authors highlight the importance of adopting a practical 
approach to self-determination. See also, Pablo Campaña, ‘Las relaciones de bilateralidad entre estados y 
pueblos indígenas’ (2012-2013) 28 American University International Law Review 1017, at 1029-1030: 
the rules contained in the UNDRIP give effect to self-determination for indigenous peoples. See further, 
Hannum, ‘Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era’ 1996, at 37. This author proposes a functional 
notion of self-determination: “This functional sovereignty will assign to sub-state groups the powers 
necessary in their particular situation to control political and economic matters of direct relevance to 
them, bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of other segments of the population and the state itself ”. 
On the concrete application of an inductive approach, see Coulter 2010, at 15-16. This author draws 
the content of the right to self-determination in the UNDRIP from the other rights recognised in the 
Declaration.
432  Hannum, ‘Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era’ 1996, at 34-35.
433  Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ 1988, at 6. For a contrary view, see 
Alfredsson, ‘Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination’ 1996, at 63-64, 66, and 
70. This author argues that the body of human rights for indigenous peoples is to be seen as an alternative 
to the solutions provided by self-determination. In this sense, the violation of political human rights, 
such as political representation, triggers the applicability of self-determination.
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Indeed, a global reading of the right to land and natural resources, cultural rights, 
the right to autonomy, and participatory rights434 integrates the elements of both political 
and economic self-determination as protected under Article 1 of the UN Covenants. 
The recognition of these rights prior to the inclusion of a right to self-determination in 
the UN Declaration435 reinforces the argument that the right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples exists and has a concrete content.
The inductive approach also goes in the direction of contextualising the meaning of 
self-determination for indigenous peoples. Like in the case of the other collective rights 
of indigenous peoples, a teleological interpretation of self-determination highlights 
the multifaceted content of this right with respect to indigenous peoples. First, self-
determination is instrumental for the preservation of indigenous peoples cultural 
integrity.436 Second, in line with Article 1(2) of the UN Covenants, self-determination 
has a strong economic component for indigenous peoples.437 In other words, the control 
over lands and resources is fundamental to preserve indigenous culture. Thus, economic 
self-determination takes precedence over the political component.438 In this context, 
participatory rights can be seen as reinforcing the economic/territorial component of 
indigenous peoples’ self-determination, in that consultation is mandated every time any 
developments takes place on indigenous peoples’ lands. At the same time, the recognition 
of participatory rights, in the form of participation in the political life of the State, feeds 
into the political component of indigenous peoples’ self-determination under Article 
1(1) of the UN Covenant. In support of these arguments, as reminded, the Human 
Rights Committee has increasingly raised the issue of the implementation of Article 1(2) 
when it comes to indigenous peoples.439  
In light of the above, self-determination can be understood as a “framework 
434  On how participatory rights qualify the right to self-determination under the UNDRIP, see Barelli, 
‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 2011, at 427.
435  See Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 2009, at 62-63. See also, section 3 in 
this chapter.
436  See Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ 
2011, at 128-129. See also, Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 2008, at 1171, where he argues that the main component 
of indigenous sovereignty is cultural integrity, not political autonomy.
437  See Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 
2007, at 239. See also, Tauli-Corpuz and Cariño 2004, at 44: “For indigenous peoples, it is impossible 
to talk of self-determination without control over territories and resources and cultural identity”. In this 
sense, land is part of indigenous peoples’ cultural identities and, in the authors’ view at 45, this is also 
a distinguishing feature vis-à-vis minorities or peasants. In more general terms, see Dam-de Jong 2015, 
at 50: “as legal subjects of the principle of permanent sovereignty, peoples can also assert rights over the 
State’s natural resources”.
438  On the relationship betweeen the economic and political component of self-determination, see 
Pertile, ‘Economic Self-Determination in the 21st Century: Tracing the Origin and the Evolution of a 
Chamaleonic Concept’ 2016, at 337-339.
439  Supra note 413. See Göcke 2013, at 128.
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right”.440 In this sense, self-determination is both a precondition for the enactment of 
other rights of indigenous peoples and an empty shell to be filled with the content of 
other substantive rights of indigenous peoples. This argument derives from a model on 
self-determination under general international law whereby the content of this right is 
derived with reference to the content of other well-established rights.441 This model does 
not imply that self-determination is not significant per se; it only conveys the idea that 
other rights can be used to give concrete effect to self-determination.442 At the same time, 
these rights do not exhaust the significance of self-determination, which is more than a 
collection of rights.443 However, collective rights are an important starting point both to 
give a concrete meaning to self-determination and to demonstrate its significance for a 
given category of peoples.
Although this theorisation of indigenous self-determination is important to 
understand how the debate on its concrete content is evolving, this section is again unable 
to draw conclusion on the status of such right under current international law. Contrary 
to the rights of indigenous peoples, the practice of human rights treaty bodies is still in 
its infancy concerning the direct attribution of self-determination to indigenous peoples. 
Moreover, State practice and opinio juris has received little attention in this section so 
that it is not possible to draw conclusion on its customary status.
The prescriptive nature of self-determination as a right of indigenous peoples is not 
particularly relevant to the research questions asked in this dissertation. Even if it could 
be demonstrated that indigenous peoples were entitled to exercise self-determination, 
this right would be relevant to solving conflicts only if the norm had reached the status 
of jus cogens.444 This status, however, is only recognised when self-determination applies 
to decolonising peoples.445 Moreover, the recognition that indigenous self-determination 
would legally prevail over other obligations contracted by States—unrealistic as it may 
440  See Desmet 2011, at 204 ff. See also, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, who 
talks about the “norms elaborating the elements of self-determination” (Ch. 4). Similarly, Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 53, argues that for internal self-determination 
under Art. 1(1) of the UN Covenants to be properly realised, the respect of other rights should be 
ensured. On the same vein, see Scheinin 2004, at 9. See also, Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United 
Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 2007, at 152 ff., where the author talks of self-
determination as an “umbrella right”.
441  See Hannum, ‘Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era’ 1996, at 32, where the author argues 
that the right to self-determination has been subsumed under the right to political participation.
442  See ibid., at 38: “self-determination has taken on a wider content as it has become infused with 
related human rights norms recognised in the second half of the twentieth century”.
443  See ibid., at 34: at the time of writing, Hannum argues that other human rights are not sufficient to 
realise the economic and political demands that are implied in the right to self-determination. This is due 
to the fact that self-determination for sub-national communities in the 1990s was mainly identified with 
internal self-determination or, in other words, political participation and limited self-government.
444  For the criteria of lex specialis and lex posterior that in any event do not apply to the conflicts 
analysed in this dissertation, see Introduction, section 5.
445  See Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 60; Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 1995, at 169-170
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be—although settling the issue of the legal prevalence of one regime over the other, 
would probably in practical terms exacerbate conflicts since it would exclude any form of 
peaceful coexistence between States and indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the purpose of 
this dissertation is to find ways to reconcile the obligations of States under international 
biodiversity law with those obligations stemming from international human rights 
treaties protecting indigenous rights. The absolute prevalence of one regime over the 
other is therefore not the best possible result.
The next section argues that self-determination still has a role to play when it comes 
to the interplay of indigenous rights with other bodies of international law, such as 
biodiversity law under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. While the prescriptive content 
of self-determination is not relevant to this end, its existence as a general principle of 
international law can provide useful criteria to reconcile indigenous peoples’ extensive 
rights with the permanent sovereignty of States.
5. Self-determination as a general principle of international law: an interpretative 
approach
This chapter has shown that both the permanent sovereignty of States and the rights of 
indigenous peoples are not absolute but indeed subject to limits. The rights of indigenous 
peoples significantly restrict the State’s powers over natural resources. In particular, 
the participatory rights of indigenous peoples are a means of realisation of indigenous 
substantive rights vis-à-vis the State’s extensive powers over natural resources. Veto 
powers, however, are exceptional, which means that neither indigenous rights nor the 
State’s permanent sovereignty automatically prevails on one another. This also means that 
when conflicts arise, these need to be solved on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, the lack of a predetermined hierarchy does not result in the absence 
of any legal criteria to solve those conflicts. This final section argues that the principle of 
self-determination is underlying indigenous peoples’ rights. In turn, this principle can 
be used to interpret the provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol potentially or 
actually conflicting with indigenous rights in a way that is in line with the substance of 
indigenous rights. In other words, the principle of self-determination offers criteria for 
the interaction of these two bodies of law and the reconciliation of conflicts.
It emerges from Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute that general principles are an 
autonomous source of international law.446 Notwithstanding this common ground, it 
446  Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press 
2006), at 23: this author correctly makes clear that there is not a hierarchy between general principles 
and other sources of international law. Furthermore, principles are not a subsidiary source. See also, 
Pauwelyn 2003, at 125. See also Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the Case concerning 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), at 132: “those principles constitute a (formal) 
“source” of international law, on their own, not necessarily to be subsumed under custom or treaties”. 
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is still very much discussed in the literature what are their constitutive elements—or in 
other words how they are created—and what their nature as sources imply in concrete 
terms.
Concerning the first question, the formulation used in Article 38(1)(c) of the 
ICJ Statute has generated a huge debate on whether or not such principles may only 
come into existence if they are present in municipal systems and extracted therefrom, or 
rather if they may be produced independently from national systems following the needs 
and specific characteristics of the international legal systems. Scholars have legitimately 
embraced both views, showing in turn a more voluntarist approach to international 
law—according to which international rules only derive from the will of their main 
subjects, i.e., States—or a more legalistic view, in accordance with which principles are 
the product of the legal system itself.447
Notwithstanding this philosophical underpinning, it is correct to argue that there 
exist different kinds of principles that are applicable for the purposes of international 
law.448 Among these principles, those generated at the international level are particularly 
relevant to this dissertation. An example of these is provided in the realm of international 
environmental law;449 another relevant example is the principle of self-determination 
that, as shown in section 4, has been created at the international level.
Although the principle of self-determination is well established in general 
international law, it has a multifarious content and has mainly been applied to decolonising 
peoples, as seen in previous sections. Thus, the remainder of this chapter addresses the 
problem of the applicability of self-determination as a principle to the realm of the rights 
of indigenous peoples. To this end, it is necessary to dwell upon the issue of how general 
principles of international law are created.
There is a tendency of international judges using general principles not to discuss 
their creation but to invoke them without explaining how they have reached their status.450 
Indeed, even the nature of general principles as sources having the same status of treaties and custom 
has been contested by the literature. See infra notes 452 and 453 (Bassiouni, Cassese, and Malanczuk).
447  Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), at 138: “Alfred Verdross pondered that, in approaching the “sources” of 
international law, there are ultimately two basic opposing conceptions: one, which starts from the “idée 
du droit”, and the other, which privileges consent or the will”. See also, Pauwelyn 2003, at 125-127 and 
130.
448  Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘General International Law Principles, Rules and Standards’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, paras. 28 ff. See also, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), at 134: “As for 
the ICJ, it has likewise applied general principles of law in the same understanding, i.e., as comprising 
principles recognized both in foro domestico (and transposed into international level) and in international 
law itself ”; at 137-145, Judge Cançado also discusses the evolution of the scholarly debate over whether 
or not general principles are only those stemming from municipal legal systems or can also be legitimately 
created at the international level. See furthermore, Voigt 2008.
449  See e.g., Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012).
450  Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
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It seems that this lack of systematisation cannot be entirely explained by the complexity 
of this undertaking451—that is comparable to the theoretical questions concerning the 
formation of custom. Instead, the lack of conclusive responses may be attributed to the 
focus on the functions that principles perform in a legal system and their interplay with 
rules rather than their precise legal nature.452
Some authors have conflated the debate over the creation of general principles 
with that on the formation of customary law, the only difference between the two being 
that State practice is not needed in the former case.453 Indeed, it seems more correct 
to refer, as some authors do, to a completely different process of formation of general 
principles that reflect their specific nature and functions in any legal systems. Principles 
are to be intended as both the underlying rationale and purposes of prescriptive rules. In 
this sense, the content of principles can be extracted from existing rules in an inductive 
way.454 However, any principle must satisfy the requirement of generality.
(Argentina v. Uruguay), at 138. Judge Cançado also aptly describes how general principles have been used 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice and the ICJ (at 133-135). For a comprehensive treatise 
on general principles of international law, see Cheng 2006.
451  See Pauwelyn 2003, at 124, who highlights the complexity of the legal debate concerning general 
principles.
452  See Iron Rhine Arbitration, Belgium v Netherlands (24 May 2005), Award, ICGJ 373 (PCA 2005), para. 
58: “The emerging principles, whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, management, 
notions of prevention and of sustainable development, and protection for future generations”. See also, 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of 
the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des cours 1, at 7: principles underlie rules and answer the question 
why; Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law. Resolving Conflicts 
between Climate Measures and WTO (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), at 168: principles can pursue two normative 
functions, namely to provide policy objectives and to contribute to the resolution of conflicts. On the 
interplay between principles and rules, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University 
Press 1977). For a literature review on the definition, origins, and functions of general principles in 
international law, including in judicial practice, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to 
“General Principles of International Law”’ (1989-1990) 11 Michigan Journal of International Law 768.
453  Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law. Resolving Conflicts between Climate 
Measures and WTO 2009, at 160: “The troublesome customary law element of universal State practice is 
not required”; at 165: To classify sustainable development as a rule of law would require the definition 
of a complete and precise content. Classification as a principle, on the other hand, presupposes a certain 
degree of indeterminacy”. On the same vein, see Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, at 92: what is needed is the “general support of the international community”, 
which does not mean that “each and every member of the community of nations has given its express and 
specific support to the principle”. See also, Conforti 2013, at 48-49; Cheng 2006, at 24; Olufemi Elias 
and Chin Leng Lim, ‘General Principles of Law, ‘Soft Law’ and the Identification of International Law’ 
(1997) 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, especially at 29-31 and 36-37. Bassiouni treats 
general principles other than those stemming from municipal law as “unperfected sources of international 
law”. See Bassiouni 1989-1990, at 768.
454  See Wolfrum General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards). The author focuses on 
principles as sources of international law and distinguishes inter alia between principles stemming from 
municipal law, principles of international relations, and principles deriving from treaty law. See also 
Cassese, International Law 2005, at 188: general principles of international law, which he distinguishes 
from principles pursuant to Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, “are sweeping and loose standards of 
conduct that can be deduced from treaty and customary rules by extracting and generalizing some of their most 
significant common parts. They do not make up a source proper. Most of them primarily serve the purpose 
of filling gaps or of making a particular construction prevail any time when two or more interpretations 
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If principles may arise through a different process as that of practice and opinio juris 
that is characteristic of international custom, it remains to be seen what gives them legal 
validity in the international legal system. The literature has found three main sources for 
the validation of general principles in international law, namely acceptance of States, their 
global significance, and both the qualification and the discretion of interpreters to extract 
them from existing rules. This section argues that the principle of self-determination 
satisfies the requirements of all three strands.
Concerning the acceptance of States,455 this chapter has shown that the limit not 
to impair indigenous distinctiveness, as elaborated by human rights treaty bodies, has 
gone unchallenged by States. Furthermore, States have not contested the interpretation 
according to which indigenous rights can be read in light of self-determination.456
Regarding global significance, the argument goes that principles need to be 
relevant beyond the legal regime from which they have originated.457 In other words, the 
substance of general principles must be found in legal documents that are different from 
those in which they have been originally formulated.458 This is certainly the case for self-
determination that, as seen in sections 4.1 and 4.2, has been originally included in the 
UN Charter and then propagated into different branches of international law, including 
indigenous rights. Although the status of the right to self-determination of indigenous 
peoples is still uncertain,459 the principle of self-determination is not connected to the 
attribution of that particular right.
are possible”; Malanczuk 1997, at 48-49: “general principles are not so much a source of law as a method 
of using existing sources—existing rules by analogy, inferring the existence of broad principles from more 
specific rules by means of inductive reasoning” (in both cases, emphasis added). On the function of 
principles, see also, Voigt, ‘The Role of General Principles in International Law and their Relationship 
to Treaty Law’ 2008. At 5, this author refers to general principles as “a crucial element of international 
law”. She also claims that “it is largely due to general principles that international law can be defined as 
a system”.
455  For an articulation of this argument, see Voigt, ‘The Role of General Principles in International Law 
and their Relationship to Treaty Law’ 2008; Elias and Lim 1997; Julio A. Barberis, ‘Los principios generales 
de derecho como fuente del derecho internacional’ (1991) 14 Revista IIDH - Instituto Interamericano 
de Derechos Humanos 11; Treves 2005. On the dangers of founding legal principles on the consent of 
States, see Bassiouni 1989-1990, at 786.
456  See section 4.2 in this chapter.
457  Wolfrum General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards), para. 41. This argument is 
also supported by Cassese, International Law 2005, at 189, note 3, where the author claims that some 
principles are specific to certain areas of international law. At 190, note 3, this author adds: “Some 
principles may first belong to a particular branch of international law and then gradually come to 
impregnate the whole body of this law”.
458  See Wolfrum General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards, para. 33: “It is not of 
relevance whether the same terms are used in various international norms, but rather whether these 
norms reflect identical principles”; para. 42: it must be verified whether principles are contained in other 
legal documents with respect to their original formulation; para. 43: for instance, for the principles 
contained in Article 2 of the UN Charter, including self-determination, it can be  concluded that they 
have been generalised.
459  Section 4.2 in this chapter has showed that Art. 1 ICCPR/ICESCR that some practice has already 
developed.
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The third route is to argue that it is the role of interpreters to extract general 
principles from existing rules. This argument in turn moves the burden of proof from 
demonstrating the existence of the principle to proving both that the rules from which it 
is extracted are valid and that the principle at stake may be soundly extracted from those 
rules. 
In this sense, this section argues that the principle of self-determination is underlying 
indigenous rights and can be extracted in an inductive way from the rationale of these 
rights, which are protected under international human rights law.460 Human rights 
treaty bodies have promoted a teleological interpretation of indigenous rights, according 
to which, although they are not absolute, their inherent purpose is to safeguard the 
existence of indigenous peoples as distinct groups. The denial of indigenous rights is the 
ultimate threshold that States cannot cross if they do not want to incur in international 
responsibility for failing to protect, fulfil, and respect internationally protected indigenous 
rights.461 
The threshold of indigenous peoples’ survival, in turn, is given concrete content 
through the substance of indigenous rights. Indigenous groups can survive as distinct 
peoples if their right to dispose of their traditional land and resources can be exercised 
with the aim to safeguard their cultural distinctiveness. In this respect, since land rights 
are founded upon indigenous customary practices, the extent to which and the modalities 
whereby indigenous ownership guarantees indigenous culture must be determined in 
autonomy by indigenous peoples themselves. Procedural rights and the duty of States 
to engage in negotiations with indigenous peoples guarantee that even when indigenous 
rights are to be compressed, this is done in cooperation with indigenous peoples.462
460  Cheng 2006, at 23-24: “This part of international law does not consist, therefore, in specific rules 
formulated for practical purposes, but in general propositions underlying the various rules” (p. 24). This 
is the same argument as Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ 1957, at 7, Arangio-Ruiz 1972, at 496: principles “determinable by way 
of induction”, and Pauwelyn 2003, at 126.
461  See supra section 3 in this chapter and Chapter 1, section 2, which explain how procedural guarantees 
serve to define this threshold. Restrictions posed on indigenous rights have to pass the test of reasonableness 
that is applicable to all human rights. This test, however, has a higher threshold than for other human 
rights. Every infringement on indigenous peoples’ rights should be measured against the paradigm of 
indigenous peoples’ survival as a distinct group. On reasonableness, see Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples 
in Modern International Law’ 1988, at 9-10.
462  In the words of Gilbert, self-determination is primarily a “relational principle”. Gilbert, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 221. In this sense, the 
relationship between States and indigenous peoples as concerns the management of natural resources is 
to be renegotiated. In the words of Anaya, “[n]egotiation makes possible nuanced solutions to potentially 
complex issues of redistribution of power and resources in diverse circumstances. In most instances, self-
determination for indigenous peoples cannot be achieved simply by allowing them to choose from among 
limited predetermined options”. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 2004, at 187. According 
to this view, self-determination is first of all a procedural endeavour that does not have a predetermined 
outcome. See Duruigbo 2006, at 64: “where a person holds a right to something, he or she “is not merely 
a passive beneficiary of someone else’s obligation, but an active participant in a relationship that he or she 
in large measure controls” (quote from Jack Donelly).
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Overall, all of these elements are pieces composing the puzzle of a modern notion of 
self-determination as applied to sub-national groups. In other words, self-determination 
is the justification behind rules on the rights of indigenous peoples.463 As a general 
principle, it can be used for the purpose of the present thesis in two phases, namely to 
clarify the content of the rights of indigenous peoples and to adapt their content in the 
context of the CBD regimes without compromising their substance. These phases are 
illustrated in the following.
Self-determination is first of all a principle that helps legislators, judges, and 
interpreters apply the rights of indigenous peoples in a way that is in line with the ultimate 
purpose of preserving indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness. The interpretative role of self-
determination has gained currency in the reports and decisions of human rights treaty 
bodies. In the Apirana Mahuika case, the Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated 
that “the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights 
protected by the Covenant, in particular article 27”.464 While the Committee used self-
determination in an interpretative fashion, it excluded that it could review the application 
of the right within the complaint mechanism laid down by the Optional Protocol.465 As 
reminded, the Inter-American Court has similarly used common Article 1 of the UN 
Covenants to extensively interpret Article 21 of the American Convention protecting 
property rights so as to encompass collective land rights of indigenous peoples.466 The 
fact that the UN Declaration on indigenous rights has explicitly recognised the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples will probably reinforce the functional reading 
of indigenous rights in light of the general principle.
Once it has been established how the principle of self-determination works within 
the regime of indigenous rights, a further stage for the purpose of this dissertation is 
to illustrate how it may solve potential conflicts generated by the interpretation and 
application of the CBD regime. This is done by way of systemic interpretation under 
463  This argument is resonated in more general terms in Emmanuel Voyakis, ‘Do General Principles Fill 
‘Gaps’ in International Law?’ (2009) 14 Austrian Review of International and European Law 239, at 245.
464  Apirana Mahuika case, para. 9.2.
465  Poma Poma case, para. 6.3.
466  Saramaka case, para. 129 and Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 122. In Maya v. Belize, para. 154, the 
Inter-American Commission has noted the petitioners’ application according to which mining and logging 
conditions violated inter alia the principle of self-determination but did not examine this contention 
since it held it was to be subsumed under the violation of Article XXIII of the American Declaration on 
Human Rights, which had already been ascertained: “the Commission notes the Petitioners’ contention 
that the failure of the State to engage in meaningful consultation with the Maya people in connection 
with the logging and oil concessions in the Toledo District, and the negative environmental effects arising 
from those concessions, constitute violations of several other rights under international human rights law, 
including the right to life under Article I of the American Declaration, the right to religious freedom 
and worship under Article III of the American Declaration, the right to a family and to protection 
thereof under Article VI of the American Declaration, the right to preservation of health and well-being 
under Article XI of the American Declaration, and the “right to consultation” implicit in Article 27 of 
the ICCPR, Article XX of the American Declaration, and the principle of self-determination” (emphasis 
added).
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Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and customary international law.467 As highlighted, in 
the formulation of the Vienna Convention, a treaty shall be interpreted by taking into 
account “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”. This is the so-called principle of harmonisation that is based on the presumption 
that the Parties to a treaty are aware of the obligations stemming from other treaties 
or general international law.468 Furthermore, even if international law changes after the 
conclusion of a treaty, the harmonization clause gives the Parties enough flexibility to 
take those development into account.469
This is the case when it comes to the relationship between indigenous rights as 
protected by global and regional human rights treaties and international biodiversity 
law under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. When the CBD was ratified in 1992, the 
protection of indigenous rights was still in its infancy. In this sense, it cannot be said 
that CBD Parties had a clear vision at that time of their parallel obligations concerning 
indigenous rights. However, since the 1990s, the interpretation that human rights 
treaties protect the rights of indigenous peoples has consolidated as shown in section 3 
in this chapter. For these reasons, when interpreting the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
the obligations of Parties towards indigenous peoples stemming from human rights law 
cannot be ignored and must be duly taken into account by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention.
This is the first part of the interpretative approach applicable to Chapters 3 and 4. 
The rights of indigenous peoples are incorporated in the interpretation of the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol on the basis of their binding nature as obligations that Parties of the 
biodiversity regime have contracted by in parallel ratifying human rights treaties.
According to the second part of the interpretative approach, the principle of self-
determination is used to ensure the balance between the obligations contained in the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol and the rights of indigenous peoples in a way that the 
integrity of the latter is preserved. Principles of international law not only have gap-
filling functions but also serve to clarify existing rules in a way to avoid conflicts.470
In this sense, the principle of self-determination can play a fundamental role 
when incorporating indigenous rights within the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. These 
467  ILC fragmentation report, at 212, para. 422: “Its wording [of Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT], however, is 
not restricted to “general international law” but extends to “[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”.
468  See Introduction, section 6.
469  This is explained very clearly by Koskenniemi in the ILC fragmentation report, at 206-218. The 
report also explains that is would be absurd to limit the applicability of this clause only to the law that 
was in force at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and that this option has been rejected by States in the 
ILC. See also at 141, para. 277: importance of harmonizing interpretation; at 211, para. 419: “This is all 
that article 31 (3) (c) requires; the integration into the process of legal reasoning – including reasoning by 
courts and tribunals – of a sense of coherence and meaningfulness”. On the presumption against conflict, 
see also Pauwelyn 2003, at 240-244.
470  See supra note 453.
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instruments are aimed to ensure the conservation of biodiversity, its sustainable use, and 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. Their objectives therefore do not coincide with 
those of human rights treaties. Indeed, biodiversity treaties apply to situations where 
human rights treaties protecting indigenous rights are also applicable. In this sense, in 
order not to incur in possible conflicts between these two bodies of law, it is important 
to find ways in which the application of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol is in line 
with indigenous rights. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that this harmonizing 
interpretation is possible.
In this light, interpretation is articulated in three main steps. First, the ensuing 
chapters assess in which cases the provisions/obligations of the CBD/Nagoya Protocol 
overlap with provisions/obligations stemming from human rights and may cause 
conflicts.471 Second, every time a conflict could arise, the same chapters propose a 
harmonising interpretation of the provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol in light 
of indigenous rights. Third, the principle of self-determination underlying indigenous 
peoples’ rights serves to adjust the content of those rights to the context of the CBD 
regime, where necessary. In other words, self-determination must be used to facilitate the 
interpretation of indigenous rights in a way that is in accordance with its rationale but 
may be adapted to the circumstances of a treaty regime that has different goals. This step, 
indeed, is optional, meaning that the principle is only invoked when the balance between 
biodiversity-related obligations and indigenous rights is particularly problematic.
In this sense, the principle of self-determination both reinforces the teleological 
approach of indigenous rights and provides ways to integrate indigenous rights into 
the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol in a flexible way. The objective of ensuring cultural 
integrity and the possibility to exist as distinct peoples may help the interpreter find the 
right solution in concrete cases. In this light, while indigenous rights need to be balanced 
with the parallel objectives of the CBD, they cannot be compressed to the point that 
they impair the existence of indigenous peoples as distinct groups. Therefore, the main 
function of the principle of self-determination is to solve interpretative doubts that may 
arise in the context of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol with respect to indigenous 
peoples in light of the rationale underlying indigenous rights under human rights 
law.472 The Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol makes reference to the UN Declaration of 
indigenous rights.473 In this sense, the whole body of indigenous rights, including self-
determination, can penetrate the international biodiversity regime by way of contextual 
interpretation. However, only time will tell whether the Declaration will be used in this 
fashion.
471  This is explained in the Introduction of this dissertation, section 5.
472  This is in line with Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ 1957, at 7, where the author argues that principles of law provide an 
explanation for any given rule.
473  Preambular para. 26 Nagoya Protocol.
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As is shown in the remainder of this thesis, the principle of self-determination 
may convey interpretations whereby provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
potentially threatening indigenous rights are applied in a way that is consistent—if not 
supportive of—the general body of indigenous peoples’ rights. In this light, the principle 
is used in Chapters 3 and 4 to suggest ways how to incorporate indigenous rights in these 
treaties where interpretation is not clear or absurd because it would lead to the conclusion 
that in order to implement their obligations under biodiversity treaties, States need to 
disregard indigenous rights. Chapters 3 and 4 also explore the limits of harmonising 
interpretation in the context of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.474
474  The ILC fragmentation report suggests that such limits lie in the object and purpose of a given treaty. 
See at 143, para. 281.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Access and Benefit-Sharing Regime and Indigenous 
Peoples: Applying the Interpretative Approach
1. ABS and indigenous rights: conflict and reconciliation
This chapter applies the interpretative approach of the interaction between the CBD 
regime and indigenous rights, as developed in Chapter 2, to the case of the utilisation 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge and the sharing of the benefits deriving 
therefrom.
Benefit-sharing is one of the objectives of the CBD, whose inclusion originally 
derives from the need to balance the appetites for access to genetic resources of less-
endowed developed countries with the interests of developing countries to grant access 
to their resources for research and development purposes while also benefiting from this 
undertaking.1 According to the CBD, however, benefit-sharing goes beyond the inter-
State dimension to embrace the notion of intra-State benefit-sharing—i.e., the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits with indigenous and local communities.2 Furthermore, 
the Nagoya Protocol has set up a comprehensive regime that noticeably intersects with 
indigenous rights.
Access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge is a considerable phenomenon 
that inter alia affects indigenous peoples. Modern biotechnologies have significantly 
increased the economic potential of genetic resources, which upon research and 
development activities—otherwise defined as bioprospecting3—can become valuable 
marketable products in the pharmaceutical and food sectors and be monetised through 
patents and other intellectual property rights.4 While genetic resources are valuable for 
their transformative potentials and marketability, the traditional knowledge and practices 
1  Art. 1 CBD. See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity 
and Community Livelihoods’ 2010, at 152-153; Glowka and al. 1994, at 1.
2  See Art. 8(j) CBD and infra section 2.3 in this chapter. See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution 
of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods’ 2010, at 159 ff.
3  See Michael I. Jeffery, ‘Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing under the 
Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines’ (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International Law 
747, at 755, who defines bioprospecting inter alia as research activities into biodiversity for scientific and 
commercial purposes.
4  See Grethel Aguilar, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Protection of Traditional Knowledge in the 
Territories of Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) 4 Environmental Science & Policy 241, at 242; Jeffery 2002, 
at 747-748; Achim Seiler and Graham Dutfield, Regulating Access and Benefit Sharing: Basic Issues, Legal 
Instruments, Policy Proposals (BfN 2001), at 11; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Biodiversity, Traditional Knowledge 
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Third World Network 2003), at 32: “Biodiversity has become such an 
important concern within the past 20 years not only because it is fast disappearing but also because of 
the growing recognition of its increased economic value and potential for the biotechnology industry. 
Bioprospecting has become the new extractive activity just like prospecting for minerals in the early days 
of colonization”.
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of indigenous peoples may increase the chances of success of bioprospecting activities in 
the productive and research sector.5 As highlighted by Jeffery, bioprospecting can be very 
costly before it becomes profitable.6 Access to traditional knowledge may reduce these 
costs by decreasing the time—and success—related aspects of bioprospecting.
For these reasons, genetic resources and traditional knowledge have become 
extremely desirable commodities for States, research entities, and private businesses.7 
In this context, the link between bioprospecting and the conservation of biodiversity is 
represented by the potentially negative effects that scoping and research activities may 
produce on the preservation of biodiversity. While this aspect is not reflected in the 
CBD, the Convention and subsequent practice have highlighted the interrelationship 
between ABS and conservation.8 Furthermore, the objective of the Nagoya Protocol is to 
ensure benefit-sharing, “thereby contributing to the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of its components”.9 This objective has been inter alia articulated 
through the obligation for Parties to “encourage users and providers to direct benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation of biodiversity 
and the sustainable use of its components”.10
The core of the legal problems stemming from ABS, however, is not per se linked 
to conservation11 but concerns issues such as the ownership of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, the characteristics of prior informed consent and the question of 
which subjects are entitled to exercise it, the conditions of mutually agreed terms (MATs) 
to be negotiated between users and providers and their regime,12 the nature of benefit-
sharing and its concrete realisation, as well as the transposition of international rules in 
5  On the pharmaceutical sector, see Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘Incorporating Traditional Knowledge in 
an International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: Problems and Prospects’ 
(2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 457, at 458. On the relevance of traditional knowledge 
for actors in the research sectors, see Elisa Morgera and Miranda Geelhoed, Consultancy on the Notion 
of ‘Utilisation’ in the Nagoya Protocol and the EU ABS Regulation for the Upstream Actors (University of 
Edinburgh 2016), at 18.
6  Jeffery 2002, at 756-757.
7  Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Factsheets in the ABS Series, Traditional 
Knowledge (2011), at 3-4.
8  See Aphrodite Smagadi, ‘Analysis of the Objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their 
Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Sharing’ (2006) 31 Columbia Journal 
of Environmental Law 243, at 283.
9  Art. 1 Nagoya Protocol.
10  Art. 9 Nagoya Protocol. Other provisions in the Protocol also spell out how the link between benefit-
sharing and conservation is to be pursued. See Nagoya Protocol: preambular para. 6 on the link between 
the economic value of biodiversity, benefit-sharing, and conservation; preambular paras. 2, 7, 14, 20, 
and 22; Art. 8; Art. 10; Art. 22(5)(h); para. 1(f ) and paras. 2(f ) and (k) of the Annex include among 
monetary and non-monetary benefits “[s]pecial fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation”, 
the “[t]ransfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology…that are relevant to 
the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological diversity”, and “[a]ccess to scientific information 
relevant to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.
11  The link between ABS and conservation will be explored again in this chapter, in section 2.4.2.
12  See infra section 2 in this chapter.
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national systems.13 This is particularly true when interrogating the CBD regime in light 
of indigenous rights.
According to international human rights law, indigenous peoples have rights over 
their lands and natural resources. These rights, however, are not explicitly embraced in 
the CBD so that access to genetic resources is framed mainly as an inter-State concern.14 
As the next sections illustrate, the lack of sufficient consideration of indigenous rights 
has been partially remedied with the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. In particular, the 
remainder of this chapter examines to what extent the CBD practice as well as the Nagoya 
Protocol manage to address and solve the problems deriving from the misappropriation 
of indigenous knowledge and genetic resources that may arise in the context of the CBD. 
In this sense, although the CBD encourages the protection of traditional knowledge, 
this protection is conditioned upon national legislation.15 Furthermore, since the CBD 
is premised upon the recognition of the permanent sovereignty of States over natural 
resources, its ABS rules do not sufficiently take into account the broad prerogatives 
in terms of resource control deriving from indigenous land rights. In this sense, this 
chapter also explores to what extent these indigenous rights are acknowledged in the 
CBD regime.16
Concerning the CBD obligations on benefit-sharing, Article 8(j) suffers from three 
main limitations. First, as happens with the protection of traditional knowledge, the 
obligation to encourage the sharing of benefits with indigenous and local communities 
is equally subject to national legislation. Second, the sharing with indigenous peoples is 
only foreseen following utilisation of traditional knowledge, thus leaving aside the case 
in which users access genetic resources held by indigenous peoples. Third, the obligation 
merely to “encourage” benefit-sharing with indigenous peoples has downplayed the 
prescriptive nature of this provision, leading to problems with its interpretation and 
limited or non-existent implementation.17
13  See Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 37: “It is difficult to design ABS policies and laws for the following 
reasons: It is hard to identify who “owns” biodiversity and traditional knowledge. Genetic resources 
and knowledge on the use of these cut across boundaries whether they are countries, provinces, or 
municipalities”. See infra sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 in this chapter.
14  See ibid., at 37: “Conflicts between national interest and indigenous peoples’ assertion of their right 
to have control over their resources are always in the picture. Even the implementation of free and prior 
informed consent has been met with many difficulties because there are different standards and criteria 
used by governments and indigenous peoples and local communities”; “[t]he potential of benefit-sharing 
schemes to create conflicts and divisions between communities and within communities is high especially 
if benefits are just couched in terms of money”.
15  Art. 8(j) CBD. On the other critical points about Article 8(j), see infra and Chapter 1, section 3.
16  See UNDESA, Potential Threats to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s Proposed International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing, UN doc. PFII/2007/WS.4/9 
(17-19 January 2007), at 8.
17  The lack of implementation of the ABS regime is a generalised problem that goes beyond the aspects 
concerning indigenous peoples. On this point, see Jeffery 2002, at 778; Tomme Young, ‘Legal Issues 
Regarding the International Regime: Objectives, Options, and Outlook’ in Santiago Carrizosa and others 
(eds), Accessing Biodiversity and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons from Implementation of the Convention on 
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This chapter analyses developments in the benefit-sharing obligations of CBD 
Parties following the creation of the Working Group on Article 8(j) and, most importantly, 
the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. This chapter also compares the CBD regime 
to the multilateral system of benefit-sharing established by the ITPGRFA, adopted 
in 2001 under the auspices of FAO. The ITPGRFA complements the CBD when it 
comes to a specific set of genetic resources. Furthermore, the FAO treaty applies to its 
Parties alternatively to the Nagoya Protocol with regard to genetic resources for food 
and agriculture since the latter treaty explicitly recognises that international instruments 
with a focus on specific genetic resources are to be considered lex specialis.18 Therefore, 
the legal regime of the ITPGRFA is relevant to respond to the research question of how 
to deal with potential conflicts between biodiversity conservation and indigenous rights 
in the context of ABS. The ITPGRFA also creates a system whereby benefits are to be 
shared with local farmers. In this respect, an assessment of the functioning of the FAO 
multilateral system of benefit-sharing can help to evaluate the obligation to establish 
a comparable global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism contained in the Nagoya 
Protocol.19
In light of the different legal problems concerning ABS in the context of indigenous 
rights, this chapter analyses access and benefit-sharing separately. Although benefit-
sharing is the legal consequence of access under the CBD, access and benefit-sharing 
remain two distinct moments. For instance, the respect of consent requirements when 
accessing traditional knowledge does not ensure that the benefits deriving from this 
utilisation are equally shared with indigenous and local communities.20 Furthermore, 
treating access and benefit-sharing separately may produce some advantages in terms 
of the present analysis since it helps to shed light on those situations where traditional 
knowledge is accessed from one community but it is shared among several communities 
that may be located in different States.21
Biological Diversity (IUCN 2004), at 275; Reji K. Jospeh, ‘International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing: Where Are We Now?’ (2010) 12 Asian Biotechnology and Development Review 77, at 78. On 
related limitations of Art. 8(j) CBD, see Chapter 1, section 3.
18  Art. 4(4) Nagoya Protocol: “Where a specialized international access and benefit-sharing instrument 
applies that is consistent with, and does not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and this 
Protocol, this Protocol does not apply for the Party or Parties to the specialized instrument in respect of 
the specific genetic resource covered by and for the purpose of the specialized instrument”. On this point, 
see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 89-90.
19  Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol.
20  See Nijar 2010, at 466.
21  Ibid., at 470. According to this author, while the prior informed consent must be obtained only 
from the community that actually provides access, benefit-sharing must be widespread. See also, Report 
of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge Associated with 
Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2 (15 July 2009), para. 91: “It was suggested that it may be helpful to address 
access and benefit-sharing separately”; para. 92: “When traditional knowledge is found in more than one 
community and prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms are negotiated with only one or few 
of these communities, it was suggested that trust funds could be established for the sharing of benefits 
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2. The incorporation of indigenous rights into the international regime on ABS
2.1. Access to traditional knowledge
Before going into the details of how traditional knowledge is treated under the CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol, it is worth defining the object of investigation in more general 
terms. Understanding what traditional knowledge is in the context of indigenous culture 
facilitates comprehension about its special status within the CBD regime. Furthermore, 
this comprehension is instrumental for spotting the limitations of the current legal 
framework.
Traditional knowledge does not simply coincide with the system of knowledge 
produced by indigenous individuals and groups.22 In the words of von Lewinski,
[k]nowledge is not ‘traditional’ because of its object, nor its subject matter 
or content, nor its age or antiquity, nor its aesthetic quality. What makes 
it traditional is the way it has been preserved and transmitted between 
generations within a community.23
In this sense, traditional knowledge is both connected to and nurtured by particular 
social structures. The interlinkages between traditional knowledge and indigenous 
societies make it so that, while the former contributes to the preservation of social order, 
societal changes are reflected upon traditional knowledge. In other words, traditional 
knowledge evolves with indigenous societies, while contributing to their functioning and 
the perpetuation of knowledge from one generation to the other.24
Although not merely constituting a collection of information, the content 
of traditional knowledge can be easily disconnected from its social structure and 
communicated to third subjects that are not members of traditional communities. Thus, 
the relative easiness with which traditional knowledge can be appropriated by non-
indigenous subjects may endanger indigenous culture and distinctiveness to the extent 
that third parties negatively affect traditional practices. The protection of traditional 
knowledge is, therefore, a complex undertaking that cannot be limited to the preservation 
of its content.
The fact that traditional knowledge does not coincide with the object of knowledge—
with the other communities who did not take part in prior informed consent and mutually agreed 
terms.” See infra sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 in this chapter.
22  According to von Lewinski this is the definition of indigenous knowledge that should be distinguished 
from traditional knowledge. Silke von Lewinski (ed) Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2008), at 69.
23  Ibid., at 59-60.
24  See also, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 33, which provides a working definition of 
traditional knowledge. Common features of traditional knowledge are: “A link to a particular culture or 
people”; “[a] long period of development, often through an oral tradition, by unspecified creators”; “[a] 
dynamic and evolving nature”; “[e]xistence in codified or uncodified (oral) forms”; “[p]assed on from 
generation to generation”; “[l]ocal in nature and often imbedded in local languages”; “[u]nique manner 
of creation”; “[i]t maybe difficult to identify original creators”.
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i.e, the content that is passed on from one generation to the other—is one of the reasons 
why indigenous peoples do not generally see indigenous-owned intellectual property 
rights as an adequate solution to protect their traditional knowledge.25 In contrast, 
indigenous peoples have experienced misappropriation of their traditional knowledge 
through patenting by third actors.26
In this context, indigenous peoples oppose to a notion of traditional knowledge 
that can be easily appropriated by external users a conception whereby the public content 
25  Other reasons that concur to the rejection of the international system of protection of intellectual 
property rights are: 1) the individual entitlement given by patents, which does not correspond to the 
collective nature of traditional knowledge and does not take into account the fact that inventors are 
difficult to identify; 2) the time-limits of patents, which do not reflect the permanent nature of indigenous 
entitlement; 3) the difficulty of patenting the content of traditional knowledge since it is considered as 
prior art and therefore does not fulfil the requirement of novelty; 4) the patentability of life forms, which 
produces counter-incentives to conservation; 5) the strict monetary nature of the rewards deriving from 
the concession of patents. On point 3), see Shakeel Bhatti and others, Contracting for ABS: The Legal and 
Scientific Implications of Bioprospecting Contracts (IUCN 2009), at 19: “Following access, many users seek 
to convert the non-exclusive genetic resource (legally held and potentially usable by a great many [sic] 
providers) into an exclusive resource, which no other person, country, or entity may use”; “Arguably, this 
kind of IPR defeats the purpose of ABS (which was intended to provide an incentive for conservation 
and sustainability), since the financial or potential value of species will be devalued following the issuance 
of the patent, thereby diminishing the conservation incentive. It seems clear that this type of IPR would 
also defeat the purpose of patents, which has been described as encouraging and protecting innovation”. 
On point 4), see Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 6: “We, indigenous peoples, have our own sources of natural 
law and we consider the values propagated by the individual property-based IPRs regime as values that 
we do not agree with. Our indigenous cosmologies and worldviews regard knowledge as gifts or heritage 
from nature, from the creators and great spirits, and from the ancestors. Knowledge is created collectively, 
accretionally, and inter-generationally and not just by individuals. Indigenous innovation is not just 
motivated by the desire for profit or for commercialization. Indigenous innovation is the result of the 
deep interrelationship between us and our territories and resources, between us and our ancestors and our 
gods and goddesses, and among ourselves.” See also, at 7 and 16-18. See further, J. L. Zweig, ‘A Globally 
Sustainable Right to Land: Utilising Real Property to Protect the Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities’ (2009-2010) 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 770; Seiler and Dutfield 2001; Davis 1999; Rama Rao, ‘The Relationship between Intellectual 
Property and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions’ in Ulia Popova-Gosart 
(ed), Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous Peoples (LIENIP and WIPO 2009), at 42: “it can be seen that 
indigenous and local communities, as the custodians of their TK and TCEs, are not entirely unfamiliar 
with the IP system and do derive some benefit from it. Yet, the conventional IP system does not respond 
fully to all their needs and aspirations”; Mattias Åhrén, ‘Legal Aspects related to Traditional Knowledge’ 
in Ulia Popova-Gosart (ed), Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous Peoples (LIENIP and WIPO 2009), at 
53-54: “the main stumbling block for indigenous peoples to use the IP system is, as already mentioned 
above, that the system primarily protects the rights of individual creators rather than the communal 
creativeness of a community”; Aguilar 2001, at 250: “At the moment, the IPR systems are not appropriate 
for protection of traditional knowledge because they cannot fully respond to the characteristics of certain 
forms of traditional knowledge like collective ownership, oral transmission, public domain (some cases), 
communal origination, collective management and ownership of information and knowledge”.
26  This phenomenon is also known as biopiracy. See Federico Lenzerini, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural 
Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of Their Traditional Knowledge’ in Francesco Francioni 
and Martin Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Nijhoff 2008), at 141-142: “in most circumstances, 
due to the objective difficulty of recognizing and even knowing the existence of such knowledge, 
biopirates have successfully exploited traditional knowledge as their own creation, thereby obtaining 
immense economic income without recognizing any role for the traditional holders of the knowledge 
concerned”.
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of this knowledge does not imply unrestricted use.27 Therefore, in the view of indigenous 
peoples, even when traditional knowledge is publicly available, access to its content 
should be conditioned to their prior informed consent.28 This requirement is based on 
the idea that there is a difference between knowledge being in the public domain and 
its public availability.29 In this sense, access to traditional knowledge does not equate to 
deprivation or alienation, since the immaterial value of traditional knowledge and its 
collective nature are simply non-disposable for indigenous peoples.30
Although being very advanced in the protection of indigenous cultural rights,31 
international human rights law hardly reflects this conception of indigenous traditional 
knowledge.32 Even the UN Declaration on indigenous rights ambiguously frame the 
protection of traditional knowledge in terms of “the right” of indigenous peoples “to 
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property”.33 The CESCR 
has approached problems related to the protection of “scientific, literary and artistic 
productions of indigenous peoples” under the rubric of Article 15 of the ICESCR. The 
Committee has never mentioned traditional knowledge but has recognised that States 
need to prevent unauthorised access to the intellectual production of indigenous peoples 
beyond protecting authorship. Furthermore, the CESCR has subjected any such use to 
the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.34
27  See Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 12: “Traditional knowledge is not in the public domain. While much of it 
is known because we openly share this knowledge, it is still held by individuals, clans, tribes, nations and 
different independent communities…Thus, the assumption that our heritage is in the public domain and 
therefore cannot be protected by IPRs and can be appropriated and used by anybody is fallacious to us”.
28  This position was expressed by some indigenous groups within the Group of Technical and Legal 
Experts on Traditional Knowledge associated with Genetic Resources. See the UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/
WG-ABS/8/2, para. 52: “Some suggested that traditional knowledge found in the public domain remains 
the property of indigenous and local communities and therefore should require prior informed consent 
before being used. The distinction between public availability and the public domain was stressed”.
29  See Pag-yendu M. Yentcharé, ‘Le Protocole de Nagoya n’institutionnalise-t-il pas l’absence de 
protection juridique des savoirs traditionnels? Une explication par l’allégories de l’éclipse solaire’ (2016) 
101 Liason Énergie-Francophonie 46, at 48.
30  See Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 7: “Traditional knowledge cannot be alienated”; “Consent to use, display, 
depict or exercise, is therefore temporary, and given only on the basis of trust that recipients respect 
and up-hold the conditions and customary laws that are attached to particular aspects of the heritage”. 
“Traditional knowledge is to be kept in perpetuity to be safeguarded, developed and passed from one 
generation to the next. The transfer of this knowledge is a collective responsibility and in most cases it is 
transmitted orally. In some cases these are codified in texts”.
31  On the link between the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural rights, see Lenzerini, 
‘Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of Their Traditional 
Knowledge’ 2008. On indigenous cultural rights, see also Chapter 2, section 3.3.
32  Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 353, at 376-377.
33  Art. 31(1) UNDRIP. Another relevant provision is Art. 24, which protects traditional medicines. 
Preambular para. 11 also recognizes “that the respect that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and 
traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of 
the environment”.
34  CESCR, General Comment 17, para. 32. See also CESCR, General Comment 21, para. 37, which 
recognises the right of indigenous peoples to traditional knowledge and the State’s corresponding duty to 
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The CBD is paradoxically more specific in the protection of traditional knowledge 
than human rights instruments. This is not only due to the fact that human rights treaties 
are not specifically targeted at indigenous peoples and have been adopted before the 
international framework of indigenous rights emerged. These considerations, in fact, 
do not explain why traditional knowledge is not sufficiently protected under the UN 
Declaration on indigenous rights. Furthermore, the same considerations of temporal 
obsolescence could apply to the CBD.
A more plausible explanation is that the CBD includes within its scope a number 
of situations where traditional knowledge, intended as a system of information that 
encompasses a specific world-vision, can be appropriated by non-indigenous subjects. 
In recognising the value of traditional knowledge for the protection of biodiversity, the 
CBD has included it in its scope of application and given it a special status within the 
international regime on conservation and ABS.
Article 8(j) of the CBD mandates the respect and preservation of indigenous 
knowledge “embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity”.35 While the Convention does not give a definition of traditional 
knowledge, the regime of in-situ conservation provides some elements to identify to 
what extent traditional knowledge falls within the scope of the CBD.
First, the fact of “embodying traditional lifestyles” confirms the vision of traditional 
knowledge as profoundly enmeshed with indigenous social practices. Some authors have 
criticised this formulation since it could be interpreted as only protecting indigenous 
traditional knowledge to the extent that it is based on a cultural stalemate of indigenous 
groups.36 While this interpretation is possible based only on the letter of the CBD, 
the method outlined in Chapter 2 helps to find an interpretative solution that is more 
harmonised with current international law.
In this sense, Article 8(j) must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the 
modern corpus of indigenous rights under international human rights law. Traditional 
knowledge is connected to the right to land, cultural rights, and participatory rights. All 
of these rights have a teleological dimension that is expressed through the principle of 
self-determination. Not only this principle preserves indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness, 
but makes it so that this distinctiveness must be determined in an autonomous way 
by indigenous peoples. In this sense, self-determination goes against cultural stagnation 
“respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent” in relation to this right; CESCR, Concluding 
observations on Jamaica, UN Doc. E/C.12/JAM/CO/3-4 (10 June 2013), para. 32.
35  Art. 8(j) CBD, emphasis added. On the notion of traditional knowledge within the CBD and a 
critique of its limitation, see Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘Traditional Knowledge Systems, International Law and 
National Challenges: Marginalization or Emancipation?’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International 
Law 1205.
36  See Glowka and al. 1994, at 48; Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in 
International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity’ 1997-1998, at 210; Morel 2010, at 176. 
These critiques have been highlighted in Chapter 1, section 3.
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and promotes instead a dynamic evolution of indigenous traditional practices pursuant 
to each group’s priorities and objectives.37 This teleological/systemic argument leads to 
the conclusion that the meaning of Article 8(j) is only in line with indigenous rights as 
protected under human rights treaties if the locution “traditional lifestyles” is interpreted 
as encompassing the evolving social structure of indigenous culture.
The second element qualifying traditional knowledge under Article 8(j) is that the 
traditional lifestyles that States have an obligation to protect and maintain should be 
instrumental for conservation and sustainable use. This locution has suffered from similar 
critiques as those outlined above. However, the reference to conservation objectives must 
not be seen as diminishing the scope of the protection of traditional knowledge in other 
subfields of international law. As illustrated, international human rights law does not 
strongly protect traditional knowledge as such. In this sense, the introduction of an 
obligation to protect indigenous knowledge in the CBD represents an improvement of 
the current international legal framework.38 Furthermore, conservation and sustainable 
development are two of the three objectives of the CBD. Consequently, CBD Parties 
cannot protect traditional practices going against those objectives without letting their 
international responsibility be engaged for the violation of the CBD itself. In this sense, 
the overall scope and objectives of the CBD prevents a consideration of indigenous 
rights that overtly challenges the Convention’s goals. This argument implies that even if 
traditional knowledge were protected under human rights law in a way that is detrimental 
to the objectives of the CBD, this connotation could not change the scope of the CBD 
via interpretative methods. In other words, systemic interpretation cannot go so far as 
to derogate from the object and purpose of the treaties that are interpreted in light of 
other legal standards unless hierarchy or a relation of specialty cannot be established.39 
Although systemic interpretation is not subordinated to other interpretative criteria, it 
does not supersede them either and must be anchored to the text of any treaties.
Furthermore, COP decisions have increasingly embraced a notion of traditional 
knowledge that goes beyond knowledge “embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”.40 The explanation for this 
evolution is probably linked to the fact that while traditional practices that go against the 
objectives of the CBD are understandably excluded from protection, it is less clear how to 
assess positive impacts of traditional knowledge on the CBD. Moreover, positive impacts 
may be the product of long-term practices, so that protecting traditional knowledge 
37  See Chapter 2, sections 4.2 and 5.
38  See Morgera, ‘Against All Odds: The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
International Human Rights Law’ 2013.
39  Art. 31(1) VCLT. On this point, see ILC fragmentation report, at 159, 205, 207, and 213. See also, 
Introduction, sections 5-6.
40  See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’ 2010, at 160.
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today can presumably contribute to the achievement of CBD objectives in the future. In 
addition, the evolution of the understanding of traditional knowledge within the CBD 
seems to be linked to the parallel consolidation of indigenous rights in international 
human rights law.
Even in early decisions the COP has required Parties to report on the incorporation 
of unqualified traditional knowledge “into development and resource-management 
decision-making processes”.41 In a number of decisions, the COP has recognised the 
dependency of traditional knowledge upon the preservation of indigenous cultural 
identity, land and resource ownership systems, and related rights.42 In some decisions, 
this conception has evolved into the acceptance of the necessity to respect indigenous 
“needs and views” when protecting traditional knowledge.43 Additionally, the COP has 
observed the mutual relationship between traditional knowledge and conservation. This 
means not only that the former should be instrumental for the latter, but also that the 
protection of the natural base should favour the maintenance of traditional knowledge.44 
Therefore, traditional knowledge and conservation are bound in a reciprocal relationship 
where conservation and traditional knowledge should be mutually beneficial.
41  COP dec. IV/9 (1998), para. 10(c). This element is reiterated in COP dec. VII/16, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/16 (13 April 2004), para. 4(b)(ii), where Parties are requested to submit 
information on how they protect traditional knowledge. See also, Akwé:Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the 
Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Developments Proposed 
to Take Place on, or Which Are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally 
Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities, COP dec. VII/16, Part F, (hereinafter 
Akwé:Kon guidelines), which mandates that traditional knowledge must be taken into account when 
performing impact assessment, especially with regard to its ownership (paras. 27(b), 29, 38, 41, 43: 
“traditional lifestyles”, and 44(h): “traditional systems of production”, for instance of medicines); COP 
dec. IX/13, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/13 (9 October 2008): Part C reaffirms “the central 
role of traditional knowledge in the cultures of indigenous and local communities and rights of indigenous 
and local communities”, thus decoupling traditional knowledge from conservation.
42  COP dec. V/16, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000), para. 16: recognition that the preservation 
of traditional knowledge depends upon the preservation of cultural identity and “the material base that 
sustains” indigenous peoples. COP dec. VI/10, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (2002), preamble: the COP 
refers to the need to protect traditional knowledge in accordance with the rights of indigenous peoples. 
COP dec. VII/16, para. 16: link between land and traditional knowledge.
43  COP dec. VII/16, para. 21 of Elements of a Plan of Action. See also, the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of 
Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local 
Communities Relevant to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity (hereinafter 
Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct), COP Dec. X/42, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/42 (29 
October 2010), which recognises that access to land and natural resources and the possibility to practice 
their traditions on those land are central elements in the preservation of traditional knowledge (preamble; 
para. 17 annex code). The Code also recognises the multifaceted nature of traditional knowledge that is 
linked to particular “spatial, cultural spiritual and temporal qualities” (preamble). Furthermore, the Code 
specifically highlights that traditional knowledge “should be respected” because of its cultural value and 
its role in promoting pluralism (para. 12 annex code).
44  COP dec. VII/28, PoWPA, Programme Element 1, para. 1.1.7: it is conservation (through the 
establishment of protected areas) that should benefit traditional knowledge. Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 
28, highlight the link between customary use of biodiversity and the preservation of traditional knowledge. 
However, the guidelines provide a definition of traditional knowledge that coincides with Article 8(j) 
(para. 6(h)). See also, COP dec. XII/12, Part B, Annex, Plan of Action on Customary Sustainable Use of 
Biological Diversity, paras. 6(g) and 9.
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All these elements underlie the recognition that traditional knowledge is broader 
than the notion provided in Article 8(j) CBD. Similar results could be achieved if the 
locution lifestyles that are relevant to the objectives of the CBD were interpreted in a 
systemic way to take into account indigenous rights as protected in human rights law. 
In light of the principle of self-determination, tradition knowledge must be protected 
in a way that preserves indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness by CBD State Parties. In this 
sense, the contribution to conservation and sustainable use can be seen as the positive 
formulation of the fact that traditional knowledge cannot be protected within the CBD 
if it endangers the objectives of this convention.
The same considerations hold true for the interpretation of Article 10(c) of 
the CBD, which creates an obligation to “[p]rotect and encourage customary use of 
biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible 
with conservation or sustainable use requirements”.45 According to some authors, this 
provision helps to define traditional knowledge within the scope of the CBD, since 
the creation of traditional knowledge is closely related to the customary use of natural 
resources.46
While the locutions used in Articles 8(j) and 10(c) do not necessarily endanger 
the protection of traditional knowledge since they are only intended to define the scope 
of the CBD, residual concerns relate to the importance that traditional knowledge may 
play outside conservation. Beyond prescribing the protection of traditional knowledge, 
according to Article 8(j) CBD Parties shall promote the application of traditional 
knowledge and encourage the sharing of the benefits deriving from such a utilisation. In 
both cases, therefore, traditional knowledge could be used for purposes that go beyond 
conservation, namely when CBD Parties access genetic resources pursuant to Article 15 
of the Convention. According to this provision, access is bound by “environmentally 
sound uses”. At the same time, access is de facto often performed by State and non-State 
users with the aim of commercialising the results of research and development activities 
conducted on the genetic resources of third countries.
In this sense, Article 8(j) suffers from many deficiencies. First, it fails to explicitly 
link the application of traditional knowledge to the ABS provisions of Article 15. 
This omission makes the connection between access to genetic resources and access to 
traditional knowledge obscure and subject to different regulatory regimes and guarantees.
Second, Article 8(j) requires with an equally obscure formulation that traditional 
knowledge is applied with the approval and involvement of indigenous and local 
communities. The main ambiguity in this sense lies in the failure to specify whether 
45  See COP dec. X/43, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/43 (29 October 2010), para. 8, which 
included analysis on Art. 10(c) CBD in the Programme of Work on Art. 8(j) CBD.
46  The 1994 CBD guide highlights the link between Article 8(j) and Article 10(c) since customary use 
is at the origin of traditional knowledge and practices. See Glowka and al. 1994, at 60.
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there is a difference between the two requirements and, if so, under which circumstances 
approval or involvement should be met.
A related interpretative puzzle is the question of whether or not traditional knowledge 
that is applied within the scope of Article 8(j) but is not relevant for conservation shall be 
accessed with the approval and involvement of indigenous peoples and shall be subject 
to benefit-sharing. This issue can be resolved by observing that the locution that qualifies 
traditional knowledge in relation to conservation, is only referred to the first part of 
Article 8(j) prescribing active protection in such a case. Therefore, the approval and 
involvement of indigenous and local communities are required as necessary conditions 
independently both from the purpose of utilisation and from the nature of traditional 
knowledge concerned.
Third, Article 8(j) does not consider the requirements of approval and involvement 
with respect to the circumstance that indigenous peoples own the genetic resources accessed 
by third-party users. While this is probably due to the late emergence of indigenous land 
and resource rights, this omission creates a normative gap that can hardly be filled via 
interpretative techniques.
Finally, Article 8(j) only establishes the rather weak obligation to encourage the 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of traditional knowledge. The weakness 
of this obligation is mainly linked to its indeterminacy, especially if compared with the 
parallel obligation under Article 15(7) of the CBD for States to put in place a national 
legal framework with the aim to share the benefits deriving from the utilisation of 
genetic resources with States providing those resources. In contrast, benefit-sharing with 
indigenous peoples does not require the translation of the obligation of ends posited by 
Article 8(j) of the CBD into national laws. This indeterminacy about the means required 
to fulfil the obligation “to encourage” have created uncertainties about implementation, 
thus the weakness of this obligation.47 This formulation,48 together with the objective 
difficulties with conceiving a well-functioning mechanism of benefit-sharing, has led to 
the failure of CBD Parties to implement this provision.
The rest of this subsection addresses more in detail the first two issues highlighted 
above with a view to understanding to what extent COP decisions and the Nagoya Protocol 
have contributed to clarify the unresolved interpretative problems and deficiencies 
47  As argued in Chapter 1, section 3, the indeterminacy of its content does not diminish the binding 
nature of the obligation to encourage benefit-sharing under Art. 8(j) CBD. Moreover, the same obligation 
“to encourage” contained in the Nagoya Protocol with reference to Art. 9 and Art. 20 has been interpreted 
as implying a “best-endeavor obligation for all Parties to support”, which means that although States are 
not obliged to enact a national legislative framework, they are required to provide the right incentives. 
Furthermore, they may incur in international responsibility if they put in place disincentives or obstacles 
to the activities that must be encouraged. See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 160 and 238 
(quotation above).
48  Combined with the highly qualified language of the entire provision: “as far as possible”, “as 
appropriate”, and “subject to national legislation”. See Chapter 1, section 3.
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of the CBD. The failure to incorporate consent requirements into the protection of 
indigenous-owned genetic resources is explored in section 2.2, while the interpretative 
gaps concerning benefit-sharing are addressed in section 2.3.
2.1.1. The link between Article 8(j) CBD and ABS
As said, Article 8(j) of the CBD frames the protection of traditional knowledge within the 
context of in-situ conservation. Thus, the link with the ABS regime is not explicit in the 
Convention. However, a contextual appraisal of the CBD would suggest a joint reading 
of Article 8(j) with Article 15 in light of the treaty’s objectives and scope of application.
Ensuring the “fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization 
of genetic resources” is one of the three objectives of the CBD.49 Article 15(7) articulates 
this objective with an obligation to put in place legislative measures that endeavour to 
obtain benefit-sharing in relation inter alia to “the results of research and development”. 
Research and development over genetic resources, however, are a matter not only of 
inter-State interaction. Several other actors may contribute to this undertaking, including 
indigenous peoples whose traditional knowledge is utilised to uncover the properties and 
potential use of genetic resources.50 The relevance of indigenous peoples is reflected in 
Article 8(j) and this element corroborates the argument that the CBD regime on ABS must 
be read in light of the indigenous-related provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, 
Articles 8(j) and 15 CBD are two of the few provisions within the Convention’s text 
articulating the objective of benefit-sharing.51
In line with this reasoning, the Working Group on Article 8(j) and the CBD COP 
have similarly embraced an interpretation according to which the provisions protecting 
traditional knowledge within the CBD are closely linked to the issue of ABS.52 This is 
particularly evident in the decision of the COP VII/19 conferring the mandate to the 
Working Group on Article 8(j) together with the Working Group on access and benefit-
sharing to elaborate the text of an international regime on ABS.53 The work of these bodies 
has resulted in the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. Before looking into the text of this 
49  Art. 3 CBD.
50  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 38-39. These authors argue that the link between Art. 
8(j) and Art. 15 CBD is praeter legem.
51  A reference to inter-State benefit-sharing is also contained in Art. 16(4), 19, and 20(2).
52  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 38. See Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/7 (13 November 2007), paras. 81 ff. See also, Report of the Sixth Meeting 
of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2 (21 November 2009), Annex II, para. 3(i).
53  COP dec. VII/19, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/19 (13 April 2004). See at 4: the Preamble 
recognises that, in negotiating a regime on ABS, Art. 8(j) is to be taken into account. The same decision 
makes also reference to the work carried out by the Working Group on Article 8(j). Finally, the two 
Working Groups were to negotiate the agreement on ABS with the participation inter alia of indigenous 
and local communities.
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agreement, it is interesting to note that, in defining the scope of the future international 
agreement, the COP has identified two main clusters, namely access to genetic resources 
and related benefit-sharing, as well as “[t]raditional knowledge, innovations and practices 
in accordance with Article 8(j)”.54
The Nagoya Protocol remedies to the disconnection between the protection of 
traditional knowledge and the rules on access to genetic resources.55 According to Article 
5, benefits deriving from the utilization of genetic resources are not only a matter of 
inter-State concern. Article 5(1) creates a strong connection between access to genetic 
resources as disciplined by Article 15 of the CBD and the complementary regime of the 
Protocol on benefit-sharing. In this sense, this provision indirectly confirms the link 
between ABS within the Convention and the protection of traditional knowledge. In 
this respect, Article 5(5) of the Protocol creates the obligation for State Parties to adopt 
“legislative, administrative and policy measures” that aim to realise the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits deriving from the utilisation of “traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources”. Letting aside for a while issues concerning the meaning of 
this locution56 and the fact that this obligation is heavily qualified,57 the link between 
traditional knowledge and ABS is explicitly recognised and can be considered a step 
forward.
The link between traditional knowledge and ABS is not only acknowledged as far as 
benefit-sharing is concerned.58 Article 7 of the Protocol also establishes that State Parties 
must adopt
measures, as appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources that is held by indigenous and local 
communities is accessed with the prior and informed consent or approval and 
involvement of these indigenous and local communities, and that mutually 
agreed terms have been established.
Notwithstanding the qualified nature of this provision,59 the Protocol creates an 
obligation to regulate procedural guarantees when accessing traditional knowledge. Two 
elements are necessary, namely prior and informed consent or approval and involvement, 
which is examined in the next section, and MATs, which are contractual agreements that 
are concluded between providers and users for the first time extended to the relationship 
54  COP dec. VII/19, at 6.
55  The CBD Secretariat has described the mandate of the Working Group on ABS as aiming to 
implement both Art. 15 and Art. 8(j) of the CBD. See the introduction to the text of the Protocol 
edited by the Secretariat, available at https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf (last 
accessed October 2016).
56  See section 2.1.3 in this chapter.
57  See section 2.3 in this chapter.
58  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 39. According to these authors, the link is represented by the 
obligation to ensure benefit-sharing.
59  See “as appropriate” and “with the aim of”. See infra.
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between the State utilising traditional knowledge and indigenous and local communities. 
The link between traditional knowledge and ABS is therefore reinforced by procedural 
guarantees. Both consent and MATs, in addition, have more than a procedural nature 
but for the purposes of this analysis constitute a further recognition that traditional 
knowledge has officially entered the realm of ABS.60
Finally, the definition of utilization of genetic resources in Article 2 of the Protocol 
includes research and development activities that, as argued above, may imply the use 
of traditional knowledge. In this sense, a clearer definition of research and development 
within the CBD regime would be desirable and could help to dissipate any further doubt.
2.1.2. Consent, approval and involvement
Article 8(j) foresees the qualified obligation for States to promote the application of 
traditional knowledge “with the approval and involvement” of indigenous and local 
communities. While approval and involvement seem to be necessary conditions to 
guarantee the utilisation of traditional knowledge,61 how these conditions are realised 
and whether they are interchangeable is less clear.
In order to understand what approval and involvement imply within the CBD, 
it is useful to define what application of traditional knowledge means. The CBD gives 
some examples in Articles 17(2) and 18(4), which respectively promote the exchange 
of information between Parties, including traditional knowledge, and the cooperation 
regarding the use of traditional technologies. The comprehensive nature of traditional 
knowledge, the use of the adjective “wider” in Article 8(j), and a comprehensive reading 
of the CBD in light of the whole of its provisions support the view that every kind of 
application, be it or not aimed to conservation, must be subject to the approval and 
involvement of indigenous and local communities.
It remains to be seen what approval and involvement imply and whether they 
are alternative conditions. In line with the ordinary meaning of the word, approval 
evokes the notion of consent. On the other hand, involvement is the weakest form of 
participation in a decision since it requires neither necessarily consultation on a specific 
matter, nor that indigenous representatives must be involved in decision-making 
processes concerning the utilisation of their traditional knowledge. The concurrent use 
of two seemingly contradictory requirements in the text of Article 8(j) leads to difficulties 
with implementation of this provision since two opposite interpretations are possible. 
It can be argued that the two requirements should be used in different circumstances. 
This interpretation would be in line with the fact that Article 8(j) is subordinated to 
national legislation, and thus different degrees of participation could be required by 
60  On MATs as a tool for reconciling indigenous rights with ABS provisions within the Protocol, see 
section 2.4 in this chapter.
61  See section 2.1 in this chapter.
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national systems. At the same time, Anaya argues that approval and involvement are 
not alternative requirements and must be read in light of the right to free, prior and 
informed consent as recognised in international human rights law.62 According to this 
interpretation, therefore, approval and involvement are a form of free, prior informed 
consent that is subject to the same requirements.63
The question, therefore, becomes whether the margin of appreciation of States that 
seems to be granted under Article 8(j) of the CBD in the implementation of participatory 
standards is legitimate under current international law. The answer to this question 
requires both an analysis of how the CBD COP has interpreted this provision and the 
interpretative support of any relevant rules of international law pursuant to Article 31(3)
(c) of the VCLT.
CBD COP decisions, however, are not decisive for understanding the conditions 
under which either approval or involvement are required because they have failed to 
define what approval and involvement imply. In contrast, the term participation has also 
been used without clarifying its peculiarities with respect to the expressions used in the 
Convention.64 Furthermore, latest COP decisions have introduced an additional level of 
complexity since they speak of “prior informed consent or approval and involvement”.65 
62  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/67/301 (13 
August 2012), para. 92. A similar argument is made by Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Law 
Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ 2013, at 70, concerning the requirement of prior informed consent 
or approval and involvement in the Nagoya Protocol.
63  See Chapter 2, section 3.5. These requirements are to engage in good faith consultation with the 
lawful representatives of indigenous peoples every time a decision affects indigenous groups directly with 
the aim to reach an agreement with them. In addition, this consultation must be done at the very early 
stages of decision-making. Furthermore, consent is to be obtained under certain circumstances.
64  See e.g. COP dec. XI(14), UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/14 (5 December 2012) , Part F, 
para. 10(a): the participation of indigenous peoples is demanded when customary practices are included 
into national biodiversity strategies.
65  COP dec. XII/12, para. 5: “Recognizing that indigenous and local communities are the holders of 
their traditional knowledge, innovations and practices, access to their traditional knowledge, innovations 
and practices should be subject to their prior informed consent or approval and involvement”; importance 
of “full and effective participation” of indigenous peoples in the development of policies about sustainable 
use. See also, Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct, para. 11 of the annex: “Any activities/interactions 
related to traditional knowledge associated with the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, occurring on or likely to impact on sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied 
or used by indigenous and local communities and impacting upon specific groups, should be carried out 
with the prior informed consent and/or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities. 
Such consent or approval should not be coerced, forced or manipulated”; para. 30: “This principle 
recognizes the crucial importance of indigenous and local communities fully and effectively participating 
in activities/interactions related to biological diversity and conservation that may impact on them, and 
of respecting their decision-making processes and time frames for such decision-making. Ethical conduct 
should acknowledge that there are some legitimate circumstances for indigenous and local communities 
to restrict access to their traditional knowledge”. An isolated interpretation is that provided in the Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of Their Utilization, COP dec. VI/24 (2002), Annex, (hereinafter Bonn guidelines) (para. 31) that 
seem to distinguish between the prior informed consent, which is to be obtained from indigenous and 
local communities, and approval and involvement from holders of traditional knowledge. The problems 
with this formulation are multiple, ranging from the fact that it is not clear who holders of traditional 
Chapter 3
199
In the CBD practice, therefore, the alternative is not between approval and involvement 
but between the legal requirement of prior and informed consent and the seemingly 
contradictory combination of approval and involvement. In addition to this lack of 
clarification provided by COP decisions, it is not clear which alternative refers to which 
situation.
Some decisions eliminate the ambiguity between two or more alternatives and foresee 
consent as the only viable option. These examples, however, are limited and coexist with 
other decisions where ambiguity persists. The Addis Ababa guidelines on sustainable use 
require that the approval of the holders of traditional knowledge utilised in the adaptive 
management of biodiversity must be obtained.66 In the context of impact assessment for 
projects that are planned on indigenous territories, the Akwé:Kon guidelines require that 
prior informed consent is obtained when traditional knowledge is used.67
The very notion of prior informed consent is not clear in the context of the CBD. 
This is partially due to the uncertainties also existing in the realm of international human 
rights law about whether consent should only be sought or must be obtained.68 COP 
decisions do not explicitly deal with those issues. However, the Report adopted in 2009 
by the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge associated with 
Genetic Resources, convened in the context of the CBD, has reconstructed the notion of 
prior informed consent in light of the international body of indigenous rights.69 The report 
is only one of the possible legal interpretations, although authoritative. The document, 
however, is interesting because it relies on both international practice, intended as the 
position crystallised in international instruments, and national practice to conclude that 
there is “a progressive trend towards international law mandating a requirement for the 
prior informed consent of indigenous peoples and local communities for traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources”.70 Interestingly, the report also refers to the 
concurrent practice of “commercial users to seek prior informed consent from indigenous 
knowledge other than indigenous and local communities are, to the fact that the ambiguity of approval 
and involvement is not resolved. This formulation is also used in Art. 6 and 7 of the Nagoya Protocol. 
See infra in this section.
66  Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (hereinafter Addis 
Ababa guidelines or principles), COP. Dec. XII/12, Operational guidelines to practical principle 4, at 12.
67  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 60.
68  See Chapter 2, section 3.5. This section argues that, although free, prior and informed consent 
cannot be considered as a veto power, it must be obtained under particular circumstances, i.e., in case of 
large scale projects that have an impact on the enjoyment of indigenous core rights.
69  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, Question 6. In para. 67, the report identifies the 
international human rights instruments that are relevant for identifying the notion of free, prior and 
informed consent under current international law: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR and 
ICESCR, ILO Convention 169, ITPGRFA, Bonn guidelines, UNDRIP, and CERD.
70  UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 68.
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peoples and local communities as a matter of best practice”.71 Furthermore, the report 
argues for an evolutionary interpretation of the CBD in accordance with new standards 
of international law.72 The Groups of experts, therefore, proposes systemic arguments 
that are similar to those put forward in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.73
Some COP decisions timidly point to the fact that the conditions under which the 
utilisation of traditional knowledge should be performed under the CBD depend on the 
indigenous rights at stake. The Akwé:Kon guidelines, for instance, refers to the respect 
for the rights of indigenous and local communities to their traditional knowledge.74 
Therefore, some CBD practice has relied on the incorporation of indigenous rights into 
the Convention. When it comes to access to traditional knowledge, this means that there 
is a spectrum of participatory rights ranging from consultation to consent, where free, 
prior and informed consent is to be obtained when States’ or third actors’ activities may 
compromise the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous peoples.75
Indigenous rights, however, are not the only elements to be taken into account 
under the CBD. The Bonn guidelines, although referring to the framework of indigenous 
rights, subordinate rights to “national access policies and domestic laws”.76 In light of the 
current framework of indigenous rights, the subordination of international standards to 
national law seems unjustified. In contrast, the manoeuvring regulatory space of States 
can be exercised by tailoring participatory processes to the impacts that the utilisation of 
traditional knowledge is expected to produce. This means at a minimum that indigenous 
peoples must always be informed when and for which purposes their traditional 
knowledge is used.
The requirement of information is mandatory even when it is particularly difficult 
to implement for States, for instance when the content of traditional knowledge is 
already in the public domain or when it is stored in archives. In such cases, for States not 
71  UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2. Other references to the role of private businesses in COP decisions can 
be found: COP dec. IX/26, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/26 (9 October 2008), Preamble; 
Akwé:Kon guidelines, at 3; Addis Ababa guidelines, at 3 and Practicle principles 1 and 3; Tkarihwaiè:ri 
Code of Ethical Conduct, para. 3; COP dec. XI/7, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/7 (5 December 
2012), paras. 4(e), (c), and (f ); COP dec. X/21, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/21 (29 October 
2010), para. 2(a), (b), (g), and (k).
72  UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 69: “The Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force in 
1993. The understanding of the Convention can evolve over time. The interpretation of the Convention 
by the Conference of the Parties through its decisions must be guided by the developments in international 
law and processes particularly with regard to prior informed consent. Within the discussions on Article 
8(j) in the Working Group on the subject, and the current negotiations of the International Regime, the 
need for the knowledge holder’s prior informed consent has been recognized in relation to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources.”
73  The Group, however, does not explicitly discuss the nature of the relevant rules invoked.
74  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 60. These rights may be established via indigenous customary laws or 
through intellectual property rights.
75  See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
76  Bonn guidelines, para. 31.
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to breach human rights provisions on indigenous participatory rights, one possibility is 
that they put in place a national normative framework requiring that subjects operating 
under their jurisdiction are obliged to provide information to and engage in consultation 
with indigenous peoples when traditional knowledge is in the public domain.77 Whereas 
engaging with indigenous peoples is mandatory also because it is functional to benefit-
sharing, consent is not necessarily required.78
The requirement of information is also a precondition for utilising traditional 
knowledge, in case the latter is not readily available. In such circumstances, States 
and private parties must in any case cooperate and consult with indigenous peoples to 
obtain that knowledge. If application of such knowledge threatens to disrupt indigenous 
cultural practices, consent must be obtained. Under any circumstances, it is unacceptable 
that private parties appropriate indigenous knowledge with patents since traditional 
knowledge is by its nature not transferrable.79
Concerning the implementation of consent requirements, the Working Group 
on Article 8(j) has recently recommended the adoption of some guidelines to steer the 
work of national legislators.80 These guidelines have been submitted to COP 13 for 
adoption by CBD Parties in 2016 and represent voluntary standards. There are, however, 
at least two interesting elements. First, indigenous representatives have contributed to 
the drafting process of these guidelines.81 Within the CBD COP, the participation of 
indigenous representatives to the COP decision-making is not exceptional when it comes 
77  The Expert group on Article 10 called for informing discussions on traditional knowledge in the public 
domain with reference to the debates taking place in the context WIPO Intergovernmental Committee 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (WIPO IGC). 
See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/4 (3 February 2016), para. 32. The WIPO IGC 
committee has not agreed upon the notion of traditional knowledge under the public domain as yet. See 
WIPO ICG, Report of the 29th session, Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/29/8 (30 May 2016). The WIPO IGC, 
however, has adopted a problematic notion of public domain, i.e., knowledge that is not protected by 
patents and may be accessed by everyone without authorization and for free. See WIPO IGC, Glossary 
of key terms related to intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions, Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/30/INF/7 (3 March 2016), at 34.
78  On this point, see also, sections 2.2 and 2.3 in this chapter. 
79  Indeed, it is possible that indigenous groups decide to commodify their knowledge and transfer 
it to third parties. In such cases, however, this commodification must be decided freely by indigenous 
peoples. The assessment of to what extent consent can be deemed free is a very complex one, for reasons 
that are not specifically analysed in this dissertation, including the rightful identification of indigenous 
representatives, and the extent to which these can lawfully represent their communities.
80  Draft Voluntary Guidelines for the Development of Mechanisms, Legislation or Other Appropriate 
Initiatives to Ensure the [Free,] Prior Informed Consent or [Approval and Involvement] of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities for Accessing their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, for Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Use of Their Knowledge, Innovations and Practices 
Relevant for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, and for Reporting and 
Preventing Unlawful Appropriation of Traditional Knowledge, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG8J/9/L.5 (7 
November 2015) (hereinafter Draft voluntary guidelines 2015), Annex.
81  See Elisa Morgera, ‘Towards International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and 
Equitable Benefit-Sharing from the Use of Traditional Knowledge’ [2015] http://www.benelexblog.law.
ed.ac.uk/2015/12/09/towards (last accessed October 2016).
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to matters that touch upon interests or rights of indigenous peoples. This decision-making 
process confirms the fact that the dialogue between States and indigenous peoples is a 
methodology that goes beyond the drafting of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights.
The second element of interest is constituted by the fact that the locution “approval 
and involvement” is one of the points that will be subject to further negotiation during 
COP 13.82 This means that the definition of participatory requirements within the CBD 
is still contentious in the practice of its State Parties and that the locution approval and 
involvement is a particularly unclear compromise solution. As argued above, however, 
this compromise solution does not stand in a legal void and must be interpreted in light 
of relevant human rights.
Furthermore, the draft COP decision contains the first bracketed reference to the 
human rights standard of free, prior informed consent in CBD history.83 Therefore, it is 
also possible that CBD Parties would solve interpretative uncertainties about approval 
and involvement by anchoring this paradigm to an express reference to a human rights 
standard. Whether or not the formulation free, prior and informed consent will be 
retained eventually, CBD Parties should have a greater incentive to agree to a clear 
formulation of participatory rights that is adapted to CBD circumstances rather than 
simply incorporating human rights standards. In other words, CBD Parties have the 
chance to clarify how the standard of prior and informed consent applies in concrete in 
the context of the CBD. In this sense, they might do so also by specifying which shade 
of participation is needed in which circumstances.84
The Nagoya Protocol, although introducing an obligation to take legislative 
measures to ensure the participation of indigenous and local communities when 
traditional knowledge is accessed, still articulates participation in terms of “prior and 
informed consent or approval and involvement”.85 However, two novelties are worth 
highlighting.
First, the Protocol explicitly recognises the rights of indigenous peoples over 
traditional knowledge and it does so in a legal pluralistic fashion. Preambular paragraph 
24 of the Protocol recognises that “it is the right of indigenous and local communities 
to identify the rightful holders of their traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources, within their communities”. Furthermore, Article 12(1) prescribes that the 
obligations of the Protocol related to traditional knowledge must be implemented taking 
82  Ibid.
83  The draft decision refers to [free,] prior and informed consent. In contrast, the Nagoya Protocol 
requires prior and informed consent under Art. 6 and 7.
84  In such a hypothesis, CBD Parties could also decide to explicitly derogate from human rights 
standards requiring consent, thus proposing an interpretation of the CBD as lex specialis with respect to 
human rights. On the nature and function of lex specialis norms, see the Introduction of this dissertation, 
section 5.
85  Art. 7 Nagoya Protocol.
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into consideration inter alia indigenous customary laws.86 In this light, the locution “in 
accordance with domestic law” included in Article 7 of the Protocol can be interpreted 
as requiring from State Parties a certain degree of flexibility in adapting participatory 
standards to national contexts and is very different from the qualification “subject to 
national law” included in Article 8(j) CBD.87 National circumstances might also include 
diversified customary laws of indigenous peoples. On the other hand, this interpretation 
does not solve the issue of the different scope of application of the Nagoya Protocol with 
respect to the CBD, which is addressed in the next section.
Second, the Nagoya Protocol adds to the requirement of “prior informed consent 
or approval and involvement” the establishment of MATs. The importance of this 
contractual instrument cannot be downplayed since it points to the fact that users 
(States and private parties) must negotiate with indigenous peoples at the same level. 
Another important novelty that is institutionalised in the Protocol is the establishment of 
community protocols on the part of indigenous peoples.88 The nature and value of these 
instruments are further discussed in section 2.4.
2.1.3. The notion of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources
A further conundrum when it comes to traditional knowledge within the CBD legal 
regime is the different formulation used in the Nagoya Protocol to define the scope 
of the latter instrument.89 Although the Protocol introduces the formula “traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources”, it fails to define it.90 The use of this new 
formula, therefore, triggers the question of whether the scope of application of the CBD 
coincides with that of the Nagoya Protocol when it comes to traditional knowledge. In 
other words, it is doubtful whether the Nagoya Protocol and its novelties can really help 
86  On the negotiations of this provision, see Kabir Bavikatte and Daniel F. Robinson, ‘Towards a 
People’s History of the Law: Biocultural Jurisprudence and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing’ (2011) 7/1 LEAD Journal 37, at 46.
87  See Gurdial Singh Nijar, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: 
Analysis and Implementation Options for Developing Countries’ [2011] https://www.southcentre.
int/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Ev_130201_GNjar1.pdf (last accessed October 2016), at 36: “The 
Protocol advances the CBD provisions on TK. However, these provisions are made subject to national 
law. It should be clarified that this is to allow countries to reflect the diversity of the ways in which TK is 
held and treated in different countries. A preamble to the Protocol recognizes ‘the unique circumstances 
where traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is held in countries’. The qualifier should 
not be construed to thwart the rights of indigenous and local communities. Further, it should be clarified 
through COP/MOP decisions and national law, that nothing in the Protocol allows for access to publicly 
available TK or TK that is diffused and has no identifiable holders (and that is consequently held by the 
State) without PIC and MAT”.
88  See Art. 12 Nagoya Protocol.
89  Art. 3 Nagoya Protocol.
90  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 63: “This gap is particularly noteworthy as no other 
international treaty has referred to this concept or more generally to ‘traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources”.
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to solve the interpretative difficulties linked to Article 8(j) of the CBD. Although the 
Protocol has inter alia been established to respond to these interpretative gaps, there are at 
least two difficulties preventing the perfect interoperability between the two instruments.
The first one is of a general character and concerns the difference in the contracting 
Parties of the two instruments. This problem, however, only requires an element of 
caution on the part of the interpreter who, whenever applying the Nagoya Protocol to 
a factual situation, must verify whether the States involved are Parties of the Protocol 
or not.91 If not, the only applicable instrument will be the CBD with the interpretative 
difficulties described above.
Indeed, the Nagoya Protocol may find application in bilateral relations between 
States that are party to it and States that are not. A relevant example is when a provider 
State establishes a legislative framework in pursuance of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Nagoya 
Protocol to regulate the sharing of the benefits with indigenous peoples and the exercise 
of prior and informed consent for the utilisation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge associated to them. In this case, even if the user State has not ratified the 
Nagoya Protocol, its provisions would apply to it via the laws of those State Parties that 
have implemented the Protocol nationally.92
Furthermore, the Protocol may also play a fundamental role in interpreting the 
CBD provisions applicable in bilateral or multilateral cases in light of the relevant 
context or subsequent practice of the Parties concerned. Under Article 31(2)(b) of the 
VCLT, the Protocol could represent an “instrument which was made by one or more 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties 
as an instrument related to the treaty”. In this case, thus, it is up to the State Party to 
demonstrate that non-party States have accepted the Nagoya Protocol as an instrument 
related to the CBD. In light of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, the Nagoya Protocol may 
also offer grounds for systemic interpretation.93
The second difficulty is related to the unclear meaning of “traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources”. Some authors have argued that the notion of traditional 
knowledge contained in the Nagoya Protocol is much more circumscribed than that of 
91  On this point, see the Introduction to this dissertation, sections 5-6, which argue that when States 
that are only party to the CBD interact with States that are also party to the Nagoya Protocol, the 
Protocol might be able to influence reciprocal obligations by means of a contextual interpretation of the 
obligations stemming from the CBD in light of the Protocol at least for those obligations that apply to 
the States that have ratified the Protocol. Since the latter are anyway obliged to implement the Protocol’s 
obligations, this implementation might indirectly affect those States that, although not being party to the 
Protocol, interact with Parties.
92  Although a similar example can be imagined for the case when user States are party to the Protocol, it 
seems that the legislative framework enacted in this context may only have some influence to the extent 
it imposes some obligations on States’ agents or private third parties that are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the State having ratified the Protocol.
93  As recalled, Art. 31(3)(a) VCLT reads: “There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions”.
Chapter 3
205
the CBD since it is qualified.94 Consequently, the scope of the two instruments would 
not perfectly coincide, thus leaving some interpretative gaps unresolved under the new 
regime. The remainder of this section argues that the expression “associated with genetic 
resources” may also be interpreted in broader terms in the absence of a contrary indication 
by the COP/MOP.
Some elements useful to the interpretation of the locution “associated with genetic 
resources” emerge from COP decisions. In the decision conferring the mandate to prepare 
an international Protocol on ABS cited above,95 traditional knowledge is almost consistently 
referred to in relation with genetic resources. Indeed, the decision also acknowledges the 
risks of misappropriation of both genetic resources and traditional knowledge without 
further qualification. This element stands out also because it is contained in the terms of 
reference for the Working Group on ABS.96 COP decision VIII/5 treats the issue of the 
adoption of an international regime on ABS in the context of a draft “plan of action for 
the retention of traditional knowledge…relevant for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity”.97 This framing of the issue highlights an important overarching 
connection between unqualified traditional knowledge and ABS. At the same time, the 
decision suggests that the association with genetic resources could be a specific feature of 
the ABS regime, but it is not the only legal aspect which is relevant in the context of the 
CBD.98 In other words, the protection of traditional knowledge per se seems an essential 
element of the CBD legal framework.
These considerations are confirmed when looking at the scope and objective of 
the Protocol in connection with the framework provided by the CBD. The text of the 
Protocol only refers to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.99 The 
objective to ensure benefit-sharing must be read, as also specified by Article 1 of the 
Protocol, in connection with the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use 
of its components. As shown in section 2.1,100 the CBD clearly links conservation to 
the traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities.101 Both in the text of 
94  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 40. In addition, if mutual supportiveness were to be intended 
as a general principle of international law as foreshadowed in Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle 
of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, 
all CBD Parties could be expected to ratify the Nagoya Protocol since the latter brings more clarity to 
the relationship between indigenous rights and ABS. Furthermore, mutual supportiveness could inform 
future CBD practice in the form of CBD COP and COP/MOP decisions to guide implementation of 
the two treaties.
95  COP dec. VII/19.
96  COP dec. VII/19, Annex, at 10.
97  COP dec. VIII/5, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VIII/5 (15 June 2006), Part II C, at 4.
98  See also COP dec. VIII/5, at 16, where the development of sui generis systems of protection relates 
to unqualified traditional knowledge.
99  See in particular Art. 1 and 3 Nagoya Protocol concerning the objective and scope of the treaty.
100  See also Chapter 4, section 1.
101  See in particular Art. 8(j) and 10(c) CBD.
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the CBD and in the practice of the CBD COP, this knowledge is not qualified only 
in connection with genetic resources. In contrast, traditional knowledge is specifically 
considered for its contribution to conservation and the harmonious achievement of the 
three objectives of the CBD. In this sense, since ABS in the Nagoya Protocol should 
also contribute to realise the other objectives of the CBD, the scope of traditional 
knowledge in the Protocol must be intended to be as broad as that of the CBD. This 
broader understanding would imply that even when traditional knowledge is not utilised 
in connection with the utilisation of genetic resources, this situation would fall under 
the scope of the Protocol, thus ensuring that the requirement of benefit-sharing applies 
to the broader hypothesis of access.102
In light of the above, the qualification of traditional knowledge in terms of its 
association with genetic resources in the Protocol may be due to the almost exclusive 
occurrence of this particular form of traditional knowledge in the ABS regime. In this 
context, traditional knowledge is valued in relation to the properties of genetic resources 
it may unveil. This is true both when this knowledge is used to promote the conservation 
of biodiversity, since it contains useful information on the management of nature, and 
when it facilitates the commercial development of genetic resources.103
Overall, it seems that there are several aspects of traditional knowledge that are 
relevant in the context of the CBD. Although these aspects constitute a characterisation 
of traditional knowledge in the different legal areas of the CBD (i.e., conservation and 
ABS), unqualified traditional knowledge remains a general concern of the CBD regime. 
In other words, the notion of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
must be interpreted broadly, including a broad spectrum of traditional knowledge, such 
as for instance healing practices that may be accessed for their potential to unveil the 
properties of certain medicinal plants.
102  On the differences between access and utilization, see next section.
103  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 13: “Although the traditional knowledge used for 
the final product may not match the body of traditional knowledge, traditional knowledge adds value 
to genetic resources by providing a massive increase of efficiency in identifying genetic resources with 
potential properties. Traditional knowledge can therefore be considered as an indicator of the potential 
properties of a genetic resource”; para. 15: “there is not always a relationship between the owners of 
genetic resources accessed and the holders of traditional knowledge”; para. 18: “Article 8(j) as a stand alone 
provision protects all traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities…including traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources. Furthermore, associated traditional knowledge does not 
necessarily have to be associated with genetic resources, as it can also include the use of traditional 
knowledge associated with biological resources”. Although the report is only an expert document that 
has not been adopted by the CBD COP, it gives useful indications on the possible interpretations of the 
notion of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. Furthermore, the decision to form 
this group was agreed by the COP in decision IX/12 with the mandate expressly to “assist” the Working 
Group on ABS elaborating the Protocol. See COP dec. IX/12, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/
IX/12 (9 October 2008), Annex II, Section C, para. 1. For information on the list of experts and the 
methods of their selection, see https://www.cbd.int/doc/notifications/2009/ntf-2009-041-abs-tk-en.pdf 
(last accessed 22 January 2016).
Chapter 3
207
In any event, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Nagoya Protocol (COP/MOP) should provide further guidance to clarify the scope 
of the Nagoya Protocol with respect to traditional knowledge. Indeed, the presence of 
multiple characterisations of traditional knowledge does not facilitate interpretation and, 
in practice, gives potentially room to differential treatment within the different regimes, 
whereas a greater level of consistency would certainly benefit implementation.
2.1.4. The definition of utilisation of traditional knowledge
Another term that the Nagoya Protocol fails to define is “utilisation of traditional 
knowledge”.104 The lack of this definition is particularly problematic since utilisation is 
the precondition for triggering the obligation of benefit-sharing under the Protocol.105 
Furthermore, this gap stands out due to the evident imbalance in Article 2 of the Protocol, 
which by contrast defines the term “utilization of genetic resources”.
The lack of a general definition can be explained in terms of the particular nature 
of traditional knowledge. As already illustrated, traditional knowledge is the evolving 
expression of indigenous cultural practices and social organisation. In light of this, 
providing a common definition of which utilisation is relevant for the purposes of the 
Protocol would probably have excluded a significant range of cases. In this sense, the 
Protocol delegates the definition of utilisation to indigenous and local communities. 
Pursuant to Article 12(3), these groups must be supported by Parties to establish 
community protocols, minimum requirements, and model contractual clauses to secure 
the sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of traditional knowledge. 
Most recently, the Working Group on Article 8(j) has elaborated a definition of 
utilisation that brings together concepts such as use and application but, at the same 
time, is very restrictive since it requires the creation or commercialisation of a traditional 
product.106 Moreover, it is very unclear what a traditional product is. Therefore, current 
attempts to elaborate general definitions are largely unsuccessful in bringing about more 
legal certainty. This restrictive interpretation does not seem reasonable also in light of a 
contextual interpretation of the notion of utilisation based on the definition provided for 
the utilisation of genetic resources, which is centred upon research and development.107 
Whereas the latter can be intended as a synonymous for commercialisation, research also 
104  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 63. For a study on the notion of utilization of both traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources, see the consultancy work carried out by Morgera and Geelhoed 2016. 
105  See Art. 3, Art. 5(5), and 12(2) Nagoya Protocol.
106  See A Glossary of Relevant Key Terms and Concepts to Be Used within the Context of Article 8(j) 
and Related Provisions, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG8J/9/2/Add.1 (24 September 2015), Annex, at 4.
107  Art. 2(c) Nagoya Protocol: “”Utilization of genetic resources” means to conduct research and 
development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the 
application of biotechnology”.
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includes non-commercial activities that are alternative to development.108
Another question is whether the notion of utilisation can be meaningfully 
distinguished from access under the Nagoya Protocol. The seed of differentiation is 
already in the CBD, which creates an obligation of inter-State benefit-sharing only with 
regard to utilisation.109 Indeed, this obligation is under the rubric of Article 15 CBD 
regulating access. Furthermore, access and utilisation are used in pair in other provisions 
of the CBD, so that the two terms cannot easily be distinguished apart from for the 
consequences they entail.
This approach is maintained in the Nagoya Protocol, where the obligation to enact 
national norms to regulate prior informed consent or approval and involvement is a 
precondition for access, while utilisation entails benefit-sharing. A further element for 
interpretation can be found in Article 6(1) of the Nagoya Protocol that, as explained 
in section 2.2, constitutes a relevant framework for the interpretation of Article 6(2) 
concerning the consent requirement following the utilisation of genetic resources held 
by indigenous peoples. The former provision links access and utilisation in a relationship 
that is at least temporal, meaning that access must precede utilisation. At the same time, 
it also reinforces the conviction that access without utilisation is not really meaningful 
in practical terms in the context of ABS. By way of analogy, and again due to the lack 
of definition of utilisation of traditional knowledge, it can be concluded that access to 
and utilisation of traditional knowledge are bound to one another when it comes to the 
international regime on ABS. The only relevant exception to that seems to be conceivable 
in terms of traditional knowledge that is shared among more than one communities, 
possibly in different State Parties. This situation may render a distinction between access 
and utilisation relevant in terms of the subjects entitled to receive a share of benefits and 
is explored in section 2.3.110 This section equally addresses the links between uncertainties 
deriving from the lack of a definition and other interpretative gaps concerning benefit-
sharing with respect to traditional knowledge.
2.2. Access to genetic resources owned by indigenous peoples
The CBD does not contemplate the case in which genetic resources are owned by 
indigenous peoples. On the contrary, the only criterion for the attribution of prerogatives 
over genetic resources is the State’s sovereignty over natural resources. Pursuant to this 
principle, enshrined in Article 15 CBD, the decision to provide access to genetic resources 
belongs exclusively to national governments. In accordance with that, State Parties may 
108  See Morgera and Geelhoed 2016, at 6-8 on the alternative nature of these activities, meaning that 
research for non-commercial purposes fall within the scope of the Protocol, irrespective of any commercial 
development of research activities.
109  Art. 15(7) CBD.
110  In this discussion, Art. 5 is complemented by Art. 11, as shown in section 2.3 in this chapter.
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subordinate access to their prior informed consent or decide otherwise, for instance by 
waiving their consent or establishing additional conditions.111
The Nagoya Protocol profoundly innovates in the matter of access to genetic 
resources since it mandates Parties to adopt national measures aiming to guarantee the 
prior informed consent or approval and involvement of those indigenous peoples having 
established rights over genetic resources.112 This provision is ground-breaking at least for 
it recognises the link between access to genetic resources and indigenous peoples in a 
binding provision.113
However, this obligation is conditioned upon three main qualifications that may 
limit its applicability in the future. Similarly to Article 8(j) of the CBD, national measures 
must be adopted “as appropriate” and “in accordance with national legislation”. Unlike 
Article 8(j), the expression “in accordance” is less restrictive than “subject to” since it does 
not evoke the possibility that international obligations may succumb against contrary 
national provisions.114 Also in light of these terminological differences, it seems that the 
qualifications on Article 6(2) of the Nagoya Protocol only give Parties discretion on the 
nature and content of the measures to be adopted nationally. Parties are in any event 
under the obligation to adopt such measures.115 The leeway of Parties on the measures 
to be adopted nationally is also confirmed by the expression “with the aim of ensuring” 
prior and informed consent.116 The borders within which States’ discretion can be lawfully 
exercised, however, are those traced by international human rights law, according to 
111  See Article 15(2) and (5) CBD.
112  Article 6(2) Nagoya Protocol. As usually in the context of the CBD/Nagoya Protocol, the provision 
is applicable to genetic resources on which local communities have established rights. For the ambiguities 
on prior informed consent or approval and involvement see section 2.1.2 According to Art. 6(3)(f ), 
criteria for obtaining consent or approval and involvement must be set up nationally. The boundaries of 
the different participatory requirements are, as already argued, determined by the relevant international 
standards on indigenous participation.
113  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 124.
114  See Bavikatte and Robinson 2011, at 45. These authors explain that the elimination of the clause 
“subject to national legislation” endured heated negotiations. They also stress that the new formulation 
“in accordance with national law” has an important role to play, since it reaffirms the role of the State and 
its responsibility to protect without limiting the protection of indigenous rights to national standards. 
This evolution may also have repercussions on the interpretation of Article 8(j) CBD. In their words, 
“This [the clause “in accordance with national legislation”] would retain the facilitative role of the State 
in situations where Parties argued that communities within their jurisdiction needed State protection 
against exploitation. At the same time, it would affirm that the GTLE [Group of Legal Experts on 
Traditional Knowledge associated with Genetic Resources] interpretation of Article 8(j) that the rights of 
communities under the CBD are not dependent on the discretion of States”.
115  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 125-126.
116  It is also up to national discretion to determine, in case there are established rights of indigenous 
peoples, whether only indigenous consent must be obtained or also the consent of the State where genetic 
resources are located. As already argued, pursuant to Art. 15 CBD and Art. 6(1) Nagoya Protocol, 
States can also waive their consent when access occurs. While when indigenous genetic resources are 
concerned, their consent/approval is always required and it is up to national legislation to determine 
whether the State’s consent is needed as well. In any event, users need to interact with national authorities 
to understand what are the legal requirements related to the genetic resources concerned.
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which consultation is always needed when indigenous rights are affected and consent 
must be obtained when indigenous cultural integrity is threatened.117
The only circumstance that might exclude the obligation to adopt national measures 
on indigenous prior informed consent is the lack of “established rights” on genetic 
resources. Through this expression, Parties have avoided both to recognise indigenous 
rights directly in the Protocol and to directly connect ownership over genetic resources 
with indigenous land and resource rights.118 This gap, however, does not justify inaction 
when it comes to adopting a national legal framework on access to genetic resources and 
affected indigenous peoples. Article 6(2) only conditions the policy objective of ensuring 
prior informed consent to the existence of established rights. Therefore, although policy 
objectives may be different in case there are no established rights, a legal framework 
must in any event be adopted. Furthermore, the issue of whether rights over genetic 
resources are established must be read in terms of the relevant international human rights 
framework that, as shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, recognise rights to land 
and natural resources to indigenous peoples, based on possession, traditional use, and/or 
customary law.119
The main issue, thus, is to establish whether rights over natural resources automatically 
give rights over genetic resources. Some authors have claimed that ownership of genetic 
resources differs from property rights due to the different object of protection. In this 
sense, property over genetic resources would be more similar to intellectual rather than 
real property.120 However, indigenous land and resources rights, although implying 
ownership, go beyond the distinction between real and intellectual property to embrace a 
system of collective entitlements to land having both material and spiritual implications. 
In this sense, excluding that ownership over genetic resources may derive from land and 
resource rights based on Western property categories would unduly restrict the notion of 
property, as already ascertained by human rights treaty bodies.121
117  See Chapter 2, sections 3.5 and 5.
118  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 125.
119  See Brendan Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The Fundamental Role of Customary Law 
in Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Resource and Knowledge Rights’ (2013) 9/2 Law, Environment and 
Development Journal 142, at 148: “Drawing attention to human rights law, constitutional recognition of 
indigenous rights and to the customary laws and protocols of Indigenous peoples and local communities, 
may help prevent narrow interpretations of ambiguous terms”.
120  See Morten Walløe Tvedt and Tomme Young, Beyond Access: Exploring. Implementation of the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing Commitment in the CBD (IUCN 2007), at 7: “The difference between genetic 
resources, as res, and other categories of natural resources makes it difficult to think about ownership of 
genetic resources in the same terms as ownership of natural resources”. See also, Nijar, ‘Incorporating 
Traditional Knowledge in an International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: 
Problems and Prospects’ 2010, at 465. According to the latter author, ownership of genetic resources is 
separated from ownership of biological resources and is often regulated through intellectual property 
rights. The property of genetic resources is also usually non-exclusive.
121  See e.g. Awas Tingni case, para. 149. See also, Statement by the Special Rapporteur on indigenous 
rights James Anaya, Indigenous peoples’ rights to genetic resources and traditional knowledge (4 
February 2013), section 3: “this property right embraces all forms of natural resources customarily used 
Chapter 3
211
An additional argument supports the equivalence of natural resources and genetic 
resources in terms of the source of their entitlement. Article 15 of the CBD confers rights 
over genetic resources to States based on their sovereignty over natural resources. The 
analysis conducted in Chapter 2 has shown that indigenous rights to land and natural 
resources imply very extensive powers that limit the sovereignty of States over natural 
resources. In particular, indigenous rights over natural resources include all resources 
located in their traditional territories, except for subsoil resources.122 In this sense, 
entitlements of indigenous peoples over genetic resources may derive from indigenous 
substantive rights over natural resources, unless human rights treaty bodies reach different 
conclusions on this point.123 Alternatively, States may either develop an international 
custom explicitly derogating from the general norm on the comprehensive scope of 
natural resources or adopt an international treaty constituting lex specialis on this point.
It might be argued that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol already constitute lex 
specialis with respect to indigenous rights over land and resources since they reiterate 
the sovereignty of States over genetic resources while not explicitly attributing genetic 
resources to indigenous peoples. However, this argument downplays the fact that the 
Nagoya Protocol explicitly admits that indigenous peoples can both hold genetic resources 
and have established rights over genetic resources. While the former option is explored in 
section 2.3, the interpretation of the locution established rights must be addressed here.
Some authors have highlighted that this expression has been voluntary left open in 
the negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol and thus neither recognises nor rejects indigenous 
rights over genetic resources.124 However, if this locution were interpreted restrictively 
so as to limit ownership of genetic resources to the case that it has been attributed 
nationally, Article 6 would seriously undermine the implementation of indigenous rights 
to land and natural resources. Bioprospecting is a widespread phenomenon and research 
and development activities are usually carried out following physical access to natural 
by indigenous peoples. Thus, indigenous peoples’ property rights should also be understood to extend 
over the genetic resources they have traditionally used according to well defined patterns. In this regard 
the legal sources just mentioned do not distinguish between genetic resources and other natural resources. 
Furthermore, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides in article 31 that “[i]
ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control…and develop their cultural heritage…including 
genetic resources””.For a more detailed analysis, Chapter 2, section 3.1. In this sense, the notion of 
traditional territories elaborated by the Working Group on Article 8(j) is not in line with international 
human rights since it links land rights only to current use and occupation. See A Glossary of Relevant 
Key Terms and Concepts to Be Used within the Context of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/WG8J/9/2/Add.1, Annex, at 4.
122  See Chapter 2, section 3.2.
123  This research did not encounter any case explicitly addressing the issue of genetic resources.
124  See Bavikatte and Robinson 2011, at 43 and 46-47. This article shows that, whereas most States have 
opposed the explicit recognition of indigenous rights over genetic resources, the final formulation of Art. 
6(2) is a compromise solution between the position of States and that of indigenous and local community. 
These authors label this technique as “strategic ambiguity”, since it allows for different interpretations.
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resources.125 In this sense, considering the restrictions over natural resources not relevant 
for the purpose of applying human rights guarantees would leave indigenous peoples 
unprotected in a significant number of cases, thus contradicting the purpose of human 
rights treaties protecting indigenous rights.
Moreover, access to genetic resources is usually obtained through access to traditional 
lands and natural resources in order to extract the relevant genetic information.126 
Pursuant to international human rights law, when States restrict indigenous rights to land 
and natural resources, they must seek free, prior and informed consent independently 
from whether or not they have adopted any national frameworks on that. The customs 
of indigenous peoples and traditional use are the criteria identified under human rights 
law to establish land and resource rights.127 Since genetic resources are in most cases 
traditionally used by indigenous peoples, these can therefore claim land and resource 
rights over those resources.128 In light of this, it does not seem that the locution established 
rights can be interpreted restrictively to mean that indigenous peoples hold rights over 
genetic resources only when national laws so establish.129 In this sense, establishing 
property rights over natural resources is a crucial step for the regulation of access to 
genetic resources in accordance with international human rights.130
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 2, indigenous rights must be read in light of the 
principle of self-determination.131 In order to preserve indigenous groups as distinct, even 
though restrictions to indigenous rights over the genetic resources they have traditionally 
used are in principle possible, these must go through a participatory process that include 
effective consultation, impact assessment, and benefit-sharing.132 Therefore, a broad 
125  See section 1 in this chapter.
126  See Jeffery 2002, at 783: “The question of ownership of genes is something that for the most part 
remains undetermined, however issues relating to accessing genetic resources from a specimen located in 
situ is by and large determined from the ownership and physical control over the specimen containing 
the genetic resource”.
127  See Chapter 2, section 3.1.
128  Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 219. On the criterion of 
traditional use, see also Chapter 2, section 3.1.
129  The same conclusion is embraced by Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 108-109 and 125.
130  In light of this reasoning, arguing that derivatives are included in the scope of application of the 
Nagoya Protocol would be more in line with international human rights law because it would allow to 
take into account indigenous land and resource rights in a broader range of situations. For a discussion 
on the issue of derivatives within the Protocol, see Bram De Jonge, ‘Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS 
Regime: Is Nagoya Leading Us in the Right Direction?’ (2013) 9 Law, Environment and Development 
Journal 243; Jospeh 2010, at 81 and 91; Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter, ‘An Introduction to the 
International ABS Regime and a Comment on Its Transposition by the EU’ (2013) 9 Law, Environment 
and Development Journal 108, at 113-114. According to the latter authors, the inclusion of derivatives 
into the scope of the Protocol derives from the fact that research and development activities, which may 
generate derivatives, are part of the utilization of genetic resources pursuant to Art. 2 of the Nagoya 
Protocol.
131  See Chapter 2, section 5.
132  See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
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interpretation of the locution established rights is more in line with international human 
rights law, since it prescribes that States must enact legislation aiming to ensure that prior 
informed consent (or approval and involvement) is obtained when indigenous genetic 
resources are concerned.
There are cases when the ownership of natural resources might not solve the issue 
of which access requirements apply under the CBD regime. For instance, the identity 
between natural and genetic resources may be challenged when the same sequences of 
genes are present in different members of the same species, in resources to be found on 
different territories or even countries, or in gene banks that predate the entry into force 
of the CBD and/or the Nagoya Protocol.133 In those cases, there might be a difference 
between ownership of genetic resources and ownership of natural resources and many 
scenarios are, therefore, possible. If genetic resources are found outside indigenous 
territories, the way of life of the indigenous groups concerned is not disturbed and 
their lands and resources are not affected. Therefore, given the non-remedial nature of 
the Nagoya regime so far,134 indigenous peoples must not be involved in access and 
subsequent development of the genetic resources at stake, although the same can be 
found in the resources situated on their lands. Different problems may arise in case the 
genetic resources found outside indigenous territories are developed through indigenous 
traditional knowledge, in which case the safeguards described in the previous section 
apply.
Furthermore, there might be cases where the same genetic resources accessed 
with the prior informed consent of some indigenous peoples are present either on the 
territories of different indigenous communities within the same State or on the territories 
of transboundary communities that share the same attachment to the land and resources 
involved.135
Concerning the first case, although neither the CBD nor the Nagoya Protocol 
explicitly contemplate this occurrence,136 the formulation of Article 6(2) is broad enough 
to include every community that has established rights on the genetic resources to be 
accessed.137 At the same time, the CBD legal framework attaches great importance to 
the role of national regulations to operationalise access requirements. This is true also in 
the framework of the Nagoya Protocol, pursuant to which national authorities play the 
133  See Bhatti and others 2009, at 18, refer to the “paradox of ‘ownership’ of genetic resources”. It should 
be clarified that there is no a priori contradiction between the rights of indigenous peoples and the storage 
of genetic materials in gene banks. On this point, see an interesting paper on how this issue is framed in 
New Zealand: Angela Beaton and others, ‘Engaging Maori in Biobanking and Genetic Research: Legal, 
Ethical, and Policy Challenges’ (2015) 6 The International Indigenous Policy Journal 1.
134  See infra, section 2.3 in this chapter.
135  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 129. See also infra section 2.4 in this chapter.
136  Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol deals with transboundary situation but delegates States to establish a 
multilateral system of benefit-sharing. On this, see section 2.3.1 in this chapter.
137  See also Art. 1 Nagoya Protocol.
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fundamental role both to adopt a legal framework on access and to guide users throughout 
national requirements on access and benefit-sharing.138 In this sense, national authorities 
may be required to inform users—when they are aware of—about potentially competing 
rights over the same genetic resources by other communities.
Concerning the case where genetic resources are found in more than one State, Article 
11 of the Nagoya Protocol obliges Parties to “endeavour to cooperate, as appropriate, with 
the involvement of indigenous and local communities concerned, where applicable, with 
a view to implementing this Protocol”. While the result of cooperation is not determined 
and the undertaking of cooperation is in itself heavily qualified, the only way to make 
the provisions on access effective in case of transboundary genetic resources is by means 
of cooperation. The framework provided by in the Nagoya Protocol is in any event very 
different from the CBD, which instead limits its jurisdictional scope to the national 
boundaries of State Parties or to activities carried out under the jurisdiction of one 
Party.139 Therefore, the regime established under the Nagoya Protocol is more protective 
of indigenous rights also because it enlarges its scope of application to include all rights 
that are established over the genetic resources concerned with access, notwithstanding 
national boundaries.
From the perspective of users, however, those subjects who access genetic resources—
be they States, private companies, or research institutions—must take into account the 
established rights on those resources.140 As already argued, these rights are established in 
pursuance of international human rights standards, according to which ownership over 
genetic resources depends on ownership over natural resources. In this sense, users of 
genetic resources must ascertain all rights that are established on the resources they want 
to access. If the communities involved are based in different countries, in principle, users 
must verify corresponding national standards on access.141 The implementation of this 
obligation would indeed be facilitated if provider States established both cooperation 
agreements among them and clear national rules to guide users through the procedure 
of consent-seeking when more than one communities are involved in a transnational 
context. By virtue of Article 15 of the Nagoya Protocol, user States must enact national 
legislation on consent requirements that is in line with the requirements adopted 
nationally by provider countries.142 Therefore, a certain degree of cooperation is already 
enshrined in the Protocol.
138  See Art. 6(3) and Art. 13 Nagoya Protocol. 
139  See Art. 4 CBD.
140  Only States have an obligation to adopt national provisions to ensure consent, while private actors 
only need to conform to national standards. States might be liable for failing to prevent violations of 
indigenous rights by private actors, according to their responsibility to protect as delineated in the 
Ruggie’s report. See Chapter 2, note 261.
141  This argument is discussed again in section 2.3 in this chapter.
142  On Art. 15, see also infra section 2.4.1 in this chapter.
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Concerning the case when genetic resources are stored in gene banks, the CBD and 
the Protocol’s requirements only apply to access that has been carried out in accordance 
with their legal regimes143 and do not contain remedial provisions in case access has 
occurred outside their international frameworks. Moreover, this problem is intertwined 
with the lack of certainty about the applicability of the CBD regime to situations that 
have occurred before the entry into force of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. In 
the absence of specific COP decisions, it is doubtful that the safeguards of the Nagoya 
Protocol apply to the situation where genetic resources have been extracted from natural 
resources owned by indigenous peoples without their consent and included in gene 
banks before the entry into force of the Protocol.144 However, this situation might in 
principle be challenged before human rights treaty bodies due to the violation of land, 
resource, and cultural rights, if it can be demonstrated that the genetic resources at stake 
were extracted from natural resources located on indigenous territories or from lands 
that indigenous peoples have unduly be dispossessed of. It is therefore important that 
indigenous peoples are aware of this possibility outside the CBD legal framework. This 
situation is also an example of a case when it is not possible to reconcile human rights 
standards with the CBD legal regimes, due to limitations in the current legal framework. 
Most recently, the Expert group meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol145 has 
highlighted that States might adopt legislative and other incentives to discourage access 
to ex situ collections not revealing their sources. If this were the case, the implementation 
of indigenous rights would be facilitated. Another possible way to integrate indigenous 
rights into access of genetic resources through gene banks would be for the latter to 
disclose the providers and require the proof of prior informed consent and MAT from 
users before granting access.146
The last point that deserves clarification is whether access pursuant to Article 6 of 
143  Art. 15(3) CBD, which is also referred to in Art. 3 of the Nagoya Protocol establishing the scope of 
application of the new regime on ABS.
144  On the issue of the doubts concerning the temporal scope of the Nagoya Protocol, see Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 73-76; Julinda Beqiraj, ‘L’equa condivisione dei benefici derivanti 
dall’utilizzo delle risorse genetiche secondo il Protocollo di Nagoya: fra obblighi degli Stati e diritti delle 
comunità indigene’ (2011) 5 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 188, at 190. See infra, section 2.4.2.
145  Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol deals with the establishment of a multilateral global system of benefit-
sharing and is analysed infra in section 2.3.1.
146  Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/4, para. 23: “They noted that many collections 
had developed codes of conduct and best practices related to ABS. It was also pointed out that measures 
to implement the Protocol had been and could be developed in such a way as to discourage the use of 
genetic resources for which information on PIC and mutually agreed terms (MAT) was unavailable. It 
was highlighted that, in many situations where ex situ collections were unable to identify the source of 
their material, users were unwilling to use this material because it did not provide legal certainty and 
collections were unwilling to share it. One expert stated that some ex situ collections, in the spirit of the 
Nagoya Protocol, redirected users to the provider country to negotiate PIC and MAT, and some experts 
noted that that might provide a useful example”. At para. 24, experts also highlighted “the paucity of 
information with respect to the ABS practices of ex situ collections”.
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the Nagoya Protocol coincides with utilisation.147 This doubt is legitimate since neither 
the CBD nor the Nagoya Protocol include a definition of access.148 Furthermore, neither 
of them has explicitly clarified the relationship between access and utilisation. This issue 
is important to understand which safeguards apply to which factual situation.
Article 6(1) of the Nagoya Protocol implies that access logically precedes utilisation 
when it states that “access to genetic resources for their utilization shall be subject to the 
prior informed consent…”.149 Apart from the temporal sequence of access and utilisation, 
a closer analysis of the Protocol reveals that different legal consequences are attached to 
access and utilisation. As shown, prior informed consent or approval and involvement 
of indigenous peoples are required whenever their genetic resources are accessed. When 
access does not materially occur, there might be situations in which genetic resources are 
utilised for research and development purposes. A clear example is when genetic resources 
are included in gene banks or when they are accessed from communities based in one 
State but transboundary communities are excluded from consent procedures. In such 
cases, even when land and resource rights are not materially affected, there are obligations 
under the Protocol to grant benefit-sharing due to utilisation.150 The separation of the 
two moments may appear artificial since it is the result of a compromise between the 
need to guarantee legal certainty, which would have followed from the clarification that 
access and utilisation coincide, and the will to separate access and utilisation in order to 
disconnect the obligation to grant benefit-sharing from the ambiguous formulation of 
established rights.151 However, as the next section shows, this separation between access 
and utilisation may enhance the possibility that, when access provisions are violated, 
indigenous rights are partially protected through benefit-sharing.
2.3. Benefit-sharing
The CBD is innovative in that it regulates the inter-State component of benefit-sharing152 
147  Concerning interpretative difficulties related to the expression “consent, approval and involvement”, 
see supra section 2.1.2.
148  Art. 2(c) of the Nagoya Protocol contains however a definition of utilization of genetic resources, 
which includes research and development activities.
149  Emphasis added. The same is true for Art. 15 CBD, which requires consent for access and benefit-
sharing following utilisation.
150  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 121. On the conditions of benefit-sharing, see ibid., at 
102 and infra section 2.3.
151  See ibid., at 119. Note that while Art. 5(5) does not submit benefit-sharing to the ambiguous 
condition that traditional knowledge is held by indigenous peoples under national law, Art. 5(2) speaks 
of “genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities, in accordance with domestic 
legislation regarding the established rights of these indigenous and local communities over these genetic 
resources”. Concerning how this ambiguity can be solved by incorporating indigenous rights, see supra 
in this section and in section 2.1.
152  Art. 15 CBD. See Bram De Jonge, ‘What is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?’ (2011) 24 Journal 
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 127, at 129, for the rationale behind inter-State benefit-
sharing in the CBD. This author argues that the imbalance in the allocation of genetic resources between 
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but it also recognises an intra-State dimension following the application of traditional 
knowledge.153 The limitations of Article 8(j) of the CBD are at this stage very well known. 
First, the heavily qualified language has cast a negative light on the prescriptive nature 
of this provision and contributed to a generalised lack of implementation. Second, the 
lack of an obligation to adopt national measures has aggravated the marginalisation of 
this provision by CBD Parties. Third, benefit-sharing is only referred to the utilisation of 
traditional knowledge, which creates a normative gap for the situations in which access 
to indigenous natural resources occurs in the framework of the CBD.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the intra-State dimension of benefit-sharing 
is recognised in a number of COP decisions, which clarify the functions of benefit-
sharing and underlie its importance in the framework of the CBD.154 First, as emerges 
from the text of the Convention, benefit-sharing is premised upon the utilisation of 
traditional knowledge. In other words, the sharing of the benefits with indigenous 
and local communities is conceived as a reward that is triggered every time traditional 
knowledge is utilised within the scope of application of the CBD. Indeed, the practice of 
the CBD COP decisions points to an application of benefit-sharing that goes beyond in 
situ conservation to embrace every situation in which traditional knowledge is utilised.155 
This practice confirms again the interpretation according to which, even outside the 
scope of application of the Nagoya Protocol, Article 8(j) of the CBD is closely related to 
the access provisions of the Convention.
Second, the utilisation of traditional knowledge is instrumental both for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.156 In this sense, the sharing of the benefits 
is conceived as a reward for the contribution that indigenous and local communities 
indirectly pay to the attainment of CBD objectives.157 Benefit-sharing helps to preserve 
developing and developed countries, the need for the latter to compensate this imbalance, and the 
preoccupation of the former for access conditions that do not threaten their sovereign rights over natural 
resources constitute the main reasons why the inter-State benefit-sharing mechanism has been originally 
conceived. See also, Jeffery 2002, at 749.
153  Art. 8(j) CBD. See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity 
and Community Livelihoods’ 2010, who have coined the categories of “inter-State” and “State-to-
community” benefit-sharing.
154  For an analysis of the functions of benefit-sharing within the CBD, see ibid. See also De Jonge, ‘What 
is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?’ 2011, who identifies six notions of benefit-sharing linked to six 
different philosophical conceptions of justice. A similar argument is made by Elisa Morgera, ‘Justice, 
Equity and Benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2015) 
24 Italian Yearbook of International Law 113.
155  See Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, COP dec. V/16 (2000) (hereinafter Programme of work on Article 
8(j)), task 7; COP dec. XI/14, Part E, para. 12; COP dec. XII/12, Part D, para. 2(ii): launch of the 
project to elaborate guidelines on benefit-sharing deriving from the use of traditional knowledge.
156  This interpretation emerges when reading Art. 8(j) CBD in connection with Art. 10(c) CBD.
157  Bonn guidelines, para. 48: “those who have contributed to resource management”. In the context of 
forestry management, see COP dec. VI/22 (2002), para. 13. The same point is made by Smagadi 2006, 
at 280: “Indigenous communities in particular need to be compensated for their efforts to conserve 
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the knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples that facilitate conservation.158 In this 
connection, benefit-sharing also represents an incentive for indigenous peoples both to 
maintain their sustainable traditional practices and to sustain their traditional ways of 
living in the future.159 Notwithstanding this, benefit-sharing is not necessarily linked to 
traditional practices that directly favour conservation.160
Third, the functions of benefit-sharing go beyond utilisation of traditional 
knowledge, to embrace decisions which deal with the establishment of protected areas.161 
In this context, benefit-sharing is conceived mainly as compensation to remedy the 
negative impacts that the creation of protected areas may produce on indigenous peoples.162 
The Addis Ababa guidelines also frame benefit-sharing in the field of conservation as a 
reward when indigenous peoples are involved in the sustainable management of natural 
resources.163
While the intra-State component of benefit-sharing is still underdeveloped in 
the decisions of the COP concerning access to genetic resources when these belong to 
indigenous peoples, the Nagoya Protocol has completely revolutionized this framework. 
Article 5(2) of the Protocol has created an obligation for Parties to adopt a national 
framework that aims to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits deriving from 
“the utilization of genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities”. 
This provision is a noteworthy innovation in the CBD regime as it explicitly associates 
benefit-sharing with access to indigenous genetic resources and foresees an obligation for 
States to set up a national regulatory framework.164 The same obligation is established 
and sustainably manage genetic resources, and for sharing with the rest of humanity valuable medicinal 
knowledge developed by them over time”.
158  Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit-Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community 
Livelihoods’ 2010, at 156.
159  See Report of Working Group on Article 8(j), UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2, Annex I, section 
6/3, para. 12. The report establishes “Elements of a code of ethical conduct to ensure respect for the 
cultural and intellectual heritage of indigenous and local communities”, which contains voluntary 
standards that have not been decided in the context of the CBD COP. These standards confirm the 
function of benefit-sharing both as a reward for indigenous peoples that preserve biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge and as a contribution for sustaining indigenous livelihoods. See also, COP dec. 
V/6 (2000), Annex B, Operational Guidance 2, para. 9; Addis Ababa guidelines, Operational Guidelines 
to Principle 4; COP dec. VII/11, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/11 (13 April 2004), Annex 
I, Annotations to Rationale to Principle 4, at 12. See also, Jeffery 2002, at 752: benefit-sharing as an 
incentive for communities to conserve biodiversity.
160  See section 2.1.3 in this chapter.
161  Consider that the granting of benefit-sharing does not substitute other requirements, such as consent. 
On this, see section 2.1.2 in this chapter.
162  See COP dec. VI/22, Annex, Programme element 2, Goal 2, activities (b) and (i); PoWPA, para. 
2.1.1; Akwé:Kon guidelines, paras. 46, 56; Addis Ababa guidelines, Operational guidance to principle 
12.
163  Addis Ababa guidelines, Operational guidance to principle 12. See also COP dec. X/31, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/31 (29 October 2010), paras. 30(b) and 31(a)-(b); COP dec. V/6, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (2000), Annex, Part C, para. 9.
164  A similar requirement was previously included in the Programme of work on Article 8(j), Element 4 
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in Article 5(5) of the Protocol in relation to the utilization of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources.
Compared to Article 8(j) of the CBD, the binding nature of these obligations to 
adopt national measures is not questionable.165 Thus, beyond expanding the scope of 
application of benefit-sharing provisions, the Nagoya Protocol also creates legal certainty 
concerning the nature of the actions to be taken by State Parties.
Most importantly, Article 5(2) of the Protocol even goes beyond the human rights 
framework concerning benefit-sharing.166 As seen in the Saramaka case before the Inter-
American Court,167 the sharing of the benefits deriving from activities carried out on 
indigenous territories is one of the means to ensure that the restrictions on indigenous 
land rights are legitimate. Therefore, in international human rights law benefit-sharing 
is premised upon the compression of land rights. In contrast, benefit-sharing in the 
Nagoya Protocol does not require any restrictions to indigenous established rights but is 
triggered when genetic resources are utilised, even in the absence of constraints.168 At the 
same time, it can be argued that when indigenous peoples share their genetic resources 
with non-indigenous actors, they automatically give up their exclusive use of resources. 
In this sense, the rationale behind benefit-sharing would still be linked to an original 
compression of rights.169
Another innovative factor relates to the fact that the obligation contained in Article 
5(2) and (5) is part of the same provision regulating benefit-sharing obligations in relation 
to provider States.170 Therefore, the Protocol explicitly clarifies that indigenous rights are 
relevant when it comes to the regime of access and they are not limited to conservation 
policies, as the CBD could unduly suggest. Furthermore, the sharing of benefits with 
indigenous peoples must be fair and equitable like the case when benefits are shared 
with States.171 In addition, similarly to the regime of inter-State benefit-sharing, the 
(Tasks 7 and 8). However, this only regarded benefits arising from the utilisation of traditional knowledge. 
Moreover, it is the very first time that this obligation is spelled out in a binding treaty. See Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 103: “The groundbreaking nature of Article 5(2) should be highlighted 
from the outset: for the first time in international environmental law, a treaty creates an obligation for 
States to establish measures to reward indigenous and local communities responsible for the stewardship 
of genetic resources and their resulting contribution to scientific progress for the benefit of the global 
community”.
165  This is also true when it comes to the formulation of inter-State benefit-sharing. See ibid., at 100, 
note 7, 101, and 103.
166  See Elisa Morgera, ‘Le Protocole de Nagoya et les droits environnementaux’ (2016) 1 Liason 
Énergie-Francophonie 42, at 43, where the author concludes that this type of benefit-sharing is a form of 
contribution to capacity-building.
167  See Chapter 1, section 2.2.1.
168  This argument is made by Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 105.
169  For a similar point, see Terry Williams and Preston Hardison, ‘Culture, Law, Risk and Governance: 
Contexts of Traditional Knowledge in Climate Change Adaptation’ (2013) 120 Climatic Change 531.
170  See Beqiraj 2011, at 190.
171  Art. 8(j) CBD only refers to the “equitable” sharing of benefits, while the Bonn guidelines already 
Chapter 3
220
distribution of benefits in case indigenous peoples are involved must be agreed upon with 
them in MATs. The convergence between inter- and intra-State benefit-sharing, therefore, 
supports the conclusion that these are qualitatively similar and based on similar premises, 
that is extensive powers on the management of natural resources—be they related to 
national sovereignty or self-determination.
In spite of the relevant building blocks established in Article 5 of the Protocol, there 
are several problematic aspects. One of the most difficult interpretative problems is that 
Article 5(2) is heavily qualified since it subordinates the sharing of the benefits to the 
existence of “established rights” of indigenous peoples over genetic resources.172 Benefit-
sharing is to be guaranteed to indigenous peoples only when these hold genetic resources 
pursuant to their established rights.
The ambiguity of this formulation lies not only in the qualifier “established”, which 
introduces a confusing category of rights. Indeed, what established rights are, compared 
to unqualified rights, is hardly clear. The main problem is that established rights are 
judged against national parameters,173 thus de facto subordinating the conditions for 
obtaining a fair and equitable share of the benefits to national law. Therefore, there is a 
risk that if this provision is interpreted restrictively, it would end up producing a stalemate 
in implementation comparable to that of Article 8(j) of the CBD.174
This restrictive interpretation, however, is not a valid option because it would run 
counter the main aim of the Protocol, which is to establish a clear legal framework to 
ensure “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources…taking into account all rights over those resources”.175 On the contrary, the 
following interpretation allows for a reading of the Protocol that is more in line with the 
relevant international human rights framework, while leaving some manoeuvring space 
to State Parties.176
utilised the formulation “fair and equitable” in relation to benefits for “all those who have been identified 
as having contributed to the resource management, scientific and/or commercial process”, including 
indigenous and local communities (para. 48). On the interpretation of the formula “fair and equitable”, 
see Morgera, ‘Towards International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and Equitable 
Benefit-Sharing from the Use of Traditional Knowledge’ 2015, at 15.
172  The formulations “as appropriate” and “with the aim of ensuring” seem to weaken the obligation to 
provide benefit-sharing. However, they can be interpreted, in line with the Protocol’s aim and object, 
simply as conferring State Parties discretion as to the choice of appropriate national measures. Concerning 
“as appropriate”, Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 110, consider that this qualifier equally “leaves 
discretion as to the type of implementing measures that Parties have to adopt, but not as to whether to 
adopt measures at all or not”. Similar problems are discussed in section 2.2 in this chapter.
173  Excerpts of Art. 5(2) Nagoya Protocol help to understand the point: “benefits arising from the 
utilization of genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities, in accordance with 
domestic legislation regarding the established rights of these indigenous and local communities over these 
genetic resources” (emphasis added).
174  As recalled, Art. 8(j) CBD used a similar formulation: “subject to national law”.
175  Art. 1 Nagoya Protocol.
176  On the systemic interpretation of the locution “established rights”, see also section 2.2 in this chapter.
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The obligation to adopt national measures contained in Article 5(2) implies that 
States must previously identify those indigenous peoples that would potentially be entitled 
to benefit-sharing in case of utilisation of their genetic resources.177 This identification 
must be conducted in good faith, which means inter alia that States should proceed 
in consultation with the communities concerned, while taking into account that the 
definition of indigenous groups is a matter of self-identification pursuant to international 
human rights law.178 Moreover, when adopting a national framework on benefit-sharing, 
States should again consult with indigenous peoples since this national framework is 
liable to directly affect indigenous communities. Once again, this duty of consultation 
derives from the international human rights framework explored in Chapter 2.179
Along similar lines, there could be an interpretation of the formula “established rights” 
that is protective of indigenous rights, namely when these are identified at the national 
level in consultation with indigenous peoples. In this sense, when recognising indigenous 
rights, States can simply rely on indigenous customary law, thus de facto delegating the 
definition of these rights and their boundaries to indigenous legal traditions.180 Although 
this delegation is a possibility, it is not necessarily the most protective option. A further 
guarantee could be assured, for instance, if national legal systems explicitly recognise the 
legal value of customary law. This result could be obtained by including a general clause 
explicitly enshrining indigenous customary law into the Constitution.
Another possibility could be that States engage into a thorough process of consultation 
with indigenous peoples in order to single out the content of indigenous customary 
rights. The positivisation of indigenous customary law has a number of problematic 
aspects since it is a very costly process181 and risks crystallising something that by its very 
nature is very fluid. Furthermore, it gives precedence to the positive paradigm as the only 
means to incorporate customary law into national legal systems. However, positivisation 
also implies greater legal certainty and reduce the risk that indigenous rights remain dead 
letter. In this sense, a good way to proceed to reflect the changing nature of customary 
law could be to foresee flexibility clauses in order to ensure that positive law evolves 
with customary law. Furthermore, positivisation must not go so far as to reverse the 
teleological interpretation according to which the body of indigenous rights serves the 
purpose of protecting indigenous groups as distinct peoples.182
The question remains of what happens if rights are unduly compressed when 
States incorporate indigenous rights into national legislation. In such an occurrence, the 
177  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 103.
178  See Introduction, section 3.1.
179  See also, Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 106.
180  See ibid., at 109.
181  Positivisation could be costly in terms of time, trust-building, and resources needed.
182  See Chapter 2.
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international human rights framework represents a limit that cannot be overcome unless 
conditions to lawfully compress indigenous rights are present.183 Still, there is room for 
abuses since the consonance of national and international legal frameworks will be at first 
verified by States. Furthermore, remedies can only be activated on a case-by-case basis 
and bear costs that cannot be sustained by every indigenous community.184
Even if all guarantees illustrated above were respected, another problem could be 
that the identification of land and resource rights may not be sufficient to ascertain the 
rights over genetic resources when these are held in gene banks.185 In these cases, genetic 
resources could have been acquired before the entry into force of the Protocol. Plus, 
it could be extremely problematic to reconnect the extracted genetic resources to its 
rightful owner. For these reasons, national legal systems on benefit-sharing should also 
deal with these aspects that are not regulated in the Nagoya Protocol.186
Article 5(5), which regulates benefit-sharing following the utilisation of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources does not subordinate indigenous rights over 
this knowledge to national circumstances. This confirms the argument put forward at 
the beginning of this chapter187 that traditional knowledge enjoys a special status within 
the Protocol, which is even more advanced than the current international human rights 
framework.188
Interpretative problems as to the scope of application of Article 5(5) may indeed 
arise concerning traditional knowledge held by more than one community. This could 
be the case either when indigenous communities holding the same traditional knowledge 
reside in the same national territory or when these communities are scattered across the 
borders. Previous sections have argued that pursuant to international human rights law 
the provider’s national authority has a duty to inform users on multiple ownership, if it 
possesses such information. Furthermore, users may have a duty to acquire information 
on all possible holders of traditional knowledge, depending on whether they are States, in 
which case they are bound by human rights law, or private users if national frameworks 
are in place in this respect.189 Given the interpretative uncertainties about the equivalence 
between access and utilisation, it could also be that consent is required only from the 
community making its natural resources available for research on genetic properties.190 At 
183  See Chapter 2, section 3. See also Preambular para. 27 Nagoya Protocol.
184  Think of the costs to initiate national and subsequently international proceedings.
185  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 107. See also, Jeffery 2002, at 758-760.
186  See section 2.2 in this chapter, note 145, for a reference on the ongoing work of the Expert Group 
Meeting on Article 10.
187  See section 2.1.
188  See also, Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 111.
189  As already underlined in Chapter 2 and in early sections of this chapter, States may incur in 
international responsibility for violating human rights if they fail to prevent the behaviour of private 
actors within their jurisdictions disrespecting human rights.
190  See section 2.2 in this chapter.
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the same time, other communities holding the same resources—whether transboundary 
or not—could be entitled to benefit-sharing in accordance with the objective of the 
Protocol. These issues fall into the scope of application of Article 10 of the Nagoya 
Protocol, which obliges Parties to “consider the need for and modalities of a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits”. The challenges of setting up such system are considered in the next subsection.
These cases also fall within the scope of Article 11(1) of the Nagoya Protocol, which 
prescribes cooperation among multiple Parties191 in which the same “genetic resources are 
found in situ” with the involvement of indigenous peoples when these resources are held 
by the latter.192 The involvement of indigenous peoples must be intended in a systemic 
light as implying effective participation in the form of free, prior and informed consent. 
This case is similar to what happens in purely internal situations where genetic resources 
are held by indigenous peoples. In this occurrence, States are obliged to enact provisions 
to ensure benefit-sharing with indigenous communities. In a similar way, when States 
engage in international cooperation for genetic resources that are found in more than one 
State, their obligation to grant a fair and equitable share of benefits to indigenous peoples 
is not superseded. Hence, in pursuance of human rights obligations, when States start 
bilateral or multilateral negotiations directly affecting the indigenous peoples located in 
their territories, they must also engage in effective consultation with them. The results of 
this consultation are not predetermined but the involvement of indigenous peoples must 
be effective with a view to influencing the negotiations with other States. Furthermore, 
these negotiations must aim to realise the objectives of the Protocol and thus cannot but 
realise the benefit-sharing obligations that States have vis-à-vis their indigenous groups.193
Before proceeding with the analysis of the problems related to the establishment of 
a multilateral system of benefit-sharing, it is worth focusing on additional issues related 
to bilateral benefit-sharing. Other interpretative puzzles concern the pre-conditions 
of benefit-sharing, the regulation of its functioning through MATs, the nature of the 
benefits to be guaranteed, and the objectives and functions of benefit-sharing.
Concerning the conditions triggering the sharing of the benefits with indigenous 
and local communities, both Article 5(2) and Article 5(5) indicate the utilisation of 
191  As argued by Morgera et al., Article 11 only contains a best-endeavour obligation to engage with 
other States. Efforts to engage in such cooperation must be in good faith. See Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck 2014, at 173. The same authors, at 175, have also made the point that it is unclear how to establish 
when States share the same genetic resources.
192  The locution “where applicable” must be referred here to the fact that the Nagoya Protocol distinguishes 
between situations where genetic resources are held by indigenous peoples and cases where indigenous 
peoples are not concerned by the use of these resources. Only in the former case, the involvement of 
indigenous peoples is required.
193  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 175: “Challenges may arise, in this respect, when 
indigenous and local communities have rights over genetic resources in one/some, but not, all relevant 
States. Still, all concerned States will be expected to exert best endeavor efforts to effectively involve these 
communities in transboundary cooperation”.
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respectively genetic resources and traditional knowledge as the starting requirement. 
As already mentioned, however, utilisation is not defined in the Protocol and doubts 
may arise as to whether this notion includes commercialisation. The question emerges 
especially if considering that Article 5(1) distinguishes between utilisation and “subsequent 
applications and commercialization” and the same formula is not used in Article 5(2) and 
(5).194 Indeed, an interpretation excluding benefit-sharing in case of commercialisation 
would be illogical because it would leave out large parts of the practices that the Nagoya 
Protocol intends to regulate.195
An additional question would be, instead, whether utilisation also includes non-
commercial research into the scope of application of benefit-sharing. As highlighted 
by the Working Group on Article 8(j), the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial uses of traditional knowledge “is not necessarily relevant” for indigenous and 
local communities since it anyway implies access.196 The same reasoning can be extended 
to the utilisation of genetic resources. In this sense, the fact that the Protocol does not 
explicitly distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial uses when it comes to 
intra-State benefit-sharing might be connected to the recognition that this distinction 
is misleading if the objective is to protect the rights of those communities over their 
knowledge and natural resources. On the contrary, several provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol reinforce the argument that utilisation includes non-commercial research 
activities, including Article 8(a) creating an obligation for Parties to “promote research” 
also encompassing non-commercial purposes.197
Regarding the concrete functioning of benefit-sharing, Article 5 indicates MATs as 
instruments to establish the conditions of the sharing. As anticipated, MATs are contracts 
of a private nature that are stipulated between users and providers.198 Article 6(3)(g) of the 
194  Kamau and Winter 2013, at 113-114.
195  Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 110. The authors claim that a restrictive interpretation would 
go against the purpose of the Nagoya Protocol.
196  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, paras. 16 and 17. On the distinction between utilization 
and access, see supra section 2.2, at 29. Some developments for a broad interpretation of utilisation are 
also visible in the Draft voluntary guidelines 2015, UN doc. UNEP/CBD/WG8J/9/L.5, para. 23(e). 
These are voluntary guidelines that are intended to help States implement Article 8(j) CBD. In this 
respect, Morgera highlights that utilisation of traditional knowledge for non-commercial purposes 
may have a number of repercussions on indigenous peoples, including the misappropriation of their 
knowledge, the failure to reflect indigenous peoples’ values and worldviews in the final research results, the 
failure to involve indigenous peoples in actual research, and the threats to the preservation of traditional 
knowledge. See Elisa Morgera, ‘Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the Cross-Roads of the Human 
Right to Science and International Biodiversity Law’ (2015) 4 Laws 803at 822-825.
197  On this point, see Morgera and Geelhoed 2016, at 7-8, who furthermore make reference to Art. 17 
Nagoya Protocol, which includes in the monitoring of utilization “any stage of research”, and Art. 5(4) 
Nagoya Protocol and the Protocol’s Annex, which “identify non-monetary benefits” that are likely to “be 
generated through non commercial research only”. The authors also support their views with reference to 
the Protocol’s travaux préparatoires.
198  On the private nature of these contracts, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 113, note 117.
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Protocol obliges Parties to adopt national measures regulating the establishment of MATs 
in the context of access to genetic resources. Concerning the utilisation of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources, Article 12(3)(b) creates a parallel obligation 
for Parties “to endeavour to support” the adoption by indigenous and local communities 
of “minimum requirements” for MATs. The Protocol therefore ensures more autonomy 
in the regulation of MATs when traditional knowledge is concerned. At the same time, 
since the conditions for establishing MATs directly affect indigenous peoples also when 
genetic resources are concerned, the creation of a national framework must be done by 
States, in pursuance of their human rights obligations, in consultation with indigenous 
peoples for the parts that are related to their rights.
In relation to MATs on traditional knowledge, Parties must also translate their 
obligation to ensure that access is done upon MATs into a national provision. Furthermore, 
in order to foster the protection of indigenous rights, Parties could also nationally establish 
an obligation for users to refer to the minimum conditions elaborated at the community 
level. Indeed, the establishment of minimum requirements is an additional guarantee 
for the enforcement of benefit-sharing under fair and equitable conditions, which is not 
present in the international human rights framework.
A limitation of the Protocol is that it has not set out minimum conditions for 
benefit-sharing, thus leaving a broad manoeuvring space to States and private parties 
when it comes to the realisation of fairness and equity.199 Articles 19 and 20 delegate to 
State Parties individually to develop model contractual clauses and voluntary standards. 
Since these clauses are difficult to be relied upon before foreign tribunals and courts, the 
same articles also obliges the COP/MOP to “take stock” of national experiences.200 Most 
importantly, Article 18 creates an obligation for States to encourage MAT-parties to 
include provisions on the resolution of disputes in the MATs. Still, indications on other 
aspects of the content of MATs are lacking.
The lack of common standards is also due to the need to come up with internationally 
agreed standards, which are enforceable beyond national borders. Indeed, until this gap 
is filled, the international human rights framework and prior CBD practice represent 
a useful indicator for determining the minimum content of MATs. In this sense, it is 
useful to distinguish, as Morgera does, between fairness, intended in procedural terms, 
and equity, which underlies the substantive objective of ensuring justice through 
benefit-sharing.201 In applying this notion to indigenous peoples, therefore, fairness 
199  See Morgera, ‘Towards International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and Equitable 
Benefit-Sharing from the Use of Traditional Knowledge’ 2015, at 19. See also, Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck 2014, at 114.
200  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 114: “it may be difficult for provider countries to rely on 
their domestic ABS frameworks in a foreign court”.
201  See Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing’ 
2016, at 381: “fairness supports stability within the legal system (predictable and clear procedures), 
whereas equity as substantive justice tends towards change (recognition or enhanced realization of rights, 
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would be related to ensuring that the participation of indigenous groups is appropriate 
in determining the benefits. In other words, involving the legitimate representatives 
of indigenous communities, in good faith and in cultural appropriate manners would 
realise fairness, together with considerations regarding the timeliness of negotiations and 
the provision of useful information. Equity would instead relate to the perception that 
the negotiated agreement is just and reflects the communities’ needs and rights.
MATs represent a direct application of the spectrum of participation described 
in Chapter 2. Since MATs are contracts, they require the consent of both parties. In 
this sense, they can be intended as a special means to realize free, prior and informed 
consent in the context of benefit-sharing. In addition, MATs are suitable formats when 
users are both States and private parties. In the latter case, MATs can translate voluntary, 
non-binding international standards on respect for human rights into binding, bilateral 
obligations.202
Indeed, MATs can also be seen as a comprehensive process whereby the initial consent 
to utilisation is negotiated and the terms and conditions of benefit-sharing are further 
defined.203 From this perspective, procedural and substantive aspects are conflated since, 
as argued in Chapter 2, participatory rights do bear relevant substantive consequences 
in that they are instrumental for the realisation of substantive rights. Although equitable 
dealings about benefit-sharing are not easily typified, an abstract way to grapple with 
equity could be to reconnect it to the respect of substantive rights.204
The Bonn guidelines have laid out additional voluntary standards of a procedural 
nature, such as the need to conclude MATs in a written form.205 Given the oral nature of 
most of indigenous legal frameworks, it certainly is a huge undertaking to translate oral 
traditions concerning the life of the community into written standards aimed to regulate 
the relationship of the community with third actors. In this sense, capacity-building 
activities as well as actions aimed to support such undertakings are necessary, also in line 
with Article 12(3)(b), concerning traditional knowledge, and, more generally, Article 
22 on capacity-building.206 Support, however, cannot be limited to the development of 
minimum requirements of MATs for the utilisation of traditional knowledge, but must 
(re-)allocation of power over resources)”.
202  On international standards about business responsibility, see Morgera, Corporate Accountability in 
International Environmental Law 2009.
203  Morgera also highlights that in some cases an agreement on benefit-sharing can be a way to waive 
consent. See Morgera, ‘Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the Cross-Roads of the Human Right to 
Science and International Biodiversity Law’ 2015, at 824.
204  In this sense, see Bonn guidelines, para. 44(g): MATs should specify “[w]hether the knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities have been respected, preserved and 
maintained, and whether the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional 
practices has been protected and encouraged”.
205  Bonn guidelines, para. 42(g).
206  Capacity-building is explored in section 2.4 in this chapter.
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extend to the concrete negotiations of MATs, also in relation to genetic resources given 
the interrelated nature of the two.
While the content of MATs is not typified, the Protocol gives an indication on 
the nature of the benefits that can be agreed upon by including in its Annex a non-
exhaustive list of both monetary and non-monetary benefits.207 Article 5(4) also clarifies 
that benefits can be of both monetary and non-monetary nature. Therefore, the Protocol 
offers guidance on one of the most important aspects of establishing MATs, which is the 
concrete identification of the benefits that can be shared.208
As observed by Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, the inclusion of non-monetary 
benefits serves the purpose of making benefits more readily available, independently from 
the realisation of monetary gains that can be delayed due to the intrinsically long process 
of product development and commercialisation.209 Furthermore, non-monetary benefits 
can also be more appropriate to suit the needs and traditions of certain indigenous and 
local communities. Users should be aware of the cultural component when negotiating 
over the types of benefits to be shared with communities. In light of international human 
rights, benefits that disrupt indigenous identities may not be in line with indigenous rights 
and the principle of self-determination, if the indigenous peoples concerned are not fully 
aware of the consequences that certain types of benefits may produce on their traditional 
lifestyles. Indeed, some of the benefits listed in the Protocol’s Annex can potentially 
contribute to the strengthening of indigenous identity and self-consciousness, although 
most of them are difficult to measure, for instance social recognition.210 In this sense, it 
is not clear whether these benefits need to be negotiated or are assumed to automatically 
arise from cooperation and the conclusion of MATs when accessing genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.
Finally, the Protocol gives a hint of the objectives of benefit-sharing. Article 9 obliges 
Parties to “encourage users and providers to direct benefits arising from the utilization 
of genetic resources towards the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of its components”. This provision certainly applies to the case where the genetic 
resources utilised belong to indigenous peoples. However, it is not clear whether this 
obligation can also be referred to the benefits arising from the utilisation of traditional 
207  The list is borrowed from the Bonn guidelines, para. 46 and Appendix II.
208  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 115. See also, at 116: “while the Annex identifies types 
of benefits to be shared, it is silent on possible links between specific benefit types and specific ABS 
transactions”.
209  Ibid., at 115.
210  Annex, para. 2(d) (“Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in education and training”), (h) 
(“Institutional capacity-building”), (i) (“Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities 
for the administration and enforcement of access regulations”), (k) (“Access to scientific information 
relevant to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity…”), (l) (“Contributions to the local 
economy”), (m) (“Contributions to the local economy”), (o) (“Food and livelihood security benefits”), 
and (p) (“Social recognition”).
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knowledge associated with genetic resources. A reason for not including benefit-sharing 
deriving from traditional knowledge could be linked to the fact that indigenous peoples 
should freely determine the destination of their benefits.211 Indeed, in light of human 
rights standards, this must be the case also when benefits derive from the utilisation 
of genetic resources, by virtue of indigenous rights to land and natural resources, their 
right to autonomy, and the principle of self-determination. Therefore, States can create a 
legislative framework to encourage the channelling of benefits belonging to indigenous 
peoples towards conservation and sustainable use. However, they cannot go so far as to 
create an obligation for indigenous peoples to do so.
Furthermore, other critiques concern the weak formulation of this obligation, which 
does not create an obligation to adopt any national regulatory framework to ensure that 
benefit-sharing contributes to conservation and sustainable use.212 In light of the analysis 
above, however, this flexibility may be ensured to guarantee enough differentiation to 
distinguish between the hypotheses when genetic resources belong to the State or to 
indigenous peoples.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties related to Article 9, other implicit functions 
of benefit-sharing within the Nagoya Protocol can be derived from other provisions. 
Although the Protocol does not fully adhere to the language of international human 
rights, it refers to the respect for rights in several provisions.213 Article 4(1), which regulates 
the relationship of the Protocol with other international instruments, establishes that the 
Protocol cannot interfere with “the rights and obligations of any Party deriving from any 
existing international agreement”. Indigenous rights fall in the category of obligations 
that State Parties are bound by through the ratification of international human rights 
treaties. Article 4(3) also establishes that, while the Protocol “shall be implemented in 
a mutually supportive manner with other [relevant] international instruments”, these 
cannot “run counter to the objectives” of the CBD and of the Protocol. This means that, 
although indigenous peoples are not obliged to direct their benefits towards conservation, 
they cannot pursue objectives or enact projects that pose a threat to biodiversity if States 
want to fulfil their obligations under the CBD regime. In light of this, benefit-sharing 
can be implemented nationally as an indirect incentive for pursuing conservation.
For the same reasons mentioned above, benefit-sharing can also be seen as means 
to protect indigenous rights. In this sense, Article 5(2) explicitly links benefit-sharing 
211  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 162.
212  See Kamau and Winter 2013, at 115: “The basic paradigm that maintaining the potential of discovering 
valuable genetic resources and traditional knowledge stimulates conservation and sustainable use is now 
explicitly complemented by the obligation to encourage the flow of benefits towards conservation and 
sustainable use (Article 9). The language is however rather weak”. See Bavikatte and Robinson 2011, 
at 41: “From a purely rights perspective Article 8(j) is weak”. See also, Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 
2014, at 160. At 161, these authors highlight that Art. 8(j) CBD should be read in connection with the 
objectives of the Protocol enshrined in Art. 1 CBD, which include conservation and sustainable use.
213  See Preambular paras. 24, 26 and 27, Art. 1, and Art. 4 Nagoya Protocol.
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to the existence of rights. Finally, the inclusion of non-monetary benefits potentially 
strengthening the identity of indigenous groups also supports the conclusion that benefit-
sharing in the Protocol is instrumental for the protection of indigenous rights.
2.3.1. Multilateral benefit-sharing: a comparison with ITPGRFA
Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol foresees the possibility that Parties establish a global 
multilateral mechanism of benefit-sharing to deal with transboundary situations or 
situations when it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.214 The 
provision is a compromise offering potential solutions to the unresolved problems of the 
Protocol, namely its temporal and geographical scope.215
Two main critical aspects have been identified in the literature. First, Article 10 
only establishes the obligation to “consider the need” for a multilateral system of benefit-
sharing, thus not creating any obligation to actually establish such a mechanism.216 Second, 
the scope of application of this mechanism is rather unclear and almost unconditionally 
delegated to further negotiations by the Parties of the Protocol. Cogent questions are, 
for instance, whether this mechanism should apply to every transboundary situation, 
and whether it can be extended to situations normally covered by the bilateral system of 
benefit-sharing.217
In this respect, the abovementioned Report of the Expert Group on Article 10 has 
214  Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol reads as follows: “Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from 
the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur 
in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent. The 
benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
through this mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components globally.” On the history of this provision, see Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck 2014, at 163-164. The authors highlight that the provision is a compromise solution put forward 
at the very last minute by Japan. The possibility to establish a multilateral mechanism has constituted a 
powerful leverage mechanism to convince developing countries to agree upon the Protocol (at 164, note 
110). 
215  See infra section 2.4 in this chapter.
216  See Alessandro Fodella, ‘Recent Development on Access and Benefit Sharing Relating to Genetic 
Resources (ABS) in International Law’ in Carlo Casonato and others (eds), Il biodiritto e i suoi confini: 
definizioni, dialoghi, interazioni (Università degli Studi di Trento 2014), at 114. See also, Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 164, who label Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol as an obligation of “a purely 
procedural nature”. As Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck argue, this mechanism is “to be considered as 
part of the exercise of national sovereignty” and is not intended as a mechanism to compensate for the 
compression of indigenous rights. On the contrary, in some cases it may also produce a deterioration 
of rights protection if compared with the bilateral system established in Art. 6 Nagoya Protocol, since 
neither of the communities sharing transboundary resources or knowledge would be able to express their 
prior informed consent. Plus, benefits must be directed to conservation and sustainable use “globally”. 
Thus, communities providing the resources and/or knowledge would not receive any benefits to sustain 
their livelihoods. But if it is applied to situations occurred before the entry into force of the CBD, the 
multilateral mechanism could represent a means to obtain partial redress, although from the formulation 
of Art. 10 Nagoya Protocol it does not seem that benefits would accrue to the community.
217  For a discussion on more undetermined elements, including those mentioned above, see Morgera, 
Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 166.
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concluded, on the basis of the views submitted by States, that the scope of Article 10 
should not extend to cover transboundary situations since these are effectively addressed 
in the context of Article 11.218 A notable exception to this view has been expressed by 
South Africa, which calls for a multilateral mechanism of benefit-sharing for cases where 
medicinal plants are found across borders and traditionally used by many communities 
in different countries.219 Furthermore, experts have highlighted that the need to establish 
such multilateral mechanism is currently very much contested and that bilateral benefit-
sharing should continue to be the gist of the efforts to implement the Nagoya Protocol.220 
Notwithstanding this, States have identified some cases where a multilateral system 
might be needed, including the case where traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources is shared among different communities in different countries.221
If examined in light of indigenous rights, Article 10 raises additional questions 
that may challenge the validity of the entire system. A multilateral system of benefit-
sharing can theoretically help to address situations where genetic resources or associated 
traditional knowledge are shared among different indigenous peoples located in more 
than one country. However, given the indeterminateness of Article 10 of the Nagoya 
Protocol and in light of the only example of multilateral system established by the 
ITPGRFA,222 legitimate doubts arise as to whether prior informed consent would be 
bypassed by the multilateral system.
Article 10 distinguishes between transboundary situations from situations where 
prior informed consent cannot be obtained so that it is not possible to assume that the 
multilateral system potentially established under the Nagoya Protocol would automatically 
waive the requirement of prior informed consent when multiple communities in multiple 
countries are concerned. However, if the multilateral system were a means to bypass the 
prior informed consent of the community where access takes place in practice, benefit-
sharing alone would not be an adequate mechanism to protect indigenous rights to land 
and natural resources and cultural rights in light of self-determination. On the contrary, 
in some cases it might also produce a deterioration of the protection of rights if compared 
with the bilateral system established in Article 6, since none of the communities sharing 
218  Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/4, para. 33. For the positions of States, see 
Synthesis of views pursuant to decision NP-1/10, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/3 (14 
December 2015). It is relevant to note that not only Parties to the Nagoya Protocol were invited to 
submit views on the development of a multilateral global system on benefit-sharing, but also “other 
Governments, international organizations, indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders” 
(para. 4). Seven non-Parties submitted views, including the United States that is party neither to the 
CBD nor to the Nagoya Protocol. No submission by indigenous groups was made.
219  UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/3, para. 16.
220  UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/4, para. 39; UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/
EM/2016/1/3, para. 26.
221  UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/3, paras. 19-20.
222  See infra in this section.
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transboundary resources or knowledge would be able either to express their prior informed 
consent or to negotiate which benefits accrue to them and how.
There are two main reasons to believe that the establishment of a multilateral 
system of benefit-sharing would threaten indigenous rights. One is related to the above-
mentioned history and rationale of this provision. As Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 
argue, this mechanism is “to be considered as part of the exercise of national sovereignty” 
and is not intended as a mechanism to compensate for the compression of indigenous 
rights.223 The second reason is linked to a comparative analysis of the structure, purposes, 
and functioning of the multilateral system of benefit-sharing within the ITPGRFA, which 
is also referred to in the Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol.224 Although the ITPGRFA has 
failed so far to produce the expected results,225 a comparison is still useful to highlight 
elements that must be taken into account when shaping the multilateral system under 
the Nagoya Protocol.
Articles 10-13 of the ITPGRFA establish the “Multilateral System of Access and 
Benefit-sharing”. Although based on States’ sovereignty over plant genetic resources like 
the CBD,226 the FAO multilateral system aims to facilitate access to those resources, 
eliminates the need for bilateral negotiations and prior informed consent, and creates 
a global mechanism to share both monetary and non-monetary benefits primarily with 
farmers.227 The ITPGRFA’s negotiating history reveals that the reasons for choosing this 
legal solution are similar to those underlying Article 10 in the Nagoya Protocol. The 
FAO multilateral system has taken stock of the difficulties experienced within the CBD 
framework to identify the origins of genetic resources and created a mechanism that 
automatically accounts for benefits.228 
223  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 163.
224  Preambular para. 19 Nagoya Protocol.
225  See De Jonge 2013, at 250. See also, Expert Group Meeting on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit-Sharing, Study on experiences gained with the development and implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol and other multilateral mechanisms and the potential relevance of ongoing work 
undertaken by other processes, including case studies, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/2 
(22 December 2015), at 10-11. This study identifies the following weaknesses: few benefits have so far 
materialised; there is an increasing use of non-listed crops; the benefit-sharing mechanism is project-
based so that farmer communities have to compete to receive funds on the basis of project proposals. The 
latter element does not take into account communities’ capacities. Moreover, the sharing of benefits with 
communities, which have provided the crops, is only potential. Another element is that contributions to 
the multilateral systems are per se non-predictable because they depend on commercialisation.
226  Art. 10(1) ITGPRFA.
227  See Art. 13(2) ITGPRFA; facilitated access is also considered a benefit per se pursuant to Art. 13(1) 
ITGPRFA; Art. 13(2)(d)(ii) ITGPRFA establishes that material benefits shall be paid to the multilateral 
system.
228  See Chambers 2003, at 321: “difficulty in determining the country of origin”. On the discussion of 
similar problems within the CBD regime, see De Jonge, ‘Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS Regime: 
Is Nagoya Leading Us in the Right Direction?’ 2013, at 250, and José T. Esquinas Alcázar, ‘Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture: International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture and Other International Agreements Negotiated through FAO Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture’ in Morten Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the 
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Compared to a prospective similar mechanism pursuant to the Nagoya Protocol, 
the FAO multilateral system is a very specific instrument due to the scope of application 
of the ITPGRFA and the limited number of genetic resources that are covered by this 
mechanism.
Concerning the first point, the ITPGRFA is considered as lex specialis with 
respect to the ABS regime laid out in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol since it only 
relates to “plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”.229 Regarding the resources 
covered by the multilateral system of benefit-sharing, while the Nagoya Protocol is 
all encompassing, the ITPGRFA only relates to the resources listed in Annex I of the 
FAO treaty.230 The inclusion of listed plant genetic resources under the ITPGRFA has 
required the identification of relevant genetic material through the cooperation of non-
State actors and gene banks.231 A similar undertaking under the Nagoya Protocol can 
certainly be problematic, especially due to the fact that research on genetic resources and 
their application is constantly evolving and that problems may arise concerning those 
resources that are unduly covered by intellectual property rights. Some authors have 
rightly observed that the inclusion of genetic resources in a prospective multilateral system 
within the Nagoya Protocol would require the consent of indigenous rightholders.232
Most importantly, however, the multilateral system under the ITPGRFA does not 
Downtrodden (Martinus Nijhoff 2003), at 244. Claudio Chiarolla, Sélim Louafi and Marie Schloen, ‘An 
Analysis of the Relationship between the Nagoya Protocol and Instruments related to Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights’ in Elisa Morgera, Elsa Tsioumani and Matthias Buck (eds), 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law 
and Implementation Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 2013), at 84-85, have highlighted that a multilateral 
approach to benefit-sharing in the food sector also serves the very peculiar objective to facilitate the 
exchange of food genetic resources in order to secure food availability.
229  Art. 3 ITPGRFA and Art. 4(4) Nagoya Protocol. See De Jonge, ‘Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS 
Regime: Is Nagoya Leading Us in the Right Direction?’ 2013, at 244; Anja von Hahn, ‘Implementation 
and Further Development of the Biodiversity Convention. Access to Genetic Resources, Benefit Sharing 
and Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities’ (2003) 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 295, at 308. See also Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen 2013, at 103: 
“Protocol Article 4.4 establishes a presumption of compatibility between the FAO Treaty, the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol”. When situations occur where providers and are not both party to the ITGRFA, 
the situation is far more complex and the applicability of the Nagoya Protocol or the ITGRFA must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis by virtue of the States involved and the genetic resources concerned. 
Mexico has proposed to extend the multilateral system foreseen in Art. 10 of the Nagoya Protocol to 
such cases. See UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/3, para. 20. On this point, see also ibid., 
at 109-110.
230  See Art. 11(1) and 11(2) ITPGRFA.
231  See Study on experiences gained with the development and implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
and other multilateral mechanisms and the potential relevance of ongoing work undertaken by other 
processes, including case studies, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/2. In this study, the 
author highlights that the FAO Treaty relied on data about food genetic material included in already 
existing gene banks that not claimed intellectual property rights over genetic material.
232  See Chiarolla, Louafi and Schloen 2013, at 114. These authors argue that this is the case only when 
national ABS legislations so provide. This thesis has maintained, in contrast, that prior informed consent 
is to be sought in pursuance of international human rights norms. Another interesting point raised by 
Chiarolla et al. is that the consent requirement is applicable also in the context of the ITPGRFA for the 
purpose of including genetic resources that belong to indigenous farmers.
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include benefits deriving from the use of traditional knowledge. Although the protection 
of traditional knowledge is acknowledged in Article 9(2)(a) of the ITPGRFA concerning 
Farmers’ rights, benefits deriving from its use are not considered in the FAO treaty. 
This gap may appear inconsistent with a treaty that both incorporates the legal category 
of Farmers’ rights for the first time in a binding convention and is clear in identifying 
farmers as the privileged beneficiaries of benefits.233 In contrast with this lack of regulation, 
the multilateral system pursuant to Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol would be again 
broader since it would also encompass traditional knowledge. Difficulties, however, may 
arise as for the best way to conceive it. For instance, if it required the identification 
of traditional knowledge and practices included in the mechanism, it would certainly 
entail the willingness of indigenous groups to map their knowledge. Although some 
communities are already engaging in the establishment of community protocols, which 
inter alia may identify their traditions and cultural features, some groups are still sceptic 
about the advantages of making their knowledge publicly available, due to risks related 
to bio-piracy.234
It seems in any event that, although Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol does not 
require it, any negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral mechanism should be 
done in consultation with indigenous representatives in order to ensure the consistency 
of this mechanism with international human rights law.
Three additional elements in the ITPGRFA still represent a good model for the 
development of a multilateral mechanism of benefit-sharing within the Nagoya Protocol. 
First, the FAO treaty foresees the possibility that private actors participate in the multilateral 
system of benefit-sharing.235 A multilateral system with the Nagoya Protocol would 
233  See Art. 9 and Art. 13(3) ITPGRFA, although the formulation of the latter is rather weak. Ibid., 
at 100, indirectly suggest that the multilateral benefit-sharing system of the ITPGRFA have positive 
repercussions on the protection of a number of farmers’ rights, including the preservation of traditional 
knowledge since it is intimately linked to the use of food genetic resources. This is plausible in 
consideration of the fact that the Nagoya Protocol stresses the link between traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources. The authors also highlight, at 110-111, that “the practical mechanisms through which 
indigenous and local communities and farmers may attain the protection of their traditional knowledge 
relevant to PGRFA as well as their rights to equitably participate in sharing benefits and in decision-
making are not spelt out by the International Treaty”. A further important point is that the requirement 
of consent incorporated in the Nagoya Protocol may influence the way in which genetic resources are 
included in the ITPGRFA’s multilateral system, as well as un understanding of genetic resources that also 
encompasses related traditional knowledge (at 113-114 and 121). 
234  Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 18-20.
235  See Art. 11(2) ITPGRFA, according to which all holders of Annex I resources are invited to include 
their plant genetic resources into the Multilateral system; Art. 11(3) ITPGRFA, according to which Parties 
“agree to take appropriate legal measures to encourage natural and legal persons” to include their Annex 
I resources into the Multilateral system; finally, Art. 13(5) ITPGRFA foresees a voluntary contribution 
of industries, although private parties are only encouraged to “include listed crops into the Multilateral 
System”. On this point, Study on experiences gained with the development and implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol and other multilateral mechanisms and the potential relevance of ongoing work 
undertaken by other processes, including case studies, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/2, 
at 10.
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certainly need to address this aspect. Second, the ITPGRFA has elaborated articulated 
rules on access to ex situ resources.236 Negotiations on similar points are expected to take 
place also in the context of the Nagoya Protocol.
Third, as already highlighted, benefits deriving from the utilisation of listed plant 
genetic resources must “primarily flow to farmers” especially in developing countries.237 
In contrast, Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol establish that benefits “shall be used to 
support the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components 
globally”.238 This provision hardly fulfils any functions of intra-State benefit-sharing since 
communities providing genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge would receive 
neither any reward for their contribution to conservation nor any compensation for the 
limits posed on their rights. Furthermore, they would be deprived of their decision-making 
power over the destination of benefits. Again, States should consult with indigenous 
representatives to implement this provision in a way that is in line with indigenous rights.
Indeed, if the global sharing of benefits is applied to situations occurred before the 
entry into force of the CBD, it would be a means to obtain partial redress.239 Although it 
does not seem from the formulation of the provision that benefits would directly accrue 
to communities, the conservation of biodiversity could indirectly benefit their ways of 
living.
In a different fashion, the ITPGRFA adopts other ways to bind benefits to 
conservation objectives. According to Article 12(3)(a) of the FAO treaty, the purposes of 
access are limited to “research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided 
that such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed 
industrial uses”. In addition, users cannot claim intellectual property rights, although 
access can end up in commercialisation.240 The approach contained in the ITPGRFA 
is thus evidently different from that of the CBD, which does not limit the purposes 
of access provided that they do not run counter the objectives of the Convention. It is 
questionable whether an approach similar to that of the ITPGRFA would be needed 
in the context of the CBD. This change would require an amendment not only of the 
Nagoya Protocol, but also of Article 15 of the CBD, which does not seem a practicable 
option. Furthermore, access within the CBD regime is already bound to conservation 
and sustainable use by the interlinkages existing between the CBD objectives. Article 1 of 
the Nagoya Protocol confirms the binding relationship between ABS, conservation, and 
sustainable use. In this sense, States must enforce an interpretation of the CBD regime 
that is truly in line with its objectives, while at the same time not limiting any activities 
236  See Art. 12(4) on standard Material Transfer Agreement and Art. 15 ITPGRFA.
237  Art. 13(3) ITPGRFA.
238  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 170.
239  This, however, seems to be excluded at this stage. See UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/3 and 
UNEP/CBD/ABS/A10/EM/2016/1/4 supra.
240  Art. 12(3)(d) ITPGRFA.
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that, although not directed to conservation, may potentially have positive effects on it. 
The additional caveat is that any such access must be based on an agreement with the 
rightful holders of resources and traditional knowledge. 
2.4. Tools for reconciliation and main limitations
The Nagoya Protocol has acknowledged that it cannot prejudice the existence of indigenous 
rights,241 thus recognising that these rights exist independently from the international 
regime on biodiversity. As mentioned, the Protocol has also noted the importance of 
the UN Declaration on indigenous rights.242 Moreover, the Protocol generally allows 
for a mutually supportive reading of its obligations with related instruments, including 
human rights treaties.243
The new regime on ABS has gone far beyond recognising the independent existence 
of indigenous rights. Indeed, it has both put in place and elaborated on a number of tools 
that help to incorporate the rights of indigenous peoples into the Protocol. The first part 
of this section analyses these tools, while the second part illustrates the main limitations 
of the Nagoya Protocol, with a particular attention to normative gaps and unclear aspects.
2.4.1. Tools for reconciliation
These tools are of a different nature and go from Parties’ obligations concerning the prior 
and informed consent of indigenous and local communities to the creation of community 
241  Preambular para. 27 Nagoya Protocol: “Affirming that nothing in this Protocol shall be construed as 
diminishing or extinguishing the existing rights of indigenous and local communities”.
242  Preambular para. 26 Nagoya Protocol.
243  See Art. 4 Nagoya Protocol. Note that mutual supportiveness is also established in the ITPGRFA, 
preambular para. 9. For a full analysis of Art. 4, see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 79-97. What 
seems particularly problematic with this provision is the lack of any specific rules on the relationship 
between the Protocol and international regimes on intellectual property rights. See Morgera, ‘Towards 
International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing from the 
Use of Traditional Knowledge’ 2015, at 12-13, who sees this gap as a missed opportunity “to provide an 
authoritative mandate for its Parties to adopt national measures that may depart from the relevant law 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and afford protection in the context of a possible WTO law 
dispute”. See also, Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A 
Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, at 201, who highlights that States 
may in principle “rule out biotechnological patents” pursuant to the TRIPS agreement (Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Quite on the contrary, developed countries have 
concluded so-called TRIPS-plus agreements whereby they make patentability of life forms, organisms 
and genetic resources mandatorily possible. Pavoni concurs with other authors that “[t]he Nagoya 
Protocol addressed this misalignment in a very cautious and ambiguous way, i.e., by making sure that 
no provision in itself could be interpreted as mandating deviations from the rights purportedly secured 
by TRIPS” (at 202). The author furthermore highlights that a significant source of potential conflicts is 
related to the issue of disclosing the origins of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, which would 
run contrary to the TRIPS but be allowable, and even desirable, under the Nagoya Protocol (at 203-204). 
Finally, Pavoni argues that Art. 4(2) Nagoya Protocol could be read as obliging its Parties not to negotiate 
a TRIPS-related agreement affecting genetic resources and traditional knowledge that would run counter 
the Protocol’s objectives, including its amendments (at 207).
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protocols by indigenous peoples themselves, from the establishment of an institutional 
framework in provider countries to the enactment of specific rules in user countries, and 
from the enhancement of indigenous rights through benefit-sharing to the recognition 
of indigenous customary law.244 The following analyses each tool of reconciliation with 
an attention to both the role played in the incorporation of indigenous rights into the 
Protocol and possible shortcomings.
The requirement that Parties need to establish national measures aiming to ensure 
the prior informed consent of indigenous and local communities is one of the most 
relevant novelties of the Protocol.245 Articles 6 and 7 mirror the spectrum of participatory 
rights established under international human rights law. Notwithstanding ambiguities 
concerning the conflation between prior informed consent and approval and involvement, 
the Nagoya Protocol allows for an evolution of its regime that is even more advanced 
than human rights standards in that prior informed consent might be required even 
when the survival of indigenous peoples is not at stake. This evolution will largely depend 
on national legislation but it may also happen—and it is desirable—that the COP/MOP 
establishes common benchmarks. In any event, national and international standards 
cannot establish participatory safeguards that are less protective than those stemming 
from international human rights law.
Furthermore, when Parties establish national legal frameworks on prior informed 
consent, it is important that they adopt clear rules to both steer and monitor the behaviour 
of private parties.246 The regulation of private activities can go so far as to extend the same 
obligations on obtaining consent from indigenous peoples to businesses and research 
institutions.
The qualified nature of the requirements concerning genetic resources has already 
been discussed.247 The adoption of national measures concerning prior informed consent 
when accessing genetic resources is conditioned upon the existence of established rights. 
The existence of rights over genetic resources must be assessed against the international 
human rights framework recognising indigenous rights over natural resources. In this 
sense, the apparently more favourable treatment reserved to traditional knowledge under 
Article 7 of the Nagoya Protocol is extended to the utilisation of genetic resources by 
means of systemic interpretation. This analysis is confirmed by the fact that the Protocol 
acknowledges the inextricable link existing between genetic resources and traditional 
244  Most of these elements are discussed by Nijar, ‘Incorporating Traditional Knowledge in an International 
Regime on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: Problems and Prospects’ 2010, at 471-472.
245  For a discussion of the difference between prior informed consent and approval and involvement, 
see supra section 2.1.2. For the qualifications of the obligation to adopt national measures, including the 
meaning of established rights, see sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.
246  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 132.
247  See supra section 2.2.
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knowledge.248
Notwithstanding the recognition of interlinkages, the Nagoya Protocol rightly 
distinguishes between utilisation of genetic resources from utilisation of associated 
traditional knowledge. As recognised already in the Bonn guidelines, consent concerning 
the utilisation of one of the two elements does not automatically extend to the other. The 
separation between consent requirements implies that the interdependence of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge can be used to raise safeguards directed to indigenous 
peoples but not to diminish their rights.249
Another important tool that allows for the incorporation of indigenous rights into 
the Nagoya Protocol is benefit-sharing. This instrument profoundly innovates in the 
protection of indigenous rights. Under international human rights law, benefit-sharing is 
one of the safeguards that States need to ensure when compressing land and resource rights 
of indigenous peoples. Under the CBD framework, instead, benefit-sharing is historically 
connected to the utilisation of traditional knowledge.250 Therefore, the international 
regime on biodiversity conservation adds up a layer of protection of indigenous rights 
since it introduces benefit-sharing in case traditional knowledge is utilised, even when 
indigenous rights are not compressed.251 On the contrary, benefit-sharing under the 
Protocol appears less established when it comes to the utilisation of genetic resources, 
due to the qualification regarding the establishment of indigenous rights over genetic 
resources in accordance with domestic law.252 Previous sections have indeed proposed a 
systemic reading of this provision in light of indigenous rights, suggesting that the two 
standards of benefit-sharing are eventually comparable.
One of the functions of benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol is to reinforce 
some rights that are protected in a less comprehensive way under international human 
rights law, such as the right to traditional knowledge.253 In contrast, the function of 
benefit-sharing as compensation has not been retained in the Nagoya Protocol, which 
does not address the establishment of protected areas. Since clearer obligations under 
248  Preambular para. 22 Nagoya Protocol.
249  Bonn guidelines, para. 37. See also, Jeffery 2002, at 801.
250  See Art. 8(j) CBD and Art. 5 Nagoya Protocol.
251  See Elisa Morgera, ‘Benefit-Sharing as a Bridge between the Environmental and Human Rights 
Accountability of Multinational Corporations’ in Ben Boer (ed), Environmental Law Dimensions of 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2014).
252  See Art. 5(2) Nagoya Protocol. See also, supra section 2.3.
253  See supra section 2.3. See also, Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘Access to GRs and Benefit Sharing - Underlying 
Concepts and the Idea of Justice’ in Evanson C. Kamau and Gerd Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and the Law (Earthscan 2009), at 8: “Farmers’ rights and the rights of local 
and indigenous communities regarding their traditional knowledge represent somewhat a new type of 
entitlement in intellectual achievements. Unlike classic IPRs, they do not aim at providing incentives for 
generating innovations, but rather reward achievement of the past. Furthermore, they are both in their 
nascent state of development and in need of clarification in view of the proper assignment of the power 
of disposal and the beneficiaries, as well as in view of appropriate enforcement mechanisms”.
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Article 5 concerning the establishment of national measures on benefit-sharing do not 
apply to this subsector of the CBD regime, benefit-sharing following the creation of 
protected areas is still characterized by the uncertainties highlighted in Chapter 4.254
MATs are instrumental for benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol since 
according to Article 5(2) and (5) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits deriving from 
the utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge must be based upon the 
conclusion of MATs. In this sense, MATs realise the condition of fairness since they 
constitute the procedural framework under which indigenous and local communities 
can participate in the decisions about benefit-sharing concerning their resources and 
traditional knowledge. Moreover, MATs also represent the institutional framework under 
which private parties are indirectly obliged to negotiate conditions with indigenous and 
local communities. Similarly, equity can be realised through MATs depending on the 
conditions negotiated between the parties.
As already highlighted, for all of these functions to be fulfilled by the establishment 
of MATs, clear national rules should exist regulating their conclusion and their minimum 
contents. Furthermore, a decision of the COP/MOP would be desirable to ensure that 
indigenous rights are rightly fulfilled in the establishment of MATs.255
When concluding MATs with States or private parties, indigenous peoples are 
formally in a position of parity, thus realising their right to grant or deny their consent 
to projects initiated by States or businesses. As highlighted in section 2.3, this feature of 
MATs makes the establishment of these instruments as conceptually similar to the right to 
free, prior and informed consent since the conclusion of MATs presupposes the granting 
of consent on the possibility and the modalities of benefit-sharing. Notwithstanding 
these similarities, prior informed consent preceding utilisation remains distinct from 
benefit-sharing following utilisation since the latter can be implemented even when the 
former is not obtained. Moreover, the implementation of benefit-sharing requirements 
under Article 5 is not a sufficient condition to meet the obligations of prior informed 
consent contained in Articles 6 and 7.256
The role of indigenous peoples in negotiating conditions for benefit-sharing must 
be additionally emphasised. Not only are indigenous peoples protagonists when it comes 
to determine the nature and extent of benefits deriving from the utilisation of their 
resources and traditional knowledge, but they are also fundamental actors when it comes 
254  See sections 2.1.1 and 3 of Chapter 4.
255  On these points, see supra section 2.3.
256  It is important to highlight that one of the main challenges in the future concerning prior informed 
consent, MATs, and benefit-sharing is to ensure that these requirements are effectively implemented. 
This is why some authors have proposed a system of certification allowing to verify the compliance with 
such requirements, in pursuance of Art. 17 Nagoya Protocol. On the advantages and shortcomings of 
certificates, see Brendan Tobin, Geoff Burton and Jose Carlos Fernandez-Ugalde, Certificates of Clarity or 
Confusion: The Search for a Practical, Feasible and Cost Effective System for Certifying Compliance with PIC 
and MAT (UNU-IAS Report 2008). On certificates, see also infra in this section.
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to the realisation of the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol and the related implementation 
of its provisions.
Although formal parity is realised in the legal framework of the Nagoya Protocol 
concerning benefit-sharing, there might be evident imbalances in the capacity of 
indigenous groups when it comes to understanding dealings, negotiating equitable 
conditions, and being aware of their rights, given also the enormous complexity of ABS 
agreements.
Article 22(1) of the Nagoya Protocol only establishes an obligation for States to 
cooperate among them in the field of capacity-building with the aim of facilitating the 
implementation of the Protocol. In this undertaking, Parties must involve indigenous 
peoples in inter-State cooperation. This provision does not prescribe any specific 
obligation to effectively implement capacity-building measures in favour of indigenous 
peoples, although this interpretation might result from a reading of this provision in 
light with the objectives of the Protocol, i.e., to realise benefit-sharing. Furthermore, 
capacity-building obligations of developed States must be fulfilled to address the capacity 
needs and priorities of developing countries. Article 22(3) prescribes that the latter must 
determine such needs with a view to supporting the capacity needs of indigenous and local 
communities.257 It seems, therefore, that indigenous peoples can be concretely involved 
in bilateral or multilateral cooperation through the mediation of the States that they are 
citizens of. Importantly, Article 22(3) also refers to the fact that the capacity needs of 
indigenous peoples must be determined by themselves in autonomy. Although it is not 
explicitly stated, in order to support indigenous capacity needs, developing countries 
must consult with indigenous peoples. This interpretation is also in line with human 
rights standards that require consultation when indigenous peoples are directly affected 
by some measures. It is also plausible that indigenous representatives will contribute to 
determine such needs via consultation in the framework of COP/MOP meetings.258
Capacity-building in establishing MATs is explicitly addressed in Article 22(4). This 
provision, however, only suggests possible areas of interest, do not produce obligations for 
State Parties, and do not specifically concern indigenous peoples. Article 22(5)(j) includes 
among the measures to enhance capacity259 special measures dedicated to indigenous and 
local communities. Again, this provision does not create obligations260 and, in addition, 
257  Art. 22(3) reads: “As a basis for appropriate measures in relation to the implementation of this 
Protocol, developing country Parties, in particular the least developed countries and small island 
developing States among them, and Parties with economies in transition should identify their national 
capacity needs and priorities through national capacity self-assessments. In doing so, such Parties should 
support the capacity needs and priorities of indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders, 
as identified by them, emphasizing the capacity needs and priorities of women”.
258  In support of this point, see Art. 25(3) Nagoya Protocol.
259  The list is not exhaustive.
260  The only obligation concerning Art. 22(4) and (5) is that regarding the communication of any 
capacity-building measures to the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House, included in Art. 22(6) 
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does not specify the areas where capacity-building measures would be more needed, 
such as for the negotiation of MATs.261 When reading these inconsistencies in light 
of abovementioned Article 22(3), it seems plausible to conclude that the Protocol has 
delegated the identification of needs directly to indigenous peoples and that the subjects 
responsible to fulfil those needs remain their States of origin. Developed countries, 
instead, bear obligations only with regards to cooperation on capacity-building. This is 
a rather weak construction, not only if considering special capacity needs of indigenous 
peoples, but also when it comes to addressing capacity issues of developing countries 
more generally.
Capacity-building obligations—although not labelled in this way—are established 
more effectively elsewhere in the Protocol. In the Annex, institutional capacity-building 
is included in non-monetary benefits. Article 21(c) includes among possible awareness-
raising activities that Parties are obliged to adopt the establishment of a help-desk for 
indigenous peoples. Furthermore, in relation to traditional knowledge, Article 12(3) of 
the Protocol obliges Parties to “endeavour to support, as appropriate, the development 
by indigenous and local communities” of community protocols, minimum requirements 
for MATs, and “model contractual clauses for benefit-sharing”.
Community protocols are another tool for incorporating indigenous rights into 
the Nagoya Protocol. These are instruments, elaborated by communities themselves, 
which constitute a way for indigenous peoples to formalise their positions on a number 
of issues, including their attitudes towards external interferences.262 Therefore, in the 
context of the Nagoya Protocol, indigenous communities could identify the ways in 
which consent must be sought or MATs can be stipulated, for instance by indicating the 
authorities that have the capacity to negotiate on behalf of the community or explaining 
the underlying values of their traditional knowledge and practices.
Article 12(1) creates the obligation for Parties to take into account inter alia the 
Nagoya Protocol. The ABS Clearing-House has been established by Art. 14 of the Nagoya Protocol 
pursuant to Art. 18 of the CBD. Parties are obliged to transmit relevant information to the Clearing-
House, including non-mandatory information on “[r]elevant competent authorities of indigenous and 
local communities, and information as so decide”.
261  The Bonn guidelines were more specific. See para. 16(a)(vii): “Support measures, as appropriate, to 
enhance indigenous and local communities’ capacity to represent their interests fully at negotiations”.
262  See Community Protocols for Environmental Sustainability: A Guide for Policymakers (UNEP and EDO 
NSW 2013), at viii: “Community protocols are instruments embodying protocols, procedures, rules 
and practices, existing in both written and unwritten form, developed and used by ILCs in numerous 
contexts, such as interactions with their ecosystems, interactions within and between ILCs themselves, 
and in their interactions with external actors”. See also, Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 62: “a 
biocultural community protocol is a community-led instrument that promotes participatory advocacy 
for the recognition of and support for ways of life that are based on the customary sustainable use of 
biodiversity”; “a community protocol is an opportunity to reflect on their ways of life, values, customary 
laws and priorities and to engage with a variety of supporting legal frameworks and rights”; at 63: “[t]
hey also provide a vehicle for articulating their procedural and substantive rights to, among other things, 
be involved in decision-making”; “[t]hey also help communities to…promote a more participatory and 
endogenous approach to the future governance”.
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community protocols of indigenous and local communities when implementing the 
provisions of the Protocol concerning traditional knowledge. The reference to national 
law263 cannot be interpreted as the possibility for Parties to derogate from the obligation 
to consider community protocols. In contrast, given the non-established nature of this 
instrument both for national legal frameworks and for the legal traditions of indigenous 
peoples, the reference to national law is a way to operationalise the modalities in which 
community protocols must be taken into account.
More problematic is the fact that the obligation to consider community protocols 
is limited to the implementation of obligations concerning traditional knowledge. 
Since there is no human rights practice on community protocols, it is difficult to argue 
that these must be taken into account also when it comes to genetic resources held by 
indigenous peoples. Indeed, there are some elements in support of this interpretation.
Community protocols are adopted on the initiative of indigenous peoples, thus 
being an expression of their capacity to self-regulate their own matters. Therefore, to 
the extent that indigenous peoples decide by themselves which matters to include in 
community protocols, these might contain also relevant provisions on land and resource 
rights. In this sense, since indigenous rights over genetic resources depend on their land 
and resource rights, States might have to consider community protocols when interpreting 
the expression “established rights” under Articles 5(2) and 6(2). The same reasoning 
is applicable to Article 12(3), which creates an obligation for Parties to “endeavour 
to support” the adoption of community protocols “in relation to access to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources” and related benefit-sharing.
Although the adoption of community protocols is left to the initiative of indigenous 
peoples, these might need to elaborate them in order to reinforce their position vis-à-vis 
States—both users and providers—and private parties. Community protocols perform 
a number of functions. They may serve the purpose of raising the self-consciousness of 
indigenous peoples on certain issues, including the extent and nature of their rights, as 
well as the possibility that their resources are sought by external actors.264 Community 
protocols can also represent a way to bring more legal certainty to customary law.265 
263  Such reference is formulated as follows in Art. 12(1) Nagoya Protocol: “In implementing their 
obligations under this Protocol, Parties shall in accordance with domestic law take into consideration 
indigenous and local communities’ customary laws, community protocols and procedures, as applicable, 
with respect to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources” (emphasis added).
264  See Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 66-67: “clarity to the drivers of external interventions 
such as protected areas, ABS agreements”. “In this regard, community protocols enable communities 
to bridge the gap between the customary management of their biocultural heritage and the external 
management of their resources”.
265  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 35: “community protocols…may provide a useful 
approach” to operationalise customary law. See also, Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The 
Fundamental Role of Customary Law in Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Resource and Knowledge 
Rights’ 2013, at 158: “Protocols may be seen as a form of partial codification of custom”. Concerning 
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Furthermore, they may operationalise indigenous rights by establishing both conditions 
for access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge266 and procedures for the 
interaction of State, companies, and indigenous peoples. By providing the institutional 
framework for indigenous peoples to sit at the same table with States and businesses, 
community protocols can also influence States’ policies and business behaviour.267
Given their multiple functions and close enmeshment with rights, community 
protocols are considered as a way to operationalise indigenous self-determination.268 
However, their utility with respect to the incorporation of indigenous rights into the 
international regime on biodiversity can be verified only to the extent that they are 
applied by national and international courts in cases concerning the utilisation of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge, or if they are reflected in MATs.269
Article 12(1) also obliges Parties to consider “indigenous and local communities’ 
customary law” when implementing obligations related to traditional knowledge.270 The 
explicit recognition of customary law as a relevant legal framework, although subjected 
to national law, is a sign that the Nagoya Protocol has internalised legal pluralism.271 
This recognition is fundamental for the protection of indigenous rights and testifies 
of an increasing importance of indigenous and local communities in the international 
framework on ABS. 
The main tool for implementing indigenous rights within the framework of the 
Nagoya Protocol, as highlighted in previous sections, is the adoption of “necessary 
legislative, administrative or policy measures” by Parties. Although these have a leeway in 
the choice of the measures deemed more appropriate to achieve the Protocol’s objectives, 
the point that positivisation is a double-edged sword, see supra section 2.3.
266  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 43. See also, ibid., at 158: “Protocols of this nature 
enable the custodians of biocultural heritage to define conditions for prior informed consent and benefit-
sharing, and to place restrictions on access and use of resources and knowledge.”
267  See ibid., at 158: “Taking the initiative to develop community protocols provides the custodians 
of traditional knowledge with an opportunity to influence the development of national, regional and 
international law and policy in this area”. See also, Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 182.
268  See Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 62: “Community protocols are one endogenous rights-
based approach that communities are using to draw on a variety of biocultural rights to affirm their right 
to self-determination, including within the context of ABS”.
269  See Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The Fundamental Role of Customary Law in 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Resource and Knowledge Rights’ 2013, at 160: “The proof of their 
utility will be seen if and when a court case arises involving issues of customary law, rights to access 
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge”.
270  The same considerations illustrated above for community protocols apply here concerning the 
possibility to extend this obligation to the implementation of provisions related to genetic resources.
271  See Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The Fundamental Role of Customary Law in 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Resource and Knowledge Rights’ 2013, at 162: “International law has 
clearly recognised that the realisation of Indigenous peoples’ human rights can only be achieved with due 
respect and recognition for their customary laws. The Nagoya Protocol has turned the duties to respect 
and recognise customary law into a binding legal obligation.”
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Parties must adopt an adequate regulatory framework concerning both benefit-sharing 
and prior and informed consent.272As already mentioned, the Protocol does not indicate 
minimum rules on prior informed consent or benefit-sharing. However, Article 6(3) 
indicate legal certainty, transparency, and non-arbitrariness as general principles when it 
comes to the establishment of national rules. In this sense, the flexibility granted to States 
must be balanced with clarity and legal certainty.273
The Nagoya Protocol contains other obligations to adopt national measures, like 
those regarding the establishment of national focal points and national authorities. 
According to Article 13(1), focal points must provide ABS-related information to 
users, thus functioning as the national institutional interface for third countries and 
private businesses.274 In particular, focal points respond to the need to facilitate access 
to technical information, such as “procedures for obtaining prior informed consent and 
establishing mutually agreed terms”.275 Ambiguities derive from the fact that information 
on these procedural requirements are referred to indigenous peoples only when it comes 
to the utilisation of traditional knowledge.276 This gap can be filled by arguing that 
the obligation to provide information on conditions for accessing genetic resources is 
left broad enough to include all possible concerned actors.277 Moreover, Parties have 
an obligation under the Protocol to establish national measures to ensure indigenous 
consent following the utilisation of genetic resources.278 In this light, the fact that focal 
points must provide information on relevant indigenous communities when third parties 
want to access genetic resources cannot be put into question.
Pursuant to Article 13(2), Parties shall also establish national authorities that are 
responsible for granting access, issuing evidence that access requirements have been met, 
as well as providing advice.279 Concerning the first aspect, the question arises of in which 
ways national authorities can establish contacts with indigenous communities in order 
to obtain their prior informed consent before granting permission for the utilisation of 
indigenous genetic resources or traditional knowledge. The Protocol is silent on these 
aspects, which must be detailed in national legislation concerning ABS.
272  See Art. 5(2) and (5), Art. 6(2) and (3), and Art. 7 Nagoya Protocol.
273  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 59: importance of flexibility of national processes.
274  Focal points also represent the institutional link between Parties and the Protocol’s Secretariat.
275  See Art. 13(1)(a) Nagoya Protocol.
276  See Art. 13(1)(b) Nagoya Protocol.
277  Art. 13(1)(a) reads as follows: “The national focal point shall make information available as follows…
(a) For applicants seeking access to genetic resources, information on procedures for obtaining prior 
informed consent and establishing mutually agreed terms, including benefit-sharing”.
278  See Art. 5(2) Nagoya Protocol.
279  Pursuant to Art. 13(3) Nagoya Protocol, the functions of giving information and granting permissions 
can be exercised by a single entity.
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One way to ensure that indigenous peoples have full control of these processes is to 
designate one of the national communities, associations with an indigenous membership, 
or organisations representing indigenous communities as national authority. While this 
choice is theoretically feasible within the framework of the Protocol, that for instance 
allows for the establishment of “one or more national authorities”,280 it is not clear to what 
extent this would be a positive development for indigenous peoples. On the one hand, 
full control over procedural aspects and direct interactions with users could enhance 
indigenous control over their lands and resources. On the other hand, leaving indigenous 
peoples alone in this undertaking would require huge efforts in terms of capacity 
building, including in terms of the administrative capacity to receive and process access 
requests. Furthermore, State Parties cannot waive their obligations concerning both the 
implementation of the Protocol and the enforcement of indigenous rights. Therefore, it 
seems more suitable that access requests are processed by authorities having a sufficient 
administrative apparatus. At the same time, processes must be in place to allow for a 
timely involvement of indigenous peoples when requests concern their genetic resources 
and/or traditional knowledge.
National authorities can also issue written “evidence that access requirements have 
been met”.281 This means that they can provide national certificates that may prove, 
at least nationally, that national ABS legislation has been correctly implemented. The 
Protocol also makes reference to international certificates, the issuance of which would 
prove that access of genetic resources has happened in compliance with the Protocol.282 
Problems arise concerning the uncertain mandatory nature of the obligation to issue 
these certificates.283 Moreover, international certificates within the Protocol seem to refer 
only to access to genetic resources and related consent and benefit-sharing requirements, 
thus setting aside traditional knowledge.284 Furthermore, the mere communication of a 
national permit to the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House as the only condition 
for creating an international certificate gives too much freedom to State Parties since these 
have carte blanche for setting the conditions for the issuance of permits at the national 
level. Although Article 17(4)(h) identifies what elements any international certificate 
must contain at a minimum,285 it does not seem that the Clearing House has a mandate 
280  Art. 13(2) Nagoya Protocol. Although theoretically feasible, the designation of an indigenous group/
association as national authority has not happened so far. Mexico, however, has designed as one of 
its national authorities its governmental agency on indigenous issues. See https://absch.cbd.int/search/
national-records/CNA (last accessed October 2016).
281  Art. 13(2) Nagoya Protocol.
282  See Art. 6(3)(e) in combination with Art. 17(3) Nagoya Protocol.
283  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 225.
284  Pavoni explains this choice through the Parties’ unwillingness to deal with IPRs implications of issuing 
certificates on the requirements related to traditional knowledge. See Pavoni, ‘The Nagoya Protocol and 
WTO Law’ 2013, at 204.
285  For a discussion on the elements that should be contained in an international certificate, Report of the 
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to review national processes on prior informed consent or the establishment of MATs.286 
Therefore, there is a high risk that conditions are met only on paper.
Another important tool to incorporate indigenous rights into the Protocol that 
is left to national initiative is the adoption of user-side measures. Articles 15 and 16 
of the Nagoya Protocol create an obligation for user countries to establish within their 
jurisdictions measures to ensure that genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge 
have been accessed under conditions that are in accordance with the legal framework of 
provider countries. These provisions also oblige States to put in place redress mechanisms 
in case provider countries’ rules on ABS are not respected. User-side measures certainly 
aim to respond to the limited enforceability of provider countries’ national measures 
on ABS.287 At the same time, Articles 15 and 16 fail to acknowledge the possibility that 
provider countries do not adopt measures correctly implementing the Protocol and other 
international obligations, such as the rights of indigenous peoples. In these cases, user-
side measures that only consider the legal framework of provider countries may not be 
sufficient both to achieve the objectives of the Protocol and to ensure an implementation 
of the Protocol that is in line with international human rights standards.288
Finally, monitoring and compliance activities are essential tools for ensuring the 
correct implementation of the Protocol’s normative standards. Concerning the latter, 
Article 30 contains a de contraendo clause for Parties to “consider and approve cooperative 
procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance and to address cases of 
non-compliance” with the Nagoya Protocol. This provision has provided the basis for the 
COP/MOP to establish in 2014 a compliance procedure.289 This mechanism presents 
several elements of novelty that specifically concern the role of indigenous peoples within 
the compliance procedure.290
Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge Associated with Genetic 
Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 102: “Essential components of a certificate would include whether or not 
there is traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources involved, who the traditional knowledge 
holders are, and whether or not the user has complied with indigenous customary law, community 
protocols and other consent or decision-making processes”.
286  See Jospeh 2010, at 82-83 for an overview of the discussions behind the adoption of this provision.
287  See De Jonge, ‘What is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?’ 2011, at 132.
288  See Fodella, ‘Recent Development on Access and Benefit Sharing Relating to Genetic Resources 
(ABS) in International Law’ 2014, at 106; Tvedt and Young 2007, at 129; De Jonge, ‘Towards a Fair and 
Equitable ABS Regime: Is Nagoya Leading Us in the Right Direction?’ 2013, at 253: “the user measures 
the Nagoya Protocol refers to are not further defined”; “[a]s such, the Nagoya Protocol does not shift the 
responsibility for benefit sharing to the (developed) countries and parties that use genetic resources from 
abroad, but leaves it to the ‘country of origin of such resources’”.
289  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, Cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote 
compliance with the Nagoya Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/
NP/COP-MOP/DEC/1/4 (20 October 2014).
290  Please note that this discussion is based on the rules of procedure that are contained in the COP/
MOP decision to establish the Compliance Committee above. More detailed rules of procedure have 
been approved by the Committee at its first meeting (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/CC/1/5, Item 3, para. 
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First, it is a non-adversarial mechanism, as it is mostly the case in multilateral 
environmental treaties. In this sense, it also considers providing assistance to indigenous 
peoples as a means to improve compliance.291 Although discussions are ongoing on this 
point, this feature opens up to the possibility that capacity building in the future is 
addressed directly to indigenous peoples.292
Second, the Compliance Committee is composed of fifteen members nominated by 
UN regional groups and then elected by the COP/MOP. These groups can also decide to 
nominate representative of indigenous peoples as Committee members.293 Furthermore, 
indigenous groups can themselves nominate two representatives to serve as observers 
within the Committee.294 Observers can participate in the deliberations without voting 
in the meeting concerning “interests of indigenous and local communities”, which 
is certainly unprecedented for a non-compliance mechanism. Although indigenous 
representatives cannot cast a vote, they may have some impact in influencing the final 
decision considering that the Committee must preferably deliberate by consensus.295
Third, although indigenous peoples cannot by themselves trigger the examination 
of the Compliance Committee, they have a number of possibilities to bring their 
concerns to the Committee. 296 One possibility is that the COP/MOP can in principle 
present submissions on behalf of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, unlikely as it may 
seem, the Committee may act motu proprio once it receives information that Parties have 
difficulties complying with the Protocol.297 Most importantly, this kind of information 
12) and are recommended for adoption at the next COP/MOP meeting. For the text of these draft rules, 
see UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/CC/1/2 (23 February 2016).
291  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. Annex A, para. 2, C and F.
292  On this point, the COP/MOP has mandated the Committee to submit recommendations to be 
followed up during the second COP/MOP. See COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. 2(b) and Annex F, para. 
3(b). At its first meeting, the Compliance Committee decided that priority should be given to assisting 
Parties with difficulties in compliance with the Protocol’s obligations. Given the existence of provisions 
on compliance, the Committee found it premature to elaborate new supporting mechanisms. See Report 
of the Compliance Committee under the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization on the Work of Its First Meeting, UN 
Doc. UNEP/CBD/ABS/CC/1/5 (8 April 2016), para. 14 and 17.
293  See COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, Annex, para. 2. This has not happened yet. See COP/MOP dec. NP-
1/4, para. 4.
294  See COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, Annex, para. 2: at least one of them must be from a developing country. 
Indigenous and local communities’ observers are Mr. Preston D. Hardison and Mr. Onel Masardule 
Arias. See COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. 4.
295  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. 11. It is still to be seen whether consensus will be the privileged 
decision-mechanism within the Committee. Consider also that, beyond the role of the observers, the 
Committee can either avail itself of information provided by indigenous peoples or look for the advice of 
indigenous experts. COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. Annex E, paras. 1-2.
296  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. Annex D, para. 1: only Parties with respect to themselves or to other 
Parties and the COP/MOP can submit issues to the Compliance Committee.
297  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. Annex D, para. 9(b). The Committee can also act to “examine 
systemic issues of general non-compliance that come to its attention” (para. 10). Time will tell whether 
the indigenous-related provisions of the Protocol fall into this category.
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may also be “provided by a directly affected indigenous or local community, related 
to provisions of the Protocol”.298 Once issues are submitted before the Secretariat for 
information, this body is obliged to expeditiously transmit them to the Committee.299 
The latter is not obliged to examine the allegations; however, it may decide to do so. 
Therefore, there exists more than an indirect possibility for indigenous representative 
to trigger the compliance mechanism. This possibility is very innovative and de facto 
recognizes a collective standing to indigenous communities, which is more advanced 
than individual petitions in certain human rights treaty mechanisms, such as the Human 
Rights Committee, from the viewpoint of the possibility to address collective claims. At 
the same time, it must be reminded that the Compliance Committee might also adopt 
very restrictive views on the implementation of the Protocol’s provisions. Therefore, the 
extent to which this mechanism would allow to vindicate human rights concerns outside 
the scope of human rights monitoring mechanisms is far from being clear at this stage.
Beyond the compliance mechanism above, the initiative for monitoring the 
implementation of the Protocol, creating mechanism to resolve disputes, and ensuring 
compliance is left to individual Parties. For instance, Article 18 obliges Parties to “encourage 
providers and users” to bilaterally define through MATs the jurisdiction competent to 
hear disputes, the applicable law, as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Moreover, Article 17(1)(a) indicates the establishment of national checkpoints as one of 
the mechanisms to ensure appropriate monitoring of the Protocol’s rules dealing with the 
utilisation of genetic resources. Beyond being only potential mechanisms, checkpoints 
have been criticised for several reasons, going from the fact that their work only concern 
genetic resources to the fact that these bodies are only able to monitor the implementation 
of national rules.300 Indeed, an international compliance mechanism could better ensure 
that the rights of indigenous peoples are effectively implemented under the Protocol. 
As highlighted by Tobin, in the absence of such a mechanism, human rights courts—
whether nationally or internationally—will be increasingly called to enforce indigenous 
rights also in the context of the ABS regime.301
298  COP/MOP dec. NP-1/4, para. Annex D, para. 9(b)(iii). 
299  See Draft rules of procedure, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD(ABS/CC/1/2 (23 February 2016), Rule 8(1): 
“The Committee shall be informed immediately by the Secretariat that a submission has been received…
or that information has been provided by a directly affected indigenous or local community under 
paragraph 9(b)”.
300  See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck 2014, at 220; Jospeh 2010, at 90.
301  Tobin, ‘Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The Fundamental Role of Customary Law in 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Resource and Knowledge Rights’ 2013, at 150: “In the absence of 
strong compliance mechanisms at the international level the burden for enforcing Indigenous peoples’ 
rights over their resources and knowledge is, therefore, likely to fall on national courts, regional human 
rights organisations, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms”.
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2.4.2. Gaps and limitations
Notwithstanding some of the positive developments described above, there are at least 
three aspects that have not been addressed in the Protocol and bear consequences on 
the extent to which indigenous rights can be fully incorporated into the international 
ABS regime. These aspects are: 1) the unresolved issue of the geographical and temporal 
scope of the Protocol; 2) the unclear impacts of the ABS regime on conservation and 
traditional knowledge; and 3) the incomplete acknowledgement of indigenous rights.
As pointed out, Article 3 of the Protocol leaves the question of the temporal and 
geographical application of the ABS regime open. Particularly problematic aspects are 
whether the obligations contained in the Nagoya Protocol extend back at least to the 
entry into force of the CBD and whether the Protocol applies to transboundary situations.
Concerning the first point, Kamau and Winter have argued that “the assumption 
that the NP [Nagoya Protocol] shall be the baseline would be tantamount to concluding 
that the Protocol waives the obligations of Parties under the CBD”.302 However, this 
argument holds true only for those obligations that are already clearly established in 
the CBD. Given that the consideration of indigenous rights in the CBD is very limited 
and the implementation of Article 8(j) of the CBD has revealed itself very problematic, 
Kamau and Winter’s argument does not solve the issue of the temporal scope of the 
Protocol. 
Moreover, both the CBD and the Protocol’s guarantees concerning indigenous 
peoples do not certainly apply to the period preceding the entry into force of the CBD. 
The failure of the Protocol to address the issue of past injustices, however, leaves out of 
the picture a lot of misappropriations happened in the past that have substantive negative 
repercussions on the Convention’s objective to ensure benefit-sharing. In Morgera’s words, 
the consideration of aspects of “corrective justice” in COP meetings or future negotiations 
could remedy these historical imbalances and make benefit-sharing within the Protocol 
truly equitable.303 The consideration of historical injustices could also concern the issue 
of access to ex situ genetic resources incorporating traditional knowledge, which in turn 
had been accessed without prior consent.304
The issue of extraterritorial application of the Protocol is relevant in this analysis 
302  Kamau and Winter 2013, at 114.
303  Morgera, ‘Towards International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and Equitable 
Benefit-Sharing from the Use of Traditional Knowledge’ 2015, at 11.
304  See Report of the Meeting of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on Access and Benefit-
Sharing, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2, para. 120: “In the discussion on ex-situ sources, some 
experts noted that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources in the public domain does 
not necessarily have the prior informed consent of the relevant indigenous peoples or local communities 
from which it was sourced. It was proposed by some that use should trigger some benefit-sharing”. As 
reminded, these issues have been touched upon in the Report of the Expert Group on Article 10. See 
supra section 2.2, note 145.
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due to the possibility, described in previous sections, that the same genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge are shared among indigenous groups in different countries. In 
such an occurrence, Article 11 only prescribes cooperation, thus leaving the issue of what 
this cooperation entails open for interpretation.305 Previous sections have argued that 
national authorities have the duty to inform users about all possible owners of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge if they are aware of transboundary situations. Plus, 
indigenous communities might authorise access in one country, while at the same time 
negotiating benefit-sharing conditions that apply to communities across the borders. 
Therefore, there are some possibilities for an extraterritorial application of the Protocol 
that are not fully addressed in the Protocol itself. 
Another problem that is not fully addressed in the Protocol is the concrete relationship 
between the ABS regime and the general objectives of the CBD. Some authors have pointed 
to the uncertain impact on conservation of the Protocol.306 Similarly, uncertainties exist 
as to the concrete impact of ABS agreements on the traditional knowledge of indigenous 
peoples.307 These questions, however, can hardly be resolved in the abstract and depend 
both on the way the Protocol is implemented at the national level and on the content of 
concrete deals. Both aspects go beyond the scope of this research.
Although general limitations and gaps do bear direct consequences on the capacity 
of the Nagoya Protocol to fulfil the rights of indigenous peoples, the failure fully to 
recognise those rights constitutes an independent limitation of the Protocol. The analysis 
conducted in previous sections has revealed that many steps forward have been taken 
towards the recognition of indigenous rights, including the acknowledgements contained 
in the Preamble of the Protocol, as well as the provisions on prior informed consent and 
benefit-sharing.
At the same time, the Protocol contaminates the language of rights with ambiguous 
alternatives (consent, approval and involvement) and qualifications deriving from 
national law (established rights). Furthermore, the Protocol fails to explicitly recognise 
indigenous rights as an integral whole body of rights, ranging from land to cultural 
rights, underlying the principle of self-determination.308
305  See supra sections 2.2 and 2.3.
306  See Fodella, ‘Recent Development on Access and Benefit Sharing Relating to Genetic Resources 
(ABS) in International Law’ 2014, at 122-123: “If one looks at the interests that should be ideally taken 
into account in the management of genetic resources, it seems that those of resources’ users have been 
privileged over those of providers, and that those of humankind and biodiversity conservation have been 
somehow overlooked”. See also, Claudio Chiarolla, Renaud Lapeyre and Romain Pirard, ‘Bioprospecting 
under the Nagoya Protocol: A Conservation Booster?’ (2013) 14/13 IDDRI Policy Brief 1, at 2.
307  See Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 57: “In sum, the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement 
simultaneously represents a moral victory for the San community for recognition of their rights relating 
to traditional knowledge and a process that has arguably further undermined their traditional values and 
knowledge and resource governance systems”.
308  See Tauli-Corpuz 2003, at 14: “Our right to our heritage which includes, among others, traditional 
knowledge and our genetic materials, cannot be delinked from the bundle of civil, political, economic, 
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Indeed, the CBD COP has acknowledged in past decisions that traditional knowledge 
is not an isolated by-product of indigenous culture but is intimately connected to the 
concrete exercise of cultural practices on indigenous lands.309 Moreover, the Preamble 
of the Nagoya Protocol has recognised that there exists a profound link between genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge. However, as highlighted in previous sections, 
the Protocol creates two slightly different sets of rules for the case when either genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge belonging to indigenous peoples are utilised. While 
the choice to create separate access requirements for genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge may be more protective of indigenous rights, differences when it comes to 
acceptable entitlements, monitoring requirements, and others are not justifiable.310
3. Unveiling the relevance of indigenous rights and the principle of self-
determination: applying the interpretative approach
The incorporation of indigenous rights into the CBD’s international regime on ABS 
is not a new idea since it was already included in the Aichi Target 18.311 The Nagoya 
Protocol, however, has enormously changed the legal framework, by partially realising 
this objective.
This chapter has shown that, notwithstanding the progress made by the Nagoya 
Protocol, it is still necessary to fill some of its normative gaps by looking at the international 
framework on the rights of indigenous peoples, in order both to avoid potential conflicts 
between the two regime and to promote a harmonious interpretation. In particular, two 
significant examples of the need to perform this systemic interpretation are the notion 
of “established rights” and the issue of when the prior informed consent of indigenous 
peoples is required. Concerning the former, when Parties adopt national measures to 
regulate the utilization of genetic resources and related benefit-sharing, they must take 
into account the relevant international human rights framework. Concerning the latter, 
social and cultural rights which we are entitled to enjoy. All these rights flow seamlessly into each other. 
Thus, the desegregation of our rights as if these can be treated as separate issues and the breaking up 
of our heritage to be handled by different international intergovernmental bodies is creating multiple 
problems for us”.
309  See e.g., COP dec. V/16, para. 16: recognition that the preservation of traditional knowledge depends 
upon the preservation of cultural identity and “the material base that sustains” indigenous peoples.
310  At the same time, as already argued in section 2.1, the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol reinforce 
indigenous rights to traditional knowledge, a category that is not equally delineated under international 
human rights law.
311  Aichi Biodiversity Targets, COP dec. X/2, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2 (29 October 
2010). Target 18: “By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and their customary use of 
biological resources, are respected, subject to national legislation and relevant international obligations, 
and fully integrated and reflected in the implementation of the Convention with the full and effective 
participation of indigenous and local communities, at all relevant levels”.
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the decisive test to assess the compatibility with protected human rights of access to 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge and related benefit-sharing is the extent to 
which the planned measures affect the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous peoples and 
their ability to dispose of their resources and to pursue their own development goals in a 
way that affects these peoples’ distinctiveness.
In both cases, indigenous rights are to be read as a coherent body of rights, whose 
aim is to preserve indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness and, thus, underlying the principle 
of self-determination. The fact that indigenous rights are not absolute312 does not diminish 
the value of reading them in light of self-determination within the CBD regime. Indeed, 
also States’ sovereignty is subject to limits but this does not diminish its normative value.
Self-determination is a principle that, as highlighted in Chapter 2, emerges 
inductively from a comprehensive reading of indigenous rights, whose essence is to 
preserve the identity and distinctiveness of indigenous peoples. In the context of the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, the principle of self-determination has permitted to 
clarify that the requirements of prior informed consent and MATs are not about private 
property and normal disposable rights.313 In contrast, both instruments are an expression 
of indigenous autonomy, their ability to shape their destiny, and their right to negotiate 
with States and private parties. The Protocol’s reference to customary law and community 
protocols confirm the instrumental nature of prior informed consent and MATs for the 
realisation of indigenous self-determination.314
Several additional examples of how self-determination shapes the interpretation of 
the Protocol have been given throughout the chapter. Beyond what has been said about 
prior informed consent and MATs, self-determination has influenced the very notion 
of traditional knowledge under the CBD regime, which reflects indigenous culture and 
evolves with it. Furthermore, entitlements over genetic resources have been derived from 
land and resource rights due to the fact that, pursuant to self-determination, indigenous 
peoples are free to determine how to utilise their natural resources and related sub-
components. In addition, a parallel has been drawn between the regulation of inter-State 
benefit-sharing, framed within States’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and 
intra-State benefit-sharing, which is premised on the liberty of indigenous peoples to 
dispose of their natural resources.
312  See Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 52: “While none of these rights are absolutely unqualified 
and do allow for limited State involvement, they should be seen as substantial gains for Indigenous 
peoples and local communities. This is especially true if we understand them, as Anaya points out, as a 
normative direction in which international law is heading”. See also, Chapter 2.
313  See Bhatti and others 2009, at 20: “the user must recognize that ABS-requirements of PIC and MAT 
are not simply a restatement of contract law”.
314  See Jonas, Bavikatte and Shrumm 2010, at 51: the Nagoya Protocol “establishes the following 
four pivotal biocultural rights...The right over their genetic resources; The right over their traditional 
knowledge; The right to self-governance through respect for their customary laws and community 
protocols [Art. 9]; and The right to benefit from the utilization of their traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources by third parties”.
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Most importantly self-determination can level the differential treatment that the 
Protocol reserves in some cases to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Since 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge are in the purview of the same body of 
international standards protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, safeguards of 
one regime must penetrate the other.315 This is true also in light of the fact that the 
Nagoya Protocol recognises the intimate link between genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.316 In this sense, for instance, when it comes to the identification of benefits 
under the Protocol, the destination of these benefits must be in the hands of indigenous 
groups both when they derive from the utilisation of traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources. Article 9 connects the latter type of benefits to conservation objectives to be 
determined by States.317 Indeed, by virtue of indigenous self-determination, when benefits 
are accrued to indigenous peoples following the utilisation of their genetic resources, 
indigenous groups must be able to decide over the destination of such benefits, similarly 
to what happens when traditional knowledge is involved.
In more general terms, both indigenous genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge are to be read as essential components of indigenous distinctiveness and must 
be dealt with by the Parties of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol in this light. However, 
in concrete terms, the requirements concerning the two are formulated in different ways 
in the Protocol. Moreover, utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge are 
conceived of as separated moments that deserve distinct safeguards. To respond to these 
conceptual challenges, the principle of self-determination can, first, justify a notion of 
genetic resources that is more firmly rooted to indigenous land rights. Second, it can 
unveil a conception of traditional knowledge that is instrumental for the utilisation of 
genetic resources, thus improving the decision-making powers of indigenous peoples 
over the latter. Third, the unity of genetic resources and traditional knowledge can help to 
unveil the contradictions stemming from monitoring mechanisms that do not promote 
the disclosure of origin when it comes to traditional knowledge that is used for research 
and development within the scope of the Protocol.318
315  See Nijar, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and 
Implementation Options for Developing Countries’ 2011, at 25: “This inextricable link of TK to the 
genetic resource implies that any application for access to the genetic resource would trigger the provisions 
in the Protocol relating to access to TK as well (UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/8/2)”.
316  Preambular para. 22 Nagoya Protocol.
317  See supra section 2.3.
318  See supra sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
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CHAPTER 4 
Conservation, Protected Areas and Indigenous 
Peoples: Applying the Interpretative Approach
1. Conservation and indigenous rights: conflict and reconciliation
This chapter applies the interpretative approach of the interaction of the CBD regime 
and indigenous rights, as developed in Chapter 2, to the case of the conservation of 
biological diversity and the creation of protected areas. The main purpose is to highlight 
the potential for conflict between obligations stemming from the international regime 
on biodiversity conservation, as well as indicating ways to reconcile conservation in the 
CBD and in the WHC with the rights of indigenous peoples.
In-situ conservation is normally achieved through the establishment of protected 
areas, which is also the approach adopted in the context of the CBD. Before delving into 
how protected areas are regulated under the CBD, it is worth briefly touching upon this 
phenomenon and what it may imply for indigenous peoples in order to understand what 
regulatory needs are at stake.
For the last fifty years, there has been a progressive intensification in the 
establishment of protected areas. According to UN data, the number of protected areas 
in 2014 was 209,429.1 This number has progressively grown since 1962, but it has more 
than doubled since 2003, which shows the centrality of this instrument in modern 
conservation strategies.
In the context of this research these numbers are not significant per se and should 
be complemented by considerations on land tenure and land use. Some authors describe 
the creation of protected areas as “the single largest land use and status change that has 
occurred in recent times”, and particularly so for indigenous peoples.2 The impact on 
1  Marie Deguignet and others (eds), 2014 United Nations List of Protected Areas (UNEP-WCMC 
2014), at 12-14. This study presents data also on the geographical distribution of these sites, revealing 
that most of protected areas are nowadays located in Europe, although the percentage of land covered 
in this continent is lower than in other regions of the world, such as Central America (at 15). See also, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/71/229, at 7.
2  Ashish Kothari and others, Recognising and Supporting Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities: Global Overview and National Case Studies (Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity 2012), at 32. See also, Doreen Lustig and Benedict  Kingsbury, ‘Displacement 
and Relocation from Protected Areas: International Law Perspectives on Rights, Risks and Resistance’ 
(2006) 4 Conservation & Society 404, at 408: “conservation-induced displacement has been comparable 
to development-induced displacement in tending disproportionately to target certain minority groups”; 
Marcus Colchester, Salvaging Nature: Indigenous Peoples, Protected Areas and Biodiversity Conservation 
(World Rainforest Movement - Forest Peoples Programme 2003), at 22: “According to some indigenous 
peoples, protected areas and conventional ‘development’ programmes - dams, mines, roads, pipelines, 
colonisation schemes - are but two sides of the same coin. Both are experienced as top- down impositions 
on indigenous communities whereby lands are taken away from the control of local communities and 
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indigenous peoples is especially strong since their lands are rich in biodiversity and are 
often chosen by States to host natural reserves.3
The establishment of protected areas on indigenous lands may encroach on 
indigenous rights at different levels.4 First, the designation and creation of protected 
areas may happen with no involvement whatsoever of indigenous peoples, thus violating 
their land and resource rights and their participatory rights. Further abuses may occur 
if indigenous peoples are not involved in the management of protected areas created 
on their territories.5 Conservation projects may also lead to the exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from their lands—through dispossession or relocation6—or from resource use. 
Finally, benefits deriving from the management of protected areas may be not shared 
equitably with indigenous peoples.7 Although these violations are independent from one 
another and may happen autonomously, a common element is the failure to acknowledge 
indigenous rights to land and underlying self-determination.
As highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
the Kaliña and Lokono decision has acknowledged the potential restrictions on indigenous 
allocated to uses determined by outsiders. Both are violations of the rights of indigenous peoples to their 
lands and to self-determination”; Desmet 2011, at 66: “It has been estimated that approximately 50 per 
cent of protected areas have been established on lands traditionally owned by indigenous peoples. In 
Latin America this would amount to 80 per cent”.
3  See Claudia Sobrevila, The Role of Indigenous Peoples in Biodiversity Conservation: The Natural but 
Often Forgotten Partners (World Bank 2008), at xii, according to which 22% of the Earth terrestrial 
surface is indigenous land and these territories preserve the 80% of global biological diversity.
4  In recognising the possibility that the establishment of protected areas may negatively affect 
indigenous peoples, the current Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights, Ms. Victoria Tauli Corpuz, 
has invited submissions from the public inter alia about cases “when the creation and management of 
conservation areas has resulted in violations of the rights of indigenous peoples as enshrined in relevant 
international human rights instruments”. Submissions can also focus on examples of conservation projects 
that have enhanced indigenous rights, as well as “conservation activities and proposals undertaken by 
indigenous peoples themselves”. To see the full range of topics: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/Pages/ConservationActivities.aspx (last accessed October 2016). The 
deadline for submissions was on 2 May 2016. On a related note, the Special Rapporteur has published 
the above-mentioned Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229. In this report, she confirms that “[t]he respective Special 
Rapporteurs…have, since the establishment of the mandate in 2001, received numerous allegations of 
large-scale violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of conservation measures” (p. 18). 
Reports on national violations are cited on the same page, note 39. For concrete examples of violations 
of indigenous rights following conservation and the establishment of World Heritage sites, see the same 
report at 19-22.
5  The reasons more frequently invoked to exclude indigenous peoples from the management of 
protected areas located in their territories are difficulties in engaging with them, the failure of indigenous 
peoples to protect the environment, and the refusal of management practices that are not based on 
Western science. See Mac Chapin, ‘A Challenge to Conservationists’ [2004] World Watch Magazine 17.
6  Note that relocation can also be performed in a way that is consistent with indigenous peoples, but 
this would require that free, prior and informed consent is obtained and possibly that indigenous peoples 
are moved in a place that has comparable features in terms of livelihood and possibility to carry out 
cultural practices. See infra.
7  On benefit-sharing, see Chapter 3.
Chapter 4
255
rights stemming from the establishment of protected areas.8 Most importantly, the Court 
has elaborated an additional requirement to evaluate the legality of restrictions placed 
on indigenous rights in case of the establishment of protected areas on their territories, 
that is the possibility that indigenous peoples continue to be able to “access and use 
their traditional territories” after the establishment of protected areas.9 Furthermore, the 
Court has explicitly invoked Articles 8(j) and 10(c) of the CBD, as well as the CBD 
PoWPA,10 to reinforce its argument that indigenous peoples have extensive participatory 
rights when it comes to the establishment and management of protected areas.11 Whether 
or not the CBD regime contains such an extensive understanding of indigenous rights is 
the object of this chapter.
In the context of the CBD, conservation is one of the three pillars of the treaty.12 
Although the term is not defined,13 the meaning of conservation emerges from the 
obligations incumbent on Parties concerning in-situ14 and, in a complementary way, 
ex-situ conservation.15 When conservation within natural habitats is viable, Article 8(a) 
and (b) requires Parties to “[e]stablish a system of protected areas or areas where special 
measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity”, and to define guidelines to 
identify those areas.
The issues at stake when interpreting this provision are two, namely the meaning of 
protected areas within the CBD and the relevance of establishing protected areas for the 
overall objective of achieving conservation.
Concerning the first point, Article 2 defines protected areas in a functional way since 
it stresses the aim of conservation.16 Furthermore, this provision associates conservation 
8  The case concerned inter alia the establishment of nature reserves without consultation and the 
prohibition to carry out traditional activities within the territories designated as protected areas. The 
Court lacked jurisdiction to examine the legality of the establishment of those nature reserves since these 
had been created before Suriname accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. However, it examined the issue of 
the legality of restrictions posed on the use of natural resources by indigenous peoples within the reserves. 
Kaliña and Lokono case, paras. 162 and 166.
9  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 181.
10  As reminded, established by COP dec. VII/28, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/28 (13 April 
2004).
11  Kaliña and Lokono case, paras. 177-178.
12  Art. 1 CBD. The three objectives of the Convention are the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components, and the sharing of the benefits deriving from the utilisation of genetic 
resources.
13  See Elisa Morgera, Wildlife Law and the Empowerment of the Poor (FAO 2010), at 19; Desmet 2011, 
at 44.
14  Art. 2 CBD. In-situ conservation implies that species, ecosystems and habitats are conserved and 
restored “in their natural surroundings”.
15  Under Art. 2 CBD, ex-situ conservation is defined as “the conservation of components of biological 
diversity outside their natural habitats”. According to Art. 9 CBD measures to realise ex-situ conservation 
should be adopted “predominantly for the purpose of complementing in-situ measures”. 
16  The definition contained in Art. 2 CBD reads: ““Protected area” means a geographically defined area 
which is designated or regulated and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives”. Gillespie has 
observed that this broad definition constitutes the “lowest common denominator” of all definitions of 
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to a physical space. In this sense, the first important element to single out protected 
areas is that these must be “geographically defined”. Second, those defined areas must be 
subject to rules or management plans that are aimed to conservation.
Protected areas, however, are not isolated biodiversity hotspots in the understanding 
promoted by the CBD. The fact that Article 8(a) requires the establishment of a “system 
of protected areas” hints to a conception of conservation whereby protected areas are 
selected for their potential to contribute to the conservation of certain species or habitats 
in a broader perspective, which also considers whether the same habitats or species are 
protected under other established protected areas.17 In other words, biodiversity is to 
be preserved not only within ecosystems but also considering the interactions among 
them. In this sense, Article 8(a) somehow complements the definition of ecosystems 
as functional units, provided by Article 2.18 This interpretation is confirmed by the 
definition of the ecosystem approach given by the CBD COP, according to which the 
functional units of any ecosystems do not have a specific scale.19
From another perspective, the ecosystem approach adopted by the CBD is cognizant 
of the competition for natural resources and the need to ensure that these are used, 
although sustainably, for goals that are different from conservation. This interpretation 
is confirmed by Article 10(a) of the CBD, which requires that States jointly consider 
conservation and sustainable use when adopting national standards.20 Furthermore, the 
CBD COP recognises that the functions of ecosystems depend on different perceptions 
of those functions by different groups.21
protected areas contained in other international regimes on conservation. Alexander Gillespie, Protected 
Areas and International Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007), at 27.
17  Lyle Glowka, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (IUCN 1994), at 39: “The word “system” in paragraph (a) implies that the protected areas of 
a Party or region should be chosen in a logical way, and together should form a network, in which the 
various components conserve different portions of biological diversity”.
18  Art. 2 CBD: ““Ecosystem” means a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism 
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit”.
19  See COP dec. V/6, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23 (15-26 May 2000), Annex, Part A, para. 1: 
“The ecosystem approach is a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources 
that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way” (emphasis added); and para. 3: “This 
definition [that of habitat provided in Art. 2 CBD] does not specify any particular spatial unit or scale, 
in contrast to the Convention definition of “habitat”. Thus, the term “ecosystem” does not, necessarily, 
correspond to the terms “biome” or “ecological zone”, but can refer to any functioning unit at any scale. 
Indeed, the scale of analysis and action should be determined by the problem being addressed”; Part 
B, para. 6, Principles 7 and 10. On the ecosystem approach, see also COP dec. II/8, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/2/19 (1995), para. 1; COP dec. IV/1 (1998), Part B; COP dec. VI/12, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/6/20 (2002); COP dec. IX/7, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/7 (9 October 2008). 
See also, the Ecosystem Approach Sourcebook, a tool to help practitioners implement the ecosystem 
approach in practice, elaborated following COP dec. VII/11. The Sourcebook is available at https://www.
cbd.int/ecosystem/sourcebook/default.shtml (last accessed October 2016).
20  A similar obligation is established under Art. 8(i) CBD.
21  See COP dec. V/6, Annex, Part B, para. 6, Principle 1: “The objectives of management of land, 
water and living resources are a matter of societal choice. Rationale: Different sectors of society view 
ecosystems in terms of their own economic, cultural and societal needs. Indigenous peoples and other 
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In this sense, the CBD COP has endorsed the six-category system of categorisation 
of protected areas by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
which provides for different degrees of conservation and different degrees of restrictions 
on the use of resources, ranging from the absolute prohibition of human interference to 
models that allow for different kind of uses.22 This categorisation responds to the question 
of how protected areas relate to the objective of conservation, identifying what can be 
done to achieve conservation depending on circumstances. Differences in strategies for 
conservation are also overshadowed in Article 8(a) of the CBD that, beyond considering 
the establishment of protected areas, it also allows for “areas where special measures need 
to be taken to conserve biological diversity”.23
The variety of conservation models brings up another fundamental question, which 
is about who decides on what is done to achieve conservation in protected areas within 
the range of possible choices, and more generally what are the subjects entitled to take 
decisions on the establishment of protected areas. These questions relate to what IUCN 
has named as governance issues.24
Governance issues in the context of Article 8(a) are certainly linked to States’ 
obligation to establish protected areas. In this respect, next sections explore to what 
local communities living on the land are important stakeholders and their rights and interests should be 
recognized. Both cultural and biological diversity are central components of the ecosystem approach, and 
management should take this into account. Societal choices should be expressed as clearly as possible. 
Ecosystems should be managed for their intrinsic values and for the tangible or intangible benefits for 
humans, in a fair and equitable way”. See also, COP dec. VII/11, Annex 1, para. 3(c): “Ecosystem 
management is a social process.  There are many interested communities, which must be involved through 
the development of efficient and effective structures and processes for decision-making and management”. 
This decision also adds new elements to the rationale for Principle 1: “The objectives for managing land, 
water, and living resources is a matter of societal choice, determined through negotiations and trade-
offs among stakeholders having different perceptions, interests, and intentions”. These decisions are also 
analysed in section 2.1.
22  See CBD dec. VII/28, para. 31 and COP dec. IX/18, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/18 
(9 October 2008), para. 9. For an overview of the IUCN categories, see Nigel Dudley, Guidelines for 
Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN 2008). The management categories elaborated 
by IUCN are six: (Ia) Strict Nature Reserves; (Ib) Wilderness Areas; (II) National Park; (III) Natural 
Monument; (IV) Habitat/Species Management; (V) Protected Landscape or Seascape; and (VI) Protected 
Areas with Sustainable Use of Natural Resources. These have been elaborated in the first place to promote 
the harmonisation of the criteria to identify and classify protected areas at the national level. According to 
Gillespie, however, the endorsement of the IUCN system by the CBD COP has not produced the desired 
harmonisation of national classifications. See Gillespie 2007, at 30. The same author has identified a 
number of necessary elements for protected areas to achieve their conservation purposes. These elements 
are: the presence of management plans, the recognition of legal status, identified borders, adequate size, 
buffer zones, networks and corridors, adequate staff and sufficient resources, and the performance of 
environmental impact assessment for projects taking place within or near protected areas. See Alexander 
Gillespie, ‘The Management of Protected Areas of International Significance’ (2006) 10 New Zealand 
Journal of Environmental Law 93.
23  This issue is further explored in section 2. See also Art. 8(c) and (g) CBD, which give a hint what 
“special measures” could be, such for instances adopting a regulatory framework to protect certain 
biological resources or to prohibit the release of genetically-modified organisms.
24  Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend and others, Governance of Protected Areas: From Understanding to Action 
(IUCN 2013), at 10-11.
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extent this obligation can be satisfied by delegating decision-making powers to non-State 
actors, and in particular indigenous peoples.
This option is not excluded by the CBD when reading Article 8(a) in combination 
with Articles 8(j) and 10(c). The former requires States to protect traditional knowledge 
relevant for conservation.25 Similarly, the latter obliges States to “[p]rotect and encourage 
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices 
that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements”. These obligations 
open up for the possibility that States promote a decentralised management of natural 
resources that might involve indigenous and local communities.26 The CBD, however, 
neither explicitly refers to the possibility of such involvement nor indicates its modalities. 
Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) are included in IUCN’s most 
recent categorisation of governance types and represent a promising model for including 
indigenous peoples in decisions on protected areas.27 The extent to which this model is 
reflected in CBD practice is explored in section 2.1.3.
Regarding the question whether the establishment of protected areas has a 
prominent place with respect to the objective of conservation, there are two possible 
interpretations, a literal one and a contextual one. Pursuant to Article 8(a), the obligation 
to establish a system of protected areas is part of a broader set of obligations to achieve 
in-situ conservation. Furthermore, as the rest of the obligations under Article 8, it is 
qualified by the locution “as far as possible and as appropriate”. While this locution does 
not necessarily limits the mandatory nature of the obligation to establish protected areas 
but only gives a broad manoeuvring space to States on how to realise this undertaking, 
protected areas are not the only way to achieve conservation under the CBD.
From a contextual perspective, however, the establishment of protected areas has 
been reaffirmed several times by the CBD COP and has been included in the long-term 
objectives of the Convention.28 In light of these elements, the creation of protected areas 
25  For a thorough analysis of Art. 8(j) CBD, see Chapter 3.
26  Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge 1994, at 60-61: “A Contracting Party’s primary goal should 
be to encourage governmental policies which minimize or eliminate the antagonism and competition 
between government and local communities over control and management of biological resources”. 
This policy objective may imply the involvement of indigenous peoples in the management of natural 
resources. The IUCN commentary also argues that Art. 11 CBD can also be interpreted as giving States 
the faculty to establish incentive measures to encourage conservation by indigenous peoples.
27  Ibid., at 7.
28  COP dec. VII/28, para. 1, according to which the establishment of protected areas is essential “for 
achieving…the three objectives of the Convention”; PoWPA, at 6: “The central role of protected areas 
in implementing the objectives of the Convention has been repeatedly emphasized in decisions of the 
Conference of Parties”. See further COP dec. X/2 establishing the CBD Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and the 
Aichi Biodiversity Targets, Target 11. Following the failure to achieve the objective to reduce biodiversity 
loss by 2010, the Strategic Plan has reiterated the importance of concrete and “immediate action”, such 
as the creation of protected areas to “safeguard” and “restore” biodiversity (para. 10(c)). Furthermore, 
the Aichi Target 11 establishes that: “By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas, 
and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative 
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is the main measure to realise conservation within the CBD.29 It seems, therefore, that 
one of the essential questions in order to understand to what extent the creation of 
protected areas is compatible with indigenous rights is how this undertaking is carried 
out. The management of natural resources for conservation purposes entails a number of 
choices that are not only related to the protection of nature.30 The idea that conservation 
is not anymore about the protection of wilderness from human abuse31 but it is instead 
related to the sustainable management of resources through human activity has largely 
permeated the literature and is broadly reflected in the CBD. An overall reading of the CBD 
allows for an interpretation whereby sustainable use is complementary to conservation32. 
and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and 
integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes”. See also Gillespie, Protected Areas and International 
Environmental Law 2007, at 105: “the creation and maintenance of protected areas are ‘essential’ in 
meeting all of the broad objectives of the CBD, the 2010 target (to significantly reduce the rate of 
biodiversity loss) from the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the attainment of the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals. To achieve these goals, protected areas became incorporated 
within many of the thematic areas of the CBD, as well as becoming an important stand alone item on the 
CBD agenda, which is supplemented by active working groups”. The obligation to establish protected 
areas is also contained in other international regimes on the conservation of certain species and habitats, 
such as the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
(Ramsar, 2 February 1971, in force 21 December 1975) and the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn, 23 June 1979, in force 1 November 1983). See ibid., at 98 
ff. Furthermore, the obligation to conserve natural heritage of outstanding universal value is contained 
in the WHC. This obligation may be realised through the creation of protected areas. See infra for the 
analysis of this issue.
29  COP dec. VII/28, PoWPA.
30  Morgera, Wildlife Law and the Empowerment of the Poor 2010, at vii: “There is a wide variety of 
interests to be balanced in wildlife management. These interests range from the conservation of 
biodiversity and specific endangered species and their habitats, to valuable opportunities in eco-tourism 
or hunting tourism, to the needs and traditions of the local population relating to hunting and collection 
of animals or their product for cultural/religious practices”.
31  On the exclusionary approaches to conservation, see Colchester 2003, at 3; Jules Pretty, ‘People, 
Livelihoods and Collective Action in Biodiversity Management: Biodiversity, Sustainability and Human 
Communities’ in Tim O’Riordan and Susanne Stoll-Kleeman (eds), Biodiversity, Sustainability and 
Human Communities: Protecting beyond the Protected (Cambridge University Press 2002), at 63-64; Holly 
Jonas, Harry Jonas and Suneetha M. Subramanian, The Right to Responsibility: Resisting and Engaging 
Development, Conservation, and the Law in Asia (Natural Justice and United Nations University – Institute 
of Advanced Studies 2013), at 3; Desmet 2011, at 15 and 45; Gilbert, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of 
Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 2013, at 339, note 97. See also Report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229, at 
14.
32  See Art. 1, Art. 8(c), Art. 10(c) CBD. See also, COP dec. II/8, para. 1: the COP “[r]eaffirms that 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and its components should be addressed in a 
holistic manner”; COP dec. III/9 (1996), preambular para. 6: “Noting that the reduction in the number 
of species and the fragmentation and degradation of ecosystems and habitats call not only for conservation 
but also for inter alia sustainable use and restoration of habitats”; PoWPA, at 6: “Protected areas, together 
with conservation, sustainable use and restoration initiatives in the wider land- and seascape are essential 
components in national and global biodiversity conservation strategies”; furthermore, “protected areas 
are important instruments for meeting the Convention’s targets of significantly reducing the rate of 
biodiversity loss by 2010” (although this objective has not eventually been met); COP dec. IX/13, which 
decides for the revision of the tasks of the programme of work at session 10, in order to emphasise the 
linkages between the protection of traditional knowledge, conservation and sustainable use, as well as 
benefit-sharing; COP dec. X/43, para. 8: the COP “Decides to include a new major component on 
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Furthermore, the role of communities and the importance of the ecosystem approach are 
explicitly acknowledged in the Convention and by the CBD COP.33
Notwithstanding this progress, conservation does not lose its potential for 
conflict since “it supposes decisions about the use of scarce natural resources”,34 as well 
as involving a different set of actors, including States, private actors, and indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples may largely contribute to conservation due to their 
traditional practices and knowledge. However, they are not intrinsically stewards of the 
environment.35 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, they enjoy a vast margin of manoeuvre 
when it comes to the management and destination of their lands and natural resources.
In this context, this chapter illustrates to what extent the human rights approach to 
conservation is incorporated into the CBD, what are its main features and its limitations. 
This analysis is compounded by the study of another international regime with conservation 
goals, namely the WHC, which embraces a conception of conservation whereby local 
communities are largely excluded from the efforts of protecting nature. However, since 
its adoption, the WHC has addressed some concerns related to indigenous participation. 
Therefore, it is worth analysing to what extent recent developments are in line with the 
current international regime on indigenous rights. In this context, the underlying purpose 
of the chapter is to understand what are the conditions under which conservation and 
indigenous rights can be reconciled under current international law.
The legal problems that guide the analysis of this chapter can be summarised as 
follows. What happens when protected areas are created without the participation or 
consent of indigenous peoples? When does consent have to be obtained? How should 
participation be realised? Can indigenous peoples be evicted from their lands, if a 
protected area is established? When agreement has been reached on the creation of a 
protected area, what happens if indigenous peoples are not involved in its management? 
What if the outcome of participatory processes is not implemented? What is the role of 
the State?36 Only some of these questions find a response in conservation regimes. The 
remainder of this section summarises to what extent these issues have been solved by the 
CBD, the WHC, and related practice, and highlights the main limitations still present 
Article 10 with a focus on Article 10(c) in the revised programme of work on Article 8(j)”; COP dec. 
XI/14, which proposes tasks for future consideration in relation to Article 10(c), including customary 
sustainable use in protected areas (Task 14); COP dec. XII/12, para. 9. See Ulrich Beyerlin and Vanessa 
Holzer, ‘Conservation of Natural Resources’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 
11: conservation and sustainable use are different, although interrelated, concepts within the CBD. The 
authors highlight that in more general terms conservation presupposes management and therefore use.
33  See Chapter 1, section 3 and infra section 2.2 in this chapter.
34  Desmet 2011, at 46. The author also acknowledges the positive value of conservation (at 19).
35  Ibid., at 46.
36  Another question could be: how should benefits stemming from the establishment of protected areas 
be shared? The issue of benefit-sharing is explored in Chapter 3, section 2.3 also with respect to possible 
interactions with the creation of protected areas. On problems concerning the scope of application of the 
ABS regime, see infra.
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in these legal frameworks.
2. The incorporation of indigenous rights into international conservation regimes
Although the establishment of protected areas has posed a strain on indigenous rights 
for many years, it has only recently attracted attention.37 This change of discourse in the 
general understanding of this problem has been possible thanks both to the increasing 
importance of indigenous voices and to the work of international institutions dealing 
with conservation, such as IUCN.
Concerning the representation by indigenous peoples of the interplay between their 
rights and the protection of biodiversity,38 these groups have traditionally recognised their 
own role in protecting the environment, additionally arguing for the linkage between the 
protection of their rights and long-term sustainability. The 2002 Indigenous Peoples’ 
Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development, furthermore, has highlighted the 
importance of the cooperation between indigenous peoples and the CBD institutional 
mechanisms.39 These positions have emerged from a number of declarations that 
indigenous representatives and indigenous-related organisations have made often in the 
context of side events organised by them on the occasion of international conferences of 
States, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and 
the Word Summit on Sustainable Development.40 These declarations, therefore, only 
37  Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, Ashish Kothari and Gonzalo Oviedo, Indigenous and Local Communities 
and Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation. Guidance on Policy and Practice for Co-
managed Protected Areas and Community Conserved Areas (IUCN 2004), at 7. Gillespie, Protected Areas 
and International Environmental Law 2007, at 181. Peter Bille Larsen and Gonzalo Oviedo, Reconciling 
Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas: Rights, Governance and Equitable Cost and Benefit Sharing (IUCN 
2006), at 2: “Three of the major milestones of the protected area paradigm change (Philips 2003) involve 
the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, equitable cost and benefit-sharing, and the emphasis 
on new forms of governance to protected area management”. See also, Anne Perrault, Kirk Herbertson and 
Owen J. Lynch, ‘Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The Public Interest and Local Community 
Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC)’ (2007) 19 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 475, at 476. Outside the CBD realm, the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary 
Resettlement (December 2001) has acknowledged the impacts that the creation of protected areas may 
produce on the capacity of indigenous peoples to access natural resources (paras. 3, 7, and 8).
38  See Desmet 2011, at 134-138.
39  Para. 35: “We will continue to participate actively in the full process of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, through the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity, in order to defend and safeguard 
the biodiversity of our lands and territories, and we call for the coherence and consistency in the 
implementation of the different Rio instruments, with other local, national and regional instruments”.
40  See Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter, paras. 67 and 83: “67. Recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ 
harmonious relationship with nature”; “83. Indigenous Peoples should form and direct their own 
environmental network”. See also, Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, 
Statement of the International Alliance of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests 
(Established Penang, 15 Feb 1992; revised Nairobi, 22 Nov 2002), Art. 13: “There can be no sustainable 
development of the forests and of our peoples until our fundamental rights as peoples are respected”; Art. 
43: “The best guarantee of the conservation of biodiversity is that those who promote it should uphold our 
rights to the use, administration, management and control of our territories. We assert that guardianship 
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provide an idea of indigenous positions on certain matters related to their interest and 
rights. As such, they have tried to influence the positions of States and the development of 
soft law standards by the latter. In spite of this, indigenous declarations do not possess an 
autonomous legal value under current international law. Furthermore, it is often unclear 
which indigenous groups endorsed these declarations. Therefore, these can be deemed 
only partially representative of indigenous world visions on certain issues.
In other indigenous declarations, indigenous peoples have clarified that they refuse 
environmental strategies that are imposed from the outside without respecting their 
self-determination and their rights, and with no consideration for their involvement 
and consent.41 In particular, the Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter has identified 
the creation of parks as an activity that can create trade-offs with indigenous rights.42 
Furthermore, the Charter has problematized the uncritical notion according to which 
biological diversity and cultural diversity always go hand in hand. Indeed, while the 
former may be instrumental for the latter, indigenous culture should evolve freely in 
accordance with each community’s priorities and development strategies.43 On the 
of the different ecosystems should be entrusted to us, indigenous peoples, given that we have inhabited 
them for thousands of years and our very survival depends on them”. See further, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 2002), para. 6: “We reaffirm our 
spiritual and cultural connection to our land and territories”; para. 38: “We demand that all legislation, 
policies or work programs on forests and protected areas guarantee and rigorously respect our lands and 
territories, rights, needs and benefits and recognize our full rights to control and manage our forests”. See 
Corobici Declaration, Expert Meeting on Traditional Forest-Related Knowledge, (San José, 2004), para 
2: “Indigenous peoples provide concrete solutions to many of the issues facing humanity today and by 
strengthening indigenous peoples’ roles through effective participation in areas such as forest management 
and sustainable development, indigenous peoples can contribute significantly to a sustainable future for 
all of humanity”; see also General Principles 1 and 2 on self-determination and free, prior and informed 
consent.
41  See inter alia Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter, para. 40: “There must be some control placed upon 
environmental groups who are lobbying to protect our territories and the species within those territories. 
In many instances, environmental groups are more concerned about animals than human beings. We 
call for Indigenous Peoples to determine guidelines prior to allowing environmental groups into their 
territories”; para. 61: “Indigenous Peoples must consent for all projects in our territories. Prior to consent 
being obtained, the people must be fully and entirely involved in any decisions. They must be given all 
the information about the project and its effects. Failure to do so should be considered a crime against 
the Indigenous Peoples”. See also, Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, 
Art. 21: “Control of our territories and the resources that we depend on: all development in our areas 
should only go ahead with the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous people involved or 
affected. We insist on recognition of our right to veto any developments proposed on our lands without 
our consent”; Art. 42: “Conservation programmes must respect our rights to the use and ownership of 
the territories and resources we depend on. No programmes to conserve biodiversity should be promoted 
on our territories without our free, prior and informed consent as expressed through our indigenous 
organisations”.
42  Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter, para. 41: “Parks must not be created at the expense of Indigenous 
Peoples. There is no way to separate Indigenous Peoples from their lands”; “The person or persons who 
violate this should be tried in a world tribunal within the control of Indigenous Peoples set for such a 
purpose. This could be similar to the trials held after World War II.” See also, Corobici Declaration, para. 
3: “Protected areas, oil, timber, fishing concessions and forest plantations are created that overlap with 
our lands, resulting in the eviction of and restrictions for our peoples”.
43  Indigenous Peoples’ Earth Charter, para. 59: “We value the efforts of protection of the biodiversity 
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contrary, other indigenous declarations have insisted on the need to assimilate protected 
areas to indigenous territories, thus calling for the recognition of indigenous forms of 
conservation in accordance with their right to self-determination.44 This argument has 
been echoed by discussions on ICCAs in the context of IUCN and the CBD, as explained 
below and in section 2.1.3.
Concerning the work of international institutions dealing with conservation, the 
recommendations and guidelines adopted by IUCN are particularly significant due to 
its work on the categorisation of protected areas, its cooperation with the CBD COP,45 
and its official role in advising the World Heritage Committee for the inscription of 
natural and mixed sites within the WHC.46 Furthermore, IUCN has played an active 
role in the promotion of indigenous rights in conservation projects.47 In this sense, 
IUCN has partially influenced the evolution of the integration of indigenous rights into 
conservation treaties, by spreading its policy papers and research, influencing UN bodies 
and States with strategies and guidelines, and proposing concrete models.48
but we reject to be included as part of an inert diversity which pretends to be maintained for scientific 
and folkloric purposes”. See also, Corobici Declaration, General Principle 6: “Indigenous peoples have 
the right to a development that is appropriate and suitable for us, on our own terms and conditions, 
and at our own pace and tempo, managed and guided by our own leaders, institutions and processes. 
The right to use our forests, water and subsoil which we have protected and sustainably used over the 
centuries, in ways that we find appropriate, including contemporary innovative systems of forest use and 
forest management, is part of our right to development”.
44  Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, Art. 44: “Environmental policies 
and legislation should recognise indigenous territories and systems of natural resource management as 
effective ‘protected areas’, and give priority to their legal establishment as indigenous territories”. See 
also, Indigenous Peoples’ Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development, para. 37: “We call for 
constitutional and legislative recognition of our conservation and management of biodiversity, as inherent 
to the sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples”; para. 40: “With regards to protected areas established on 
indigenous lands and territories, including wetlands, coasts and seas, States must transfer the territorial 
control, including the jurisdiction, administration and management over these areas to Indigenous 
Peoples”.
45  Especially by developing position papers for CBD meetings. See http://www.iucn.org/theme/global-
policy/resources/position-papers/convention-biological-diversity-cbd (last accessed October 2016).
46  On the last point, see infra section 2.2.2 in this chapter. See also Operational Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter Operational Guidelines), Doc. 
WHC.15/01 (8 July 2015), paras. 30, 31(e), and 37: “The specific role of IUCN in relation to the 
Convention includes: evaluation of properties nominated for inscription on the World Heritage List, 
monitoring the state of conservation of World Heritage natural properties, reviewing requests for 
International Assistance submitted by State Parties, and providing input and support for capacity-
building activities”.
47  The interest in indigenous issues is reflected already in the IUCN resolutions of the 1970s. See IUCN 
General Assembly (GA) Res. 12.5 (1975), recommendations 3-5.
48  See Desmet 2011, at 122: “The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has played 
a leading role in promoting the integration of the rights and aspirations of indigenous peoples and 
local communities in conservation policy and practice”. For the history of the institution’s most relevant 
decisions concerning indigenous rights and conservation and its advocacy activity, see at 138-144. See 
also, IUCN, Indigenous Peoples Issues in IUCN: An Internal Discussion Note (24 November 2006), 
available at https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/sp_ip_issues_iucn_wcc_04.pdf (last 
accessed October 2016). This section analyses only some of the IUCN decisions on protected areas 
depending on their relevance. For the identification of concrete models to address the issue of interaction 
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The different nature of these instruments reflects the varied and atypical 
institutional structure of IUCN. This has a complex institutional framework, since it 
gathers different kinds of members, such as States and NGOs. Decisions within IUCN 
are also adopted by different sets of bodies, such as the Council, the governing body, 
and general Congresses, which are the general assemblies of the union. The latter are 
convened by IUCN but gather a broad range of actors, going from States to indigenous 
representatives and businesses. The value of IUCN position papers and other documents, 
therefore, mainly relates to the capacity to represent the position of IUCN’s members 
and of the union as such. IUCN resolutions, on the other hand, usually are used both 
to express the official endorsement of certain positions by the union and to adopt non-
binding recommendations directed to IUCN members. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the importance of IUCN variegated set of instruments lies in the influence that these 
standards have exercised both on the process of formation of international norms and on 
their interpretation, which is examined more in detail in the next two sections, and on 
the positions of the national departments that are members of the union.49
IUCN’s position vis-à-vis indigenous rights has significantly evolved so that it is 
possible to identify two main phases, one preceding the Durban World Parks Congress in 
2003 and the changes following the adoption of the Durban Accord and Action Plan.50 
Concerning the first phase, the adoption in 1996 of Resolution 1.53 on Indigenous 
Peoples and Protected Areas has set the agenda of the organisation for the years to come.51 
IUCN was called to endorse a tripartite set of objectives:
1) recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their lands 
or territories and resources that fall within protected areas; 2) recognition of 
the necessity of reaching agreements with indigenous peoples prior to the 
establishment of protected areas in their lands or territories; 3) recognition of 
the rights of the indigenous peoples concerned to participate effectively in the 
management of the protected areas established on their lands or territories, 
and to be consulted on the adoption of any decision that affects their rights 
and interests over those lands or territories.52
The path towards the official endorsement by the organisation of these standards 
has been incremental until the World Parks Congress held in Durban in 2003.53 The 
between indigenous rights and the creation of protected areas, see the work of TILCEPA. This acronym 
stands for the “Theme on Indigenous and Local Communities, Equity and Protected Areas”, which has 
been set up by IUCN in 2000. This body regularly produces policy briefs and guidance. 
49  See IUCN’s website for the list of State departments that are members of the union: http://www.iucn.
org/secretariat/membership/about/union/members/who-are-our-members (last accessed October 2016). 
Most of them are governmental departments dealing with environmental issues.
50  See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229, at 15-18.
51  IUCN GA Res. 1.53 (1996) (hereinafter Res. 1.53).
52  Res. 1.53, para. 1.
53  Res. 1.53 was followed up by a set of guidelines and principles adopted in 1999. IUCN and WWF, 
Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas (May 1999). 
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Congress, bringing together inter alia representatives of governments, indigenous peoples 
and business, has produced the Durban Accord, a declaration of intent, and the Durban 
Action Plan that was meant to implement the related political agreement.54 The latter 
document has clearly endorsed a set of outcomes, including Outcome 5, according to 
which “[t]he rights of indigenous peoples, including mobile indigenous peoples, and local 
communities are secured in relation to natural resources and biodiversity conservation”. 
This outcome is complemented by a series of targets and actions to be implemented at 
all decision-making levels.55
The resulting framework of reference is an inclusive approach to conservation that 
promotes the respect for indigenous rights (target 8),56 the participation of indigenous 
peoples in the management of protected areas (target 9), and the establishment of 
participatory mechanisms for the restitution of territories “that were incorporated in 
protected areas without their free and informed consent” (target 10).57 It is significant 
to note that the Durban Plan of Action has identified the CBD COP as one of the 
main addressees of the standards elaborated by IUCN. COP VII, which took place only 
one year after the Durban World Congress then adopted decision VII/28 that explicitly 
Although these guidelines acknowledge the need to consider the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
establishment of protected areas, priority is given to conservation objectives (Introduction). Furthermore, 
the guidelines are ambiguous in stating that agreements between indigenous peoples and conservation 
agencies should only be sought (Principle 1). Furthermore, more emphasis is put on the role of indigenous 
peoples in the management of protected areas, rather than in their establishment. Also, the way in which 
indigenous rights are framed is not in line with international human rights standards on indigenous 
peoples, since the right to own and use traditional lands and resources is ambiguously downplayed in 
favour of a right to participate in the management of those land and resources (Principle 2).
54  IUCN, Durban Accord: Our Global Commitment for People and Earth’s Protected Areas; Durban 
Action Plan (Vth IUCN World Parks Congress, 2003).
55  The levels of action required are international, national and local, at the level of the managements 
authorities of protected areas, and by IUCN. Concerning international action, the Durban Action Plan 
recommends that the “CBD COP7 should ensure the implementation of the spirit and intent of articles 
8(j), 10(c) and related provisions of the CBD”. Given the ambiguities of these articles, however, this 
recommendation appears at least generic.
56  In the follow-up to the Durban Congress, IUCN World Conservation Congress (WCC) Res. 
4.048 (2008) has furthermore referred to the application to the UNDRIP to “IUCN’s Programme and 
operations”. Other elements of interest are that: the implementation of IUCN’s standards should be 
evaluated with the involvement of indigenous peoples; and national governments should undertake reform 
to implement the Durban Accord and Action Plan, as well as the UNDRIP. The interconnectedness 
between the recognition of indigenous rights and the attainment of conservation objectives has been 
reiterated at the last World Parks Congress of 2014. See IUCN, A Strategy of Innovative Approaches 
and Recommendations for Respecting Indigenous and Traditional Knowledge and Culture in the Next 
Decade (22 December 2014) (hereinafter A Strategy of Innovative Approaches), at 2: “The situation 
can be turned around based on strong evidence demonstrating that where policies recognize, support 
and protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and the importance of their traditional knowledge and 
governance systems, conservation values and peoples well-being are improved and sustained”.
57  See Desmet 2011, at 141. These targets have been confirmed by the last World Parks Congress 
of 2014. See A Strategy of Innovative Approaches. Concerning the substance of these standards, the 
reference to free, prior and informed consent is only indirect since this is not explicitly requested for 
the creation of protected areas. Instead, the lack of free, prior and informed consent is considered an 
entitlement to restitution.
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recognises the role of indigenous peoples in the establishment and management of 
protected areas, as discussed in next section.58
Other targets have been agreed in Sidney in 2014, including that “[t]he 
implementation of the World Heritage Convention is aligned with the principles of 
UNDRIP and the Outcome Document of the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples and the Convention’s procedures and Operational Guidelines are amended 
accordingly”.59 Some ambiguities, however, remain concerning the recognition by 
individual States within IUCN of indigenous peoples as “equal partners” in conservation 
policies.60
Notwithstanding contradictory declarations of individual members, recent policy 
documents have made explicit the difference between the management categories of 
protected areas, which focus on the types of conservation measures, and the governance 
categories of protected areas, which respond to the question of which subjects decide 
over the establishment of protected areas. Governance categories are four and include 
governance by governments, shared governance, private governance, and governance 
by indigenous and local communities.61 This categorisation has not been developed 
autonomously in the context of IUCN, which instead has extensively drawn from parallel 
developments in the CBD regime.62
While these normative developments are analysed in the next section, the following 
gives a brief overview of IUCN’s governance types both to introduce terms of reference 
58  See Durban Action Plan, at 264: “Perhaps the most important audience of all for the work done in 
Durban is the intergovernmental Conference of Parties to the CBD. The sections of this plan that relate 
to the CBD, and the Message to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted in Durban, constitute 
a wealth of expert advice that IUCN hopes will be of great assistance to the CBD COP7 – with its 
special focus on protected areas – and subsequently”. See also, at 249: under the heading of suggested 
international action, the “CBD COP7 should ensure the implementation of the spirit and intent of 
articles 8(j), 10(c) and related provisions of the CBD”. On CBD COP dec. VII/28, see infra section 2.1.
59  The World Conservation Congress of IUCN had agreed already in 2008 to fully implement the 
UNDRIP in every activity of the organisation. See WCC Res. 4.052 (2008), which endorses the 
UNDRIP and recognises that “the ability of indigenous peoples to protect and support biological and 
cultural diversity is strengthened by a fuller recognition of their fundamental human rights” (Preamble). 
See also WCC Res. 5.055 (2012), which “[r]equests, as directed in WCC Res. 4.052 and as funding 
permits, that the Council establish a taskforce to examine the application of the Declaration to every 
aspect of the IUCN Programme”.
60  A Strategy of Innovative Approaches, at 2. This is also evident in the commitments formulated by 
individual States. Although these represent a tangible result of the Sidney World Parks Congress, they 
remain vague in terms of the recognition of indigenous rights and of the actions that every State is willing 
to take to include them in the establishment and management of protected areas. See the commitments 
at http://worldparkscongress.org/about/promise_of_sydney_commitments.html.
61  See Borrini-Feyerabend and others 2013. The categorization of governance types has been endorsed 
by IUCN through a series of resolutions adopted at the World Conservation Congress of Jeju, including 
Res. 5.040 (2012), Res. 5.042 (2012), and Res. 5.094 (2012).
62  As revealed in the report, IUCN’s categorisation is also a survey of existing governance types. See 
ibid., at 29. Overall, IUCN’s position paper stresses the importance of involving a range of different 
actors also with a view of achieving more effective conservation (at 18: “Having multiple institutions 
engaged in protected area governance buffers the system against the failings of any one institution”). 
According to the report, this is also the tendency in some States (at 17).
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that are used in the rest of the chapter and to understand to what extent the same 
categories are reflected in CBD-related instruments.
IUCN’s approach to the issue of governance is based on the understanding that each 
governance type has a different and well-identifiable decision-maker. In this light, when 
protected areas are established on the initiative of governmental agencies, either at central 
or decentralised levels, it is a case of governance by government. The argument goes that 
the government does not need to own the territories of prospected protected areas, as 
long as it has the power to decide over the destination on land. Similarly, governmental 
agencies can delegate management powers to non-governmental actors, as long as the 
former retain decision-making powers.63
Notwithstanding this clear-cut premise, different factors contribute to blur the lines 
of this first category. IUCN refers to the case where national laws foresee participatory 
requirements for the establishment and day-to-day governance of protected areas.64 
In such cases, depending on how participatory requirements are conceived, decision-
making powers may be shared among different actors. Even though the initiative comes 
from the government, decisions might not be taken solely by it. Furthermore, relevant 
participatory requirements can be found not only in national legislation but also in 
international treaties. In the case of indigenous peoples, a participatory process seeking 
consent must be initiated if indigenous land, resource and cultural rights are at stake.65 
This means that contrary to IUCN categorisation, land rights do play a role when it 
comes to decision on governance types.
The co-decision of different actors is reflected in the second governance type, that 
of shared governance where governmental and non-governmental actors are flexibly 
involved in decision-making.66 This governance type must be tested against three 
criteria, namely that an effective negotiation process takes place, that “a co-management 
agreement…establishing roles, responsibilities and expected benefits and contributions 
from different parties” is concluded, and that “a multi-party governance institution” is 
in place.67 Depending on the concrete institutional arrangements under this governance 
type, indigenous rights may be satisfied if this shared governance is established with the 
free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.
The third IUCN type, i.e., governance by private actors encompasses a range of 
options where landowners—be they individuals or profit and not-for-profit entities—
63  Ibid., at 30-31.
64  Ibid., at 31.
65  See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
66  Beyond the involvement of different national decision-makers, IUCN refers to the case of 
transboundary protected areas, when more than one States are involved, as a case falling into the category 
of shared governance. Borrini-Feyerabend and others 2013, at 33.
67  Ibid., at 33.
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are also those who established a protected area on their territory.68 Under this category, 
the establishment of protected areas is thus voluntary, although arrangements with 
governmental agencies may follow mainly to seek recognition and support from public 
authorities.69 While lack of recognition is usually reflected in the absence of data on 
privately-owned protected areas,70 a too pronounced involvement of government 
authorities may in contrast transform this governance type into those described above. 
This category may also overlap with the following category, ICCAs, when landowners are 
indigenous peoples.71
Governance by indigenous peoples, the last IUCN category, is realised when 
conservation occurs in areas collectively owned and/or voluntarily managed by 
indigenous peoples.72 Although IUCN recognises that this governance type might not 
have a formally established decision-making system, it identifies three main criteria to 
dub indigenous territories as ICCAs, i.e., attachment to land, at least a de facto capacity 
to enforce decisions, and some results in terms of conservation.
The last two criteria are especially difficult to meet. First, the capacity to enforce 
decisions might be compromised by governmental decisions authorising a different set of 
activities on indigenous territories without effectively consulting with them. Since ICCAs 
have been formalised as a governance category in order to ensure more recognition for 
areas managed by indigenous peoples, the failure to enforce decisions vis-à-vis the State or 
private actors authorised by the State cannot be considered a very telling criterion in the 
identification of those areas. On the contrary, States need to put in place legislative and 
other kind of provisions to ensure that indigenous governance can be effectively enforced 
on third actors. Second, it is not clear by what standards the achievement of conservation 
objectives needs to be evaluated and why the same criterion is not considered when 
evaluating other governance types.
This last critique finds resonance in the acknowledgment by IUCN that beyond 
these four governance types, there might exist cases of territories that de facto achieve 
conservation results although their original purpose was not to maintain biological 
diversity. Ancillary conservation, as the IUCN report defines it, can be recognised as 
a relevant example of conservation efforts and might represent an example of special 
area-based conservation measures under Article 8(a) of the CBD.73 In this sense, even 
68  Ibid., at 36.
69  Ibid., at 37-38.
70  Ibid., at 39.
71  The multiple overlapping of IUCN governance types are recognised in the IUCN policy paper, which 
indeed frames the four governance types as a continuum. See ibid., at 45.
72  Ibid., at 40. This category also includes protected areas that are governed by local communities. The 
report refers to a comprehensive concept of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Conserved Territories 
and Areas, abbreviated as ICCAs. At 41, the report provides some examples of existing ICCAs. On the 
definition of ICCAs, see also Kothari and others 2012, at 16-20.
73  Borrini-Feyerabend and others 2013, at 51.
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indigenous territories that are not managed primarily to protect nature or that do not fall 
under the definition of protected areas under the CBD but that de facto contribute to 
conservation might be relevant for the purposes of meeting the obligation of Article 8(a).
The main problem is that States willing to meet their international obligations 
through the recognition of ICCAs or ancillary conservation need to engage in a process 
of formalisation that is not necessarily sought by indigenous peoples. In this sense, 
the legality of this formalisation need to be carefully evaluated against the standards 
established under international human rights law, including the existence of a process 
of effective participation and direct negotiation with indigenous peoples concerning the 
formal recognition of their conservation efforts.74 As highlighted by IUCN, formal or 
informal recognition of indigenous rights over land is usually a necessary precondition 
for the State to engage in participatory processes with indigenous peoples.75
2.1. Developments in the CBD: indigenous participatory rights
Article 8(a) of the CBD does not offer explicit criteria to address the issue of the potential 
conflict with the rights of indigenous peoples. While the utilisation and protection of 
indigenous traditional knowledge is regulated under Article 8(j) and the Nagoya Protocol,76 
the issue on how to reconcile indigenous land and resource rights with conservation is 
left unaddressed in the text of the CBD. As highlighted above, a combined reading of 
Article 8(a) and 10(c) suggests a positive presumption in favour of the integration of 
conservation objectives and indigenous traditional practices. However, the CBD does 
not indicate any concrete means to achieve the mutually supportive objective of realising 
conservation while enhancing traditional practices. Furthermore, the CBD does not 
adopt the language of the human rights of indigenous peoples currently recognised under 
international law. This lack of explicit human rights language can be attributed to the 
fact that the adoption of the CBD precedes the consolidation of indigenous rights. Still, 
the problem remains as to whether it is possible to interpret the provisions concerning 
conservation within the CBD in light of indigenous rights.
In more general terms, the CBD does not establish any hierarchy between its 
provisions and other international regimes. According to Article 22,
[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious 
damage or threat to biological diversity.
74  Ibid., at 52: “voluntary conserved territories and areas should not be incorporated into a formal 
protected area system unless there is clear agreement from the rightholders that this is desired”.
75  Ibid., at 55.
76  Other CBD provisions are relevant when it comes to the issue of traditional knowledge, practices and 
innovations. COP decisions on Art. 8(j) are also crucial in partially solving the interpretative difficulties 
linked to this provision. These issues are examined in Chapter 3.
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In light of this, the CBD would prevail on other obligations agreed upon by 
Parties only in case other international regimes produce negative effects or a threat on 
biodiversity that are so strong to reach the threshold of seriousness required in Article 
22.77 The general expectation is, however, that Parties should find ways to implement the 
CBD in a manner that is in line with other obligations incumbent on them.78 
As seen in the Introduction of this dissertation, a way in which the coordination 
of multiple instruments with different subject matters can be achieved is by means of 
interpretation. Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT prescribes that interpretation must take 
account of general international law that might be relevant to the provisions at stake. 
In the same vein, the ICJ has concluded that “an international instrument has to be 
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at 
the time of the interpretation”.79 In this sense, the international regime on the rights of 
indigenous peoples is relevant not only to the extent that the CBD recognises a role for 
indigenous and local communities in the conservation of biodiversity, but also given 
that indigenous peoples might be affected by the implementation of CBD provisions on 
conservation.
This argument is supported by a conspicuous set of CBD COP decisions that have 
clarified the relationship between conservation and indigenous rights.80 Recent CBD 
practice has specifically provided indications on the role of indigenous peoples in the 
creation and management of protected areas. In this sense, while Article 23 assigns to 
the COP a law-making role with respect to the adoption of protocols and amendments 
to the Convention,81 some authors have argued that, given the COP’s mandate for the 
77  On the indeterminateness of this threshold, see Glowka and al. 1994, at 109. See also, Chandler 
1993, at 148-150. See also Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-
Making: A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, at 655. This author has 
denounced the indeterminateness of this threshold, thus challenging the value of Art. 22 CBD as a 
rule capable of addressing conflicts across regimes. The same author has also questioned the very need 
to discuss the interaction with other treaties from the perspective of which treaty should prevail, i.e., 
hierarchy. Morgera opposes to the argument of indeterminateness a different interpretation of Art. 22. 
See Elisa Morgera, ‘Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 85. According to 
this author, not only does Art. 22 authorize CBD Parties to deviate from non-CBD obligations when 
these pose a threat or have negative impacts on biodiversity, but it also requires that CBD Parties actively 
seek for cases where negative repercussions could occur and raise an explicit exception.
78  See ILC fragmentation report, para. 277. The report highlights that while harmonisation of regimes 
maybe relatively easy when international rules share the same subject matter or goals, the same operation 
may reveal itself difficult when international regimes have different rationales. See the Introduction to 
this thesis, section 2.
79  ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory opinion (21 June 1971), para. 
53.
80  Although the first COP meeting took place in 1994, the first decisions relevant for indigenous and 
local communities were taken at COP 3 in 1996.
81  See Art. 23(4)(c), (d), and (e) CBD. The entry into force of protocols and amendments is in any case 
subjected to the ratification of new instruments and changes by Parties.
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development and implementation of the CBD regime, even COP decisions have been 
acquiring an interpretative and “norm-making” role.82 In this sense, for instance the COP 
has created a Working Group on Article 8(j) to suggest ways for States to implement this 
provision in their national legal system.83 It is interesting to note that non-State actors 
including indigenous peoples are invited to take part in COP meetings and may influence 
the discussion therein. In more general terms, the COP functions as the general assembly 
of State Parties and thus crystallises their practice in relation to the CBD regime.
In light of this important role of the CBD COP, the remainder of this section 
explores the way in which the relationship between conservation and indigenous peoples 
has been framed by CBD parties. Particular attention is given to the issue of how 
participation and ICCAs are reflected in CBD decisions.
2.1.1. Participatory rights and the ecosystem approach
As said, the ecosystem approach underlies the CBD obligations on conservation. This 
approach is relevant from the perspective of acknowledging indigenous rights while 
implementing CBD provisions on in-situ conservation since it recognises the existence 
of multiple values attached to biological resources, as well as the possibility of different 
conservation choices depending on societal needs.84 In this sense, conservation needs to 
be balanced against competing interests. One of the ways to account for multiple interests 
is to ensure the participation of several actors in conservation, including indigenous 
peoples.85
82  See Morgera and Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’ 2011, at 4: “The COP is principally mandated to keep under review the 
implementation of the convention, including by undertaking ‘any additional action that may be required 
for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention in the light of experience gained in its operation.’ 
On this basis, it has evolved into a prolific norm-creating body across all areas covered by the CBD”.
83  On this Working Group, see Chapter 3.
84  COP dec. V/6, Annex, Part A, para. 1: “The ecosystem approach is a strategy for the integrated 
management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an 
equitable way. Thus, the application of the ecosystem approach will help to reach a balance of the three 
objectives of the Convention”; para. 2: “It recognizes that humans, with their cultural diversity, are an 
integral component of many ecosystems”; para. 3: “the scale of analysis and action should be determined 
by the problem being addressed”; Part B, Principle 1: “The objectives of management of land, water and 
living resources are a matter of societal choice” (emphasis added); Principle 10: “The ecosystem approach 
should seek the appropriate balance between, and integration of, conservation and use of biological 
diversity”. See also COP dec. VII/11, Annex 1, para. 2: “It recognizes that humans, with their cultural 
diversity are an integral component of many ecosystems”; para. 3(a): “Management of living components 
is considered alongside economic and social considerations at the ecosystem level of organisation, not 
simply a focus on managing species and habitats”; para. 3(c): “Ecosystem management is a social process. 
There are many interested communities, which must be involved through the development of efficient 
and effective structures and processes for decision-making and management”; Annex 1, Annotations to 
the rationale of Principle 1 “All relevant sectors of society need to have their interests equitably treated”; 
Annex 1, Annotations to the rationale of Principle 2: “There are usually many communities-of-interest 
in ecosystem management”; annex 1, Implementation guidelines to Principle 10.
85  COP dec. VII/11, para. 10: the COP “[r]ecommends that Parties and other Governments, [sic] 
facilitate the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities”; Annex 1, Annotations 
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This recognition is certainly a first attempt to operationalize the multiple options 
concerning the creation of protected overshadowed in Article 8(a) in a way that is coherent 
with indigenous rights.86 At the same time, some ambiguities remain. First, participation 
in decision-making is only foreseen with respect to the management of conservation,87 
thus excluding governance issues related to the establishment of protected areas from the 
scope of the ecosystem approach. This limitation is probably due to the fact that early 
decisions on the ecosystem approach do not specifically deal with protected areas but 
more extensively with conservation.
At the same time, there seems to be a conflation of governance and management 
issues. For instance, both COP decisions V/6 and VII/11 insist on a participatory approach 
to the definition of spatial scale, with the involvement inter alia of indigenous peoples.88 
Similarly, indigenous peoples are to be involved in management choices over the goals of 
management.89 Both boundaries and the identification of conservation objectives clearly 
require a participatory governance model. Furthermore, a very innovative element is the 
indication that power inequalities need to be considered when promoting participatory 
processes in decision-making.90 In contrast with this framework, the same COP decisions 
suggest a division of work where strategic decisions are taken by central government, 
while communities only decide on the allocation of benefits.91
The framework delineated above must be completed through the examination of 
the links between conservation and sustainable use in the CBD. This analysis sheds some 
light on the additional idiosyncrasies and contradictions of the CBD regime when it comes 
to the relationship between conservation and indigenous peoples. As already clarified, 
conservation and sustainable use are interdependent objectives within the CBD.92 The 
Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity confirm 
this bond in that they highlight that sustainable use contributes to conservation and 
to the rationale of Principle 1: “All interested parties (particularly including indigenous and local 
communities) should be involved in the process”.
86  COP dec. V/6, Annex, Part B, Rationale for Principle 1: “Indigenous peoples and other local 
communities living on the land are important stakeholders and their rights and interests should be 
recognized”.
87  COP dec. V/6, Annex, Part B, Principle 2 and Part C, para. 11.
88  COP dec. V/6, Annex, Part B, Principle 7.
89  COP dec. VII/11, Annex 1, Implementation guideline 1.1 to Principle 1.
90  COP dec. VII/11, Annex 1, Implementation guideline 1.5.
91  COP dec. VII/11, Annex 1, Implementation guideline 2.1 to Principle 2. Additional ambiguities 
relate to the indication, in Principle 11 and related implementation guidelines, that information provided 
by indigenous peoples must be facilitated within the framework of Art. 8(j). Chapter 3 explores in depth 
the problems concerning the interpretation of this article, as well as the potential conflict between the 
utilisation of traditional knowledge under Art. 8(j) and indigenous rights.
92  See note 32 supra.
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cannot be achieved without it.93 In continuity with the PoWPA and related decisions,94 
the Addis Ababa principles recognise the importance of the participation of indigenous 
peoples in the decisions concerning resource use. The conditions, procedural steps, and 
results of participation are not specified.95 In the same vein, the principles make reference 
to “local rights” although they fail to specify the relevant legal framework.96 Also, benefit-
sharing is defined only as an instrument for addressing the needs of indigenous peoples 
following inter alia conservation projects.97 Under human rights law, however, benefit-
sharing is a general measure and must be ensured every time States restrict indigenous 
land rights.98 In sum, the principles fall short of adopting a fully-fledged human rights 
language.
2.1.2. Participatory rights and protected areas
COP decision VII/28 of 2004 represents a paradigm change in terms of the relationship 
between conservation and indigenous peoples since it adopts the PoWPA. With this 
document the COP has agreed on the main framework for the establishment of protected 
areas for the years to come. While the overall objective of the decision is to contribute 
to the conservation of ecosystems,99 the PoWPA reflects the CBD Parties’ consensus on 
four interrelated and mutually supportive areas: 1) the establishment and management of 
93  Addis Ababa guidelines, at 5.
94  See next section.
95  Therefore, it is not clear whether or in which cases indigenous peoples should only be consulted or 
their consent should be required. See infra section 3 in this chapter.
96  Addis Ababa guidelines, Practical Principle 2 and its Rationale: “Governments recognize and 
respect the “rights” or “stewardship” authority, responsibility and accountability to the people who use 
and manage the resource, which may include indigenous and local communities, private landowners, 
conservation organizations and the business sector. Moreover, to reinforce local rights or stewardship of 
biological diversity and responsibility for its conservation, resource users should participate in making 
decisions about the resource use and have the authority to carry out any actions arising from those 
decisions”. On the link between conservation and benefit-sharing, see Chapter 3, section 2.3.
97  Addis Ababa guidelines, Practical principle 12: “The needs of indigenous and local communities 
who live with and are affected by the use and conservation of biological diversity, along with their 
contributions to its conservation and sustainable use, should be reflected in the equitable distribution 
of the benefits from the use of those resources”. Operational guidelines: “Promote economic incentives 
that will guarantee additional benefits to indigenous and local communities and stakeholders who are 
involved in the management of any biodiversity components”; “[i]nvolve local stakeholders, including 
indigenous and local communities, in the management of any natural resource”. These formulations 
never refer to the fact the participation is to be ensured by virtue of indigenous substantive rights. 
98  See Saramaka case. See Chapter 2, section 3.
99  See COP dec. VII/28, at 7, suggested activity 1.1.5, and Goal 1.2. This decision also explicitly 
confirms that the creation of protected areas is “essential for achieving, in implementing the ecosystem 
approach, the three objectives of the Convention” (para. 1).
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protected areas;100 2) participation;101 3) enabling activities; and 4) standards, assessment, 
and monitoring. Each of the four programme elements contains a number of suggested 
activities from which Parties may select “according to particular national and local 
conditions and their level of development”.102 While the variety of measures confers 
flexibility to the system, monitoring is ensured through the reporting duties incumbent 
on Parties and “other Governments”.103
Concerning the elements that are relevant to the relationship between protected 
areas and indigenous peoples, there are three thematic clusters that emerge from the 
analysis of the PoWPA, namely respect for indigenous rights and participation, impact 
assessment, and community-conserved areas. The last element is examined in the next 
section dedicated to COP decisions on ICCAs, while the first two are analysed in the 
following.
“Full and effective participation” of indigenous and local communities in “the 
establishment, management and monitoring of protected areas” is one of the cornerstones 
of the PoWPA. The main novelty in this context is represented by the articulation 
of participation in relation to the “full respect for the rights of, indigenous and local 
communities consistent with national law and applicable international obligations”.104 
The first innovative aspect is, therefore, that there is a clear reference to the rights of 
indigenous peoples, as overshadowed in decisions on the ecosystem approach. Indigenous 
rights must be used as a benchmark to determine the content of participation under 
national and international law. The second innovation is that, contrary to Article 8(j) where 
100  The PoWPA is divided into four Programme elements. The title of Programme element 1 is: “Direct 
actions for planning, selecting, establishing, strengthening, and managing, protected area systems and 
sites”.
101  The full title of the second element is: “Governance, participation, equity and benefit sharing”.
102  COP dec. VII/28, at 7-8. According to paras. 5-6 of the decision, the programme is to be adjusted 
by taking into account national legislation and national priorities.
103  COP dec. VII/28, para. 30. States should report to the Executive Secretary, which in turn is called to 
“[c]ompile information received from Parties, other Governments and relevant organizations and bodies 
on the implementation of the programme of work” (para. 35(a)). The decision has also established an 
Ad Hoc Open Ended Working Group on Protected Areas to support and review implementation (para. 
25). For more information on monitoring and implementation, see https://www.cbd.int/protected/
implementation/highlights/?headerid=4df79863-f2ad-43cf-a560-b6c90475b533 and https://www.cbd.
int/protected/implementation/actionplans/ (last accessed October 2016).
104  COP dec. VII/28, para. 22: the COP “[r]ecalls the obligations of Parties towards indigenous and 
local communities in accordance with Article 8(j) and related provisions and notes that the establishment, 
management and monitoring of protected areas should take place with the full and effective participation 
of, and full respect for the rights of, indigenous and local communities consistent with national law and 
applicable international obligations”. See also, Goal 2.2: “To enhance and secure involvement of indigenous 
and local communities and relevant stakeholders” in management and establishment of protected areas 
“in full respect of their rights and recognition of their responsibilities” by implementing specific plans 
and initiatives (suggested activity 2.2.2) and involvement in decision-making (2.2.4); suggested activity 
1.4.1: in order to ensure effective planning and management, Parties should “Create a highly participatory 
process, involving indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders”; suggested activity 2.1.5: 
Parties should “Engage indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders in participatory 
planning and governance, recalling the principle of the ecosystem approach”.
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the protection of traditional knowledge is subject to national law, the PoWPA indicates 
that both national and international law are relevant frameworks for the identification 
of indigenous rights. It seems, therefore, that these frameworks are supplementary to 
one another, although it is not entirely clear what would happen if national standards 
diverged from internationally established rights.
More recent decisions indicate the need to “take note” of the United Nations 
Declaration on indigenous rights while implementing the PoWPA.105 In light with 
Chapter 2, indigenous participatory rights are protected under international human 
rights treaties, whose provisions are mandatory on those CBD Parties that have ratified 
them. For these reasons, obligations stemming from human rights treaties cannot be 
disregarded when implementing the CBD. 
The reference to “applicable international obligations” is a clear indication that the 
international body of indigenous rights applies to the situation where protected areas are 
established, managed, or monitored. Under international law, participation is a spectrum 
that can be subsumed under the concept of free, prior and informed consent and goes 
from consultation in matters concerning the land and resources of indigenous peoples or 
otherwise affecting their culture to actual consent.106
In line with human rights law, the PoWPA requires that prior and informed 
consent is obtained every time the creation or management of protected areas imply the 
resettlement of indigenous and local communities.107 Resettlement is certainly one of the 
hypotheses when the consent of indigenous peoples is required. As explained in Chapter 
2, the compression of indigenous rights to the point that their distinguished identity is 
threatened has also been interpreted as a case that requires consent under international 
human rights law.108
Human rights treaty bodies have not applied yet the requirement of consent to the 
case concerning the establishment of protected areas. In Kaliña and Lokono, the Inter-
American Court has elaborated a specific test to assess the compression of indigenous 
rights following the creation of protected areas.109 In the reasoning of the Court, 
proportionality is ensured when effective participation, continued access to territories 
105  COP dec. X/31, para. 1(i); COP dec. X/2, Strategic Plan 2011-2020, para. 4.
106  See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
107  PoWPA, suggested activity 2.2.5: “Ensure that any resettlement of indigenous communities as a 
consequence of the establishment or management of protected areas will only take place with their 
prior informed consent that may be given according to national legislation and applicable international 
obligations”. Compare with Art. 10 UNDRIP: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from 
their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent 
of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, with the option of return”.
108  Chapter 2, section 3.5.
109  As reminded in note 8, the Inter-American Court did not specifically assess the legality of the creation 
of concerned protected areas due to lack of jurisdiction on facts occurred before Suriname accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 162. 
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and resources, and benefit-sharing are in place.110
It is interesting to note that concerning effective participation, the Inter-
American Court directly refers to the PoWPA to support the point that agreements on 
establishment and management must be sought between indigenous representatives 
and conservation agencies.111 The Court equally refers to Article 8(j) and Article 10(c) 
of the CBD to reinforce the argument that conservation and indigenous rights can be 
mutually supportive.112 Furthermore, it inter alia relies on the abovementioned Addis 
Ababa guidelines on sustainable use elaborated by the CBD COP to argue that protected 
areas are not only biodiversity reserves, but also have a “socio-cultural dimension”.113 
This reliance on the CBD and CBD-related instruments is a unique example in the 
panorama of human rights treaty bodies and testifies to an increased contamination of 
the two international bodies. The fact that this contamination has occurred in relation 
to participatory requirements for the creation and management of protected areas is 
also very significant and may be linked to the fact that the CBD COP decisions have 
elaborated on participatory requirements in a way that is more detailed than human 
rights treaty bodies since they explicitly contemplate the case where consent is required.
The last COP has furthermore acknowledged the potential for conflict of 
establishing protected areas without the prior informed consent of indigenous and local 
communities. At the same time, it has highlighted the centrality of conservation for 
“the protection and maintenance of customary sustainable use of biological diversity and 
associated traditional knowledge”.114 While it is noteworthy that the COP has articulated 
the ambivalence inherent in the relationship between conservation and indigenous 
peoples, the last COP has shown that the recognition of indigenous rights within the 
CBD cannot be taken for granted for two reasons.
First, decision XII/12 adopts a broad formulation to refer to prior informed consent, 
which inter alia includes the mere approval and involvement of indigenous peoples.115 
This confusion contributes to blur the lines between these categories but at the same time 
reflects the fact that participation is a spectrum going from consultation to consent even 
under international human rights law.116 Indeed, the fact that the CBD does not use the 
110  In Xákmok Kásek case, the Court equally found a link between the creation of a nature reserve and the 
failure for the State to respect indigenous rights to land. However, it did not explicitly articulated criteria 
to judge the proportionality of restrictions. In the African system (Endorois case), the creation of a nature 
reserve is judged against the paradigm established in the Saramaka case, namely legality, proportionality 
and necessity. On the latter cases, see Chapter 1, section 2.2.1 and section 2.2.2.
111  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 181, note 230.
112  Kaliña and Lokono case, paras. 177 and 181.
113  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 173. On the guidelines, see infra in this section.
114  COP dec. XII/12, para. 9.
115  For an analysis of this formulation in Art. 8(j), see Chapter 3, section 2.1.2. See also, Morgera, 
‘Towards International Guidelines on Prior Informed Consent and Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing 
from the Use of Traditional Knowledge’ 2015.
116  See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
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same terms of art as in human rights law, but introduces new categories may signal that 
CBD Parties would like to keep a way-out from the application of human rights standards 
within the CBD. In light of systemic interpretation and harmonisation, States cannot 
implement one treaty’s obligations while disregarding connected obligations stemming 
from other treaties, unless they explicitly derogate from one of the regimes concerned.
Second, it seems that the implementation of indigenous participatory rights is 
downplayed in favour of the attainment of the objectives of the CBD. While this further 
ambiguity is dictated by the restricted scope of the Convention and the separateness 
of the regime on indigenous rights, the COP would better contribute to the definition 
of this relationship by providing more concrete criteria for the interaction of the two 
regimes.
Participation is compounded in the PoWPA by complementary activities, such as 
the assessment of the impacts deriving from the establishment of protected areas. The 
PoWPA does not specify whether the assessment of costs and benefits should precede the 
establishment of protected areas;117 this would be the case under human rights standards. 
Furthermore, an important term of reference for impact assessment within the CBD is 
the decision VII/16 adopting the Akwé:Kon guidelines. These are voluntary standards on 
“cultural, environmental and social impact assessments regarding developments proposed 
to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters 
traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities”.118 The guidelines 
were agreed upon at the same COP as PoWPA’s and can be read in logical continuity 
with it. 
In contrast with the PoWPA, however, the Akwé:Kon guidelines do not adopt 
a clear human rights language, referring instead to the need to take into account the 
“concerns and interests” of indigenous and local communities.119 The only references to 
indigenous rights are related to a specific kind of assessment, highly qualified, or both. 
For instance, “[n]ational environmental impact assessment legislation and processes 
should respect existing inherent land and treaty rights as well as legally established rights 
of indigenous and local communities”.120 While the locution “inherent land rights” 
might refer to indigenous customary land tenure systems, the reference to treaty land 
rights is ambiguous. Indeed, it is not clear whether this locution limits the consideration 
117  PoWPA suggested activity 2.1.1: Parties should “[a]ssess the economic and socio-cultural costs, 
benefits and impacts arising from the establishment and maintenance of protected areas, particularly for 
indigenous and local communities, and adjust policies to avoid and mitigate negative impacts, and where 
appropriate compensate costs and equitably share benefits in accordance with the national legislation”.
118  These terms are defined in the guidelines in para. 6. It is interesting to note that cultural assessment 
may concern elements such as the impact on traditional livelihoods. See COP dec. VII/16, Akwé:Kon 
guidelines paras. 40, 43(c) and (i), 44(i) 45, and 47.
119  Akwé:Kon guidelines para. 3(b), and para. 21: “In order to protect the interests of affected indigenous 
and local communities”.
120  Akwé:Kon guidelines para. 35.
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of indigenous rights to the extent they are protected under international human rights 
treaties ratified by CBD Parties or, instead, whether treaty rights are only those established 
in bilateral agreements between the State and indigenous peoples.121
In any event, and as a general requirement, “[g]overnments, their agencies and 
development proponents should take into account the rights of indigenous and local 
communities over lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by them and the 
associated biological diversity”.122 The definition of land rights as merely based on 
traditional occupation or use, however, leaves out the case where indigenous groups have 
been illegally deprived of their lands and relocated elsewhere. The failure to acknowledge 
a broader notion of land rights is also reflected in the delimitation of the scope of 
application of the guidelines, which uses the same formula.123 Therefore, the notion of 
land rights incorporated in the guidelines is not entirely in line with international human 
rights standards.
This drawback in the formulation of the guidelines, however, can be remedied by 
looking at the notion of land rights as emerging from the decisions of regional human 
rights treaty bodies, the ILO monitoring system, and the UN Declaration on indigenous 
rights. In light of this framework, the lack of current possession does not amount to the 
absence of land ownership, which is a broader concept than physical occupation and 
reflects the cultural relationship of indigenous peoples with land.124
Another element that needs clarification is the extent to which involvement and 
participation of indigenous and local communities in impact assessment activities are 
“subject to national legislation”. In light of the Akwé:Kon guidelines, participation 
in screening and scoping activities might be limited by national legislation.125 On the 
121  An example could be the Treaty of Waitangi. This interpretation, however, is problematic due both 
to the contested legal nature of and the difficulties in implementing most of those treaties, as well as 
the assimissionalist nature of some of them. See e.g., Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under 
International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006, at 41-54; Olivier Michel, ‘Status of Treaties Entered 
into with Indigenous Peoples Predating Modern State Practice’ (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 223; Michael R. Hudson, ‘Status of Treaties with Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law’ [1993] Canadian Council on International Law Proceedings 114; John  Borrows, ‘Ground-Rules: 
Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand’ (2006) 22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 188; 
Andrea Ormiston, ‘(Re)writing History : A Report on the United Nations Expert Seminar on Treaties, 
Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations’ (2005) 
12 Law & Anthropology 196; Kent McNeil, ‘Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, 
Legislation, and Judicial Discretion’ (2002) 33 Ottawa Law Review 301; Michael Coyle, ‘Marginalized 
by Sui Generis? Duress, Undue Influence and Crown-Aboriginal Treaties’ (2009) 32 Manitoba Law 
Journal 1.
122  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 57.
123  See Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 12.
124  See Chapter 2, section 3.1.
125  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 14: “Affected indigenous and local communities should be invited to 
participate on any body appointed to advise on the screening and scoping phases or should be consulted 
on an impact assessment process for a development proposal, and should be involved in the establishment 
of the terms of reference for the conduct of the impact assessments, subject to national legislation”. On 
the meaning of this locution under Art. 8(j) CBD, see Chapter 1, section 3, and Chapter 3, section 1.
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contrary, assessment procedures are to be carried out in accordance with indigenous rights, 
including participation, “subject to national legislation consistent with international 
obligations”.126 Given the different formulations used, it can be concluded that within 
the scope of application of the Akwé:Kon guidelines, when impact assessments are 
performed, national standards contrary to internationally protected rights of indigenous 
peoples shall be superseded by international obligations. It can be inferred that the similar 
locution used in the PoWPA shares the same meaning. Therefore, also in the context of 
the PoWPA, international standards would prevail on contrasting national provisions.
In addition to the framework above, the Akwé:Kon guidelines operationalize the 
involvement of indigenous peoples in impact assessment in a way that is not explicitly 
contemplated by human rights bodies and instruments. The novelty is represented by the 
possibility for indigenous communities and the proponent of any development taking 
place on their lands to stipulate an agreement to identify the reciprocal rights and duties, 
as well as any procedural steps to be taken in the assessment procedure, “including the 
option of a no-action alternative”.127 Agreements, even when framed as a mere possibility, 
are an expression of a recognised subjectivity for indigenous peoples, in that they concern 
fundamental aspects such as the option not to proceed with the proposed development. 
Furthermore, such agreements may regulate rights and duties in a position of reciprocity. 
It may occur, therefore, that when the proponents of developments are public agencies, 
indigenous peoples have an instrument to negotiate with the State. In this case, the 
locution “subject to national legislation and regulations” contained in the guidelines 
confirms the fact that these agreements are not comparable to international treaties but 
should be framed as internal acts whose conclusion is regulated by national legislation.
Moreover, when development projects are controlled by private actors, CBD 
Parties must supervise them in accordance with their general duty to protect human 
rights.128 Private parties that are proponents of conservation projects may also enter into 
agreements with indigenous communities. Therefore, this instrument allows both States 
and businesses to engage with indigenous peoples.
The possibility to stipulate agreements might in principle also provide a solution 
to the issue of the relationship between impact assessment and the requirement of prior 
and informed consent. The Akwé:Kon guidelines condition the results of assessment 
126  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 57.
127  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 21: “In order to protect the interests of affected indigenous and local 
communities, an agreement, could be negotiated between the community and the proponent of the 
development. The terms of such an agreement, subject to national legislation and regulations, could 
cover the procedural aspects of impact assessments, including the option of a no-action alternative, 
setting out the rights, duties and responsibilities of all parties, and also address measures to prevent or 
mitigate any negative impacts of the proposed development”. Similarly, in para. 30 concerning cultural 
impact assessments, the guidelines foresee the possibility that indigenous peoples conclude protocols 
with the proponents of development projects to regulate the behaviour of development agents.
128  UN Report on business and human rights. See Chapter 2, note 261.
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procedures to prior informed consent only when this is required at national level.129 In 
this sense, agreements between indigenous peoples and development proponents may 
circumvent the lack of consent requirements in national legislation. However, while the 
failure to seek for free, prior and informed consent is not in line with international 
standards,130 the conclusion of agreements is only optional so that it may not suffice to 
fill national lacunae.
By reading the PoWPA in conjunction with the Akwé:Kon guidelines, it is clear 
that impact assessment is a complex undertaking that may contribute to reach the 
objective of realising participation in the establishment and management of protected 
areas. If conducted as a process that incorporates indigenous rights into broadly-speaking 
development decisions on indigenous lands, impact assessment may be instrumental for 
the empowerment of indigenous peoples and the realisation of their rights. In this sense, 
impact assessment can be functional to the establishment of procedural and institutional 
arrangements through which indigenous peoples can negotiate with the concerned 
authorities.131
The empowerment of indigenous peoples may also derive from the requirement 
that CBD Parties invest in capacity-building activities in order to allow for an effective 
participation of indigenous and local communities in decision-making processes.132 The 
main problem with the standards contained in the Akwé:Kon guidelines is that they are 
voluntary and scarcely implemented.133 At the same time, impact assessment is also a 
procedural guarantee that must be performed under human rights law when restrictions 
are imposed on indigenous peoples. In this sense, although the modalities of impact 
assessment are left to the initiative of States, their performance is anyway required to 
ensure the protection of indigenous rights.
While the adoption of the standards of participation and impact assessment is a 
way to integrate the rights of indigenous peoples into the implementation of the CBD, 
it is very hard—and it lies outside the scope of this dissertation—to assess the concrete 
impact of the adoption of the PoWPA and related standards on national legal systems. 
129  An exception to that is represented by impact assessment procedures of projects that require the 
utilisation of traditional knowledge. According to para. 60 Akwé:Kon guidelines, this is always subject to 
prior informed consent. This requirement is also explored in Chapter 3, section 2.1.
130  Since a process of consultation must always be initiated when indigenous peoples are directly affected. 
See Chapter 2, section 3.5.
131  This conclusion is explicitly recognised in Akwé:Kon guidelines para. 35: “As information gathering 
processes, environmental impact assessments can contribute to the protection of the rights of indigenous 
and local communities by recognizing the distinct activities, customs and beliefs of the affected indigenous 
and local communities”.
132  See Akwé:Kon guidelines paras. 18, 55, and 66. See COP dec. IV/9.
133  See Leena Heinämäki, Thora Martina Herrmann and Antje Neumann, ‘The Protection of the 
Culturally and Spiritually Important Landscapes of Arctic Indigenous Peoples under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and First Experiences from the Application of the Akwé:Kon Guidelines in Finland’ 
(2015) 6 The Yearbook of Polar Law 189, at 217.
Chapter 4
281
When looking at the PoWPA Action Plans submitted by CBD Parties to this date, the 
level of detail on the involvement of indigenous peoples is so poor that it is not possible 
to tell to what extent PoWPA standards are implemented at the national level. National 
reports make no explicit reference to the different degrees of participation and to the 
requirements in place to realise the involvement of indigenous peoples.134 Furthermore, 
some of the submitted national reports are usually not organised so as to reflect the 
structure of the PoWPA. For these reasons, it is not easy to understand to what extent 
suggested activities are implemented at national level.135
2.1.3. Participatory rights and ICCAs
The PoWPA also innovates concerning alternative forms of protected areas, including 
ICCAs. These are recognised as potentially contributing to the achievement of 
conservation pursuant to the CBD. Furthermore, it encourages State Parties to promote 
these forms of conservation also by means of legal recognition and protection at the 
national level.136 Legal recognition in turn should occur in the context of a process where 
indigenous peoples are duly involved.137
134  Most countries have used the same template for PoWPA Action Plans, which provides no details 
concerning the measures implemented for realising the objective to ensure the participation of indigenous 
peoples.
135  See e.g., the PoWPA action plans of Bolivia, Botswana, Denmark, India, Kenya, New Zealand, 
and Nicaragua that I have selected as a representative sample of every geographical area of interest for 
indigenous peoples. New Zealand presented a Statement of Intent for 2012-2017 where it does not even 
refer to the PoWPA. Denmark assessed the implementation of the suggested activities and goals, but only 
in a very condensed table at the end of the report. Bolivia, Botswana, India, Kenya, and Nicaragua only 
assign numerical value from 0 to 4 to measure the advancement in every suggested activities without 
further description. This is in any event the template used by most of CBD Parties that have reported on 
PoWPA, where 0 stands for activity “not yet begun, no progress”, 1 for “just started, limited progress”, 2 
for “activity fully underway”, 3 for “significant progress, nearly completed”, 4 for “activity completed”. 
For the full list of action plans, see https://www.cbd.int/protected/implementation/actionplans/ (last 
accessed October 2016). COP dec. IX/18 has recommended to Parties to create national focal points 
to facilitate the implementation of the PoWPA (para. 21). See Larsen and Oviedo 2006, at 8: “While 
the new protected area paradigm can be considered reconciliatory in spirit and wording, it is also clear 
that the CBD programme of work on protected areas does not equate an actual consensus on how 
to effectively reconcile indigenous peoples and protected area relationships. The majority of protected 
areas have not been established with the rights of indigenous peoples in mind and the use of alternative 
governance measures, albeit growing hastily, remains limited”. If national implementation is uncertain, it 
is worth mentioning that COP dec. X/31, para. 32(e) and COP dec. XI/24, para. 1(i), encourage Parties 
to include indigenous peoples in committees that report to the CBD on the implementation of the 
PoWPA. Therefore, monitoring at the international level foresees the involvement of indigenous peoples.
136  PoWPA, suggested activity 2.1.2: “Recognize and promote a broad set of protected area governance 
types related to their potential for achieving biodiversity conservation goals in accordance with the 
Convention, which may include areas conserved by indigenous and local communities and private 
nature reserves. The promotion of these areas should be by legal and/or policy, financial and community 
mechanisms”. See also, suggested activity 2.1.3 and suggested activity 2.2.7 The latter promotes exchange 
of information inter alia on ICCAs.
137  PoWPA, suggested activity 2.1.3: “Establish policies and institutional mechanisms with full 
participation of indigenous and local communities, to facilitate the legal recognition and effective 
management of indigenous and local community conserved areas in a manner consistent with the goals 
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Importantly, participation of indigenous peoples is also required to assess the 
effectiveness of ICCAs in protecting biological diversity.138 Pluralism in the assessment of 
conservation results is also overshadowed by the promotion of “understanding of science-
based knowledge by indigenous and local communities” and indigenous capabilities.139 
Moreover, conservation need to be beneficial to indigenous peoples, thus confirming a 
notion of nature protection that is socially determined.140
This means in terms of guidance to national governments that when these decide 
on their national system of protected areas, their understanding of what constitutes 
a protected area must reflect pluralism to be in line with both human rights law and 
international biodiversity law. This broad interpretation of conservation is possible under 
the CBD not only by virtue of Article 8(a) including special area-based conservation 
measures, but also in light of COP decisions on ecosystem approach above and ICCAs.
The autonomous determination of conservation objectives and methodologies 
seems more in line with a governance model of protected areas where indigenous peoples 
play a fundamental role in decision-making concerning the establishment of protected 
areas. This point is left open in the PoWPA, which instead does not explicitly distinguishes 
between participatory planning, management, establishment, and governance of 
protected areas.141
Subsequent decisions reiterate that the creation of protected areas must occur in 
consultation with indigenous peoples and the latter must also be involved in management 
decisions, as well as national strategic planning.142 Participation in decision-making is 
indeed only one aspect of the integration of indigenous rights into conservation, which 
is realised through the acknowledgement of broader governance issues.
of conserving both biodiversity and the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities”.
138  PoWPA, suggested activity 1.1.4.
139  PoWPA, suggested activities 3.5.2 and 2.2.4.
140  PoWPA, suggested activity 1.1.7.
141  PoWPA suggested activities 1.4.1, 2.1.5, and 2.2.2.
142  COP dec. IX/13, Part D, para. 4(i): “Creation of protected areas, nature parks and others, in 
consultation with indigenous and local communities and also involving them in their management, 
consistent with national law”; COP dec. IX/18, Part A, para. 6(d): Parties are invited to “[e]stablish 
effective processes for the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities, in full 
respect of their rights and recognition of their responsibilities, in the governance of protected areas, 
consistent with national law and applicable international obligations”; COP dec. X/31, para. 32(c): 
“Establish effective processes for the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities, 
in full respect of their rights and recognition of their responsibilities, in the governance of protected areas, 
consistent with national law and applicable international obligations”; COP dec. XI/2, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/DEC/XI/2 (5 December 2012), para. 4: Parties are invited “to include all stakeholders, 
including indigenous and local communities, women and youth, in planning and implementing national 
biodiversity strategies and action plans”; COP dec. XI/16, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XI/16 
(5 December 2012), para. 1(g): “Promoting the full and effective participation of indigenous and local 
communities and the use of relevant traditional knowledge and practices in appropriate ecosystem 
restoration activities”.
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In this sense, COP decisions continue to encourage CBD Parties to acknowledge 
the contribution of ICCAs to conservation,143 including through the recognition of 
ICCAs by national laws, the diversification of governance models, and financial support 
to indigenous activities aimed to develop conservation methods and to institutionalise 
their conserved areas.144 Furthermore, in Aichi Target 11 the CBD COP takes stock 
of IUCN’s categorisation of governance types, explicitly referring to governance by 
indigenous peoples and local communities.145 In relation to IUCN categories, the 
recognition in CBD decisions that capacity building may be needed partially responds 
to the critique, formulated in section 2, against the inclusion of the capacity to enforce 
decisions among IUCN criteria to identify non-formalised ICCAs.
In contrast, an aspect that is not specifically dealt with in CBD COP decisions 
is the issue of how non-formalised ICCAs can become part of the national system of 
protected areas, thus contributing to the fulfilment of Parties’ obligations to establish 
protected areas under Article 8(a). It must be reminded that Article 8(a) foresees the 
possibility of conserved areas that are less formalised than protected areas (“areas where 
special measures need to be taken”). Still the question of how States can assess to what 
extent special measures for conservation are put into place remains. As emerges from 
human rights law, however, States cannot impose a change of destination of indigenous 
lands without engaging in a process of free, prior and informed consent. Moreover, if 
formalising protected areas implies that indigenous peoples are to be displaced or deprived 
of their resources, consent is also needed.
Overall, it seems indeed that the requirements contained in COP decisions go 
beyond the safeguards identified by the Inter-American Court in the abovementioned 
Kaliña and Lokono decision. Apart from the already discussed proportionality test, the only 
reference to different types of governance is made by the Inter-American Commission, 
which in the allegations to the case recommends co-management as one of the possible 
solutions to remedy the violation of land rights.146 The Court does not build upon this 
143  COP dec. IX/18, Part A, para. 6(b) and Part B, para. 6(a); COP dec. X/31, paras. 31(b): invites Parties 
to “[r]ecognize the role of indigenous and local community conserved areas and conserved areas of other 
stakeholders in biodiversity conservation, collaborative management and diversification of governance 
types”.
144  COP dec. X/31, para. 32(a) and (b); COP dec. XI/14, Part A, para. 9; COP dec. XI/24, para. 
1(e); COP dec. XII/12, Plan of Action on Customary Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Annex, 
para. 9: “Customary sustainable use of biological diversity and traditional knowledge can contribute 
to the effective conservation of important biodiversity sites, either through shared governance or joint 
management of official protected areas or through indigenous and community conserved territories and 
areas”.
145  See Aichi Target 11 and Strategic Plan For Biodiversity 2011-2020: Further Information Related to 
the Technical Rationale for the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, Including Potential Indicators and Milestones, 
UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/12/REV1 (14 March 2011), at 15. See also COP dec. XI/24, 
para. 1(e). See furthermore Quick guide to Aichi Target 11, available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/strategic-
plan/targets/T11-quick-guide-en.pdf (last accessed October 2016).
146  Kaliña and Lokono case, para. 161.
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suggestion and limits itself to find the violation of indigenous rights due to the lack of 
participation into decision-making.
2.2. Developments in the WHC: indigenous participatory rights
The general framework provided by the CBD on biodiversity conservation is accompanied 
by a number of specialised regimes that protect particular species or habitats, preserve 
nature from specific threats, or concern identified regions.147 Some of these treaties, 
such as the Ramsar convention on wetlands and the Bonn convention on migratory 
species, contain obligations to create protected areas. These instruments, however, have 
been excluded from the present analysis due to their limited scope either in terms of 
membership or the object protected. In contrast with this fragmented framework, 
the WHC is a universal treaty with a general subject matter, which lays down a legal 
framework for the protection of cultural and natural heritage148 and has approximately 
the same number of Parties as the CBD.149
Similarly to the CBD, the protection of the world heritage is grounded on the 
exercise of the State’s sovereign powers over the sites that form the object of international 
protection.150 Furthermore, the preservation of the world heritage is a common concern 
147  Although some of these general categories may overlap, examples of the first category are the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat and the Convention 
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. The second category is represented by the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (most commonly 
known as CITES) (Washington, 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975). Examples of the third group are 
the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern, 19 September 
1979, in force 1 June 1982) and the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources. Most of these instruments precede the CBD in time, although the latter is the most general in 
scope and has been widely ratified. For an overview of these instruments and their reciprocal relationship, 
see Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law 2007.
148  See Art. 1 and Art. 2 WHC. According to the former, “the following shall be considered as “cultural 
heritage”: monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or 
structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which 
are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of buildings: 
groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their 
place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; 
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites 
which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological 
point of view”. Pursuant to Art. 2, “the following shall be considered as “natural heritage”: natural features 
consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding 
universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; geological and physiographical formations 
and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of 
outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; natural sites or precisely 
delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or 
natural beauty”. For a detailed analysis of the WHC, see Francesco Francioni with Federico Lenzerini (eds) 
The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008). For a summary of 
the process of listing World Heritage properties, see Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell 
(eds), International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press 2009), at 677-680.
149  The CBD has 196 Parties, the WHC 191. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (last accessed 
October 2016).
150  See Art. 6(1) WHC; Operational Guidelines, para. 15: “While fully respecting the sovereignty of 
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of humankind.151
At the same time, the logic behind the two international global treaties on 
conservation is different in many respects. First, while the CBD aims inter alia to 
conserve the genetic variability of species, habitats, and ecosystems, the WHC embraces 
a conception of conservation that has been defined as “spatial” since protection is in 
principle reserved to unmovable objects, i.e., cultural and natural monuments and 
sites.152 Natural heritage, in particular, includes habitats of threatened species, as well 
as “natural areas” that are relevant for conservation, including protected areas.153 In this 
sense, the WHC pursues objectives of biodiversity conservation.
The second big difference with respect to the CBD regime is that not all sites 
potentially relevant for conservation purposes fall in the purview of the WHC. Only 
those natural sites that are recognised as being of “Outstanding Universal Value” can be 
included in the World Heritage List and protected under the terms established by the 
WHC.154 According to the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the WHC, 
the value of World Heritage properties is universally outstanding only if their significance 
is “exceptional”, “transcend[s] borders” and has repercussions on future generations.155 
Notwithstanding the complex notion of Outstanding Universal Value, some authors 
have highlighted that the presence of this threshold in the WHC significantly limits the 
the States on whose territory the cultural and natural heritage is situated, States Parties to the Convention 
recognize the collective interest of the international community to cooperate in the protection of this 
heritage”.
151  See Operational Guidelines, para. 4. The term “common concern” is not explicitly used in the text of 
the WHC. However, the creation of an international institutional mechanism to manage and conserve 
cultural and natural habitats presupposes the acknowledgment that national territories and resources 
must be managed in a way that satisfies the general concern of the international community for the 
protection of the assets of humanity. See Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2013), at 52.
152  Dupuy and Viñuales 2015, at 178. See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, at 678: “The Convention is…
useful only in protecting certain habitats (mostly in national parks); a species itself, however extraordinary, 
cannot be listed”. See infra the special regime reserved to cultural landscapes.
153  Operational Guidelines, para. 102: nominated properties may coincide with protected areas. On the 
concept of natural heritage, see Catherine Redgwell, ‘Protecting Natural Heritage and Its Transmission 
to Future Generations’ in Abdulqawi Yusuf (ed), Standard-setting at UNESCO: Essays in Commemoration 
of the Sixtieth Anniversary of UNESCO (Brill 2007), at 267 ff.
154  See Art. 1, Art. 2, and Art. 11 WHC. See also, Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Article 8-11: World Heritage 
Committee and World Heritage List’ in Francesco Francioni with Federico Lenzerini (eds), The 1972 
World Heritage Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008), at 161-166; Francesco 
Francioni, ‘The Preamble’ in Francesco Francioni with Federico Lenzerini (eds), The 1972 World Heritage 
Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008), at 17-21; Catherine Redgwell, ‘Article 2: 
Definition of Natural Heritage’ in Francesco Francioni with Federico Lenzerini (eds), The 1972 World 
Heritage Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008), at 68-75.
155  Operational Guidelines, paras. 49-53. See also, section II.D of the guidelines, including para. 77(iii), 
(v) and (x), and para. 95. Section II.E of the guidelines furthermore elaborates on the requirements 
of integrity and/or authenticity, which also must be present for a property to meet the threshold of 
outstanding universal value. On previous attempts to define outstanding universal value within the 
WHC, see World Heritage Committee, Dec. WHC-05/29.COM/9 (15 June 2005), sections 19(g) and 
20(c).
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number of protected areas that actually qualify to be included in the list.156
Indeed, World Heritage sites are numerous and widespread across the four 
continents.157 More than one-hundred-and-eighty sites have been inscribed in the World 
Heritage List as natural or mixed properties. This phenomenon is relevant not only in 
terms of biodiversity conservation, but also due to the impact that the nomination, 
inscription, and management of these sites may have on the livelihood and rights of 
indigenous peoples. According to the former Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights, 
although the exact number of properties established within or next to indigenous 
territories is unknown,
[i]ndigenous peoples have expressed concerns over their lack of participation 
in the nomination, declaration and management of World Heritage sites, 
as well as concerns about the negative impact these sites have had on their 
substantive rights, especially their rights to lands and resources.158
The creation of World Heritage sites has, for instance, led to the displacement of 
indigenous peoples.159
In this context, it is worth exploring to what extent the WHC and related practice 
infringe on indigenous rights and if attempts to reconcile the two have been satisfactory. 
Similarly to the CBD, although the WHC was adopted well before the creation of 
international norms establishing indigenous rights, it does not stand in a legal vacuum. 
Therefore, its obligations and subsequent practice must be interpreted in light of relevant 
international standards.160
156  Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law 2007, at 10-11.
157  According to UNESCO data, there are 1,031 World Heritage properties to date. For UNESCO 
statistics and an overview on the geographical distribution, see http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ (last 
accessed October 2016).
158  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/67/301, para. 
33. See also, paras. 34 and 35: “34. The exact number of World Heritage sites that are within or near the 
traditional territories of indigenous peoples, or that otherwise affect them, is not certain and the World 
Heritage Committee has apparently never undertaken a comprehensive review of this, but the indications 
are that there are dozens of such sites. 35. In the meantime, there is still no specific policy or procedure 
which ensures that indigenous peoples can participate in the nomination and management of these sites”. 
Concerning the Operational Guidelines, although they have been reformed, it cannot be said they have 
laid out a specific policy on indigenous peoples.
159  See Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the ninth session (19-30 April 2010), UN 
Doc. E/2010/43-E/C.19/2010/15, para. 131: “The Permanent Forum reiterates its concern about 
conservation efforts, including the designation of national parks, biosphere reserves and world heritage 
sites, which frequently lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples from their traditional lands and 
territories”. The Operational Guidelines recognise that “[f ]or some properties, human use would not 
be appropriate” (para.  119), thus confirming at least the option that some sites could exclude human 
presence.
160  The general need for harmonisation and systemic integration may be reinforced by the fact that the 
WHC has been adopted under the auspices of UNESCO, which is a UN agency and as such should 
respect UN standards on indigenous rights, including the UNDRIP. Therefore, although the same 
reasoning cannot be applied to its member States, UNESCO does have an institutional role to play when 
it comes to the implementation of the WHC after 2007. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/67/301, para. 41. See also, Draft Programme of Action for the 
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The text of the Convention does not contemplate the role of sub-State groups. 
Instead, States are primarily responsible for the identification and the correct management 
of World Heritage sites.161 The final decision on the inscription of national sites on the 
World Heritage List, however, is taken by the World Heritage Committee, which is 
an intergovernmental body composed of twenty-one rotating States.162 The Committee 
also adopts and revises the Operational Guidelines, which guide States in the process 
of inscription of their properties.163 Therefore, the World Heritage Committee has a 
steering role in the evolution of the practice of the WHC.164 The remainder of this 
section analyses its decisions with a view to understanding to what extent the rights 
of indigenous peoples are integrated into the WHC. One of the objectives is also to 
compare WHC standards with those emerged in the practice of the CBD and to see to 
what extent the latter may supersede the former.
Indigenous rights overlap with the implementation of the WHC in at least three 
respects, namely the participation of relevant stakeholders in the identification and 
management of World Heritage sites, the inscription of cultural landscapes on the World 
Heritage List, and the performance of mining activities in protected properties.
2.2.1. Participatory rights and the creation and management of World Heritage sites
Concerning participation, the incorporation of communities’ interests into the WHC 
has been fairly recent. Following on from the Budapest Declaration,165 the World 
Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, UN Doc. A/60/270 (18 August 2005), 
para. 16.
161  See Art. 4 WHC. The creation of a Tentative List and the nomination of sites are in the exclusive 
responsibility of States. See Art. 11(1) WHC; Operational Guidelines, para. 62. International cooperation, 
however, is mandated under Art. 6(1) and (2) WHC. Concerning the obligation of Parties to correctly 
manage World Heritage sites, see Operational Guidelines paras. 97-102; para. 117: implementation should 
be done “in close collaboration with property managers, the agency with management authority and 
other partners, and stakeholders in property management”. States should also report on implementation 
to the World Heritage Committee. See Art. 29 WHC; Operational Guidelines paras. 96, 169-176, and 
199-210.
162  Art. 8-10 WHC and Operational Guidelines, paras. 19 and 21. See also, Art. 11, Art. 13, and Art. 
29 WHC. On the powers of the Committee to decide upon the inscription of properties, see Operational 
Guidelines, para. 153. For a complete list of the Committee’s functions, see Operational Guidelines, 
para. 24.
163  Operational Guidelines have been revised many times since the entry into force of the WHC, the 
last being in 2015. On the history of the amendments to the guidelines, see http://whc.unesco.org/en/
guidelines/%23guidelineshistorical (last accessed October 2015).
164  See Edward J. Goodwin, ‘The World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and Compliance’ 
(2009) 20 Colorado Journal of  International Environmental Law and Policy 157, at 173, who argues 
that the World Heritage Committee exercises executive powers and supersedes the role of the WHC 
COP.
165  World Heritage Committee, Budapest Declaration, Dec. 26 COM 9 (2002), para. 3(f ), Doc. 
WHC-02/CONF.202/25 at 6: the Committee will “seek to ensure the active involvement of our local 
communities at all levels in the identification, protection and management of our World Heritage 
properties”.
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Heritage Committee in 2007 revised its Strategic Orientations to include “communities” 
among the five strategic objectives of the World Heritage regime.166 More specifically, in 
subsequent decisions, the Committee has recommended that States, in implementing 
the WHC, both involve indigenous peoples in decision-making processes concerning 
World Heritage sites and respect their rights.167
The World Heritage Committee has only partially incorporated these 
recommendations in the Operational Guidelines, which do not explicitly mention 
indigenous peoples when encouraging Parties
to ensure the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, including 
site managers, local and regional governments, local communities, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and other interested parties and partners 
in the identification, nomination and protection of the World Heritage 
properties.168
At the same time, the Committee promotes a “partnership approach to nomination, 
management and monitoring” of World Heritage sites and includes indigenous peoples 
among the relevant partners.169
This ambiguity is not dissipated with respect to the creation of Tentative Lists of 
properties on the part of State Parties since the Operational Guidelines fail again to 
explicitly acknowledge the role of indigenous communities.170 In this respect, it is useful 
to compare the ambiguous notion of stakeholder under the WHC with the distinction, 
proposed by IUCN, between rightholders and stakeholders. While the former indicates 
the existence of legal—whether statutory or customary—rights over land and natural 
resources, the second notion is only qualified in terms of mere interests of certain 
subjects in developments over natural resources.171 In this sense, although indigenous 
peoples often possess a direct interest in the matters at stake, they are most importantly 
166  See World Heritage Committee, Dec. 31 COM 13A (2007), para. 5, and Dec. 31 COM 13B (2007), 
para. 3, Doc. WHC-07/31.COM/24 at 192-193. The other objectives are credibility, conservation, 
capacity-building, and communication. Together they are defined as the five Cs. The original four Cs 
were identified in 1992. See Doc. WHC-92/CONF.002/12 (1992), Annex II.
167  See World Heritage Committee, Dec. 35 COM 12E (2011), para. 15: the World Heritage Committee 
encourages States to “e) Involve indigenous peoples and local communities in decision making, monitoring 
and evaluation of the state of conservation of the properties and their Outstanding Universal Value and 
link the direct community benefits to protection outcomes, f ) Respect the rights of indigenous peoples 
when nominating, managing and reporting on World Heritage sites in indigenous peoples’ territories”. 
See also Dec. 35 COM 10A (2011), para. 13: the Committee “[r]ecognises the valuable role played by 
local communities, including indigenous peoples, in the management of cultural and natural heritage 
properties in Africa”.
168  Operational Guidelines, para. 12.
169  Operational Guidelines, paras. 39-40.
170  Operational Guidelines, para. 64: “States Parties are encouraged to prepare their Tentative Lists 
with the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, including site managers, local and regional 
governments, local communities, NGOs and other interested parties and partners”.
171  It is interesting to note that, in IUCN’s understanding, even those that are not legally entitled may 
have a recognised interest in intervening in decisions over the destination of land for public interest.
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rightholders under international law.
In contrast with these ambiguities, Operational Guidelines are very clear in 
encouraging the participation of indigenous peoples “in the nomination process”.172 It 
should be noted that this participation is also meant “to enable them to have a shared 
responsibility with the State Party in the maintenance of the property”.173 The guidelines, 
therefore, go in the direction of expanding the responsibility for the protection of the 
World Heritage to non-State actors, provided that these are duly involved in the process 
of nomination of sites.
Furthermore, States are encouraged to prove that nomination has been preceded 
by the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.174 Emphasis is put on 
procedural aspects, such as the fact that public hearings and consultation are conducted 
and that information is provided in the appropriate language, although these are only 
possible ways to realise the Operational Guidelines.175 In this respect, it is unclear whether 
the request to obtain free, prior and informed consent alludes to the requirement that 
States should only seek this consent or should actually get the agreement of indigenous 
peoples before proceeding with the nomination.
If interpreted in light of relevant human rights standards and the principle of self-
determination, consent would indeed be needed under certain circumstances, such as if 
the creation of a World Heritage site would lead to the forcible removal of indigenous 
peoples or the consequences of the inscription of the property would be so extensive as to 
compromise the livelihood and cultural identity of those peoples. As a practical example 
of this circumstance, in a resolution concerning the designation of Lake Bogoria as a 
World Heritage site, the African Commission has concluded that inscription
without involving the Endorois in the decision-making process and without 
obtaining their free, prior and informed consent contravenes the African 
Commission’s Endorois Decision and constitutes a violation of the Endorois’ 
right to development under Article 22 of the African Charter.176
In the African system, therefore, consent must be obtained before inscribing 
172  Operational Guidelines, para. 123: “States Parties are encouraged to prepare nominations with the 
widest possible participation of stakeholders and to demonstrate, as appropriate, that the free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples has been obtained”.
173  Operational Guidelines, para. 123. See Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental 
Law 2007, at 168-169. According to this author, the rationale behind involving non-State actors in the 
identification and management of sites is inter alia that when the public is not involved, it may engage 
in unsustainable patters in protest with the decision of establishing protected areas. Thus, participation 
becomes a means to extend the responsibility to conserve nature to other actors, including indigenous 
peoples.
174  Operational Guidelines, para. 123.
175  The text says “through, inter alia”, public hearings and consultation.
176  African Commission, Resolution on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Context 
of the World Heritage Convention and the Designation of Lake Bogoria as a World Heritage site, Res. 
197 (5 November 2011), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/50th/resolutions/197/ (last accessed 
October 2016).
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heritage properties in order to fulfil the rights of peoples to development. As a general 
rule, when indigenous land and resources are involved, States must genuinely seek for the 
consent of indigenous peoples, thus commencing a process of negotiation that cannot 
boil down to the mere provision of information on the project in an appropriate form.
Although the Operational Guidelines encourage States to obtain free, prior and 
informed consent, this requirement is not necessary for an application to be complete.177 
The only indirect reference in the nomination form to the potential involvement of 
indigenous peoples might be found in the fact that States can also indicate “traditional 
measures” as a way to fulfil their obligation to protect the nominated site. Nonetheless, 
it is not clear whether the term used refer to the traditional knowledge and practices 
of indigenous peoples, although it may be interpreted so as to include indigenous 
practice. The main problem is that the Operational Guidelines do not say anything on 
the requirements to obtain such knowledge.178 This is also the case in the CBD, where 
COP decisions on conservation encourage the use of traditional knowledge without fully 
articulating consent requirements. Indeed, as seen in previous sections, COP decisions 
acknowledge the link between indigenous contribution to conservation and benefit-
sharing.179
The concrete irrelevance of the involvement of indigenous peoples in the process of 
nomination appears to be confirmed by the fact that the Advisory Bodies to the World 
Heritage Committee do not have to verify whether requirements of consultation and 
consent have been respected by the proponent States when evaluating their nominations.180
Another undertaking that can be incompatible—depending on its implementation—
with the requirement of encouraging the participation of indigenous peoples is the 
definition of the boundaries of nominated sites.181 In particular when it comes to natural 
heritage sites, the Operational Guidelines establish that “boundaries should reflect the 
spatial requirements of habitats, species, processes or phenomena”.182 Although this 
requirement is understandable in terms of an ecosystem approach to nature conservation, 
the fact that the requirements to delimit properties are presented as verifiable in terms of 
scientific data leaves little room for the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ perspectives. On 
the contrary, the evaluation of the spatial requirements needed to preserve some natural 
properties might require the knowledge of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, as emerges 
177  See Operational Guidelines, para. 132 and Annex 5.
178  It seems, therefore, that general human rights should apply here to fill this gap. Human rights norms, 
however, do not regulate directly the issue of access to traditional knowledge. On this, see Chapter 3.
179  Concerning the functions of benefit-sharing in the ABS regime, see Chapter 3, section 2.3.
180  These bodies provide advice to the World Heritage Committee. As said, IUCN gives advice on 
natural heritage, while ICOMOS (the International Council on Monuments and Sites) evaluates the 
nominations of cultural sites. See Operational Guidelines, paras. 30-31 and 143-151.
181  Operational Guidelines, para. 132(1).
182  Operational Guidelines, para. 101.
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from CBD decisions on the ecosystem approach, ecological units and conservation needs 
are to be determined in line with social needs.
In the context of the WHC, the definition of boundaries could be a concrete way to 
involve indigenous peoples in the nomination process. Again, however, the WHC regime 
does not give indications on how traditional ecological knowledge is to be obtained and 
whether their contrary view to the establishment of a World Heritage property within 
certain boundaries would be taken into account.
Similarly, the Operational Guidelines do not explicitly require that management 
plans for nominated sites are prepared in consultation with indigenous peoples.183 It 
might happen that, pursuant to the WHC, States consult indigenous peoples on the 
opportunity to nominate a given site, but do not engage with them for elaborating 
the obligatory management plan. This differential treatment would not be in line with 
human rights standards since the management of World Heritage sites can enormously 
affect indigenous rights.
Furthermore, consultation with indigenous peoples is not a requirement for 
a correct management of the sites already inscribed on the World Heritage List. The 
Operational Guidelines only mention the possibility that effective management can be 
reached through “a thorough shared understanding of the property by all stakeholders”.184 
While “stakeholders” is a generic term for all interested actors, it is unclear what a “shared 
understanding” would imply for the site managers. The World Heritage Committee in 
its decision on the Kakadu National Park of 2003 required Australia to report about 
consultation efforts undertaken with the site’s traditional owners.185 In a previous decision 
about the Everglade National Park in the United States, the Committee considered as 
a “significant progress made in the state of conservation” the fact that the Miccosukee 
Tribe would be allowed to stay in the territory of the reserve. The Tribe’s presence was 
deemed to contribute to the restoration of the site’s water cycle and thus of its entire 
ecosystem.186 It is difficult, however, to recognise a trend in this sense in the decisions of 
the Committee affecting properties that are found on indigenous lands. In this respect, 
CBD requirements are again more advanced in that they explicitly demand participation 
in management decisions, even co-management, or independent management by 
183  Operational Guidelines, para. 108.
184  Operational Guidelines, para. 111. The same paragraph refers to “(d) the development of mechanisms 
for the involvement and coordination of the various activities between different partners and stakeholders”.
185  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 27 COM 7B.28 (2003), para. 3(c).
186  World Heritage Committee, Dec. VII.12 (1999), Doc. WHC-98/CONF.203/18, at 10. The French 
version is more easily understandable. See Dec. VII.4 (1999), Doc. WHC-98/CONF.203/18 (French 
version), at 8: “Une législation a été présentée au Congrès américain afin d’assurer la présence permanente 
de la tribu Miccosukee dans le Parc national des Everglades. Tout accord visant à assurer un site pour 
maintenir la culture vivante de la tribu pourrait aller à l’encontre de la restauration du flux des eaux 
dans la partie est de Shark Slough (où habite la tribu Miccosukee), considérée comme mesure essentielle 
pour la restauration de l’ensemble de l’écosystème des Everglades et pour la survie des espèces menacées 
comme le moineau noir de mer”.
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indigenous peoples.
Moreover, in light of the analysis above, the World Heritage Committee unreasonably 
distinguishes among situations where consultation of indigenous peoples is not required, 
i.e., the establishment of Tentative Lists or the management of sites, from others where 
consultation is indeed requested, i.e., the nomination of sites. This seems unreasonable 
because under human rights law consultation is required every time indigenous peoples 
are potentially affected by States’ measures. In this respect, the inclusion of a property 
traditionally owned or used by indigenous peoples in the Tentative List starts a process 
whereby indigenous lands might end up being listed among World Heritage properties. 
Tentative Lists, therefore, are the first step of a decision-making process that directly 
affects indigenous land and resource rights. Since consultation must be started at the 
very early stages of a decision potentially impacting on indigenous peoples, the inclusion 
of indigenous lands in Tentative Lists must equally entail a procedure of consultation.187 
Similarly, the management of natural heritage can enormously affect the capacity of 
indigenous peoples to freely dispose of their lands and resources and, therefore, free, 
prior and informed consent must be guaranteed under international human rights law.
Given the strong impact of site inscriptions on the life of indigenous peoples, the 
former Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples has argued that these peoples should 
be able to autonomously propose the inscription of their own lands.188 However, this is 
not reflected anywhere in the WHC system. 
A recent report of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights has highlighted that 
the failure to adequately implement participatory rights within the WHC system may 
be due to the lack of sufficient financial resources and governmental support to carry 
out comprehensive consultative processes.189 International financial assistance, however, 
is granted to State Parties also on the basis of the WHC.190 While Article 13 of the 
Convention identifies the protection of sites as the main target of financial assistance, 
the Operational Guidelines introduce an element that could improve the protection 
of participatory rights within the WHC. One of the criteria to evaluate applications 
for international assistance is the extent to which such assistance can contribute to the 
fulfilment of the Committee’s Strategic Objectives, which as said include consultation.191 
Additional funding might improve the concrete implementation of indigenous 
187  See Stefan Disko and Helen Tugendhat, Report of the International Expert Workshop on the World 
Heritage Convention and Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2013), at 23. According to this report, the creation 
of Tentative Lists should be transparent so that indigenous peoples may activate themselves at an early 
stage.
188  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/67/301, para. 40: 
“In the view of the Special Rapporteur, proposals for the declaration of World Heritage sites that directly 
affect indigenous peoples should come from those peoples”.
189  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/67/301, para. 39.
190  See Art. 13 WHC; Operational Guidelines, paras. 223-257.
191  Operational Guidelines, para. 239(e).
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participatory rights by, for instance, allowing for activities that facilitate the engagement 
of public and private actors with indigenous peoples, including translation and cultural 
mediation.
Another concern that has emerged is the involvement of indigenous peoples in the 
decisions of the World Heritage Committee. As said, the Committee has the final say on 
the inscription of nominated properties upon advice of ICOMOS and IUCN. In this 
context, a proposal endorsed by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand was made in 2000 
by a Forum of indigenous peoples to create a committee that could especially assist the 
World Heritage Committee in the evaluation of mixed sites or cultural landscapes.192 
The creation of the World Heritage Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts, however, 
was soon dismissed at the World Heritage Committee in 2001, inter alia on the grounds 
that the term indigenous would need further elaboration, together with a disagreement 
within the World Heritage Committee on its functions.193 Therefore, participation of 
indigenous peoples at the international level in the context of the WHC reveals itself 
difficult. A further confirmation of that is given by the fact that participation of sub-
national groups, including indigenous peoples, is not required when States submit their 
periodic reports to the World Heritage Committee.194
While the issue of property nomination and inscription is generally problematic 
for the reasons above, the category of “cultural landscape” particularly intersects with 
indigenous rights. It is defined in the Operational Guidelines as a form of cultural heritage 
which presents elements in common with natural properties since it represents “the 
combined works of nature and man”.195 Although cultural landscape is never explicitly 
connected to indigenous peoples in the guidelines, this category embraces a notion of 
192  World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.204/21 (2001), Annex V, Submission to the 
World Heritage Committee from a Forum of Indigenous Peoples Assembled in Cairns, Australia, 24 
November 2000. See Lynn Meskell, ‘UNESCO and the Fate of the World Heritage Indigenous Peoples 
Council of Experts (WHIPCOE)’ (2013) 20 International Journal of Cultural Property 155, at 161-162. 
On cultural landscapes, see infra in this section.
193  World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC-01/CONF.208/24 (2002), para. XV.5. See also, para. XV.4: 
“It was proposed that indigenous peoples could meet on their own initiative, be included as part of State 
Party delegations to the Committee and were encouraged to be involved in UNESCO’s work relating to 
the intangible heritage”. See Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law 2007, at 177; 
Meskell 2013, at 162-165.
194  See Operational Guidelines, paras. 96, 169-176, and 199-210.
195  Art. 1 WHC; Operational Guidelines para. 47: “Cultural landscapes are cultural properties and 
represent the “combined works of nature and of man” designated in Article 1 of the Convention. They 
are illustrative of the evolution of human society and settlement over time, under the influence of the 
physical constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural environment and of successive social, 
economic and cultural forces, both external and internal”. This category was introduced in 1992. See 
World Heritage Committee, WHC-92/CONF.002/12 (1992), para. XIII.2.3. See also, Dec. CONF 
203 VIII.C.1 (1995), at 43, concerning a Chilean property: “The Committee concluded that Rapa Nui 
National Park contains one of the most remarkable cultural phenomena in the world. An artistic and 
architectural tradition of great power and imagination was developed by a society that was completely 
isolated from external cultural influences of any kind for over a millennium. The substantial remains of 
this culture blend with their natural surroundings to create an unparalleled cultural landscape”.
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cultural property that goes well beyond the protection of architectural monuments.196 
The guidelines also recognise that some forms of land use that are instrumental for 
the conservation of biodiversity fall into this category and deserve protection under 
the WHC.197 Moreover, some decisions of the World Heritage Committee concerning 
the inscription of sites show that cultural specificities are the decisive element in the 
identification of a site as cultural landscape. In this sense, natural elements are almost 
non-existent or they are only functional to a particular cultural tradition.198 A significant 
example of this practice is the decision to inscribe the Richetersveld Cultural and Botanic 
Landscape in South Africa on the basis of the cultural value of the indigenous Navi’s 
living traditions, as well as due to the special relationship of the community with the 
natural environment.199 
Linked to the category of cultural landscape is the problem of the identification of 
this type of cultural heritage. If indigenous peoples are not involved in the identification 
of these properties, it might be problematic for States to recognise the cultural specificities 
relative to those sites. Indeed, the debates among States taking place in the Bureau of 
the World Heritage Committee200 reflect these concerns. For instance, concerning the 
196  See Meskell 2013, at 161. The Operational Guidelines distinguish among three categories of cultural 
landscape. See Annex 3, section I, para. 10: 1) “intentionally created by man” mainly for aesthetic reasons; 
2) “organically evolved landscape” created for social, religious and other reasons but there are signs of 
evolution due to the interaction with nature; 3) “associative cultural landscape” with almost no “material 
cultural evidence”.
197  Operational Guidelines, Annex 3, section I, para. 9.
198  World Heritage Committee, Doc. WHC-96/CONF.201/21 (1997), para. IX.4: cultural landscape 
in Africa also includes “traditional architecture and material traces of living non-monumental cultures, 
including technical heritage and unbuilt sacred places”; Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.204/21 (2001), at 45: 
Ryukyu islands: decision to inscribe this Japanese site on the basis of the fact that “the Ryukyu sacred 
sites constitute an exceptional example of an indigenous form of nature and ancestor worship that has 
survived intact into the modern age alongside other established world religions”; Dec. 32 COM 8B.27 
(2008): “The continuing cultural landscape of Chief Roi Mata’s domain, Vanuatu, has Outstanding 
Universal Value as an outstanding example of a landscape representative of Pacific chiefly systems. This is 
reflected in the interaction of people with their environment over time in respecting the tangible remains 
associated with Roi Mata and being guided by the spiritual and moral legacy of his social reforms. 
The landscape reflects continuing Pacific chiefly systems and respect for this authority through tabu 
prohibitions on use of Roi Mata’s residence and burial that have been observed for over 400 years and 
structured the local landscape and social practices. The landscape memorialises the deeds of Roi Mata 
who still lives for many people in contemporary Vanuatu as a source of power and inspiration”; Decision 
32 COM 8B.50 (2008); Dec. 35 COM 8B.18 (2011): protecting the creation of terraces by Konso 
peoples in Ethiopia; Dec. 36 COM 8B.16 (2012).
199  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 31 COM 8B.20 (2007), para. 3: “The extensive communal 
grazed lands of the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape are a testimony to land management 
processes which have ensured the protection of the succulent Karoo vegetation and thus demonstrates 
a harmonious interaction between people and nature”; “[t]he rich diverse botanical landscape of the 
Richtersveld, shaped by the pastoral grazing of the Nama, represents and demonstrates a way of life 
that persisted for many millennia”; “[t]he Richtersveld is one of the few areas in southern Africa where 
transhumance pastoralism is still practised; as a cultural landscape it reflects long-standing and persistent 
traditions of the Nama, the indigenous community”.
200  The Bureau is made of seven State Parties elected by the World Heritage Committee and functions 
as a preparatory body for the discussions to be held in the Committee. The Bureau also undertakes 
organisational matters. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/committee/ (last accessed October 2016).
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Tongariro National Park in New Zealand, IUCN reported during a Bureau meeting that 
any intervention on the site would affect its spiritual value for the Maori tribes concerned 
and, therefore, its classification as cultural landscape.201
In a decision concerning the Kakadu National Park in Australia, the delegate of 
Japan highlighted that it was problematic to assess the cultural impacts of a mining 
project on the property, due to the complexities of the cultural and spiritual elements 
at stake.202 Japan also “stressed that such cultural factors as living culture and cultural 
landscapes have gained more and more weight in the work of the Committee and Bureau 
through the history of the World Heritage regime”. While Korea and Morocco joined 
Japan in calling for a “consensual solution” between Australia and the Mirrar Aboriginal 
peoples involved, the government of Australia highlighted that “living cultural traditions” 
were not established concepts and could not be applied to an ongoing case. Therefore, 
the catalyst role for indigenous participation that could be played by the inscription of 
cultural landscapes encounters the resistance of some States.
The same difficulties may arise when the Advisory Bodies and the World Heritage 
Committee are called, in their respective roles, to evaluate the Outstanding Universal 
Value of nominated properties.203 In this respect, indigenous peoples could contribute 
to the attainment of the objectives of the WHC by helping States identify cultural 
landscapes. This collaboration would further the objective to “establish a representative, 
balanced and credible list”.204
In the practice of the WHC, the classification of sites within this category has 
improved some aspects of the interplay between the State and indigenous peoples in the 
management of those sites. For instance, already in 1999, “[t]he Bureau recommended 
that the Committee request the Australian Government, with the necessary co-operation 
of the Mirrar and appropriate involvement of other stakeholders, to complete the cultural 
heritage management plan of Jabiluka”.205 In some cases, the Committee recommended 
governments to modify the site’s management plans in order to take into account and 
sustain the living traditions of local peoples.206 In other cases, the Committee requested 
201  Bureau Dec. CONF 201 V.B.38 (1998). The same document reports that consultations with Maori 
were ongoing at that time.
202  Bureau Dec. CONF 204 IV.B.47 (1999): the Japanese delegate distinguished between natural and 
cultural impacts of the mining project and concluded that there are “difficulties to assess such cultural 
elements as the spiritual linkages between people and nature, the impact upon living cultures as well as 
the impact upon the cultural landscape. He commented that it seemed that the cultural assessment is, in 
a sense, much more difficult than scientific assessment”.
203  See Meskell 2013, at 155-156.
204  See Operational Guidelines, paras. 54-61.
205  Bureau Dec. CONF 204 IV.B.47 (1999), para. 4.
206  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 31 COM 8B.20 (2007), para. 4(c) and (d): the Committee 
recommended to South Africa to “Develop the proposed Management of Cultural Assets Plan in order to 
identify effective ways to sustain the grazing traditions of the Conservancy, to give cultural matters an even 
higher profile in the Management Plan” and to “Allocate a sufficient recurring budget for conservation 
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that local peoples take an active—or even a leading role—in the management of sites.207
In this sense, the role of the Committee in assessing the inscription and management 
of sites provides a concrete opportunity for testing the respect of indigenous rights in 
these undertakings, which is lacking in the CBD system that only foresees monitoring of 
general national programmes on conservation. Although these decisions represent steps 
forward towards an approach to conservation that recognises participation and direct 
involvement as its method of work, the Committee has never explicitly referred either to 
indigenous peoples or to the rights of the peoples concerned.
A positive reading could be that the cultural landscapes transcend fixed categories 
of rightholders—such as indigenous peoples—to include every situation in which natural 
and cultural aspects intermingle. However, this approach is easily subject to abuse since 
it leaves a broad manoeuvring space either to the State Parties or to the World Heritage 
Committee to decide which sites classify as cultural landscape and where participation 
and co-management are needed. The limitations of this approach are confirmed by the 
fact that the recognition of participatory prerogatives has been uneven in the decisions of 
the World Heritage Committee. For instance, in recent cases, although the link between 
local peoples and cultural manifestations was recognised, the governments of Indonesia 
and China were not required to revise their plans in consultation with the populations 
concerned.208 It is not clear whether these differences have to do with the different nature 
of the communities concerned or with the different stances taken by the governments 
involved on the matter of participatory rights.
2.2.2. Participatory rights and mining in World Heritage sites
The participation of indigenous peoples may be required by the Committee in cases 
development projects are planned to take place on World Heritage sites. The case of 
mining projects is interesting because the Committee has recognised that mining activities 
can affect the cultural and natural values inherent in World Heritage properties.209 The 
granting of licences for uranium mining activities within the Kakadu National Park 
has prompted the Committee to send an independent mission to Australia that would 
and management of the cultural aspects of the landscape”.
207  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 35 COM 8B.18 (2011), para. 4: “b) Revise the existing Management 
Plan to include community members”; Dec. 32 COM 8B.50 (2008), para. 5: “c) enter into agreements 
with Kaya Elders to establish them as the guardians of the Kayas; d) modify the Management Plan to 
reflect the needs of the nominated Kayas, in particular integrating the conservation of cultural and 
natural resources and traditional and non-traditional conservation and management practices”.
208  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 36 COM 8B.26 (2012); Dec. 37 COM 8B.24 (2013). See also, 
Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law 2007, at 177.
209  The impact of mining activities on indigenous rights has also been recognised by human rights treaty 
bodies. See Chapter 1, section 2 and Chapter 2, section 3. See also, Reports by former Special Rapporteur 
on indigenous rights, James Anaya: UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41; A/HRC/21/47; A/HRC/18/35 (11 July 
2011); A/HRC/15/37 (19 July 2010).
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evaluate the consequences of the project. The mission concluded for the incompatibility 
of the mining project with the preservation of the Outstanding Universal Value due to 
heavy projected impacts on both cultural and natural elements.210
In particular concerning cultural impacts, the Committee highlighted that 
Aboriginal communities would be prevented from maintaining “their traditional 
relationships to the land” and “emphasized the fundamental importance of ensuring 
thorough and continuing participation, negotiation and communication with Aboriginal 
traditional owners”. Therefore, given multiple impacts on aboriginal way of living and, 
consequently, on the site’s integrity, the Committee recognised the importance to consult 
with indigenous peoples.
Significantly, the Bureau also acknowledged “that it is the clear responsibility of the 
Australian Government to regulate the activities of a private company, such as Energy 
Resources of Australia, Inc, in relation to the proposed mining and milling activities at 
Jabiluka”.211 Pursuant to its responsibility to protect human rights, the State must put 
in place measures that ensure the fulfilment of those human rights also on the part of 
private actors.212 In addition, under the WHC, the State is responsible for creating a 
regulatory environment that favours the preservation of both cultural and natural values 
embedded in World Heritage properties.213
In another series of decisions concerning the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical 
Landscape, the Committee influenced the decision of South Africa not to proceed with 
mining activities within the World Heritage site.214 Therefore, the inscription of cultural 
landscapes on the World Heritage List could theoretically be seen as an additional means 
210  World Heritage Committee, Dec. CONF 203 VII.28 (1998): “the mission had seriously questioned 
the compatibility of mining, and particularly uranium mining and milling, with such close proximity, 
and upstream from, a World Heritage property”. See also, Bureau Dec. CONF 201 V.B.36 (1998): 
“Uranium mining in an area of high natural and cultural values is of sensitivity and potential concern”. 
The issue at stake was the inscription of the Kakadu National Park on the List of World Heritage in 
Danger without the consent of Australia. Before deciding on the matter, the Committee asked for a 
detailed report of Australia on the measures taken to avoid additional damage and mitigate past impacts. 
It also asked for the voluntary suspension of the mining works.
211  Bureau Decision CONF 204 IV.B.47 (1999), para. 5.
212  UN Report on business and human rights. See Chapter 2, note 261.
213  Businesses, however, may also play a role on their own, as it has happened in the Kakadu National 
Park, when the company involved “has made a commitment to the Gundjemi Aboriginal Corporation 
(GAC) that no mining will take place at the Jabiluka without the agreement of the Mirmar people”. See 
World Heritage Committee, Dec. 28 COM 15B.35 (2004), para. 1. In this case, therefore, the WHC 
system has prompted a private company to fulfil its international responsibility to respect human rights. 
This element is more nuanced in the CBD system, which does have important standards on business 
responsibility but leaves their implementation to States, as partially showed in section 2.1.
214  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 33 COM 7B.49 (2009): the Committee “[n]otes with satisfaction 
that the State Party has confirmed that prospecting/mining activities are not allowed within the property 
and its buffer zone, in line with the “No-go” commitment of the International Council for Minerals and 
Metals (ICMM) in World Heritage properties (2003)” and “[e]ncourages the State Party to carry out 
an assessment of the impact of mining activities in areas close to the buffer zone on the Outstanding 
Universal Value and integrity of the property and to identify measures to comprehensively address them”.
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to prevent mining activities on indigenous territories. However, further practice shows 
that the listing of properties as World Heritage has not prevented the same State Party, 
i.e., South Africa, to grant mining licences on other protected sites.215 Importantly 
enough, the recommendation of the Committee to halt mining activities, pending the 
performance of impact assessments, had initially been followed up by South Africa that 
eventually authorised the continuation of extractive works.216
Although there is no general policy preventing developing activities from taking 
place in World Heritage sites, the Operational Guidelines establish that when such 
activities endanger the Outstanding Universal Value of properties, the World Heritage 
Committee may consider delisting them.217 In this sense, to the extent that the value of 
properties is assessed also against parameters such as traditional land use or the effects on 
indigenous livelihood, the establishment of World Heritage sites could help to protect 
indigenous rights. As long as the participation of indigenous peoples in the identification, 
inscription, and management of sites is not systematically ensured, the positive effect on 
indigenous rights would only remain potential.
Other elements could also contribute to the strengthening of indigenous rights, such 
as the performance of comprehensive heritage impact assessments with the involvement of 
indigenous peoples. The practice within the WHC, however, does not provide sufficient 
guidance in terms of the conditions under which impact assessment must be performed 
and its procedural requirements, including the actors to be involved.218 In contrast, 
215  World Heritage Committee, Dec. 34 COM 7B.52 (2010), para. 3: the Committee “[e]xpresses 
concern at the granting of a mining licence for coal 5 km from the boundary of the property, in a highly 
sensitive area adjacent to the Limpopo river and in the proposed buffer zone that was submitted at the 
time of the inscription”; para. 7: the Committee “[u]rges the State Party to halt the mining project until 
the joint World Heritage Centre/Advisory Bodies mission has assessed the mining impact”.
216  See World Heritage Committee, Dec. 35 COM 7B.44 (2011), para. 5 and Dec. 36 COM 7B.48 
(2012), para. 3. Mining activities were eventually authorised only to take place in the buffer zone. See 
Dec. 37 COM 7B.43 (2013), para. 7. It is not clear whether the mining projects discussed in the decisions 
are the same.
217  See Operational Guidelines para. 98: “protection of the property from social, economic and other 
pressures or changes that might negatively impact the Outstanding Universal Value, including the 
integrity and/or authenticity of the property”; para. 116: “Where the intrinsic qualities of a property 
nominated are threatened by human action and yet meet the criteria and the conditions of authenticity 
or integrity set out in paragraphs 78-95, an action plan outlining the corrective measures required should 
be submitted with the nomination file. Should the corrective measures submitted by the nominating 
State Party not be taken within the time proposed by the State Party, the property will be considered by 
the Committee for delisting in accordance with the procedure adopted by the Committee”; para. 119: 
“World Heritage properties may support a variety of ongoing and proposed uses that are ecologically 
and culturally sustainable and which may contribute to the quality of life of communities concerned. 
The State Party and its partners must ensure that such sustainable use or any other change does not 
impact adversely on the Outstanding Universal Value of the property. For some properties, human 
use would not be appropriate. Legislations, policies and strategies affecting World Heritage properties 
should ensure the protection of the Outstanding Universal Value, support the wider conservation of 
natural and cultural heritage, and promote and encourage the active participation of the communities 
and stakeholders concerned with the property as necessary conditions to its sustainable protection, 
conservation, management and presentation”.
218  Operational Guidelines limit themselves to establish that “[i]mpact assessments for proposed 
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within the CBD regime, through in particular the Akwé:Kon Guidelines operationalise 
the participation of indigenous peoples in impact assessments procedures in ways that in 
some cases even go beyond human rights standards.219
Another element to reconcile indigenous rights with developments occurring in 
World Heritage sites would be the introduction of a general requirement to create buffer 
zones, which is not present in the Operational Guidelines,220 as well as the definition of 
general criteria to determine the activities that are allowed to take place in these buffer 
areas. World Heritage Sites themselves may be either protected areas or buffer zones. The 
latter are areas surrounding protected ones, where less restrictive or no special protection 
rules apply, that in any event are functional to implement or reinforce protective rules 
within protected areas.221
IUCN highlights the role of buffering zones in conservation, especially due to their 
functions as ecological corridors allowing for the undisturbed migration of species.222 
This is in line with the ecosystem approach under the CBD, according to which, as 
reminded, ecosystems are functional units whose scale must be determined in line with 
conservation needs.223 Furthermore, although buffer zones are usually not subject to 
active conservation activities, they do not allow for the performance of development 
activities that may negatively affect the conservation of protected areas. In line with this 
notion of buffer zones, when these are not established protected areas, their role can 
be secured through voluntary stewardship of local communities.224 In this sense, the 
governance of buffer zones surrounding World Heritage sites could be left to indigenous 
peoples when these coincide with indigenous lands. At the same time, when indigenous 
territories also include core areas of World Heritage sites, the governance of buffer zones 
might not be sufficient to ensure that indigenous rights are respected.
interventions are essential for all Heritage properties” (para. 110). It is not clear for instance whether 
impact assessment should be performed only for interventions on sites that are already on the World 
Heritage List. Moreover, the term “interventions” is not elaborated on any farther. ICOMOS, one of 
the Advisory Bodies, has elaborated about the differences between environmental impact assessment and 
Heritage impact assessment. See ICOMOS, Guidance on Heritage Impact Assessment for Cultural World 
Heritage Property (ICOMOS 2011). Much emphasis is put on the need to identify the components of 
a site that are responsible for its Outstanding Universal Value. Indeed, this analysis may be far from 
complete when indigenous peoples are not involved in the nomination process. The guidance highlights 
the importance of involving all relevant actors, including local communities, in the scoping phase of the 
impact assessment. However, it does not mention specifically indigenous peoples. Furthermore, local 
communities are not involved in the evaluation of impacts.
219  See supra section 2.1.2.
220  The Operational guidelines, in paras. 103-107, only require to establish buffer zones “[w]henever 
necessary”.
221  Nigel Dudley (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN 2013) (on 
management categories), at 37, 55, and 81.
222  Ibid., at 16, 20, and 37.
223  COP dec. V/6, para. 3.
224  Dudley 2013, at 55.
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2.3. Common elements: tools for reconciliation and limitations
As emerges from the analysis of the two global regimes on conservation, the consideration 
of indigenous rights in these legal regimes is incomplete but positive elements have indeed 
developed.
Concerning the first aspect, the failure to incorporate international human rights 
standards has to do with the limited scope of conservation treaties. The CBD is primarily 
a framework convention that has laid out objectives and a common institutional 
framework. In this sense, it does not provide details on conservation measures, leaving a 
lot of manoeuvring space to States. The WHC, on the contrary, is a very specific regime 
where the consent of States to the inscription of sites remains the cornerstone.
Another reason for the lack of indigenous rights in the treaties’ texts is that most 
of conservation instruments have been adopted before a normative body on indigenous 
rights had emerged under international law and before even that participation gained 
some importance in international environmental law. This is particularly true for the 
WHC, which has recognised the importance of public participation only in recent times.
On the contrary, the CBD has been adopted at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio and is thus receptive of the changes in mind-set this conference 
has provoked inter alia in terms of the role of non-State actors in environmental protection. 
This is probably why the CBD regulates access to traditional knowledge, although with 
insufficient means, and recognises the role of indigenous and local communities in the 
protection of biodiversity. In spite of this, it does not set up any hard-law standards to deal 
with the issue of the establishment of protected areas under Article 8(a) on indigenous 
territories. Again, this one-sided acknowledgement of the role of indigenous peoples in 
conservation is probably attributable to the fact that at the time of the CBD adoption 
indigenous land tenure was not intended as a collective right to land ownership with 
extensive prerogatives on land and resource use.
Concerning positive developments, as shown in the analysis above, the original texts 
of the CBD and WHC have been enriched by subsequent practice within each regime. 
The CBD COP has most recently recognised that conservation projects may conflict 
with indigenous rights.225 Furthermore, it has elaborated a number of participatory tools 
that aim to ensure the participation of indigenous and local communities in the creation 
of protected areas, as well as guidance for impact assessment. With rather different 
institutional mechanisms, the World Heritage Committee of the WHC has amended 
several times its Operational Guidelines so as to include consideration of indigenous 
peoples, mainly in the form of their participation. Indeed, although the practice of 
conservation regimes now reflects indigenous issues, the incorporation of international 
225  See section 2.1 in this chapter.
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human rights standards into these treaties has been realised only to a certain extent.226
Both the CBD and the WHC have established a framework to promote the 
involvement of indigenous peoples in conservation projects. However, they have done 
so in a different way. The CBD anchors the PoWPA to the “full respect” of the rights 
of indigenous peoples. Previous sections have shown that the complementarity between 
national and international standards is resolved in favour of the latter. Although the 
reference to rights is not consistent in all PoWPA-related documents,227 overall the 
language of rights testifies to a framing of the issue of participation that is typical of law. 
While some standards may be broadly formulated, participation is a requirement that 
is not subject to fluctuating circumstances. According to PoWPA indigenous peoples 
should be involved in the “establishment, management and monitoring of protected 
areas”. This standard derives from the reference to “applicable international obligations”.
In contrast to the framework delineated in the CBD, the WHC Operational 
Guidelines and the decisions of the World Heritage Committee fail to frame participation 
as an established right. The language of rights is less pervasive with the result that the 
involvement of indigenous peoples may depend on the different phases of the inscription 
process, on the circumstances of the site, or on the States involved. This underlying 
indefiniteness of the WHC regime with respect to indigenous participation resembles 
more the variability of political decisions rather than the parameters of law.
Furthermore, a problem that is not addressed and cannot be solved with a human 
rights interpretation of the WHC is the possibility for indigenous peoples to propose 
the inscription of their lands on the World Heritage List, either directly or through the 
State. The first option would require an amendment of the Convention which seems 
unlikely at present, also because it raises the issue of other local communities that might 
be willing to exercise similar powers within the Convention. Concerning the second 
option, even the fulfilment of participation in the listing and nomination of sites would 
not give indigenous peoples an autonomous power to propose the inscription of new 
sites.228 This faculty has instead received recognition under the CBD, which as reminded 
226  The International Expert Workshop on the World Heritage Convention and Indigenous Peoples 
(Copenhagen, 20-21 September 2012) has produced a report where it proposed amendments to the 
Operational Guidelines to include a reference to the UNDRIP and the introduction of a human 
rights language. The report is available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0610_
International_orkshop_-H_and_IP_-Report_eb.pdf (last accessed October 2016). See also, Wiessner and 
Lenzerini 2012, at 17-20. See also, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229, at 25.
227  I refer here to the Akwé:Kon guidelines and the Addis Ababa principles.
228  To this end, national standing committees would be needed whereby indigenous groups could discuss 
with States’ representatives proposals made by the former. Indeed, the possibility for indigenous peoples 
to propose their sites would be in line with their right both to freely determine their development and to 
freely dispose of their resources. See Chapter 2, section 3. Art. 31 UNDRIP also recognises the right of 
indigenous peoples “to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage”. Furthermore, the 
creation of those sites would create a corresponding obligation of the States involved to preserve those 
properties.
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has embraced the governance types elaborated by IUCN, including ICCAs.
Regarding the concrete modes in which participation is realised in the CBD and 
in the WHC, in both legal systems there are numerous uncertainties with respect to the 
concrete steps to realise participation, the differences between participation and consent, 
and the results of participatory processes. It may be purported that the differences 
between human rights standards on participation and those upheld in the regimes on 
conservation could be interpreted as an emerging State practice that is aimed to modify 
crystallised rights and principles. However, the participatory standards of conservation 
regimes are so undefined that it is not possible to identify a consistent practice.
In contrast, the interpretative gaps in conservation treaties must be filled in light 
of existing human rights norms. Chapter 2 has identified the main components of 
participation under international human rights law, according to which consultations 
should be carried out in good faith and with the objective of obtaining consent.
The requirement of good faith is partially reflected in the Akwé:Kon guidelines 
on impact assessment, which foresees the participation of indigenous peoples in the 
screening and scoping phases of impact assessment processes.229 This requirement, 
however, is subject to national legislation. Furthermore, impact assessment may not 
be the earliest phase of decision-making processes, in which case indigenous peoples 
must be informed on planned decisions and involved well before the stage of impact 
assessment. The guidelines also establish the need to notify interested indigenous peoples 
of information on the project and the results of impact assessments.230
The World Heritage Committee of the WHC has not elaborated any concrete 
general standards to ensure that indigenous peoples participate in the initial phase of 
the inscription of a site. On the contrary, the Operational Guidelines do not require 
that participation must be ensured when States create Tentative Lists. In contrast with 
this framework, providing information on the creation of Tentative Lists would allow 
indigenous peoples to take action and engage with the State from a very early stage of the 
inscription process.231
Both the CBD and the WHC give indications on the cultural adequateness of 
indigenous participation.232 Again, while the PoWPA remains silent on those issues, the 
Akwé:Kon guidelines request that communications should be provided “in the language(s) 
of the communities and region that will be affected”.233 Furthermore, they propose a 
model for a correct articulation of values on the part of the communities in cooperation 
229  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 14.
230  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 10.
231  See Disko and Tugendhat 2013, at 23.
232  The issue of how to access traditional knowledge is analysed in Chapter 3.
233  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 10.
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with the proponents of conservation projects through the conclusion of protocols.234 
To facilitate participation, the Akwé:Kon guidelines foresee the possibility to record the 
positions of indigenous peoples living in remote areas.235 Indeed, this seems a double-
edged sword since it does not allow for a real and interactive exchange of positions.
Under the WHC, the comprehension and communication of indigenous cultural 
values is at the basis of the inscription of cultural landscapes. However, neither the 
Operational Guidelines nor decisions of the World Heritage Committee give indications 
on the way in which participation should be concretely realised.236
Concerning the meaning of free, prior and informed consent, the Akwé:Kon 
guidelines condition it to national legislation,237 thus excluding the applicability of 
international standards. Under the PoWPA, it is not clear whether prior informed 
consent must be only sought or be obtained. However, the PoWPA refers in this case 
to applicable international standards, thus opening up to the contamination of CBD 
standards with human rights law in light of the considerations above.
A similar lack of clarity has been found in the WHC Operational Guidelines. On 
the one hand, the guidelines require Parties, when nominating sites, “to demonstrate, as 
appropriate, that the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples has been 
obtained”.238 On the other hand, this demonstration is not a mandatory part of the 
applications for nomination and Advisory Bodies have no mandate to verify that consent 
has been obtained. Furthermore, the decisions of the World Heritage Committee on the 
inscription of sites have not upheld these concerns and rather refer to the involvement 
and participation of local communities. In this case, therefore, although there is no 
interpretative problem, the requirement of free, prior and informed consent is not 
enforced in the practice.
Another problem identified when participatory rights are concerned is the lack of 
clarity as to the requirements of participation in the management of protected areas or 
World Heritage properties. The PoWPA only refers to the need to “[i]mplement specific 
234  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 30: “protocols could be established in order to facilitate the proper 
conduct of the development, and personnel associated with it, on sacred sites and on lands and waters 
traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities”. The establishment of protocols 
may be likewise relevant for a participatory management of protected areas.
235  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 17: “The proponent and members of the affected indigenous or local 
community should establish a process by which community views and concerns can be properly recorded, 
as community members may not be in a position to attend public meetings because of, for example, 
remoteness of the community, or poor health. While written statements may be preferred, the views of 
the community members could also be recorded on video or audio tape, or any other appropriate way, 
subject to the consent of communities”.
236  See section 2.2.1 in this chapter.
237  Akwé:Kon guidelines, para. 53. On the possibility to conclude agreements between indigenous 
peoples and proponents, see section 2.1 in this chapter.
238  Operational Guidelines, para. 123.
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plans and initiatives” to ensure the involvement of indigenous peoples.239 On the other 
hand, the CBD COP has gone beyond human rights standards, by acknowledging 
the contribution to conservation given by ICCAs and encouraging States to give legal 
recognition to these forms of conservation by indigenous peoples. This indication is a 
historical step forward not only concerning management issues, but also raising concrete 
opportunities for indigenous peoples to have their governance recognised, at least for the 
purpose of biodiversity conservation.
Quite differently, within the WHC, the World Heritage Committee is only starting 
considering the participation of indigenous peoples in the management of sites as a 
criterion to postpone or revise the inscription of sites. However, there is not a coherent 
trend and no details are provided as to the concrete involvement of indigenous peoples.240
Given that participation may be a burdensome process in terms of time and 
activities to be undertaken, this process may require huge financial demands for the 
actors involved. In this respect, neither the CBD nor the WHC foresee dedicated 
funding mechanisms. The PoWPA only refers to the need to “[i]dentify and establish 
positive incentives that support the integrity and maintenance of protected areas and the 
involvement of indigenous and local communities and stakeholders in conservation”.241 
No international mechanism is otherwise established. The WHC, instead, has established 
a general funding mechanism, i.e., the World Heritage Fund,242 under which Parties may 
request international assistance to manage and preserve their sites.243 No specific funding 
heading, however, is dedicated to promote the Strategic Objective to foster community 
involvement. In a limited number of decisions, the Bureau has recommended to the 
States obtaining the funds that these should be used to reach the planned objective in 
cooperation with local communities.244
In addition, some decisions of the World Heritage Committee have highlighted 
that development activities, and in particular mining projects, are likely to endanger the 
Outstanding Universal Value of properties. This gives State Parties a broad manoeuvring 
239  PoWPA, suggested activity 2.2.2.
240  See section 2.2.
241  PoWPA, suggested activity 3.1.6.
242  Art. 15-18 WHC.
243  Art. 19-26 WHC. Operational Guidelines, paras. 233-257. See para. 233: “The Convention provides 
International Assistance to States Parties for the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage 
located on their territories and inscribed, or potentially suitable for inscription on the World Heritage 
List. International Assistance should be seen as supplementary to national efforts for the conservation 
and management of World Heritage and Tentative List properties when adequate resources cannot be 
secured at the national level”.
244  For instance, in the Bureau Dec. CONF 205 VII.28 (2002), concerning the request of Indonesia 
to obtain financial assistance to develop the Strategic plan for the Lorentz National Park, “[t]he Bureau 
approved an amount of US$30,000, requesting the State Party to work in collaboration with other 
potential donors, conservation NGOs and the private sector, and in particular the local communities, 
for the preparation of the strategic plan and seek their full support for the long-term conservation of the 
Lorentz National Park”. See also, Bureau Dec. CONF 205 VII.24 (2001).
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space to regulate and limit the activities of businesses when World Heritage sites are 
concerned. Furthermore, cultural impact assessment is a concrete instrument through 
which States may include the cultural effect of proposed projects on indigenous peoples 
into the overall evaluation of cultural impacts. However, there is not consolidated 
practice in this sense and the conditions under which heritage impact assessments are to 
be conducted appear unclear.
In light of the above, the incorporation of human rights norms on indigenous rights 
into conservation treaties has only been partial. This lack of integration is furthermore 
aggravated by a rudimental system of monitoring of the international treaties analysed. 
This is particularly true of the CBD, where a compliance mechanism does not exist. 
The COP has monitored the implementation of the PoWPA. However, this body does 
not have the power and the resources to investigate the capacity of the legal frameworks 
established at the national level to fulfil international standards.
Within the WHC, the opposite is true. While the decisions of the World Heritage 
Committee are in principle pervasive and many propose recommendations for States to 
preserve the integrity of their sites, the standards implemented are overall less protective of 
indigenous rights. The last version of the Operational Guidelines establishes a generalised 
requirement to obtain free, prior and informed consent when establishing World Heritage 
sites on indigenous territories. It remains to be seen however whether this requirement 
will be enforced by the Committee and whether it will be done in a consistent way.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that WHC and CBD obligations may overlap 
when World Heritage sites, in particular natural heritage and cultural landscapes, are also 
part of States’ national systems of protected areas.245 In this sense, CBD requirements 
might also extend to the creation of mixed sites or cultural landscapes, thus ensuring an 
interpretation of participatory requirements that is more in line with indigenous rights.246
3. Unveiling the relevance of indigenous rights and the principle of self-
determination: applying the interpretative approach
The analysis of the incorporation of indigenous rights into conservation treaties has shown 
the positive developments, as well as the limitations and interpretative doubts, deriving 
from the practice of the CBD and the WHC. Some questions remain unaddressed, such as 
245  Dudley 2013, at 16: “All new and most existing natural World Heritage sites are protected areas and 
comply with the IUCN definition of a protected area. So are some cultural sites, especially World Heritage 
Cultural Landscapes”. See also, Redgwell, ‘The World Heritage Convention and Other Conventions 
Relating to the Protection of the Natural Heritage’ 2008, at 384.
246  Redgwell, ‘The World Heritage Convention and Other Conventions Relating to the Protection of 
the Natural Heritage’ 2008 also suggests that the WHC might be lex specialis with respect to other 
conservation treaties. She also argues that cross-fertilisation is possible by virtue of Art. 31-32 VCLT (at 
395-397).
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what is the content of free, prior and informed consent within international conservation 
regimes and to what extent these regimes contemplate the option that indigenous peoples 
may themselves establish protected areas. As seen, the lack of fully-fledged responses to 
the issue of indigenous participation and initiative is partly attributable to an insufficient 
recognition of indigenous rights within conservation regimes.
Another important reason for insufficient responses and legal uncertainty, which 
is developed in this concluding section, is the lack of reflection upon the articulation of 
participatory rights in a way that is tailored to the foreseeable impacts on indigenous 
peoples stemming from the creation and/or management of protected areas. While the 
occurrence of some impacts have received precise legal responses, some other situations 
need a more thorough consideration of how indigenous rights can be concretely 
articulated, while at the same time safeguarding public interest and conservation needs. 
As illustrated below, the principle of self-determination plays an important role in this 
exercise.
Chapter 2 has proposed an innovative reading of indigenous rights, according to 
which the self-determination of indigenous peoples is a general principle of international 
law and as such has an important interpretative role to fulfil. First, within international 
human rights law, the rights of indigenous peoples are to be interpreted in light of self-
determination.247 The second interpretative function goes beyond the realm of human 
rights to affect the international regimes on conservation examined in this chapter. 
Whenever there are interpretative doubts or gaps in the interpretation of provisions 
regarding indigenous peoples, the principle of self-determination must be used to fill 
these gaps.
The principle therefore contributes to define the rights of indigenous peoples 
delineated in conservation regimes, such as participation and consent. Furthermore, the 
principle sets a threshold according to which, while fulfilling conservation obligations, 
indigenous rights cannot be compressed so as to impair the cultural distinctiveness 
of indigenous groups. Since cultural distinctiveness depends on factors such as the 
relationship with land, the ability to practice traditional activities, the organisation of 
indigenous society, and others, this threshold needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis, depending on the indigenous peoples concerned.
The first situation potentially affecting indigenous peoples is the establishment of 
protected areas. In contrast with human rights law and with CBD standards, this may 
happen without engaging in a process of free, prior and informed consent. It may also 
happen, when indigenous land governance is realised, that the formalisation of ICCAs 
occurs without seeking the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. This 
original violation of indigenous land and participatory rights may in turn result in at least 
three different additional violations, namely the forced removal of indigenous peoples 
247  See Chapter 2, section 5.
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from their lands, the imposition of some restrictions on the use of natural resources, and 
the blanket prohibition to use natural resources.
The eviction of indigenous peoples from their lands has received a mixed response 
in human rights law. Expropriation or dispossession cannot occur without the consent 
of indigenous peoples according to Article 10 of the UN Declaration on indigenous 
rights and Article 16(2) of the ILO Convention 169. Chapter 2 has explained why these 
instruments have a limited binding capacity, although they can be and have been used 
to interpret and enlarge the scope of other human rights treaties’ provisions in relation 
to indigenous rights. Human rights treaty bodies, however, have not clearly established 
so far that consent must be obtained in case of removal of indigenous peoples from their 
lands, the CERD representing an exception in this context.248 This might be due to the 
fact that nearly no case of recent forced dispossession has been brought before them.
The requirement of obtaining consent can indeed be derived by implication from the 
fact that, as explained in Chapter 2, this is recognised in case developments on indigenous 
lands risk threatening indigenous cultural integrity. This would most probably be the 
case, if the State failed to negotiate with indigenous peoples any potential relocation.249 
Furthermore, human rights treaty bodies have both established that lost possession does 
not extinguish property rights and grants rights to restitution or compensation with 
similar land when indigenous peoples have been forcibly dispossessed. In this context, 
it is also relevant that the PoWPA has embraced the requirement of prior consent as a 
necessary safeguard to avoid encroachments on indigenous rights when relocation is at 
stake.250 Therefore, the failure of the WHC framework to foresee a similar safeguard 
appears as a lacuna that contravenes international law.251
Restrictions upon resource use are another possible consequence of the establishment 
of protected areas. As already highlighted, their legality is tested by human rights treaty 
bodies against proportionality, which is satisfied inter alia when participatory processes 
seeking consent are in place. Furthermore, proportionality has also substantive limits since 
248  CERD, General Recommendation 23, para. 5. See also, Sawhoyamaxa case, para. 131 (establishing 
the right to restitution). In the Dann case, para. 130, the Commission finds that indigenous title to 
land cannot be changed without consent, thus indirectly confirming the provisions on forced removal 
contained in UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169.
249  Human rights treaty bodies have also established that, when restitution cannot be enforced, indigenous 
peoples must be given with similar lands enabling their traditional livelihoods. These remedies are also 
established under Art. 28 UNDRIP. See Chapter 2, section 3.1.
250  See section 2.1.2 in this chapter.
251  See section 2.2.1 in this chapter. See also, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 
para. 250: “Necessarily, the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent varies according 
to the circumstances and the interests involved. A significant, direct impact on indigenous peoples’ lives 
or territories, such as their removal from their traditional lands, establishes a strong presumption that the 
proposed measure should not go forward without indigenous peoples’ consent”; Report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229, at 
25, which recommends to UNESCO to “[r]eform the Operational Guidelines”.
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restrictions are only acceptable if they do not compromise indigenous distinctiveness. 
Another important criterion is that indigenous peoples are still able to access and utilise 
their resources.252 In this case, therefore, depending on the impacts at stake the free, prior 
and informed consent is to be intended as a process more than as a given participatory 
result since it does not imply that consent must be obtained but only that prospected 
impacts and remedies are jointly assessed. As also highlighted by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, conservation measures do not need to be exclusionary and thus 
can be conceived with the participation of indigenous peoples in a way that is respectful 
of indigenous rights. To ensure this, however, participatory processes must be in place. 
This requirement would be for instance satisfied if States had permanent bodies in place 
where States, indigenous representatives, and possibly conservation agencies, could meet 
regularly to discuss all kinds of activities planned to take place on indigenous territories.
In some cases, however, restrictions are conceived as blanket prohibitions to use 
some resources or to use them in a traditional way. This occurrence for the reasons 
explained above and by virtue of the principle of self-determination requires that consent 
is obtained. Although human rights treaty bodies have elaborated these criteria in the 
context of development projects, it is not excluded that a conservation project can be 
large-scale and equally affect indigenous peoples.253 In this sense, also a combination 
of small projects may produce an impact on indigenous rights that is so extensive as to 
trigger the guarantee of obtaining consent. This is indirectly confirmed by the condition 
posed in the Kaliña and Lokono case for restrictions to be acceptable, i.e., resources must 
continue to be accessible.
In order to meet these criteria, the choice about the management type of protected 
areas appears essential. IUCN distinguishes between six management categories that 
allow for different degrees of human presence and involvement.254 In this sense, engaging 
in participatory processes with indigenous peoples on this choice will help States and 
conservation agents find a combination of conservation measures that does not compress 
indigenous rights.
Another option to meet both conservation needs and indigenous rights is that 
indigenous peoples themselves create and manage protected areas through ICCAs. In the 
African regional context, the revised Maputo Convention already includes an obligation 
for its Parties to “promote the establishment by local communities of areas managed 
252  See Kaliña and Lokono case; HRC, Apirana Mahuika case and Länsman cases in Chapters 1 and 2.
253  Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress report on the study on indigenous 
peoples and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2, para. 34: 
“Particular emphasis is placed on free, prior and informed consent for projects or measures that have a 
substantial impact on indigenous communities, such as those resulting from large-scale natural resource 
extraction on their territories or the creation of natural parks, reserved forests, game reserves on indigenous 
peoples’ lands and territories” (emphasis is added).
254  See Dudley 2008 and Gillespie, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law 2007, at 33 ff.
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by them primarily for the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources”.255 
The most problematic aspect concerns the question whether and under which terms 
States’ recognition of these conservation models is needed. In this sense, Western science 
cannot be considered the only way to validate the conservation objectives and results 
of ICCAs.256 Furthermore, certain indigenous groups might be unwilling to have their 
territories formalised as protected areas.257 In this context, a good starting point would 
be to map those areas in consultation with indigenous peoples and to include them in 
the evaluation of national and international conservation goals through a participatory 
process aiming to obtain consent.258
A second set of violations may also derive even if the first condition, i.e., establishing 
protected areas with the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples, is met. 
When protected areas are not created by indigenous peoples, management models may 
vary to the extent that management decisions are taken without engaging in a process of 
free, prior and informed consent with indigenous peoples. In this sense, it may happen 
that indigenous peoples are completely excluded from the management board, that they 
are only superficially consulted or merely informed when decisions are taken, or even 
that participation takes place in an effective way but excluding those matters that are of 
primary concern for indigenous peoples.
In order to judge whether management decisions are in line with participatory 
standards, it is useful to assess whether protected areas coincide with indigenous territories 
or are established on lands that are close to indigenous territories or where indigenous 
peoples occasionally go for their activities. When protected areas are on indigenous 
territories, it seems that the only way to ensure effective participation is co-management, 
meaning that indigenous peoples must be on the management board.259 This does not 
255  Art. XII(3) African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. See Desmet 
2011, at 157.
256  See Kothari and others 2012, at 17: “ICCAs do not have to be considered as protected areas (i.e., 
within the official protected area system) for their conservation achievements to be recognized”.
257  See Perrault, Herbertson and Lynch 2007, at 535-542. These authors make the argument that the legal 
recognition of indigenous-led protected areas might be detrimental. See also, Kothari and others 2012, 
at 85: “While legal recognition is considered as a generally beneficial foundation for a resilient ICCA, it 
is also important to note that not all indigenous peoples or local communities will want their ICCAs to 
be recognized”. Indeed, these authors argue (at 26), the formalisation of ICCAs may contribute to the 
recognition of land rights. At the same time, the recognition of indigenous land rights is an enabling 
condition for ICCAs to flourish (at 30).
258  See Kothari and others 2012, at 27: “There is no global estimate of the number and extent of ICCAs. 
This is largely due to their neglect by formal conservation circles”. These authors also note the absence 
of written documentation among indigenous groups on conserved areas and the fact that this category is 
not well defined; at 44: they indicate the existence of a voluntary database, the ICCA Registry. See also, 
Göcke 2013 at 121-122 for examples also in Canada and New Zealand.
259  For a review of co-management experiences in Australia and Canada, see Donna Craig, ‘Recognising 
Indigenous Rights through Co-Management Regimes: Canadian and Australian Experiences’ (2002) 6 
New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 199. In some of them indigenous peoples retain ownership, 
in others not. The author is very critical of those forms where indigenous peoples retain ownership but 
then lease back their lands and resources to the State, either perpetually or for a long term (at 254). 
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mean that they would have veto powers on all decisions; in contrast with that, voting 
rules may be majoritarian and consent might only be required when restrictive measures 
impact on the exercise of their rights to the extent that their culture is compromised. 
However, it is important that specific measures to address cultural differences, and 
possibly capacity building, are in place according to the circumstances.
When protected areas are not established on indigenous lands, co-management 
might be an option but it is not necessary. As a bottom line, however, the State and 
conservation agents must engage in a participatory process with affected indigenous 
peoples both to determine potential impacts, corrective measures, the rights that are 
likely to be compressed, the benefits that indigenous peoples can obtain, and, if impacts 
are particularly extensive, to acquire consent. Once again, good faith, engagement at 
an early stage, and cultural appropriateness are essential elements of these participatory 
processes.
The problems described above mainly concern the obligatory interaction between 
indigenous peoples and national and local levels of government. However, the same 
restrictions on indigenous rights might derive from multilateral/bilateral treaties 
establishing natural reserves. The question arises on whether it is sufficient in this case 
that indigenous peoples are represented by negotiators of the State. The answer once 
again depends on which rights are at stake. If prospective protected areas are to be created 
on indigenous territories, States must engage in a consultation process with indigenous 
representatives before concluding treaties. When indigenous peoples are otherwise 
affected by those treaties, it is possible that States autonomously pursue international 
negotiations, with a view to ensuring that they can implement obligations at national 
level in a way that is compatible with indigenous rights.260
Concerning the first option, it is possible that States establish institutional 
mechanisms through which indigenous peoples can effectively participate in international 
negotiations.261 The World Heritage Committee has embraced this position while 
See also, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, UN Doc. A/71/229, at 22: “indigenous participation in management boards is impeded by 
a lack of training and orientation for indigenous peoples on their roles and responsibilities and such 
meetings tend to be conducted using overly technical language”.
260  This would be in line with the principle of mutual supportiveness that, according to Pavoni, 
must guide the conclusion of new obligations. See Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of 
Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?’ 2010, 
at 650 and 666-669.
261  See Kamrul Hossain, ‘Hunting by Indigenous Peoples of Charismatic Mega-Fauna: Does Human 
Rights Approach Challenge the Way Hunting by Indigenous Peoples is Regulated?’ (2008) 10 
International Community Law Review 295. This author has made an attempt to place the interaction 
between conservation and indigenous peoples within the debate on self-determination with reference to 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Washington, 2 December 1946, in force 
10 November 1948) and Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (Oslo, 15 November 1973, in 
force 26 May 1976). One of the conclusions he reached is that, pursuant to their self-determination, 
representatives of indigenous peoples should be included in national delegations representing States 
before the institutional mechanisms of conservation regimes (at 317). Furthermore, according to Hossain, 
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rejecting the creation of an advisory body made of indigenous representatives. Indeed, the 
participation of indigenous peoples in national delegations would not reach the goal of 
articulating indigenous positions through agents of the State, if the State did not recognise 
indigenous groups, failed to consult in good faith with indigenous representatives, or 
failed to report indigenous peoples’ opinions.
In contrast with this framework, the CBD allows indigenous representatives to 
participate in COP meetings as autonomous subjects with respect to their respective 
national delegations. Being no Parties to the CBD, indigenous peoples are not granted 
with voting rights within the COP. However, their presence has been decisive in 
influencing the workings of the COP in indigenous-related matters, such as for instance 
the creation of the Working Group on Article 8(j),262 which has gradually led to the 
adoption of the Nagoya Protocol.
Finally, a third area of conflict between conservation and indigenous rights concerns 
access to traditional knowledge for conservation purposes by national authorities and/or 
national private actors without the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. 
This issue is addressed in Article 8(j) of the CBD and has been thoroughly analysed in 
Chapter 3 concerning its connections with the ABS regime. Although obligations on 
ABS aim to regulate inter-State relations, Article 8(j) is a general provision primarily 
intended to regulate intra-State matters. In this sense, notwithstanding the interpretative 
uncertainties illustrated in Chapter 3,263 the expression “approval and involvement” 
must be interpreted in a systemic way in light of indigenous rights and the principle of 
self-determination. It must be reminded, however, that the Nagoya provisions requiring 
States to establish a national framework to ensure consent and benefit-sharing only 
applies to inter-State relations.264 It might be argued, however, that differential treatment 
at national level might be sanctioned on the grounds of discrimination. Furthermore, the 
obligation to put in place a normative framework that realise participatory rights stems 
indigenous peoples should be able to withdraw from conservation treaties. This argument, however, sounds 
illogical to the extent that indigenous peoples are not parties of conservation treaties in the first place. To 
my knowledge the only other author that has made a similar point on the importance of recognising the 
self-determination in conservation treaties is Aristizábal Corredor in his Master thesis published online, 
available at http://thesis.eur.nl/pub/8632/ (last accessed October 2016). His dissertation, however, is not 
a legal analysis on this issue.
262  See COP dec. III/14 (1996), para. 8: “Decides that activities as part of the intersessional process referred 
to in paragraph 7 should include representation by Governments, indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and 
other relevant bodies”; COP dec. IV/9, para. 2: “Decides that the working group shall be composed of 
Parties and observers, including, in particular, representation from indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity 
with participation to the widest possible extent in its deliberations in accordance with the rules of 
procedure”; para. 5. According to the CBD, the COP has a broad mandate to “[c]onsider and undertake 
any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention in the 
light of experience gained in its operation” (Art. 23(4)(i)).
263  Chapter 3, sections 2.1.2 and 2.4.1.
264  Another limitation of course is the limited number of ratifications of the Nagoya Protocol as yet.
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in any event from human rights law and would also derive from mutual supportiveness 
as explained in the Introduction to this dissertation.265
As emerges from the discussion above, one of the major threats to indigenous 
governance of protected areas is the lack of recognition of indigenous rights, and in 
particular land rights.266 Indeed, the novelty provided for in the CBD and partially in 
the WHC is that, even in the absence of articulated rights,267 participation of indigenous 
peoples is a requirement. This practice reinforces the existence of indigenous rights because 
it is implicitly founded on this recognition. Furthermore, the lack of explicit links between 
rights and protection may open up to the extension of indigenous prerogatives to other 
subjects and groups, as it is foreshadowed by the reference both to local communities in 
the CBD and to stakeholders in the WHC.
At the same time, the creation of protected areas can also be seen as a way to remedy 
past expropriations or dispossessions of indigenous peoples’ lands. Co-management 
and ICCAs may produce control on lands, autonomy arrangements and internal self-
determination, as well as the prevention of development activities that are threatening 
both conservation and indigenous rights.268 In this sense, the international regime 
on conservation may reinforce the rights of indigenous peoples when conservation is 
implemented through effective participation and, in some cases, consent.
To conclude, this section has illustrated how the rights of indigenous peoples 
and the principle of self-determination may allow for a systemic interpretation of the 
international regimes on conservation. The only caveat is that a correct interpretation 
does not ensure that the implementation of the concerned conventions will ensure the 
fulfilment of indigenous rights. For this to occur it is necessary to have monitoring 
mechanisms in place, stricter requirements, and more financial resources. Furthermore, 
when interpretation is overstretching existing obligations contained in conservation 
treaties, the principle of self-determination can perform the function of guiding principle 
in the modification of existing provisions. In certain cases, only the amendment of existing 
treaties or changes in the practice of the organisation can guarantee the compatibility of 
conservation regimes with indigenous rights.
265  See Introduction, section 6.
266  See Ashish Kothari and others, Recognising and Supporting Territories and Areas Conserved by Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities: Global Overview and National Case Studies (2012), at 30.
267  The WHC only speaks of stakeholders and equates indigenous peoples to other subjects; the CBD in 
principle recognises rights but does not articulate them, apart from procedural ones.
268  Craig 2002, at 214, gives the examples of Nisga’a and Nunavut.
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CONCLUSION 
Avenues for Reconciliation with Indigenous 
Rights: the CBD and beyond
1. A reasoned summary and main results
Indigenous peoples, often depicted as stewards of the environment, can be affected 
by environmental conservation in many ways. This dissertation has investigated the 
relationship between the rights of indigenous peoples and the protection of biodiversity 
under international law in light of two main research questions. The first question was 
aimed to detect potential conflicts between the obligations incumbent on CBD Parties 
and those stemming from human rights treaties and protecting indigenous rights. The 
second question looked at these conflicts to identify ways to prevent or solve them by 
ways of systemic interpretation. One of the main objectives, therefore, was to suggest 
harmonious interpretations of States’ obligations stemming both from the CBD regimes 
and the human rights treaties protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.
The relevance of conflicts between these two bodies of law has been established 
in Chapter 1, which has first positioned this research in the context of the traditional 
scholarly debate about human rights and the environment. This strand of research has 
privileged the analysis of the incorporation of environmental considerations into well-
established human rights, also known as human rights approach to environmental 
protection. Human rights treaty bodies have used environmental degradation as an 
element to ascertain the violation of indigenous rights, thus mainly concluding that 
environmental protection and indigenous rights are mutually reinforcing. In the limited 
cases where the pursuance of environmental objectives by States has negatively affected 
indigenous rights, the problem of conflict has not explicitly been addressed. In parallel, 
Chapter 1 has analysed the text of the CBD to see whether the specific problem of 
the interaction between indigenous rights and biodiversity protection is addressed 
under this treaty. This analysis has produced two main results. First, there is a lot of 
potential for conflict between the provisions of the CBD concerning indigenous and 
local communities (Articles 8(a), 8(j) and 10(c)) and the rights of indigenous peoples as 
protected in human rights treaties. Second, these conflicts are understudied and therefore 
need to be identified by looking at two subfields of the CBD, i.e., ABS and conservation. 
Chapter 1 has also identified the problem of access to land and natural resources as the 
main underlying issue that lies at the basis of the conflict between indigenous rights and 
biodiversity protection.
Chapter 2 has elaborated an interpretative approach to promote coherence between 
States’ obligations under the CBD and obligations establishing indigenous rights pursuant 
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to human rights law. These conflicts cannot be solved through classic rules of hierarchy, lex 
posterior, or lex specialis since the CBD and indigenous rights do not represent jus cogens, 
have different objects, and do not explicitly derogate from one another. This interpretative 
approach is based on the presumption against conflicts characterising international law. 
In this sense, it harmonises conflicts by means of the incorporation of indigenous rights 
into the CBD through contextual and systemic interpretation. Indigenous rights are 
protected under widely ratified global and regional human rights treaties and, therefore, 
represent applicable international rules in the relations of CBD Parties. The interpretative 
approach builds on systemic interpretation with an additional tool. Beyond substantive 
and procedural indigenous rights, another applicable rule between CBD Parties is the 
principle of self-determination that, Chapter 2 has argued, must be used when the 
content of CBD provisions is particularly unclear or interpretation particularly complex.
The principle of self-determination has been extracted inductively from the 
underlying rationale of existing indigenous rights. These rights emerge mainly from the 
practice of human rights treaty bodies, which have extensively interpreted existing—
primarily individual—rights as encompassing the collective rights of indigenous peoples 
to land, natural resources, culture, autonomy, and participation. Coherently with human 
rights cases, the limited instruments dedicated to the protection of indigenous rights (the 
ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on indigenous rights) have been used 
mainly as supplementary means to identify the content of indigenous rights. The general 
binding force of indigenous rights, however, is attributable to the almost exhaustive 
membership of global and regional human rights treaties.
Although this thesis has argued that extensive interpretation has been accepted by 
States, the main limitation of this approach is that human rights practice is in any event 
limited to a defined number of emblematic cases. It seems, therefore, that the study 
of indigenous rights may in future benefit from a detailed analysis of how indigenous 
rights are realised in national systems. At the same time, the objective of this dissertation 
was not to reach definitive conclusions on the content and status of indigenous rights, 
but rather to find criteria of interactions between those rights and the protection of 
biodiversity.
Chapter 2 has acknowledged that indigenous rights are not absolute but subject to 
limits. The same is true for the permanent sovereignty of States over natural resources that 
lies at the basis of the CBD. In this context, self-determination is in essence a relational 
principle, which allows for the compression of indigenous rights in the exercise of States’ 
sovereignty up to the so-called denial test. This test has been used by all human rights 
treaty bodies, including the more restrictive European Court of Human Rights, to assess 
the legality of the restrictions imposed on indigenous rights. Accordingly, restrictions are 
admissible as long as they do not amount to a denial of rights and preserve the distinctive 
identity of indigenous groups as peoples.
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Although limited to indigenous rights, this understanding of self-determination 
as a relational general principle makes a contribution to the general debate on self-
determination in international law. This thesis has purposefully downplayed the issue of 
the attribution of self-determination as a prescriptive right that belongs to a problematic 
notion of peoples. On the contrary, it has recovered the significance of self-determination 
as a general principle of international law. Furthermore, it has privileged an inductive 
approach that can be used in future research to explore the issues of both which peoples 
are entitled to self-determination and what is the substantive content of this right. 
This thesis has identified three main functions of the principle of self-determination. 
First, in the field of human rights, self-determination serves to operationalise the limits to 
possible States’ restrictions stemming from the exercise of public powers, public interest, 
and the sovereignty over natural resources. Under international human rights, the precise 
contours of indigenous rights often depend on the circumstances, including participatory 
rights. In this sense, the principle of self-determination permits to adapt the content of 
indigenous rights to different national circumstances, while preserving the substance of 
rights.
Second, in the context of the CBD, the principle of self-determination serves to 
clarify the contours of indigenous rights when CBD provisions are ambiguous and allow 
for multiple possible States’ conducts. Again, although there is room for a diversification 
of rights within the CBD, interpretations cannot go so far as to deprive indigenous 
peoples of their distinctiveness. In this sense, the principle poses some limits to the leeway 
attributed to States under the CBD. Furthermore, the principle allows for extending the 
teleological criterion, used by human rights treaty bodies to set limits to the restrictions 
posed by States on indigenous rights, to the rights protected under the CBD regime. 
This is important for instance to determine the content of “consent or approval and 
involvement” in the context of specific ABS arrangements.
Third, self-determination also solves possible inconsistencies between the 
membership of human rights treaties and the Parties of the CBD regime. In this last 
respect, in the remote hypothesis that CBD Parties are not bound by any human 
rights treaty, the principle of self-determination can help balance States’ powers with 
indigenous rights protected under the CBD. In this sense, the principle permits to extend 
interpretations that are more protective of indigenous rights to CBD Parties that have 
not ratified certain human rights treaties. It also offers arguments why indigenous rights 
must apply even to the cases that are not regulated by the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
such as the collections of genetic materials created preceding the entry into force of the 
CBD.
The interpretative approach illustrated above has been tested against two thematic 
case studies. Chapter 3 has identified conflicts between the CBD regime on ABS 
and indigenous rights as protected under human rights law. The study of CBD COP 
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decisions, as well the Nagoya Protocol, has revealed that conflicts can be solved through 
the incorporation of indigenous rights into the CBD regime.
This approach has led to a number of results with respect to the following 
problematic issues, i.e., titles over genetic resources, the definition of access and utilisation, 
the notion of traditional knowledge, differences between rules concerning traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources, and forms of participation. Chapter 3 has highlighted 
the importance of establishing clear land rights because title to genetic resources can 
be deduced from land and resource rights. Moreover, it has revealed that, although 
artificially drawn, the line between access and utilisation can facilitate the protection of 
indigenous rights in that if the former’s requirements are not ensured (consent, approval 
and involvement), the latter’s might be (benefit-sharing). This means that participation 
and benefit-sharing are cumulative guarantees that do not necessarily need to be satisfied 
at the same moment. Chapter 3 has also illustrated the main novelties of the Nagoya 
Protocol, including the fact that this instrument creates clear obligations concerning 
indigenous peoples even when genetic resources are involved. In this sense, the seemingly 
more restrictive conditions applicable to genetic resources are to be interpreted in light 
of indigenous rights. If conditions were to be interpreted restrictively—for instance, 
entitlements to genetic resources only if established nationally—land rights would be 
potentially disrupted by the increasing phenomenon of bioprospecting. Furthermore, 
this interpretation would be contrary to the acknowledgment, in the Nagoya Protocol, 
of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights and the recognition of the close relationship 
between traditional knowledge and genetic resources. Indeed, the Protocol delimits its 
scope with reference to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, which 
reinforces the link between the two elements. Chapter 3 also identifies a number of 
substantive reconciliation tools, including the conclusion of MATs as a way to realise 
the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. The clearer standards of the 
Nagoya Protocol in this respect might be extended to CBD Parties that have not ratified 
the Protocol to the extent that Parties of the latter adopt national legislation requiring 
users to perform the more stringent requirements of the Protocol. Indeed, national 
implementation seems crucial especially in the context of a very technical regime, such 
as that on ABS.
Chapter 4 has identified conflicts between the CBD regime on conservation and 
indigenous rights as protected under human rights law. The main result in this subfield 
concerns the high level of fragmentation of the CBD regime on protected areas. While the 
Nagoya Protocol gives legal certainty to the regime on ABS, the regulation of conservation 
results from a combination of often heterogeneous CBD decisions adopting different 
kinds of standards. In this sense, for instance, whereas the PoPWA acknowledges the 
importance of fully respecting indigenous rights, other decisions adopt a limited notion 
of land rights. There is also an underlying ambiguity between the notions of governance 
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and management of protected areas, due probably to the relative novelty of debates about 
the former. At the same time, one of the most important achievements in this field is 
the recognition of ICCAs as legitimate governance types. This requirement goes beyond 
the standards elaborated under human rights law in the Kaliña and Lokono case. The 
CBD also distinguishes itself from the WHC in that it has embraced to a further extent 
the ecosystem approach to conservation, according to which human needs and societal 
necessities are a crucial part of the evaluation of conservation objectives. At the same 
time, the disruptive effects of mining projects on both conservation and the rights of 
communities have been exposed more clearly under the WHC, due to the existence of 
a dedicated monitoring system. Chapter 4 concludes with the articulation of different 
participatory requirements depending on the prospective impacts of conservation. One 
of the main limitations of this analysis is related to the fact that the approach of this 
thesis is to look at indigenous peoples as black boxes, without investigating either the 
articulation of authority within communities or issues of representation. In this sense, 
participation might be more difficult in reality than prospected if conceiving indigenous 
peoples as a single unitary entity.
Notwithstanding specificities, the CBD regimes on ABS and conservation also share 
important elements. In both cases, the CBD regime protects indigenous peoples in a way 
that cannot be anticipated from the mere textual analysis of the framework convention. 
Even when sticking to textual interpretation, the biodiversity regime provides for some 
level of protection for indigenous peoples also in the remote circumstance that its State 
Parties have not ratified human rights treaties. Furthermore, indigenous rights are 
operationalised within the CBD regime through participation, including consultation, 
consent, and benefit-sharing.
2. The conceptual limits of lex specialis
As stated in the Introduction, one of the objectives of this research was to verify to what 
extent differences in the CBD regime concerning the protection of indigenous rights may 
amount to derogations of human rights law. In other words, may different formulations 
of indigenous rights in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol prevail over human rights 
obligations by virtue of lex specialis? Does the CBD regime aims to establish a more 
specialised body of law when it comes to the consideration of indigenous rights? The 
analysis of the cases on ABS and conservation would rather warrant a different conclusion. 
While no explicit derogation can be found in the rules examined, these in contrast are 
either not sufficiently clear when enucleating standards on indigenous peoples or more 
protective of indigenous rights than human rights treaties.
The first point has been examined in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. For instance, 
uncertainties surround the notion of approval and involvement both under the CBD 
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and the Nagoya Protocol. As explained, human rights law allows for a spectrum of 
participatory rights (under the category of free, prior and informed consent) that permits 
different shades of involvement of indigenous peoples in decision-making. In this sense, 
the adequateness of participatory requirements in the CBD with respect to human rights 
standards will depend on concrete implementation. The latter in turn must be judged 
on a case-by-case basis depending on circumstances, concrete impacts, and indigenous 
rights involved. In this sense, uncertainty in this case can be read as a means to ensure 
flexibility in the protection of indigenous rights rather than as a way to derogate from 
them, also in light of the fact that the same uncertainties characterise human rights law.
A difference with the human rights regime can be found in the interplay between 
participation and benefit-sharing. Under human rights law, these are cumulative guarantees 
that need to be satisfied concurrently to ensure that restrictions on indigenous rights do 
not amount to a violation. In contrast, under the CBD regime, participation and benefit-
sharing do not necessarily need to intervene at the same moment and seem to respond to 
different logics. This separation can be explained through the abovementioned distinction 
between access and utilisation. As said, however, this distinction allows for a reinforced 
protection of indigenous rights since benefit-sharing may intervene when participatory 
requirements have not been fully satisfied. Furthermore, while the safeguards of human 
rights law are premised on the restriction of indigenous rights, the requirements of the 
CBD regime are to be fulfilled even if no restrictions is foreseen.1
In three significant cases the CBD regime is even more advanced or more detailed 
in the protection of indigenous rights than human rights law. First, as highlighted in 
Chapter 3, the CBD enucleates the protection of traditional knowledge in a way that is 
more explicit than in human rights law, whose monitoring systems mainly refer to cultural 
rights in general. Rather, under the CBD, COP decisions have acknowledged the need to 
preserve traditional knowledge even when it is not immediately related to conservation 
purposes given the long-term beneficial effects on conservation. Second, as reminded, 
participatory rights and benefit-sharing are foreseen for every kind of utilization, not only 
those restricting indigenous rights. This finding confirms the argument that indigenous 
participatory rights are an autonomous category of rights that is not only instrumental 
for the protection of substantive rights but stands on its own to fulfil different functions, 
including providing for a special position of indigenous peoples in the framework of 
inter-State relations concerning access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
Third, under the general obligation for State Parties to foresee consent or approval and 
involvement of indigenous peoples in the case of access to genetic resources and related 
traditional knowledge,2 the Nagoya Protocol gives national legislators the possibility to 
1  Chapter 3 has explained that the fact of sharing indigenous resources/knowledge can per se be 
considered a restriction.
2  Art. 6(2) and 7 Nagoya Protocol. See Chapter 3, sections 2.1.2 and 2.2 for a thorough discussion on 
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implement participatory standards in the form of consent even when survival is not at 
stake. Consent instead has been framed as a residual option under human rights law, 
which is only limited to large-scale project threatening the survival of indigenous peoples. 
Depending on the future practice of States within the CBD regime, therefore, there 
could be a third hypothesis where consent is required under international law, beyond 
relocation and the preservation of cultural distinctiveness.
In light of the above, it could be argued that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
constitute lex specialis because they apply in substitution of human rights standards in a 
context that is more specific. However, this category is not very meaningful in the case 
the CBD regime does not derogate from human rights law since it is not instrumental 
for solving conflicts. In contrast, the relationship between the two regimes analysed in 
this dissertation might be described as one of complementarity, whereby the standards 
of both regimes complements one another to ensure a level of protection of indigenous 
rights that guarantees their survival.
Indeed, this thesis has highlighted cases where the two regimes are not complementary 
and recourse to systemic interpretation and mutual supportiveness cannot solve potential 
or actual conflicts. First, the unclear temporal scope of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol 
generates gaps where standards of free, prior and informed consent and benefit-sharing are 
not applicable to the situations occurred before the entry into force of these biodiversity 
treaties. Since genetic resources and traditional knowledge have been extensively collected 
before the 1990s,3 the inapplicability of standards protective of indigenous rights creates 
a disparity between two similar situations, violating both the object and purpose of treaty 
provisions that protect indigenous rights and aim to redress historical injustices and the 
objectives of the CBD, including realising benefit-sharing. In those cases, amendments 
or developments by the CBD COP and the COP/MOP are warranted to ensure the 
harmonious application of CBD-related rules with the parallel obligations incumbent 
on States pursuant to the established rights of indigenous peoples under human rights 
treaties. Second, under the WHC, the participation of indigenous peoples in the creation 
of Tentative Lists, as well as their consent when inscription of sites requires relocation 
must be ensured through the amendment of Operational Guidelines.
With the purpose to explore further elements of complementarity, the next session 
assesses to what extent the developments occurred in the CBD context have influenced 
or have the potential to influence the evolution of indigenous rights under human rights 
law.
this point.
3  Moreover, there are numerous gene banks that do not reveal the origins of their genetic materials.
Conclusion
320
3. The CBD regime and contamination of indigenous rights
State practice in the CBD can contribute to clarify, reshape, and even to reinforce the 
content of indigenous rights. Two examples have been already made in the previous 
section concerning traditional knowledge and the nature and form of participatory 
rights. Other examples are also relevant and are illustrated in this section.
The Nagoya Protocol embraces a pluralistic notion of indigenous rights. In 
particular, Article 12 emphasises the role of both community protocols, elaborated by 
indigenous peoples, and indigenous customary laws in determining States’ obligations 
with regard to traditional knowledge. This explicit reference to other legal standards not 
only contributes to the reinforcement of legal pluralism within the CBD regime, but also 
confirms the role of customary laws for the identification of indigenous rights.4
Another important consequence of this provision is that indigenous peoples are 
fundamental actors when it comes to the implementation of the Protocol’s obligations 
concerning traditional knowledge and associated genetic resources. The obligation 
of States to take into account indigenous legal standards becomes an incentive for 
indigenous peoples to be as clear as possible when articulating their conditions for 
access and utilisation of genetic resources and related traditional knowledge. The more 
indigenous groups engage in the process of articulating these standards, the more they 
are able to actively promote their rights in the context of the CBD regime. At the same 
time, it must be reminded that this push towards codification may also produce the effect 
of rendering customary law rigid and, eventually, challenging its very nature as living law. 
Furthermore, it might force indigenous peoples to use a language that does not genuinely 
reflect indigenous legal concepts.
To these elements of caution it must be added that indigenous peoples do not have 
the legal standing to directly activate the newly established international compliance 
system under the Protocol. This system is in any event in its infancy and its functioning 
must be reviewed in the future. It might also be interesting in the future to study the 
concrete translation of indigenous-related provisions of the Nagoya Protocol into national 
legal systems.
It is worth emphasising, however, that any developments may be challenged by 
indigenous groups before the monitoring systems of human rights treaty bodies. Although 
not being conceived for reviewing the implementation of METs, these bodies may review 
the legitimacy of national measures taken to implement the CBD/Nagoya Protocol in 
light of indigenous rights. For instance, even if the temporal scope of the CBD and 
the Nagoya Protocol is limited, indigenous peoples may bring their cases before human 
rights treaty bodies if the violations have occurred within the temporal scope of human 
4  Chapter 2 has illustrated the importance of customary laws in defining indigenous land rights.
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rights treaties. In line with the case law examined in Chapter 2, human rights treaties 
also apply to the continuing effects of past actions undertaken before the entry into force 
of human rights regimes. Therefore, human rights treaty bodies might in principle hear 
cases that are outside the temporal scope of application of the CBD regime. To avoid 
that situations not being in the purview of the CBD are only regulated by human rights 
standards, CBD Parties could have an incentive to extend the scope of the CBD to cases 
that require historical adjustments.
It is also possible that human rights treaty bodies indirectly review the correct 
implementation of legal standards of the CBD regime, similarly to what happened in 
the Kaliña and Lokono case, where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
used CBD standards to support the argument that conservation and indigenous rights 
may be mutually beneficial. In this sense, litigation before human rights treaty bodies 
may accelerate the effective incorporation of indigenous rights into the CBD regime. 
The complementarity of remedies is, therefore, an important aspect of the more general 
debate on the relationship between human rights and the environment that should be 
explored more in future research, as illustrated in the next section.
Furthermore, CBD institutional mechanisms do bear important consequences 
on the consolidation of the role of indigenous peoples in international law. Their role 
within the CBD is testified by the fact that indigenous peoples can participate, either as 
observers or within national delegations, in COP meetings. As highlighted in Chapter 
3, they have actively taken part both in the Working Group on Article 8(j) and in the 
Working Group that has produced a draft of the Nagoya Protocol. In this sense, it can be 
concluded that indigenous peoples have acquired an institutional role within the CBD, 
as well as being able to influence the development of CBD-related legal standards. The 
role of indigenous peoples in the development of legal standards is also linked to their 
recognised right to directly negotiate MATs with users to determine the conditions of 
benefit-sharing. This right, however, does not necessarily reflect the concrete capacity of 
indigenous peoples to negotiate MATs in a way that may benefit them.5
The abovementioned developments concerning institutional capacity, participation 
in norm creation, and role in implementation, confirm a trend that has been consolidating 
in the UN context over the last thirty years. As highlighted in this dissertation, indigenous 
peoples’ representatives sit on an equal footing with States at the UNPFII. Although 
this institutional arrangement does not allow for bilateral negotiations, it is an explicit 
acknowledgment of the importance to recognise equal status to States and indigenous 
peoples when discussing indigenous issues at the international level. Furthermore, the 
negotiations of the UN Declaration on indigenous rights has also conformed to the 
5  On a related problem, see Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and 
Equitable Benefit Sharing’ 2016, at 372, who discusses the capacity of benefit-sharing has to enhance the 
position of vulnerable actors.
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need to include indigenous peoples’ views in the process of standard creation at the 
international level. As reminded, indigenous peoples associations have elaborated the 
first draft of the Declaration within the WGIP, as well as participating in the following 
stages of the consolidation of the text. The negotiations of the newly adopted American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have also followed similar patterns 
since representatives of indigenous peoples have been involved in the preparation of the 
document.6
The transformation of indigenous peoples “from victims to actors”7 also opens 
research avenues on the extent to which this increasingly recognised personality of 
indigenous peoples in international law is compounded by corresponding duties. The 
recognition that indigenous peoples have responsibilities together with rights might 
represent a factor increasing the acceptability of indigenous powers in the face of States. It 
might also mirror a conception of State sovereignty that, as illustrated in this dissertation, 
is subject to limits that are both inherent in the notion of sovereignty and qualified by the 
evolution of public international law.
4. Lessons for human rights and the environment and global significance of this 
research
To conclude the analysis conducted in this dissertation, final considerations are warranted 
concerning the relevance of this research to the more general debate on human rights and 
the environment. These can be summarised in four main points.
First, this research has shown the importance of investigating potential conflicts 
between international environmental law and human rights law. As said, it cannot be 
concluded that one of these two bodies of law represents lex specialis and shall supersede 
the other. If a genus to species relationship exists, this must be verified on a case-by-case 
basis. This is true for the rights of indigenous peoples with respect to the international 
regime on biodiversity, but can also be extended to the relationship of other environmental 
regimes with the rights of indigenous peoples.8
Second, the interpretative approach proposed in Chapter 2 to solve potential 
conflicts between the rights of indigenous peoples and the CBD regime can be used 
to assess the compatibility of other conservation regimes with indigenous rights. In 
6  The role of indigenous peoples in international negotiations concerning their rights has been indicated 
by Åhrén as an emerging “external aspect of the right to self-determination” of indigenous peoples. See 
Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System 2016, at 131 and 224.
7  I borrowed this term from the title of Jérémy Gilbert’s monograph. See Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 2006. The same language is used by Oeter 
2012, at 497.
8  The same case-by-case approach could be adopted also for the relationship between international 
environmental law and obligatons of States concerning the protection of individual rights.
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this respect, beyond emphasising the possibility for reconciliation, this thesis has put 
emphasis on a neglected aspect of the debate on human rights and the environment, 
namely the possibility for conflict. 
Third, although the interpretative approach can be generalised, the results of the 
assessment might be different depending on the regimes analysed. Concerning the CBD 
regime, this thesis has concluded that both the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol allow for 
interpretations that are compatible with the respect and promotion of indigenous rights. 
In the study of other METs, the initial step would be to identify potential conflicts 
through an in-depth analysis of the environmental treaties concerned as well as the related 
practice. Indeed, given the centrality of preserving the cultural implications of land and 
resource rights, the same interpretative approach could be used to assess the compatibility 
with indigenous rights of other regimes that are not concerned with the protection of 
the environment but with the use of natural resources—trade, investments, intellectual 
property. The principle of self-determination would then serve to exclude from legitimate 
implementation certain kinds of interpretation that are too restrictive of indigenous 
rights. The same types of arguments may also be used by activists before national courts 
or human rights treaty bodies to support the view that some interpretations are not 
legitimate in light of international human rights law on indigenous peoples. In this sense, 
although the main purpose of this thesis is to advance analysis, the method proposed can 
be used also to promote indigenous rights beyond the academic context. More clarity 
on the content and boundaries of indigenous rights may also be relevant when it comes 
to the emerging discussion on the business responsibility to respect human rights, since 
it also clarifies the implications for the due diligence required of private actors when 
affecting indigenous peoples.
Finally, the interplay between the CBD and indigenous rights also teaches some 
lessons on the alleged separateness of international environmental law and human rights 
law. Although they continue to be different in terms of Parties, objectives, and monitoring 
mechanisms, this thesis has demonstrated that these two bodies of law are not separated 
and complement each other. Furthermore, as highlighted above, their monitoring 
mechanisms can be complementary and the legal developments occurring in one field are 
likely to influence legal developments in the other. The main implication of this thesis, 
however, is that mutual supportiveness and the principle of self-determination must 
guide the evolution of international biodiversity law. In this sense, some interpretations 
of States’ obligations under the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, and the WHC are to be 
preferred, although future practice in the different institutional settings will say whether 
the incorporation of indigenous rights in the forms described in this thesis is also retained 
by States and international organisations.
The interpretative approach described in this thesis might indeed be used in the 
practice of the CBD COP and COP/MOP to foster interpretations of the CBD that 
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are coherent with human rights obligations in the field of indigenous rights. In the same 
vein, the monitoring mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol might in the future propose 
interpretations that take into account protected indigenous rights. Human rights treaty 
bodies might discuss in more explicit terms the relationship between the CBD regime and 
the rights they are mandated to monitor. Most importantly for the impact of this research 
on indigenous rights, States might embrace the interpretative approach proposed either 
when implementing the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol nationally or when enacting 
legislation on indigenous rights9. Finally, public officers and national judges could adopt 
a similar interpretative approach when interpreting and applying national laws that give 
effect to international obligations.
Indigenous rights and the international regime on conservation are in constant 
evolution; monitoring their developments certainly offers avenues for future research and 
provokes stimulating intellectual challenges for scholars and practitioners alike.
9  This emerges very clearly from French 2006, at 287.
325
BIBLIOGRAPHY
An Introduction to the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources. Introduction à la Convention africaine sur la conservation de la nature et des 
ressources naturelles (2nd edn, IUCN 2006)
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Constitutional and Legislative Protection 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 24 African Countries (ILO and ACHPR 2009)
Community Protocols for Environmental Sustainability: A Guide for Policymakers 
(UNEP and EDO NSW 2013)
Defending the Earth: Abuses of Human Rights and the Environment (Human Rights Watch 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council 1992)
Ecosystems and Human Well-Being. Biodiversity Synthesis (World Resource Institute 2005)
Indigenous Peoples and the Oil and Gas Industry: Context, Issues and Emerging Good Practice 
(IPIECA 2012)
Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders: WIPO 
Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge 
(1998-1999) (WIPO 2001)
Overview Report of the Research Project by the International Labour Organization and the 
African
Abate RS and Kronk Warner EA (eds), Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples. The Search 
for Legal Remedies (Edward Elgar 2013)
Abi-Saab G, ‘Cours général de droit public’ (1987) 207 Recueil des cours 15
Aceves WJ, ‘Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty Norm through Human 
Rights Litigation’ (2002) 25 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 
261
ADB, Indigenous Peoples/Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction: Philippines (Asian 
Development Bank 2002)
Addo MK, The Legal Nature of International Human Rights, Series: International Studies 
in Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2010)
Agrawal A, ‘Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge’ 
(1995) 26 Development and Change 413
Aguilar G, ‘Access to Genetic Resources and Protection of Traditional Knowledge in the 
Territories of Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) 4 Environmental Science & Policy 241
Aguirre D, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights Law in Africa’ (2005) 5 
African Human Rights Law Journal 239
Åhrén M, ‘Legal Aspects related to Traditional Knowledge’ in Popova-Gosart U (ed), 
Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous Peoples (LIENIP and WIPO 2009)
Bibliography
326
–––, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ in Charters C and Stavenhagen 
R (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009)
–––, Indigenous Peoples’ Status in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press 
2016)
Åhrén M, Scheinin M and Henriksen JB, ‘The Nordic Sami Convention: International 
Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central Provisions’ (2007) 3 Gáldu 
Čála – Journal of indigenous Peoples Rights 8
Aikio P and Schenin M (eds), Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination (Institute for Human Rights Åbo Academy University 2000)
Akhtar Z, ‘Mapuche Land Claims: Environmental Protest, Legal Discrimination and 
Customary Rights’ (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
551
Alam S, ‘Collective Indigenous Rights and the Environment’ in Alam S and others (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge 2013)
Alam S and others (eds), International Environmental Law and the Global South 
(Cambridge University Press 2014)
Alam S and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Routledge 2013)
Albro R, ‘The Challenges of Asserting, Promoting, and Performing Cultural Heritage’ 
[2005] available at http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/center/cultural_policy/pdf/
robalbrofellow.pdf
Alfredsson G, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Treaties with’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law
–––, ‘Peoples’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
–––, ‘The Right of Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ in Tomuschat C (ed), 
Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 1993)
–––, ‘Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of Self-Determination’ in Clark D and 
Williamson R (eds), Self-Determination: International Perspectives (Macmillan Press 
1996)
–––, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples with a Focus on the National Performance and 
Foreign Policies of the Nordic Countries’ (1999) 59 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 529
–––, ‘Arctic Governance: Human Rights, Good Governance and Democracy’ (2012) 4 
The Yearbook of Polar Law 141
Allen S, ‘The Consequences of Modernity for Indigenous Peoples: An International 
Appraisal’ (2006) 13 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 315
Bibliography
327
Allen S and Xanthaki A (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011)
Alston P, People’s Rights (Oxford University Press 2001)
–––, ‘Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall’ in Alston P (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2001)
Alston P and Goodman R, International Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2012)
–––, International Human Rights. The Successor to International Human Rights in Context: 
Law, Politics and Morals (Oxford University Press 2013)
Alston P and Robinson M, Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement 
(Oxford University Press 2005)
Alvardo LJ, ‘Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua’ (2007) 24 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 609
Ambrus M, ‘The Precautionary Principle and a Fair Allocation of the Burden of Proof in 
International Environmental Law’ (2012) 21 Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law 259
Amiott JA, ‘Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in the Inter-
American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua’ (2002) 32 Environmental Law 873
Anaya SJ, ‘Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination’ 
(1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 131
–––, ‘The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect in Nicaragua’ (1996-1997) 
9 St Thomas Law Review 157
–––, ‘Maya Aboriginal Land and Resource Rights and the Conflict over Logging in 
Southern Belize’ (1998) 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 17
–––, ‘Environmentalism, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Tale of Converging 
and Diverging Interests’ (1999-2000) 7 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 1
–––, ‘Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary International 
Law’ in Aikio P and Scheinin M (eds), Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Self-Determination (Institute for Human Rights Åbo Akademi University 
2000)
–––, ‘The Mayagna Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni and its Effort to Gain 
Recognition of Traditional Lands. The Community’s Case before the Human Rights 
Institutions of the Organization of American States’ in Picolotti R and Taillant 
JD (eds), Linking Human Rights and the Environment (University of Arizona Press 
2003)
–––, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2004)
Bibliography
328
–––, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the 
Multicultural State’ (2004) 21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 13
–––, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural 
Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous 
Peoples Have in Lands and Resources’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 7
–––, ‘Keynote Address: Indigenous Peoples and Their Mark on the International Legal 
System’ (2006-2007) 31 American Indian Law Review 257
–––, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers 2009)
––– (ed) International Law and Indigenous Peoples (Ashgate Dartmouth 2003)
Anaya SJ and Crider ST, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment, and Commercial 
Forestry in Developing Countries: The Case of Awas Tingni, Nicaragua’ (1996) 18 
Human Rights Quarterly 345
Anaya SJ and Grossman C, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’ (2002) 19 Arizona Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 1
Anaya SJ and Rogers JE, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business 2009)
Anaya SJ and Wiessner S, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-Empowerment’ [2007] JURIST
Anaya SJ and Williams Jr. RA, ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands 
and Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2001) 
14 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33
Andrade GSM and Rhodes JR, ‘Protected Areas and Local Communities: An Inevitable 
Partnership toward Successful Conservation Strategies?’ (2012) 17 Ecology and 
Society 14
Anton DK and Shelton D, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2011)
Anuradha RV, ‘In Search of Knowledge and Resources: Who Sows? Who Reaps?’ (1997) 
6 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 263
–––, ‘IPRs: Implications for Biodiversity and Local and Indigenous Communities’ (2001) 
10 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 27
Arangio-Ruiz G, ‘The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations’ (1972) 137 Recueil des 
cours 419
–––, ‘Customary Law: A Few More Thoughts about the Theory of “Spontaneous” 
International Custom’ in Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: mélanges offerts à Jean 
Bibliography
329
Salmon (Bruylant 2007)
Arcari M, ‘The Creeping Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation of International 
Law: From ‘Constitutional’ to ‘Consistent’ Interpretation’ in Jakubowski A and 
Wierczyska K (eds), Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalisation of International Law 
(Taylor and Francis 2016)
Atapattu S, ‘The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence 
of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law’ (2002) 16 
Tulane Environmental Law Journal 65
Atapattu SA, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law (Transnational 
Publishers 2006)
Ayala Corao CM, ‘El derecho a la participatión política de los pueblos indígenas’ (1998) 
26 Revista IIDH - Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 107
Badger A, ‘Collective v. Individual Human Rights in Membership Governance for 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2011) 26 American University International Law Review 485
Balisacan RHC, ‘Harmonising Biodiversity Conservation and the Human Right to 
Livelihood: Towards a Viable Model for Sustainable Community-Based Ecotourism 
Using Lessons from the Donsol Whale Shark Project’ (2012) 57 Ateneo Law 
Journal 423
Bank W, Striking a Better Balance. The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries (World 
Bank 2004)
Bankes N, ‘The Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Territory through the 
Property Rights Provisions of International Regional Human Rights Instruments’ 
(2011) 3 The Yearbook of Polar Law 57
Barberis JA, ‘Los principios generales de derecho como fuente del derecho internacional’ 
(1991) 14 Revista IIDH - Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 11
Barelli M, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 957
–––, ‘The Interplay between Global and Regional Human Rights Systems in the 
Construction of the Indigenous Rights Regime’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 
951
–––, ‘Shaping Indigenous Self-Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions’ 
(2011) 13 International Community Law Review 413
–––, ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges ahead’ (2012) 16 
International Journal of Human Rights 1
–––, Seeking Justice in International Law: The Significance and Implications of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Taylor and Francis 2016)
Bibliography
330
Barelli M and others, Minority Groups and Litigation: A Review of Developments in 
International and Regional Jurisprudence (Minority Rights Group International 
2011)
Barral V, ‘National Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Environmental Challenges and 
Sustainble Development’ in Morgera E and Kulovesi K (eds), Research Handbook 
on International Law and Natural Resources (Edward Elgar 2016 forthcoming)
Barrera-Hernandez L, ‘Sovereignty over Natural Resources under Examination: The 
Inter-American System for Human Rights and Natural Resource Allocation’ (2006) 
12 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 43
Barsh RL, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International 
Law’ (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33
Barsh RL, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ in Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007)
Barume AK, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa (IWGIA 2010)
Baslar K, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff - Brill 1997)
Bassiouni MC, ‘A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”’ 
(1989-1990) 11 Michigan Journal of International Law 768
Bavikatte K and Jonas H (eds), Bio-Cultural Community Protocols: A Community Approach 
to Ensuring the Integrity of Environmental Law and Policy (UNEP 2009)
Bavikatte K and Robinson DF, ‘Towards a People’s History of the Law: Biocultural 
Jurisprudence and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing’ (2011) 7/1 
LEAD Journal 37
Baxter RR, ‘Treaties and Custom’ (1970) 129 Recueil des cours 27
Beaton A and others, ‘Engaging Maori in Biobanking and Genetic Research: Legal, 
Ethical, and Policy Challenges’ (2015) 6 The International Indigenous Policy 
Journal 1
Behrendt L, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia’s Future (Federation 
Press 2003)
Bellier I and Préaud M, ‘Emerging Issues in Indigenous Rights: Transformative Effects of 
the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ (2011) 16 International Journal of Human 
Rights 474
Beltrán J, Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines 
and Case Studies (IUCN 2000)
Beltrán J and Phillips A, Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas : Principles, 
Guidelines and Case Studies (IUCN -The World Conservation Union 2000)
Benedict CG, ‘The Status and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada’ (1999) 59 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 405
Bibliography
331
Bentirou R, ‘Droits environnementaux et droits de l’homme: coexistence pacifique, 
conflit éternel?’ in Cournil C and Colard-Fabregoule C (eds), Changements 
environnementaux globaux et Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 2012)
Benvenisti E, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to 
Foreign Stakeholders’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 295
Beqiraj J, ‘L’equa condivisione dei benefici derivanti dall’utilizzo delle risorse genetiche 
secondo il Protocollo di Nagoya: fra obblighi degli Stati e diritti delle comunità 
indigene’ (2011) 5 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 188
–––, ‘The Delicate Equilibrium of EU Trade Measures: The Seals Case’ (2013) 14 German 
Law Journal 279
Berkey CG, ‘International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination 
for Indigenous Peoples’ (1992) 5 Harvard Human Rights Journal 65
Bermudez FL, ‘Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Case of Ecuador’ [1997] 
10 St Thomas Law Review 175
Bernhardt R, ‘International Protection of Human Rights: Universalism and Regionalism’ 
in Yee S and Morin J-Y (eds), Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in 
Honour of Edward McWhinney (Martinus Nijhoff 2009)
Berraondo M, Pueblos indígenas y derechos humanos (Universidad de Deusto 2006)
Beyerlin U, ‘Access of Indigenous Peoples to Natural Resources from a Human Rights 
Perspective’ in Breuer M (ed), Der Staat im Recht: Festschrift für Eckart Klein zum 
70 Geburtstag (Duncker & Humboldt 2013)
Beyerlin U and Holzer V, ‘Conservation of Natural Resources’ Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law
–––, ‘Perspectives on Nature Protection in Africa: The 2003 Maputo Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’ (2008) 1 Journal of African and 
International Law 1
Beyerlin U and Marauhn T, International Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2011)
Bhatti S and others, Contracting for ABS: The Legal and Scientific Implications of 
Bioprospecting Contracts (IUCN 2009)
Birnie P, Boyle A and Redgwell C (eds), International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press 2009)
Blanco E and Razzaque J, Globalisation and Natural Resources Law: Challenges, Key Issues 
and Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011)
––– (eds), Natural Resources and the Green Economy. Redefining the Challenges for People, 
States and Corporations (Martinus Nijhoff 2011)
Blaustein RJ, ‘Protected Areas and Equity Concerns’ (2007) 57 BioScience 216
Blumm MC and Steadman JG, ‘Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and Habitat Protection: 
The Martinez Decision Supplies a Resounding Judicial Reaffirmation’ (2009) 49 
Bibliography
332
Natural Resources Journal 653
Bodansky D, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University 
Press 2010)
–––, ‘Implementation of International Environmental Law’ (2011) 54 Japanese Yearbook 
of International Law 62
Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (Oxford University Press 2007)
Boisson de Chazournes L, ‘Convention on Biological Diversity and its Protocol on 
Biosafety’ [2009] United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
Bojosi KN and Wachira GM, ‘Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of 
the Approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 
6 African Human Rights Law Journal 382
Borelli S and Lenzerini F (eds), Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural Diversity: New 
Developments in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012)
Borg S, ‘The Influence of International Case Law on Aspects of Internationl Law Relating 
to the Conservation of Living Marine Resources beyond National Jurisdiction’ 
(2012) 23 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 44
Borgen CJ, ‘Resolving Treaty Conflicts’ (2005) 37 George Washington International 
Law Review 573
Borrini-Feyerabend G and others, Governance of Protected Areas: From Understanding to 
Action (IUCN 2013)
Borrini-Feyerabend G, Kothari A and Oviedo G, Indigenous and Local Communities and 
Protected Areas: Towards Equity and Enhanced Conservation. Guidance on Policy and 
Practice for Co-managed Protected Areas and Community Conserved Areas (IUCN 
2004)
Borrows J, ‘Ground-Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand’ (2006) 22 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 188
Bosselmann K, ‘The Right to Self-Determinationa and International Environmental 
Law: An Integrative Approach’ (1997) 1 New Zealand Journal of Environmental 
Law 1
Bothe M, ‘Les droits de l’homme et le droit de l’environnement’ in Prieur M and 
Lambrechts C (eds), Les hommes et l’environnement: Quels droits pour le vingt-et-
unième siècle? (Frison-Roche 1998)
Boulden J and Kymlicka W (eds), International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity 
(Oxford University Press 2015)
Bowhay C, ‘Native American Tribal Treaty Rights and Fisheries Co-Management in 
the U.S. Pacific Northwest’ in Van Dyke JM and others (eds), Governing Ocean 
Resources: New Challenges and Emerging Regimes: A Tribute to Judge Choon-Ho Park 
Bibliography
333
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013)
Bowman L, ‘Sealing the Deal: Environmental and Indigenous Justice and Mining 
in Nunavut1’ (2011) 20 Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law 19
Bowman M and Redgwell C (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity (Kluwer Law International 1996)
Boyle A, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23 European 
Journal of International Law 613
Boyle AE, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ (2007) 18 Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 471
Boyle AE and Anderson M, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(Oxford University Press; Clarendon Press 1996)
Boyle AE and Chinkin CM, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007)
Bratspies R and Miller R, ‘Introduction. Symposium: Lands, Liberties, and Legacies: 
Indigenous Peoples and International Law’ (2006-2007) 31 American Indian Law 
Review 253
Bratspies RM, ‘The New Discovery Doctrine: Some Thoughts on Property Rights and 
Traditional Knowledge’ (2006-2007) 31 American Indian Law Review 315
Brechin SR and others, ‘Beyond the Square Wheel: Toward a More Comprehensive 
Understanding of Biodiversity Conservation as Social and Political Process’ (2002) 
15 Society and Natural Resources 41
Brilmayer L, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’ (1991) 16 
Yale Journal of International Law 177
Briones J, ‘We Want to Believe Too: The IRFA and Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Freedom 
of Religion’ (2002) 8 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 345
Broderstad EG, ‘The Promises and Challenges of Indigenous Self-Determination: 
The Sami Case’ (2010-2011) 66 International Journal Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs 893
Brölmann C, Lefeber R and Zieck M (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law 
(Kluwer 1993)
Brölmann C and Zieck M, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ in Brölmann C, Lefeber R and Zieck M 
(eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Kluwer 1993)
Brooks TM and others, ‘Global Biodiversity Conservation Priorities’ (2006) 313 Science 
58
Brosius JP and Hitchner SL, ‘Cultural Diversity and Conservation’ (2010) 61 International 
Social Science Journal 141
Brown Weiss E, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, 
Bibliography
334
and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational Publishers 1989)
–––, ‘The Changing Structure of International Law’ in Prieur M and Lambrechts C (eds), 
Les hommes et l’environnement: Quels droits pour le vingt-et-unième siècle? (Frison-
Roche 1998)
–––, ‘The Evolution of International Environmental Law’ (2011) 54 Japanese Yearbook 
of International Law 1
Brownlie I, ‘An Essay on the History of the Principle of Self-Determination’ in 
Alexandrowicz CH (ed), Grotian Society Papers: Studies in the History of the Law of 
the Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 1968)
–––, ‘Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law’ (1979) 162 Recueil des 
cours 245
–––, ‘Problems Concerning the Unity of International Law’ in Le droit international à 
l’heure de sa codification: études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, vol 1 (Giuffré 1987)
–––, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ in Crawford J (ed), The Rights 
of Peoples (Oxford University Press 1988)
Brunnée J, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1
–––, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in Bodansky D, 
Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (Oxford University Press 2007)
Brunner L, ‘The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People Decision 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 7 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 699
Brunner L and Quintana K, ‘The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal 
Standards after Sarayaku’ (2012) 16 American Society of International Law: Insights
Buchanan A, ‘Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ 
(1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 89
Bulan R, ‘International Law and Indigenous Peoples: Integrating International Norms 
for the Protection of Indigenous Minorities in Malaysia’ (2007) 4 Soochow Law 
Journal 145
Bullard RD, ‘Confronting Environmental Racism in the Twenty-First Century’ (2002) 
4 Global dialogue
Bungenberg M and Hobe S (eds), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Springer 
2015)
Bürgenthal T, ‘Human Rights’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
Burger J, ‘Making the Declaration Work for Human Rights in the UN System’ in 
Charters C and Stavenhagen R (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009)
Bibliography
335
Burhenne-Guilmin F, ‘L’accès aux ressources génétiques - les suites de l’article 15 de la 
Convention sur la diversité biologique’ in Prieur M and Lambrechts C (eds), Les 
hommes et l’environnement: Quels droits pour le vingt-et-unième siècle? (Frison-Roche 
1998)
Burke R, Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2010)
Burke-White WW, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ (2003-2004) 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 963
Butler WE, ‘Comparative Approaches to International Law’ (1985) 190 Recueil des 
cours 9
Byers M, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1999)
Byrnes A, Hayashi M and Michaelsen C, International Law in the New Age of Globalization 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013)
Cabrera Medaglia J, ‘Espace juridique pour l’application du système multilatéral (SML) 
prévu au traité international sur les ressources phytogénétiques pour l’alimentation 
et l’agriculture (TIRPAA) à la lumière du Protocole de Nagoya’ (2016) 1 Liason 
Énergie-Francophonie 23
Cabrera Ormaza MV, ‘Re-thinking the Role of Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law: New Developments in International Environmental Law and Development 
Cooperation’ (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of International Law 263
Caddell R, ‘The Integration of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Lessons from 
the Biodiversity-Related Conventions’ (2011) 22 Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 37
Campaña P, ‘Las relaciones de bilateralidad entre estados y pueblos indígenas’ (2012-
2013) 28 American University International Law Review 1017
Campese J and others, Rights-Based Approaches: Exploring Issues and Opportunities for 
Conservation (Center for International Forestry Research 2009)
Cançado Trindade AA, ‘International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium 
(I) and (II)’ (2005) 316 and 317 Recueil des cours 31
–––, ‘The Right to Cultural Identity in the Evolving Jurisprudential Construction of 
the Inter-American Court’ in Yee S and Morin J-Y (eds), Multiculturalism and 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward McWhinney (Martinus Nijhoff 2009)
–––, The Access of Individuals to International Justice (Oxford University Press 2011)
–––, ‘The Expansion of the Material Content of Jus Cogens: The Contribution of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in Spielmann D, Tsirli M and Voyatzis P 
(eds), La Convention européenne des droit de l’homme, un instrument vivant: Mélanges 
en l’honneur de Christos L Rozakis (Bruylant 2011)
Bibliography
336
Canovas J and Barbosa J, ‘Enjeux et défis de la consécration constitutionnelle des 
cosmovisions autochtones dans la protection de l’environnement: regards croisés 
entre Bolivie et Équateur’ in Cournil C and Colard-Fabregoule C (eds), Changements 
environnementaux globaux et Droits de l’Homme (2012)
Cariño J, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Natural Resource Extractive Corporations and Human 
Rights’ (2002) 5 Indigenous Perspectives 10
–––, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: Reflections on Concept 
and Practice’ (2009) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 19
Carmen A, ‘The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Framework for Harmonious 
Relations and New Processes for Redress’ in Hartley J, Joffe P and Preston J (eds), 
Realizing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and 
Action (Purich Publishing 2010)
Carr G, ‘Protecting Cultural Intangible Resources: Alternatives to Intellectual Property 
Law’ (2013) 18 Michigan Journal of Race and Law 363
Cassese A, ‘Self-Determination Revisited’ in Rama-Montaldo M (ed), El derecho 
internacional en el mundo en transformacion Liber Amicorum: en homenajen al 
Professor Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga (Fundación de cultura universitaria 1994)
–––, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press 1995)
–––, International Law (Oxford University Press 2005)
Castellino J, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Right to Development: Emerging Synergies or 
Collusion?’ in Allen S and Xanthaki A (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011)
Castellino J and Allen S, Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis 
(Ashgate 2003)
Castellino J and Walsh N (eds), International Law and Indigenous Peoples (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2005)
Cavallo Aguilar G, ‘Pascua Lama, Human Rights, and Indigenous Peoples: A Chilean 
Case Through the Lens of International Law’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law 215
CBD, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
2010)
–––, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (Secretariat of the Convention of Biological Diversity 
2014)
Černič JL, ‘State Obligations Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Their Ancestral 
Lands: Lex Imperfecta’ (2012-2013) 28 American University International Law 
Review 1129
Cespedes R, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Right to a Clean Environment, Environmental 
Impact Assessment and ILO Convention 169’ (2013) 3 Warwick Student Law 
Bibliography
337
Review 71
Chambers WB, ‘Emerging International Rules on the Commercialization of Genetic 
Resources’ (2003) 6 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 311
Chandler M, ‘The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International 
Lawyer’ (1993) 4 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 
141
Chang WBC, ‘Indigenous Values and the Law of the Sea’ in Van Dyke JM and others 
(eds), Governing Ocean Resources: New Challenges and Emerging Regimes: A Tribute 
to Judge Choon-Ho Park (Martinus Nijhoff 2013)
Chapin M, ‘A Challenge to Conservationists’ [2004] World Watch Magazine 17
Charlesworth H, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law
Charters C and Stavenhagen R, Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA - Distributors Transaction 
Publisher and Central Books 2009)
Chechi A, ‘Plurality and Coordination of Dispute Settlement Methods in the Field 
of Cultural Heritage’ in Francioni F and Gordley J (eds), Enforcing International 
Cultural Heritage Law (Oxford University Press 2013)
Cheng B, General Principles of Law as Applied by Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge 
University Press 2006)
Chennels R, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol: 
Three Cases from South Africa’ (2013) 9 Law, Environment and Development 
Journal 165
Chiarolla C, Lapeyre R and Pirard R, ‘Bioprospecting under the Nagoya Protocol: A 
Conservation Booster?’ (2013) 14/13 IDDRI Policy Brief 1
Chiarolla C, Louafi S and Schloen M, ‘An Analysis of the Relationship between the 
Nagoya Protocol and Instruments related to Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture and Farmers’ Rights’ in Morgera E, Tsioumani E and Buck M (eds), 
The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: Implications 
for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 2013)
Chibememe G, Protected Area (IIFB 2010)
Chimni BS, ‘The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Toward a 
Radical Interpretation’ (1998) 38 Indian Journal of International Law 208
Chirdaris V, ‘The Limits of Interpretation of the Strasbourg Court and the Principle of 
Non-Regression’ in Spielmann D, Tsirli M and Voyatzis P (eds), La Convention 
européenne des droit de l’homme, un instrument vivant: Mélanges en l’honneur de 
Christos L Rozakis (Bruylant 2011)
Chiropolos ML, ‘Inupiat Subsistence and the Bowhead Whale: Can Indigenous Hunting 
Bibliography
338
Cultures Coexist with Endangered Animal Species’ (1994) 5 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 213
CIDH, Derechos de los pueblos indígenas y tribales sobre sus tierras ancestrales y recursos 
naturales: normas y jurisprudencia del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos 
(Inter‐American Commission on Human Rights 2009)
Cirkovic E, ‘Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples in International Law’ (2006-
2007) 31 American Indian Law Review 375
Cittadino F, ‘The Balance Between Indigenous Rights and the Protection of Nature: Some 
Remnants of the Colonial Past’ (2013-2014) 20 African Yearbook of International 
Law 223
–––, ‘Applying a UNDRIP Lens to the CBD: A More Comprehensive Understanding of 
Benefit-Sharing’ (2014) 24 Indigenous Policy Journal
–––, ‘The Public Interest to Environmental Protection and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: 
Procedural Rights to Participation and Substantive Guarantees’ in Lohse E and 
Poto M (eds), Participatory Rights in the Environmental Decision-Making Process 
and the Implementation of the Aarhus Convention: A Comparative Perspective 
(Ducker&Humblot 2015)
Clapham A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006)
Claridge L, ‘Landmark Ruling Provides Major Victory to Kenya’s Indigenous Endorois’ 
[2010] Briefing - Minority Rights Group International
Clark D and Williamson R (eds), Self-Determination: International Perspectives (Macmillan 
1996)
Clavero B, ‘Cultural Supremacy, Domestic Constitutions, and the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Charters C and Stavenhagen R (eds), Making the 
Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(IWGIA 2009)
Clech Lâm M, ‘We the [Indigenous] Peoples of the United Nations’ in Yee S and Morin 
J-Y (eds), Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward 
McWhinney (Martinus Nijhoff 2009)
CoE, Manual on Human Rights and the Environment (Council of Europe 2006)
–––, Manual on Human Rights and the Environment (Council of Europe 2012)
Cohen JL, ‘A Global State of Emergency or the Further Constitutionalization of 
International Law: A Pluralist Approach’ (2008) 15 Constellations 456
Colard-Fabregoule C, ‘La contribution des entreprises à la définition des droits de l’homme 
à l’environnement’ in Cournil C and Colard-Fabregoule C (eds), Changements 
environnementaux globaux et Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 2012)
Colchester M, Salvaging Nature: Indigenous Peoples, Protected Areas and Biodiversity 
Conservation (World Rainforest Movement - Forest Peoples Programme 2003)
Bibliography
339
–––, ‘Conservation Policy and Indigenous Peoples’ (2004) 7 Environmental Science & 
Policy 145
Colchester M and others, Conservation and Indigenous Peoples: Assessing the Progress since 
Durban (2008)
Conforti B, Diritto internazionale (9th edn, Editoriale scientifica 2013)
Conforti B and Francioni F, Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997)
Coomans F, ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 749
Coombe RJ, ‘Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in 
International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the 
Conservation of Biodiversity’ (1998-1999) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 59
Corntassel J, ‘Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary 
Indigenous-Rights Discourse’ (2008) 33 Alternatives 105
Corntassel JJ and Primeau TH, ‘Indigenous “Sovereignty” and International Law: 
Revised Strategies for Pursuing “Self-Determination”’ (1995) 17 Human Rights 
Quarterly 343
Corradetti C, ‘What Does Cultural Difference Require of Human Rights?’ in Holder C 
and Reidy D (eds), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge University Press 
2013)
Corten O and Klein P (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of the Treaties: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2011)
Costa S and Leite Gonçalves G, ‘Human Rights as Collective Entitlement? Afro-
Descendants in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (2011) 2 Zeitschrift für 
Menschenrechte 52
Coulter RT, ‘The Law of Self-Determination and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs 1
Cournil C and Colard-Fabregoule C (eds), Changements environnementaux globaux et 
Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 2012)
Cowan JK, Dembour M-B and Wilson RA, Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press 2001)
Coyle M, ‘Marginalized by Sui Generis? Duress, Undue Influence and Crown-Aboriginal 
Treaties’ (2009) 32 Manitoba Law Journal 1
Craig D, ‘Recognising Indigenous Rights through Co-Management Regimes: Canadian 
and Australian Experiences’ (2002) 6 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 
199
Bibliography
340
Craig D and Davies M, ‘Ethical Relationships for Biodiversity Research and Benefit-
Sharing with Indigenous Peoples’ (2005) 2 Macquarie Journal of International and 
Comparative Environmental Law 31
Crawford J, ‘Rights of Peoples: Peoples or Governments’ (1985) 9 Bulletin of the 
Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 136
–––, The Rights of Peoples (Oxford University Press 1988)
–––, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future’ in Alston P (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press 2001)
Crawhall N, ‘Africa and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2011) 
15 International Journal of Human Rights 11
Crook P, ‘After Adong: The Emerging Doctrine of Native Title in Malaysia’ (2005) 32 
Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law 71
Cullet P, ‘Environmental Justice in the Use, Knowledge and Exploitation of Genetic 
Resources’ in Ebbeson J and Okowa P (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in 
Context (Cambridge University Press 2009)
Cuneo IM, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Human Rights 
System’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 53
Curci J, The Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge in International Law of 
Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press 2010)
D’addetta M, ‘The Practice of Regional Human Rights Bodies on the Protection of 
Indigenous People’s Right to Culture’ (2014) 5 Rivista giuridica dell’ambiente 587
D’Amato A, ‘Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change 
of Paradigms’ (1995-1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 47
D’Amato AA, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press 1971)
D’Aspremont J, Epistemic Forces in International Law: Essays on the Foundational Doctrines 
and Techniques of International Legal Argumentation (Edward Elgar 2015)
Daes E-I, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land and Natural Resources’ in Ghanea N and 
Xanthaki A (eds), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of 
Patrick Thornberry (Martinus Nijhoff 2005)
Daes E-IA, ‘Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1
–––, ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to “Self-Determination” in the Contemporary 
World Order’ in Clark D and Williamson R (eds), Self-Determination: International 
Perspectives (Macmillan Press 1996)
–––, ‘International Human Rights Law, the Environment and Indigenous Peoples’ in 
Bergsmo M (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2003)
Bibliography
341
–––, ‘An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination and the 
United Nations’ (2008) 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 7
Daillier P, Forteau M and Pellet A, Droit international public (8th edn, LGDJ 2008)
Dakas DCJ, ‘The Role of International Law in the Colonization of Africa: A Review 
in Light of Recent Calls for Re-Colonization’ (1999) 7 African Yearbook of 
International Law 85
Dam-de Jong D, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Situations (Cambridge University Press 2015)
Das JK, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (A.P.H. Pub. Corp. 2001)
Davis M, ‘Indigenous Rights in Traditional Knowledge and Biological Diversity: 
Approaches to Protection’ (1999) 4 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 1
Davis M, ‘To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Five Years on’ (2012) 19 Australian International Law Journal 
17
De Brabandere E, ‘Arbitral Decisions as a Source of International Investment Law’ in 
De Brabandere E and Gazzini T (eds), International Investment Law: The Sources of 
Rights and Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff 2012)
De Costa R, ‘Reconciliation or Identity in Australia’ (2000) 2 National Identities 277
De Jonge B, ‘What is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?’ (2011) 24 Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 127
–––, ‘Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS Regime: Is Nagoya Leading Us in the Right 
Direction?’ (2013) 9 Law, Environment and Development Journal 243
de Oliveira Godinho F, ‘The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Protection of Indigenous Rights in Brazil’ (2008) 12 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 247
De Santo EM, ‘Implications of the Tenth Conference of Parties to the UN Convention 
on Biological Diversity for Coastal Management and Marine Protected Areas’ 
(2012) 26 Ocean Yearbook 249
de Schutter O, ‘The Emerging Human Right to Land’ (2010) 12 International 
Community Law Review 303
de Wet E, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 51
Deguignet M and others (eds), 2014 United Nations List of Protected Areas (UNEP-
WCMC 2014)
Déjeant-Pons M and Pallemaerts M, Human Rights and the Environment (Council of 
Europe 2002)
del Toro Huerta MI, ‘El derecho de propriedad colectiva de los miembros de comunidades 
y pueblos indégenas en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Bibliography
342
Humanos’ (2010) 10 Anuario mexicano de derecho internacional 49
Deroche F, ‘Emergence d’un système de protection du rapport à la terre et aux ressources 
naturelles des peuples autochtones’ in Cournil C and Colard-Fabregoule C (eds), 
Changements environnementaux globaux et Droits de l’Homme (Bruylant 2012)
Desgagné R, ‘Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 263
Desmet E, Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia 2011)
Devasish Roy R, Traditional Customary Laws and Indigenous Peoples in Asia (Minority 
Rights Group International 2005)
Dinstein Y, ‘Self-Determination Revisited’ in Rama-Montaldo M (ed), El derecho 
internacional en el mundo en transformacion Liber Amicorum: en homenajen al 
Professor Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga (Fundación de cultura univsersitaria 1994)
Disko S and Tugendhat H, Report of the International Expert Workshop on the World 
Heritage Convention and Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2013)
Dolzer R and Schreuer C, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University 
Press 2012)
Donnelly J, ‘State Sovereignty and International Human Rights’ (2014) 28 Ethics & 
International Affairs 225
Downes DR, ‘How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional 
Knowledge’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 253
Doyle C and Gilbert J, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development 
Aggression” to “Self-Determined Development”’ (2009) 8 European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues 219
Doyle CM, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory and Resources: The Transformative Role of 
Free Prior and Informed Consent (Routledge 2015)
Dudley N (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN 
2008)
––– (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN 2013)
Dudley N and others, ‘The Revised IUCN Protected Area Management Categories: The 
Debate and Ways Forward’ (2010) 44 Fauna & Flora International 485
Dupuy P-M, ‘À propos des mésaventures de la responsabilité internationale des États 
dans ses rapports avec  la protection internationale de l’environnement’ in Prieur M 
and Lambrechts C (eds), Les hommes et l’environnement: Quels droits pour le vingt-
et-unième siècle? (Frison-Roche 1998)
–––, ‘A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalization Era: On the “Fragmentation” of 
International Law’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 25
Dupuy P-M, Francioni F and Petersmann EU (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009)
Bibliography
343
Dupuy P-M and Viñuales JE, International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015)
Duruigbo E, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in 
International Law’ (2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 33
Duvic-Paoli L-A, ‘The Status of the Right to Public Participation in International 
Environmental Law: An Analysis of the Jurisprudence’ (2012) 23 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 80
Dworkin R, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977)
Ebbesson J, ‘Public Participation’ in Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007)
Ebeku KSA, ‘Right to a Satisfactory Environment and the African Commission’ (2003) 
3 African Human Rights Law Journal 149
Echo-Hawk WR and James AS, In the Light of Justice: The Rise of Human Rights in Native 
America and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (FULCRUM 
Incorporated 2013)
Edwards J, ‘Collective Rights in the Liberal State’ (1999) 17 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 259
Ehrmann M, ‘The Status and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in New Zealand’ (1999) 59 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 463
Elian G, The Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1979)
Elias O and Lim CL, ‘General Principles of Law, ‘Soft Law’ and the Identification of 
International Law’ (1997) 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3
Engle K, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of 
International Law 141
Ens E and McDonald T, ‘Caring for Country: Australian Natural and Cultural Resource 
Management’ (2012) 13 Ecological Management & Restoration 1
Ens EJ and others, ‘Australian Approaches for Managing ‘Country’ Using Indigenous and 
Non-Indigenous Knowledge’ (2012) 13 Ecological Management & Restoration 
100
Ercmann S, ‘Linking Human Rights, Rights of Indigenous People and the Environment’ 
(1999-2000) 7 Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 15
Erni C (ed) The Concept of Indigenous Peoples in Asia: A Resource Book (IWGIA - AIPP 
2008)
Errico S, ‘The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples: the Operational Policy on Indigenous 
Peoples (O.P. 4.10.): Between Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Traditional Lands and 
to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent’ (2006) 13 International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights 367
Bibliography
344
–––, ‘La Dichiarazione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti dei popoli indigeni’ (2007) 1 Diritti 
Umani e Diritto Internazionale 167
–––, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Is Adopted: An Overview’ 
(2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 756
–––, ‘The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty with 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ in Allen S and Xanthaki A (eds), Reflections on the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011)
Esquinas Alcázar JT, ‘Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: International Treaty 
on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and Other International 
Agreements Negotiated through FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture’ in Bergsmo M (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the 
Downtrodden (Martinus Nijhoff 2003)
Evans MD, International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2010)
Fabra A, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation and Human Rights: A Case 
Study’ in Boyle A and Anderson M (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection (Clarendon 1996)
–––, ‘The Intersection between Human Rights and Environmental Issues: A Review 
of Institutional Developments at the International Level’ (2002) 2 Yearbook of 
Human Rights & Environment 175
Fabra A and Arnal E, ‘Review of Jurisprudence on Human Rights and the Environment 
in Latin America’ (2002) 2 Yearbook of Human Rights & Environment 153
FAO (ed) Law and Sustainable Development since Rio: Legal Trends in Agriculture and 
Natural Resource Management (FAO 2002)
––– (ed) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: Building on Biological and Cultural Diversity for 
Food and Livelihood Security (FAO 2009)
––– (ed) Indigenous Peoples’ Food Systems: The Many Dimensions of Culture, Diversity and 
Environment for Nutrition and Health (FAO 2009)
Fay D, ‘Property, Subjection and Protected Areas: The ‘Restitution’ of Dwesa-Cwebe 
Nature Reserve, South Africa’ in Fay D and James D (eds), The Rights and Wrongs 
of Land Restitution ‘Restoring What Was Ours’ (Glasshouse 2009)
Fedder B, Marine Genetic Resources, Access and Benefit Sharing: Legal and Biological 
Perspectives (Routledge 2013)
Feldman D, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’ (1989) 52 The Modern Law Review 498
Ferrari Bravo L, ‘Méthodes de recherche de la coutume internationale dans la pratique 
des Etats’ (1985) 192 Recueil des cours 233
Fischer-Lescano A and others, ‘III. Umwelt und Ressourcen – Environment and 
Resources – Environnement et resources’ in Fischer-Lescano A and others (eds), 
Frieden in Freiheit - Peace in liberty - Paix en liberté: Festschrift für Michael Bothe 
Bibliography
345
zum 70 Geburtstag (1 edn, Nomos Verlag 2008)accessed 08.05.2014, 15:41:46
Fischer-Lescano A and Teubner G, ‘Regime-Collissions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2003-2004) 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 999
Fisher E and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental 
Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213
Fitzmaurice M, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des cours 1
–––, ‘International Protection of the Environment’ (2001) 293 Recueil des cours 9
Fitzmaurice M, ‘The Dilemma of Traditional Knowledge: Indigenous Peoples and 
Traditional Knowledge’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 255
Fitzmaurice M, ‘Practical Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights: A Case 
Study of the Russian Federation (Comparison with Certain Developments in Africa 
in Relation to Indigenous Peoples)’ (2011) 3 The Yearbook of Polar Law 389
–––, ‘Tensions between States and Indigenous Peoples over Natural Resources in Light 
of the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Including Relevant National Legislation and Case-Law)’ (2012) 4 The 
Yearbook of Polar Law 227
–––, ‘The Question of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: A Time for Reappraisal?’ in French 
D (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013)
–––, ‘Law-Making and International Environmental Law: The Legal Character of 
Decisions of Conferences of the Parties’ in Liivoja R and Petman J (eds), International 
Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge 2014)
Fitzmaurice M, Ong DM and Merkouris P (eds), Research Handbook On International 
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2010)
Fodella A, ‘International Law and the Diversity of Indigenous Peoples’ (2005-2006) 30 
Vermont Law Review 565
–––, ‘La tutela dei diritti collettivi: popoli, minoranze, popoli indigeni’ in Pineschi L 
(ed), La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani (Giuffré 2006)
–––, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment, and International Jurisprudence’ in Boschiero 
N and others (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law 
Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013)
–––, ‘Recent Development on Access and Benefit Sharing Relating to Genetic Resources 
(ABS) in International Law’ in Casonato C and others (eds), Il biodiritto e i suoi 
confini: definizioni, dialoghi, interazioni (Università degli Studi di Trento 2014)
Fodella A and Pineschi L (eds), La protezione dell’ambiente nel diritto internazionale 
Bibliography
346
(Giappichelli 2009)
Ford CA, ‘Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and 
“General Principles of Law”’ (1994-1995) 5 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 35
Foster GK, ‘Foreign Investment and Indigenous Peoples: Options for Promoting 
Equilibrium between Economic Development and Indigenous Rights’ (2012) 33 
Michigan journal of international law 627
Francioni F, ‘Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared 
Interest of Humanity’ (2003-2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 1209
–––, ‘Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International Legal 
Framework’ (2006) 17 EUI Working Paper LAW
–––, ‘The Preamble’ in Francioni F with Lenzerini F (eds), The 1972 World Heritage 
Convention: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2008)
–––, ‘Reparation for Indigenous Peoples: Is International Law Ready to Ensure Redress 
for Historical Injustices?’ in Lenzerini F (ed), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2008)
–––, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law’ in Dupuy 
P-M, Francioni F and Petersmann E-U (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (2009)
–––, ‘Il rapporto fra protezione dell’ambiente, libertà del commercio e disciplina degli 
investimenti’ in Fodella A and Pineschi L (eds), La protezione dell’ambiente nel 
diritto internazionale (Giappichelli 2009)
–––, ‘International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’ (2010) 21 European 
Journal of International Law 41
–––, ‘Diritto internazionale degli investimenti e tutela dei diritti umani: convergenza 
o conflitto?’ in Di Stefano A and Sapienza R (eds), La tutela dei diritti umani e il 
diritto internazionale (Editoriale Scientifica 2011)
–––, ‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction’ 
(2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 9
–––, ‘Plurality and Interaction of Legal Orders in the Enforcement of Cultural Heritage 
Law’ in Francioni F and Gordley J (eds), Enforcing International Cultural Heritage 
(Oxford University Press 2013)
–––, ‘Human Rights: Natural Resources and Human Rights’ in Morgera E and Kulovesi 
K (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (Edward 
Elgar 2016 forthcoming)
––– (ed) Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (Hart Publishing 2001)
Francioni F with Lenzerini F (eds), The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2008)
Bibliography
347
Francioni F and Scheinin M (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2008)
French D, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 
55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 281
–––, ‘Finding Autonomy in International Environmental Law and Governance’ (2009) 
21 Journal of Environmental Law 255
Frickey PP, ‘The Status and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the United States’ (1999) 59 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 383
Friedrich J, International Environmental “Soft Law”: The Functions and Limits of Nonbinding 
Instruments in International Environmental Governance and Law (Springer 2013)
Frowein JA, ‘The Internal and External Effects of Resolutions by International 
Organizations’ (1989) 49 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 778
Fujishima S, ‘The Legality of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Construction From The 
Perspective of Indigenous Land Rights’ (2014) 24 Indigenous Policy Journal
Garavito CR (ed) El derecho en América Latina. Un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del 
siglo XXI (Siglo Veintiuno Editores 2011)
Gardiner R, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015)
Gargarella R, ‘Pensando sobre la reforma constitucional en América Latina’ in Garavito 
CR (ed), El derecho en América Latina Un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del siglo 
XXI (Siglo Veintiuno Editores 2011)
Gazzini T and Yannick R, ‘Foreign Investment with a Human Face - with Special 
Reference to Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Hofmann R and Tams CJ (eds), 
International Investment Law and its Others (Nomos 2012)
Gehring T, ‘Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution’ in Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007)
Gess KN, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analytical Review over 
the United Nations Declaration and its Genesis’ (1964) 13 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 398
Ghanea N and Xanthaki A, Minorities, Peoples, and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour 
of Patrick Thornberry (Martinus Nijhoff 2005)
Gibson J, ‘Traditional Knowledge and the International Context for Protection’ (2004) 
1 SCRIPT-ed 58
Gilbert G, ‘Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law’ (2002) 35 
Cornell International Law Journal 307
Gilbert J, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 
(Transnational Publishers 2006)
–––, ‘Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims: A Comparative and International 
Bibliography
348
Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title’ (2007) 56 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 583
–––, ‘Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to Nomadic Peoples’ Land Rights’ 
(2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 681
–––, ‘Custodians of the Land: Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Cultural Integrity’ 
in Langfield M, Logan W and Craith MN (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and 
Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice (Abingdon, Routledge 2010)
–––, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic Revolution of the 
Africa Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2011) 60 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 245
–––, ‘Corporate Accountability and Indigenous Peoples: Prospects and Limitations of 
the US Alien Tort Claims Act’ (2012) 19 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 25
–––, ‘The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Rights?’ 
(2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 314
–––, Nomadic Peoples and Human Rights (Routledge 2014)
Gillespie A, ‘The Management of Protected Areas of International Significance’ (2006) 
10 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 93
–––, Protected Areas and International Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007)
–––, Conservation, Biodiversity and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011)
Glowka L, Burhenne-Guilmin F and Synge H, A Guide to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (IUCN 1994)
Glowka L and Normand V, ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing: 
Innovations in International Environmental Law’ in Morgera E, Buck M and 
Tsioumani E (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in 
Perspective (Martinus Nijoff 2013)
Göcke K, ‘The Case of Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru before the Human Rights Committee: 
The Concept of Free Prior and Informed Consent and the Application of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the Protection and 
Promotion of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 337
–––, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in Alaska, the 
Northern Regions of Canada, Greenland, and Siberia and the Russian Far East’ 
(2012) 4 The Yearbook of Polar Law 279
–––, ‘Protection and Realization of Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights at the National and 
International Level’ (2013) 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 87
Goggin S, ‘Human Rights and ‘Primitive’ Culture: Misrepresentations of Indigenous 
Life’ [2011] 15 International Journal of Human Rights 873
Bibliography
349
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